



Clavister CorePlus Administration Guide

Version: 9.15.02

Clavister AB
Sjögatan 6J
SE-89160 Örnsköldsvik
SWEDEN

Phone: +46-660-299200
Fax: +46-660-12250

www.clavister.com

Published 2010-05-04
Copyright © 2010 Clavister AB

**Clavister CorePlus
Administration Guide
Version: 9.15.02**

Published 2010-05-04

Copyright © 2010 Clavister AB

Copyright Notice

This publication, including all photographs, illustrations and software, is protected under international copyright laws, with all rights reserved. Neither this manual, nor any of the material contained herein, may be reproduced without the written consent of Clavister.

Disclaimer

The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Clavister makes no representations or warranties with respect to the contents hereof and specifically disclaims any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Clavister reserves the right to revise this publication and to make changes from time to time in the content hereof without any obligation to notify any person or parties of such revision or changes.

Limitations of Liability

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL CLAVISTER OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES OF ANY CHARACTER (E.G. DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PROFIT, SOFTWARE RESTORATION, WORK STOPPAGE, LOSS OF SAVED DATA OR ANY OTHER COMMERCIAL DAMAGES OR LOSSES) RESULTING FROM THE APPLICATION OR IMPROPER USE OF THE CLAVISTER PRODUCT OR FAILURE OF THE PRODUCT, EVEN IF CLAVISTER IS INFORMED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. FURTHERMORE, CLAVISTER WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS AGAINST CUSTOMER FOR LOSSES OR DAMAGES. CLAVISTER WILL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT CLAVISTER RECEIVED FROM THE END-USER FOR THE PRODUCT.

Table of Contents

Preface	13
1. CorePlus Overview	16
1.1. Features	16
1.2. CorePlus Architecture	20
1.2.1. State-based Architecture	20
1.2.2. CorePlus Building Blocks	20
1.2.3. Basic Packet Flow	21
1.3. CorePlus State Engine Packet Flow	24
2. Management and Maintenance	29
2.1. Managing CorePlus	29
2.1.1. Overview	29
2.1.2. Default Administrator Accounts	31
2.1.3. The Web Interface	31
2.1.4. The CLI	36
2.1.5. CLI Scripts	45
2.1.6. Secure Copy	49
2.1.7. The Console Boot Menu	51
2.1.8. Management Advanced Settings	53
2.1.9. Working with Configurations	55
2.2. Events and Logging	62
2.2.1. Overview	62
2.2.2. Log Messages	62
2.2.3. Creating Log Receivers	63
2.2.4. Logging to MemoryLogReceiver	63
2.2.5. Logging to Syslog Hosts	64
2.2.6. Logging to the Clavister Logger	65
2.2.7. SNMP Traps	66
2.2.8. Customizing Log Messages	67
2.2.9. Advanced Log Settings	68
2.3. RADIUS Accounting	70
2.3.1. Overview	70
2.3.2. RADIUS Accounting Messages	70
2.3.3. Interim Accounting Messages	72
2.3.4. Activating RADIUS Accounting	72
2.3.5. RADIUS Accounting Security	72
2.3.6. RADIUS Accounting and High Availability	73
2.3.7. Handling Unresponsive Servers	73
2.3.8. Accounting and System Shutdowns	73
2.3.9. Limitations with NAT	73
2.3.10. RADIUS Advanced Settings	74
2.4. Monitoring	76
2.4.1. Real-time Monitor Alerts	76
2.4.2. The Link Monitor	76
2.4.3. SNMP Monitoring	78
2.4.4. Hardware Monitoring	82
2.4.5. Memory Monitoring	84
2.5. Diagnostic Tools	85
2.5.1. Overview	85
2.5.2. Diagnostic CLI Commands	85
2.5.3. The <i>pcapdump</i> CLI Command	86
2.5.4. Hardware Fault Troubleshooting	88
2.6. Maintenance	90
2.6.1. Software Upgrades	90
2.6.2. Auto-Update Mechanism	91
2.6.3. Backing Up Configurations	92
2.6.4. Restore to Factory Defaults	93

2.6.5. Listing and Adding Ethernet Ports	94
2.7. Licensing	96
2.7.1. Overview	96
2.7.2. Evaluation Mode	96
2.7.3. License Purchase	96
2.7.4. The Clavister Customer Web	97
2.7.5. License Files	97
2.7.6. Registering Additional Licenses	97
2.7.7. Lockdown Mode	98
2.7.8. Uploading Licenses	98
2.7.9. The Maximum Connections Should Be Adequate	99
3. Fundamentals	101
3.1. The Address Book	101
3.1.1. Overview	101
3.1.2. IP Addresses	102
3.1.3. Ethernet Addresses	104
3.1.4. Address Groups	105
3.1.5. Auto-Generated Address Objects	106
3.1.6. Address Book Folders	106
3.2. Services	107
3.2.1. Overview	107
3.2.2. Creating Custom Services	109
3.2.3. ICMP Services	112
3.2.4. Custom IP Protocol Services	113
3.2.5. Service Groups	114
3.2.6. Custom Service Timeouts	114
3.3. Interfaces	116
3.3.1. Overview	116
3.3.2. Ethernet Interfaces	118
3.3.3. VLAN	127
3.3.4. PPPoE	131
3.3.5. GRE Tunnels	134
3.3.6. Loopback Interfaces	138
3.3.7. Interface Groups	141
3.4. ARP	143
3.4.1. Overview	143
3.4.2. The CorePlus ARP Cache	143
3.4.3. Creating ARP Objects	145
3.4.4. Using ARP Advanced Settings	148
3.4.5. ARP Advanced Settings Summary	149
3.5. IP Rule Sets	152
3.5.1. Security Policies	152
3.5.2. IP Rule Evaluation	155
3.5.3. IP Rule Actions	156
3.5.4. Multiple IP Rule Sets	157
3.5.5. IP Rule Set Folders	158
3.5.6. Configuration Object Groups	159
3.6. Schedules	164
3.7. Certificates	167
3.7.1. Overview	167
3.7.2. Certificates in CorePlus	169
3.7.3. CA Certificate Requests	170
3.8. Date and Time	172
3.8.1. Overview	172
3.8.2. Setting Date and Time	172
3.8.3. Time Servers	174
3.8.4. Settings Summary for Date and Time	177
3.9. DNS	179
3.10. Internet Access Setup	181
3.10.1. Static Address Setup	181
3.10.2. DHCP Setup	182

3.10.3. The Minimum Requirements for Traffic Flow	183
3.10.4. Creating a Route	183
3.10.5. Creating IP Rules	184
3.10.6. Defining DNS Servers	184
4. Routing	187
4.1. Overview	187
4.2. Static Routing	188
4.2.1. The Principles of Routing	188
4.2.2. Static Routing	192
4.2.3. Route Failover	197
4.2.4. Host Monitoring for Route Failover	200
4.2.5. Advanced Settings for Route Failover	202
4.2.6. Proxy ARP	203
4.3. Policy-based Routing	206
4.3.1. Overview	206
4.3.2. Policy-based Routing Tables	206
4.3.3. Policy-based Routing Rules	207
4.3.4. Routing Table/Interface Association	207
4.3.5. Routing Table Selection	207
4.3.6. The <i>Ordering</i> parameter	208
4.4. Route Load Balancing	212
4.5. Virtual Routing	220
4.5.1. Overview	220
4.5.2. A Simple Scenario	220
4.5.3. Advantages Over Routing Rules	222
4.5.4. IP Rules with Virtual Routing	225
4.5.5. Multiple IP rule sets	226
4.5.6. Trouble Shooting	226
4.6. OSPF	228
4.6.1. Dynamic Routing	228
4.6.2. OSPF Concepts	231
4.6.3. OSPF Components	236
4.6.4. Dynamic Routing Rules	242
4.6.5. Setting Up OSPF	245
4.6.6. An OSPF Example	250
4.7. Multicast Routing	253
4.7.1. Overview	253
4.7.2. Multicast Forwarding with SAT Multiplex Rules	254
4.7.3. IGMP Configuration	259
4.7.4. Advanced IGMP Settings	264
4.8. Transparent Mode	267
4.8.1. Overview	267
4.8.2. Enabling Internet Access	271
4.8.3. Transparent Mode Scenarios	273
4.8.4. Spanning Tree BPDU Support	278
4.8.5. MPLS Pass Through	279
4.8.6. Advanced Settings for Transparent Mode	280
5. DHCP Services	284
5.1. Overview	284
5.2. DHCP Servers	285
5.2.1. Static DHCP Hosts	288
5.2.2. Custom Options	290
5.3. DHCP Relaying	291
5.3.1. DHCP Relay Advanced Settings	292
5.4. IP Pools	294
6. Security Mechanisms	298
6.1. Access Rules	298
6.1.1. Overview	298
6.1.2. IP Spoofing	299
6.1.3. Access Rule Settings	299
6.2. ALGs	302

6.2.1. Overview	302
6.2.2. The HTTP ALG	303
6.2.3. The FTP ALG	306
6.2.4. The TFTP ALG	316
6.2.5. The SMTP ALG	317
6.2.6. The POP3 ALG	326
6.2.7. The PPTP ALG	326
6.2.8. The SIP ALG	328
6.2.9. The H.323 ALG	340
6.2.10. The TLS ALG	356
6.3. Web Content Filtering	360
6.3.1. Overview	360
6.3.2. Active Content Handling	360
6.3.3. Static Content Filtering	361
6.3.4. Dynamic Web Content Filtering	363
6.4. Anti-Virus Scanning	379
6.4.1. Overview	379
6.4.2. Implementation	379
6.4.3. Activating Anti-Virus Scanning	380
6.4.4. The Signature Database	381
6.4.5. Subscribing to the Clavister Anti-Virus Service	381
6.4.6. Anti-Virus Options	381
6.5. Intrusion Detection and Prevention	385
6.5.1. Overview	385
6.5.2. Subscribing to Clavister IDP	386
6.5.3. IDP Rules	387
6.5.4. Insertion/Evasion Attack Prevention	388
6.5.5. IDP Pattern Matching	389
6.5.6. IDP Signature Groups	390
6.5.7. IDP Actions	391
6.6. Denial-of-Service Attack Prevention	395
6.6.1. Overview	395
6.6.2. DoS Attack Mechanisms	395
6.6.3. <i>Ping of Death</i> and <i>Jolt</i> Attacks	396
6.6.4. Fragmentation overlap attacks: <i>Teardrop</i> , <i>Bonk</i> , <i>Boink</i> and <i>Nestea</i>	396
6.6.5. The <i>Land</i> and <i>LaTierra</i> attacks	396
6.6.6. The <i>WinNuke</i> attack	396
6.6.7. Amplification attacks: <i>Smurf</i> , <i>Papasmurf</i> , <i>Fraggle</i>	397
6.6.8. TCP SYN Flood Attacks	398
6.6.9. The <i>Jolt2</i> Attack	398
6.6.10. Distributed DoS Attacks	399
6.7. Blacklisting Hosts and Networks	400
7. Address Translation	403
7.1. Overview	403
7.2. NAT	405
7.3. NAT Pools	411
7.4. SAT	415
7.4.1. Translation of a Single IP Address (1:1)	415
7.4.2. Translation of Multiple IP Addresses (M:N)	421
7.4.3. All-to-One Mappings (N:1)	424
7.4.4. Port Translation	424
7.4.5. Protocols Handled by SAT	425
7.4.6. Multiple SAT Rule Matches	425
7.4.7. SAT and <i>FwdFast</i> Rules	426
8. User Authentication	429
8.1. Overview	429
8.2. Authentication Setup	431
8.2.1. Setup Summary	431
8.2.2. Local User Databases	431
8.2.3. External RADIUS Servers	433
8.2.4. External LDAP Servers	433

8.2.5. Authentication Rules	440
8.2.6. Authentication Processing	442
8.2.7. A Group Usage Example	443
8.2.8. HTTP Authentication	443
8.3. Customizing HTML Pages	447
9. VPN	451
9.1. Overview	451
9.1.1. VPN Usage	451
9.1.2. VPN Encryption	452
9.1.3. VPN Planning	453
9.1.4. Key Distribution	453
9.1.5. The TLS Alternative for VPN	454
9.2. VPN Quick Start	455
9.2.1. IPsec LAN to LAN with Pre-shared Keys	456
9.2.2. IPsec LAN to LAN with Certificates	457
9.2.3. IPsec Roaming Clients with Pre-shared Keys	458
9.2.4. IPsec Roaming Clients with Certificates	460
9.2.5. L2TP Roaming Clients with Pre-Shared Keys	461
9.2.6. L2TP Roaming Clients with Certificates	463
9.2.7. PPTP Roaming Clients	463
9.3. IPsec Components	465
9.3.1. Overview	465
9.3.2. Internet Key Exchange (IKE)	465
9.3.3. IKE Authentication	471
9.3.4. IPsec Protocols (ESP/AH)	473
9.3.5. Algorithm Proposal Lists	474
9.3.6. Pre-shared Keys	475
9.3.7. Identification Lists	477
9.4. IPsec Tunnels	480
9.4.1. Overview	480
9.4.2. LAN to LAN Tunnels with Pre-shared Keys	482
9.4.3. Roaming Clients	482
9.4.4. Fetching CRLs from an alternate LDAP server	489
9.4.5. Troubleshooting with <i>ikesnoop</i>	489
9.4.6. IPsec Advanced Settings	496
9.5. PPTP/L2TP	500
9.5.1. PPTP Servers	500
9.5.2. L2TP Servers	501
9.5.3. L2TP/PPTP Server advanced settings	507
9.5.4. PPTP/L2TP Clients	507
9.6. CA Server Access	510
9.7. VPN Troubleshooting	513
9.7.1. General Troubleshooting	513
9.7.2. Troubleshooting Certificates	514
9.7.3. IPsec Troubleshooting Commands	514
9.7.4. Management Interface Failure with VPN	515
9.7.5. Specific Error Messages	515
9.7.6. Specific Symptoms	518
10. Traffic Management	521
10.1. Traffic Shaping	521
10.1.1. Overview	521
10.1.2. Traffic Shaping in CorePlus	522
10.1.3. Simple Bandwidth Limiting	525
10.1.4. Limiting Bandwidth in Both Directions	526
10.1.5. Creating Differentiated Limits Using Chains	528
10.1.6. Precedences	529
10.1.7. Pipe Groups	533
10.1.8. Traffic Shaping Recommendations	536
10.1.9. A Summary of Traffic Shaping	538
10.1.10. More Pipe Examples	538
10.2. IDP Traffic Shaping	543

10.2.1. Overview	543
10.2.2. Setting Up IDP Traffic Shaping	543
10.2.3. Processing Flow	544
10.2.4. The Importance of Specifying a Network	544
10.2.5. A P2P Scenario	545
10.2.6. Viewing Traffic Shaping Objects	546
10.2.7. Guaranteeing Instead of Limiting Bandwidth	547
10.2.8. Logging	547
10.3. Threshold Rules	548
10.3.1. Overview	548
10.3.2. Limiting the Connection Rate/Total Connections	548
10.3.3. Grouping	549
10.3.4. Rule Actions	549
10.3.5. Multiple Triggered Actions	549
10.3.6. Exempted Connections	549
10.3.7. Threshold Rule Blacklisting	549
10.4. Server Load Balancing	550
10.4.1. Overview	550
10.4.2. SLB Distribution Algorithms	551
10.4.3. Selecting Stickiness	552
10.4.4. SLB Algorithms and Stickiness	553
10.4.5. SLB Server Monitoring	554
10.4.6. Setting Up <i>SLB_SAT</i> Rules	556
11. High Availability	561
11.1. Overview	561
11.2. HA Mechanisms	564
11.3. Setting Up HA	567
11.3.1. HA Hardware Setup	567
11.3.2. CorePlus Setup with the HA Wizard	569
11.3.3. CorePlus Manual HA Setup	570
11.3.4. Verifying the Cluster Functions	571
11.3.5. Unique Shared Mac Addresses	572
11.4. HA Issues	573
11.5. Upgrading an HA Cluster	575
11.6. Link Monitoring and HA	577
11.7. HA Advanced Settings	578
12. Advanced Settings	580
12.1. IP Level Settings	580
12.2. TCP Level Settings	584
12.3. ICMP Level Settings	589
12.4. State Settings	590
12.5. Connection Timeout Settings	592
12.6. Length Limit Settings	594
12.7. Fragmentation Settings	597
12.8. Local Fragment Reassembly Settings	601
12.9. SSL Settings	602
12.10. Miscellaneous Settings	604
A. Update Subscriptions	607
B. IDP Signature Groups	610
C. Verified MIME filetypes	614
D. The OSI Framework	618
Alphabetical Index	619

List of Figures

1.1. Packet Flow Schematic Part I	24
1.2. Packet Flow Schematic Part II	25
1.3. Packet Flow Schematic Part III	26
1.4. Expanded <i>Apply Rules</i> Logic	27
2.1. CorePlus Firmware Structure	90
3.1. VLAN Connections	129
3.2. A Simple Network with Loopback Interfaces	139
3.3. Components of Loopback Interface Setup	140
3.4. An ARP Publish Ethernet Frame	147
3.5. Simplified CorePlus Traffic Flow	154
4.1. A Typical Routing Scenario	189
4.2. Using <i>Local IP Address</i> with an Unbound Network	191
4.3. A Route Failover Scenario for ISP Access	197
4.4. A Proxy ARP Example	204
4.5. The RLB Round Robin Algorithm	213
4.6. The RLB Spillover Algorithm	214
4.7. A Route Load Balancing Scenario	216
4.8. A Simple OSPF Scenario	229
4.9. OSPF Providing Route Redundancy	230
4.10. Virtual Links Connecting Areas	234
4.11. Virtual Links with Partitioned Backbone	235
4.12. CorePlus OSPF Objects	236
4.13. Dynamic Routing Rule Objects	244
4.14. Setting Up OSPF	246
4.15. OSPF Over IPsec	248
4.16. Multicast Forwarding - No Address Translation	255
4.17. Multicast Forwarding - Address Translation	257
4.18. Multicast Snoop Mode	259
4.19. Multicast Proxy Mode	260
4.20. Non-transparent Mode Internet Access	272
4.21. Transparent Mode Internet Access	272
4.22. Transparent Mode Scenario 1	274
4.23. Transparent Mode Scenario 2	275
4.24. An Example BPDU Relaying Scenario	278
5.1. DHCP Server Objects	288
6.1. Deploying an ALG	302
6.2. HTTP ALG Processing Order	305
6.3. FTP ALG Hybrid Mode	308
6.4. SMTP ALG Processing Order	319
6.5. Anti-Spam Filtering	321
6.6. PPTP ALG Usage	327
6.7. TLS Termination	357
6.8. Dynamic Content Filtering Flow	364
6.9. IDP Database Updating	386
7.1. NAT IP Address Translation	405
7.2. A NAT Example	407
7.3. Anonymizing with NAT	409
7.4. The Role of the DMZ	416
8.1. Normal LDAP Authentication	439
8.2. LDAP for PPP with CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2	440
9.1. The AH protocol	473
9.2. The ESP protocol	474
9.3. PPTP Client Usage	509
9.4. Certificate Validation Components	511
10.1. Pipe Rules Determine Pipe Usage	524
10.2. <i>FwdFast</i> Rules Bypass Traffic Shaping	525

10.3. Differentiated Limits Using Chains	528
10.4. The Eight Pipe Precedences	529
10.5. Minimum and Maximum Pipe Precedence	531
10.6. Traffic Grouped By IP Address	535
10.7. A Basic Traffic Shaping Scenario	539
10.8. IDP Traffic Shaping P2P Scenario	546
10.9. A Server Load Balancing Configuration	550
10.10. Connections from Three Clients	553
10.11. Stickiness and Round-Robin	554
10.12. Stickiness and Connection-rate	554
D.1. The 7 Layers of the OSI Model	618

List of Examples

1. Example Notation	13
2.1. Enabling remote management via HTTPS	35
2.2. Setting the Console Line Speed	41
2.3. Enabling SSH Remote Access	41
2.4. Listing Configuration Objects	55
2.5. Displaying a Configuration Object	56
2.6. Editing a Configuration Object	57
2.7. Adding a Configuration Object	58
2.8. Deleting a Configuration Object	58
2.9. Undeleting a Configuration Object	59
2.10. Listing Modified Configuration Objects	59
2.11. Activating and Committing a Configuration	60
2.12. Enable Logging to a Syslog Host	64
2.13. Enabling Logging to Clavister Loggers	65
2.14. Sending SNMP Traps to an SNMP Trap Receiver	67
2.15. RADIUS Accounting Server Setup	74
2.16. Enabling SNMP Monitoring	80
2.17. Backing up the Entire System	92
2.18. Complete Hardware Reset to Factory Defaults	93
3.1. Adding an IP Host	102
3.2. Adding an IP Network	103
3.3. Adding an IP Range	103
3.4. Deleting an Address Object	103
3.5. Adding an Ethernet Address	104
3.6. Listing the Available Services	107
3.7. Viewing a Specific Service	108
3.8. Creating a Custom TCP/UDP Service	111
3.9. Adding an IP Protocol Service	114
3.10. Defining a VLAN	131
3.11. Configuring a PPPoE Client	133
3.12. Creating a Loopback Interface Pair	141
3.13. Creating an Interface Group	142
3.14. Displaying the ARP Cache	144
3.15. Flushing the ARP Cache	144
3.16. Defining a Static ARP Entry	145
3.17. Adding an <i>Allow</i> IP Rule	158
3.18. Setting up a Time-Scheduled Policy	165
3.19. Uploading a Certificate	169
3.20. Associating Certificates with IPsec Tunnels	169
3.21. Setting the Current Date and Time	172
3.22. Setting the Time Zone	173
3.23. Enabling DST	174
3.24. Enabling Time Synchronization using SNTP	175
3.25. Manually Triggering a Time Synchronization	176
3.26. Modifying the Maximum Adjustment Value	176
3.27. Forcing Time Synchronization	177
3.28. Configuring DNS Servers	179
4.1. Displaying the <i>main</i> Routing Table	194
4.2. Displaying the Core Routes	196
4.3. Creating a Policy-based Routing Table	208
4.4. Creating the Route	209
4.5. Policy-based Routing Configuration	209
4.6. Setting Up RLB	217
4.7. Creating an <i>OSPF Router Process</i>	250
4.8. Add an <i>OSPF Area</i>	250
4.9. Add <i>OSPF Interface</i> Objects	250

4.10. Import Routes from an OSPF AS into the Main Routing Table	251
4.11. Exporting the Default Route into an OSPF AS	252
4.12. Forwarding of Multicast Traffic using the SAT Multiplex Rule	255
4.13. Multicast Forwarding - Address Translation	257
4.14. IGMP - No Address Translation	260
4.15. <i>if1</i> Configuration	262
4.16. <i>if2</i> Configuration - Group Translation	263
4.17. Setting up Transparent Mode for Scenario 1	274
4.18. Setting up Transparent Mode for Scenario 2	276
5.1. Setting up a DHCP server	287
5.2. Checking DHCP Server Status	287
5.3. Static DHCP Host Assignment	289
5.4. Setting up a DHCP Relay	291
5.5. Creating an IP Pool	296
6.1. Setting up an Access Rule	300
6.2. Protecting an FTP Server with an ALG	310
6.3. Protecting FTP Clients	313
6.4. SIP with Local Clients, Proxy on Internet	333
6.5. Protecting Phones Behind Clavister Security Gateways	343
6.6. H.323 with private IP addresses	344
6.7. Two Phones Behind Different Clavister Security Gateways	346
6.8. Using Private IP Addresses	347
6.9. H.323 with Gatekeeper	349
6.10. H.323 with Gatekeeper and two Clavister Security Gateways	351
6.11. Using the H.323 ALG in a Corporate Environment	352
6.12. Configuring remote offices for H.323	354
6.13. Allowing the H.323 Gateway to register with the Gatekeeper	355
6.14. Stripping ActiveX and Java applets	361
6.15. Setting up a white and blacklist	362
6.16. Enabling Dynamic Web Content Filtering	366
6.17. Enabling Audit Mode	367
6.18. Reclassifying a blocked site	369
6.19. Editing Content Filtering HTTP Banner Files	377
6.20. Activating Anti-Virus Scanning	383
6.21. Setting up IDP for a Mail Server	392
6.22. Adding a Host to the Whitelist	401
7.1. Adding a NAT Rule	407
7.2. Using NAT Pools	413
7.3. Enabling Traffic to a Protected Web Server in a DMZ	416
7.4. Enabling Traffic to a Web Server on an Internal Network	419
7.5. Translating Traffic to Multiple Protected Web Servers	421
8.1. Creating an Authentication User Group	446
8.2. Configuring a RADIUS Server	446
8.3. Editing Content Filtering HTTP Banner Files	448
9.1. Using an Algorithm Proposal List	474
9.2. Using a Pre-Shared key	476
9.3. Using an Identity List	477
9.4. Setting up a PSK based VPN tunnel for roaming clients	483
9.5. Setting up a Self-signed Certificate based VPN tunnel for roaming clients	484
9.6. Setting up CA Server Certificate based VPN tunnels for roaming clients	486
9.7. Setting Up Config Mode	488
9.8. Using Config Mode with IPsec Tunnels	488
9.9. Setting up an LDAP server	489
9.10. Setting up a PPTP server	501
9.11. Setting up an L2TP server	502
9.12. Setting up an L2TP Tunnel Over IPsec	503
10.1. Applying a Simple Bandwidth Limit	525
10.2. Limiting Bandwidth in Both Directions	527
10.3. Setting up SLB	557

Preface

Intended Audience

The target audience for this reference guide is Administrators who are responsible for configuring and managing Clavister Security Gateways which are running the CorePlus operating system. This guide assumes that the reader has some basic knowledge of networks and network security.

Text Structure and Conventions

The text is broken down into chapters and sub-sections. Numbered sub-sections are shown in the table of contents at the beginning. An index is included at the end of the document to aid with alphabetical lookup of subjects.

Where a "See chapter/section" link (such as: see *Chapter 9, VPN*) is provided in the main text, this can be clicked to take the reader directly to that reference.

Text that may appear in the user interface of the product is designated by being in **bold case**. Where a term is being introduced for the first time or being stressed *it may appear in italics*.

Where console interaction is shown in the main text outside of an example, it will appear in a box with a gray background.

```
Device: />
```

Where a web address reference is shown in the text, clicking it will open the specified URL in a browser in a new window (some systems may not allow this). For example, <http://www.clavister.com>.

Screenshots

This guide contains a minimum of screenshots. This is deliberate and is done because the manual deals specifically with CorePlus and administrators have a choice of management user interfaces. It was decided that the manual would be less cluttered and easier to read if it concentrated on describing how CorePlus functions rather than including large numbers of screenshots showing how the various interfaces are used. Examples are given but these are largely textual descriptions of management interface usage.

Examples

Examples in the text are denoted by the header **Example** and appear with a gray background as shown below. They contain a CLI example and/or a Web Interface example as appropriate. (The CorePlus *CLI Reference Guide* documents all CLI commands.)

Example 1. Example Notation

Information about what the example is trying to achieve is found here, sometimes with an explanatory image.

Command-Line Interface

The Command Line Interface example would appear here. It would start with the command

prompt followed by the command:

```
Device: /> somecommand someparameter=somevalue
```

InControl

The InControl actions for the example are shown here. They are typically a numbered list showing what actions in the interface need to be taken followed by information about the data items that need to be entered:

In many cases the actions are identical to the actions required for the Web Interface and when that is the case the text indicates this.

Web Interface

The Web Interface actions for the example are shown here. They are also typically a numbered list showing what items in the tree-view list at the left of the interface or in the menu bar or in a context menu need to be opened followed by information about the data items that need to be entered:

1. Go to **Item X > Item Y > Item Z**
2. Now enter:
 - **DataItem1:** datavalue1
 - **DataItem2:** datavalue2

Highlighted Content

Special sections of text which the reader should pay special attention to are indicated by icons on the left hand side of the page followed by a short paragraph in italicized text. Such sections are of the following types with the following purposes:



Note

This indicates some piece of information that is an addition to the preceding text. It may concern something that is being emphasized, or something that is not obvious or explicitly stated in the preceding text.



Tip

This indicates a piece of non-critical information that is useful to know in certain situations but is not essential reading.



Caution

This indicates where the reader should be careful with their actions as an undesirable situation may result if care is not exercised.



Important

This is an essential point that the reader should read and understand.



Warning

This is essential reading for the user as they should be aware that a serious situation may result if certain actions are taken or not taken.

Documentation Feedback

Despite all efforts, unintentional typographic errors, factual errors or omissions may regrettably occur in documentation. Clavister appreciates all feedback pointing out such problems or other suggestions for content improvement. Email all feedback to <mailto:support@clavister.com>.

Trademarks

Certain names in this publication are the trademarks of their respective owners.

Windows, Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7 are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries.

Chapter 1: CorePlus Overview

This chapter outlines the key features of CorePlus.

- Features, page 16
- CorePlus Architecture, page 20
- CorePlus State Engine Packet Flow, page 24

1.1. Features

Clavister CorePlus is the base software engine that drives and controls the range of Clavister Security Gateway hardware products. CorePlus can also be deployed on the administrator's preferred choice of server hardware as a software only product.

CorePlus as a Network Security Operating System

Designed as a *network security operating system*, CorePlus features high throughput performance with high reliability plus super-granular control. In contrast to products built on top of standard operating systems such as Unix or Microsoft Windows, CorePlus offers seamless integration of all its subsystems, in-depth administrative control of all functionality, as well as a minimal attack surface which helps to negate the risk from security attacks.

CorePlus Objects

From the administrator's perspective the conceptual approach of CorePlus is to visualize operations through a set of logical building blocks or *objects*. These objects allow the configuration of CorePlus in an almost limitless number of different ways. This granular control allows the administrator to meet the requirements of the most demanding network security scenarios.

Key Features

CorePlus has an extensive feature set. The list below presents the key features of the product:

IP Routing

CorePlus provides a variety of options for IP routing including static routing, dynamic routing, , virtual routing as well as multicast routing capabilities. In addition, CorePlus

supports features such as Virtual LANs, Route Monitoring, Proxy ARP and Transparency. For more information, please see *Chapter 4, Routing*.

Firewalling Policies

CorePlus provides stateful inspection-based firewalling for a wide range of protocols such as TCP, UDP and ICMP. The administrator can define detailed firewalling policies based on source/destination network/interface, protocol, ports, user credentials, time-of-day and more. *Section 3.5, "IP Rule Sets"*, describes how to set up these policies to determine what traffic is allowed or rejected by CorePlus.

Address Translation

For functionality as well as security reasons, CorePlus supports policy-based address translation. Dynamic Address Translation (NAT) as well as Static Address Translation (SAT) is supported, and resolves most types of address translation needs. This feature is covered in *Chapter 7, Address Translation*.

VPN

CorePlus supports a range of Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions. CorePlus supports IPsec, L2TP and PPTP based VPNs concurrently, can act as either server or client for all of the VPN types, and can provide individual security policies for each VPN tunnel. The details for this can be found in *Chapter 9, VPN* which includes a summary of setup steps in *Section 9.2, "VPN Quick Start"*.

ALGs

CorePlus provides a range of Application Level Gateways (ALGs) which provide security features that examine traffic at higher OSI layers such checking if file download content agrees with the given filetype. Another example is the SIP ALG that is able to handle the SIP message exchanges that take place during the setup of peer to peer data exchanges. For detailed information, see *Section 6.2, "ALGs"*.

TLS Termination

CorePlus supports TLS termination so that the Clavister Security Gateway can act as the end point for connections by HTTP web-browser clients (this feature is sometimes called *SSL termination*). For detailed information, see *Section 6.2.10, "The TLS ALG"*.

Anti-Virus Scanning

CorePlus features integrated anti-virus functionality. Traffic passing through the Clavister Security Gateway can be subjected to in-depth scanning for viruses, and virus sending hosts can be black-listed and blocked. For details of this feature, see *Section 6.4, "Anti-Virus Scanning"*.

Intrusion Detection and Prevention

To mitigate application-layer attacks towards vulnerabilities in services and applications, CorePlus provides a powerful *Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP)* engine. The IDP engine is policy-based and is able to perform high-performance scanning and detection of attacks and can perform blocking and optional black-listing of attacking hosts. More information about the IDP capabilities of CorePlus can be found in *Section 6.5, "Intrusion Detection and Prevention"*.

Web Content Filtering

CorePlus provides various mechanisms for filtering web content that is deemed inappropriate according to a web usage policy. With *Web Content Filtering (WCF)* web content can be blocked based on category (*Dynamic WCF*),

malicious objects can be removed from web pages and web sites can be whitelisted or blacklisted. More information about this topic can be found in *Section 6.3, "Web Content Filtering"*.

Traffic Management

CorePlus provides broad traffic management capabilities through *Traffic Shaping, Threshold Rules* and *Server Load Balancing*.

Traffic Shaping enables limiting and balancing of bandwidth; Threshold Rules allow specification of thresholds for sending alarms and/or limiting network traffic; Server Load Balancing enables a device running CorePlus to distribute network load to multiple hosts. These features are discussed in detail in *Chapter 10, Traffic Management*.

User Authentication

A CorePlus device can be used for authenticating users before allowing access to protected resources. Multiple local user databases are supported as well as multiple external RADIUS servers, and separate authentication policies can be defined to support separate authentication schemes for different kinds of traffic. See *Chapter 8, User Authentication* for detailed information about this feature.

Operations and Maintenance

Administrator management of CorePlus is possible through either a Web-based User Interface (the WebUI) or via a Command Line Interface (the CLI). Both interfaces allow management of a single Clavister Security Gateway at a time. CorePlus also provides detailed event and logging capabilities plus support for monitoring through SNMP. More detailed information about this topic can be found in *Chapter 2, Management and Maintenance*.

High Availability

High Availability (HA) is supported through automatic fault-tolerant fail-over to a secondary Clavister Security Gateway device. The two devices act together as a *cluster*, with one being active while the other is passive but constantly mirroring the state of the active unit. This feature is described in more detail in *Chapter 11, High Availability*.

Virtualization

CorePlus supports *virtualization* using one of two techniques:

- Using separate CorePlus routing tables, as mentioned above under *IP routing*, it is possible to create separate *virtual routers*. Although a single version of CorePlus is being run it is possible to create separate sets of IP rules and other policies. See *Section 4.5, "Virtual Routing"* for more information about this topic.
- Using *VMware* it is possible to have multiple, independent versions of CorePlus running on a single computer. This option is not available on Clavister hardware but runs, instead, as a software-only installation on non-Clavister hardware that has VMware installed. Installation with VMware is described in the separate *Clavister VMware VSG Series Getting Started Guide*.

In addition to the above mentioned features, CorePlus includes a number of features such as accounting using RADIUS Accounting, providing DHCP services, protection against *Denial-of-Service* (DoS) attacks, support for PPPoE, GRE, dynamic DNS services and much more.

CorePlus Documentation

Reading through the available documentation carefully will ensure that you get the most out of your CorePlus product. In addition to this document, the reader should also be aware of the companion reference guides:

- Separate *Getting Started Guides* detail how to set up a new installation of CorePlus.
- The *CLI Reference Guide* which details all CorePlus CLI commands.
- The *CorePlus Log Reference Guide* which details all CorePlus log event messages.

Together, these documents form the essential reference material for CorePlus operation.

CorePlus Education and Certification

For details about classroom and online CorePlus education as well as CorePlus certification, visit the Clavister company website at <http://www.clavister.com> or contact your local sales representative.

1.2. CorePlus Architecture

1.2.1. State-based Architecture

The CorePlus architecture is centered around the concept of state-based connections. Traditional IP routers or switches commonly inspect all packets and then perform forwarding decisions based on information found in the packet headers. With this approach, packets are forwarded without any sense of context which eliminates any possibility to detect and analyze complex protocols and enforce corresponding security policies.

Stateful Inspection

CorePlus employs a technique called *stateful inspection* which means that it inspects and forwards traffic on a per-connection basis. CorePlus detects when a new connection is being established, and keeps a small piece of information or *state* in its *state table* for the lifetime of that connection. By doing this, CorePlus is able to understand the context of the network traffic which enables it to perform in-depth traffic scanning, apply bandwidth management and a variety of other functions.

The stateful inspection approach additionally provides high throughput performance with the added advantage of a design that is highly scalable. The CorePlus subsystem that implements stateful inspection will sometimes be referred to in documentation as the *CorePlus state-engine*.

1.2.2. CorePlus Building Blocks

The basic building blocks in CorePlus are interfaces, logical objects and various types of rules (or rule sets).

Interfaces

Interfaces are the doorways through which network traffic enters or leaves the Clavister Security Gateway. Without interfaces, a CorePlus system has no means for receiving or sending traffic.

The following types of interface are supported in CorePlus:

- **Physical interfaces** - These correspond to the actual physical Ethernet ports.
- **Sub-interfaces** - These include VLAN and PPPoE interfaces.
- **Tunnel interfaces** - Used for receiving and sending traffic through VPN tunnels.

Interface Symmetry

The CorePlus interface design is symmetric, meaning that the interfaces of the device are not fixed as being on the "insecure outside" or "secure inside" of a network topology. The notion of what is inside and outside is totally for the administrator to define.

Logical Objects

Logical objects can be seen as predefined building blocks for use by the rule sets. The address book, for instance, contains named objects representing host and network addresses.

Another example of logical objects are services which represent specific protocol and port

combinations. Also important are the Application Layer Gateway (ALG) objects which are used to define additional parameters on specific protocols such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP and H.323.

CorePlus Rule Sets

Finally, rules which are defined by the administrator in the various *rule sets* are used for actually implementing CorePlus security policies. The most fundamental set of rules are the *IP Rules*, which are used to define the layer 3 IP filtering policy as well as carrying out address translation and server load balancing. The Traffic Shaping Rules define the policy for bandwidth management, the IDP Rules control the behavior of the intrusion prevention engine and so on.

1.2.3. Basic Packet Flow

This section outlines the basic flow in the state-engine for packets received and forwarded by CorePlus. The following description is simplified and might not be fully applicable in all scenarios, however, the basic principles will be valid for all CorePlus deployments.

1. An Ethernet frame is received on one of the Ethernet interfaces in the system. Basic Ethernet frame validation is performed and the packet is dropped if the frame is invalid.
2. The packet is associated with a Source Interface. The source interface is determined as follows:
 - If the Ethernet frame contains a VLAN ID (Virtual LAN identifier), the system checks for a configured VLAN interface with a corresponding VLAN ID. If one is found, that VLAN interface becomes the source interface for the packet. If no matching interface is found, the packet is dropped and the event is logged.
 - If the Ethernet frame contains a PPP payload, the system checks for a matching PPPoE interface. If one is found, that interface becomes the source interface for the packet. If no matching interface is found, the packet is dropped and the event is logged.
 - If none of the above is true, the receiving Ethernet interface becomes the source interface for the packet.
3. The IP datagram within the packet is passed on to the CorePlus Consistency Checker. The consistency checker performs a number of sanity checks on the packet, including validation of checksums, protocol flags, packet length and so on. If the consistency checks fail, the packet gets dropped and the event is logged.
4. CorePlus now tries to lookup an existing connection by matching parameters from the incoming packet. A number of parameters are used in the match attempt, including the source interface, source and destination IP addresses and IP protocol.

If a match cannot be found, a connection establishment process starts which includes steps from here to 10 below. If a match is found, the forwarding process continues at step 11 below.

5. The source interface is examined to find out if the interface is a member of a specific routing table. Routing Rules are also evaluated to determine the correct routing table for the connection.
6. The *Access Rules* are evaluated to find out if the source IP address of the new connection is allowed on the received interface. If no Access Rule matches then a *reverse route lookup* will be done in the routing tables.

In other words, by default, an interface will only accept source IP addresses that belong to networks routed over that interface. A *reverse lookup* means that we look in the routing

tables to confirm that there is a route where if this network is the destination then the same interface could be used.

If the Access Rule lookup or the reverse route lookup determine that the source IP is invalid, then the packet is dropped and the event is logged.

7. A route lookup is being made using the appropriate routing table. The destination interface for the connection has now been determined.
8. The IP rules are now searched for a rule that matches the packet. The following parameters are part of the matching process:
 - Source and destination interfaces
 - Source and destination network
 - IP protocol (for example TCP, UDP, ICMP)
 - TCP/UDP ports
 - ICMP types
 - Point in time in reference to a predefined schedule

If a match cannot be found, the packet is dropped.

If a rule is found that matches the new connection, the *Action* parameter of the rule decides what CorePlus should do with the connection. If the action is Drop, the packet is dropped and the event is logged according to the log settings for the rule.

If the action is *Allow*, the packet is allowed through the system. A corresponding state will be added to the connection table for matching subsequent packets belonging to the same connection. In addition, the service object which matched the IP protocol and ports might have contained a reference to an Application Layer Gateway (ALG) object. This information is recorded in the state so that CorePlus will know that application layer processing will have to be performed on the connection.

Finally, the opening of the new connection will be logged according to the log settings of the rule.



Note: Additional actions

There are actually a number of additional actions available such as address translation and server load balancing. The basic concept of dropping and allowing traffic is still the same.

9. The Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) Rules are now evaluated in a similar way to the IP rules. If a match is found, the IDP data is recorded with the state. By doing this, CorePlus will know that IDP scanning is supposed to be conducted on all packets belonging to this connection.
10. The Traffic Shaping and the Threshold Limit rule sets are now searched. If a match is found, the corresponding information is recorded with the state. This will enable proper traffic management on the connection.
11. From the information in the state, CorePlus now knows what to do with the incoming packet:
 - If ALG information is present or if IDP scanning is to be performed, the payload of the packet is taken care of by the TCP Pseudo-Reassembly subsystem, which in turn makes

use of the different Application Layer Gateways, layer 7 scanning engines and so on, to further analyze or transform the traffic.

- If the contents of the packet is encapsulated (such as with IPsec, PPTP/L2TP or some other type of tunneled protocol), then the interface lists are checked for a matching interface. If one is found, the packet is decapsulated and the payload (the plaintext) is sent into CorePlus again, now with source interface being the matched tunnel interface. In other words, the process continues at step 3 above.
 - If traffic management information is present, the packet might get queued or otherwise be subjected to actions related to traffic management.
12. Eventually, the packet will be forwarded out on the destination interface according to the state. If the destination interface is a tunnel interface or a physical sub-interface, additional processing such as encryption or encapsulation might occur.

The next section provides a set of diagrams illustrating the flow of packets through CorePlus.

1.3. CorePlus State Engine Packet Flow

The diagrams in this section provide a summary of the flow of packets through the CorePlus state-engine. There are three diagrams, each flowing into the next. It is not necessary to understand these diagrams, however, they can be useful as a reference when configuring CorePlus in certain situations.




Figure 1.1. Packet Flow Schematic Part I

The packet flow is continued on the following page.





Figure 1.2. Packet Flow Schematic Part II

The packet flow is continued on the following page.

**Figure 1.3. Packet Flow Schematic Part III**

Apply Rules

The figure below presents the detailed logic of the *Apply Rules* function in Figure 1.2, "Packet Flow Schematic Part II" above.




Figure 1.4. Expanded *Apply Rules* Logic

Chapter 2: Management and Maintenance

This chapter describes the management, operations and maintenance related aspects of CorePlus.

- Managing CorePlus, page 29
- Events and Logging, page 62
- RADIUS Accounting, page 70
- Monitoring, page 76
- Diagnostic Tools, page 85
- Maintenance, page 90
- Licensing, page 96

2.1. Managing CorePlus

2.1.1. Overview

CorePlus is designed to give both high performance and high reliability. Not only does it provide an extensive feature set, it also enables the administrator to be in full control of almost every detail of the system. This means the product can be deployed in the most challenging environments.

A good understanding on how CorePlus configuration is performed is crucial for proper usage of the system. For this reason, this section provides an in-depth presentation of the configuration subsystem as well as a description of how to work with the various management interfaces.

Management Interfaces

CorePlus provides the following management interfaces:

Clavister InControl

InControl is a separate Clavister software product for the centralized administration of multiple Clavister Security Gateways. The product provides an intuitive graphical client which runs on a standard Windows based PC. One or multiple clients communicate with an InControl server running on the same or different Windows

based computer. The server serves as a repository for all CorePlus configuration data and mediates all management commands sent by clients.

More information about InControl can be found in the separate *InControl Administrators Guide*.

The Web Interface

The *Web Interface* (also known as the *Web User Interface* or *WebUI*) is built into CorePlus and provides a user-friendly and intuitive graphical management interface, accessible from a standard web browser (Microsoft Internet Explorer or Firefox is recommended). The browser connects to one of the hardware's Ethernet interfaces using *HTTP* or *HTTPS* and the CorePlus responds like a web server, allowing web pages to be used as the management interface.

The WebUI does not provide centralized management control of multiple Clavister Security Gateways. One browser window can communicate with one Clavister Security Gateway, although it is possible to have multiple browser windows open at the same time.

This feature is fully described in *Section 2.1.3, "The Web Interface"*.

The CLI

The *Command Line Interface* (CLI), accessible locally via serial console port or remotely using the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, provides the most fine-grained control over all parameters in CorePlus.

This feature is fully described in *Section 2.1.4, "The CLI"*.

Secure Copy

Secure Copy (SCP) is a widely used communication protocol for file transfer. No specific SCP client is provided with CorePlus distributions but there exists a wide selection of SCP clients available for nearly all workstation platforms. SCP is a complement to CLI usage and provides a secure means of file transfer between the administrator's workstation and the Clavister Security Gateway. Various files used by CorePlus can be both uploaded and downloaded with SCP.

This feature is fully described in *Section 2.1.6, "Secure Copy"*.

Console Boot Menu

Before CorePlus starts running, a console connected directly to the Clavister Security Gateway's RS232 port can be used to do basic configuration through the *boot menu*. This menu can be entered by pressing any console key between power-up and CorePlus starting. It is the *Clavister firmware loader* that is being accessed with the boot menu.

The menu is fully described in *Section 2.1.7, "The Console Boot Menu"*.



Note: Recommended browsers

Microsoft Internet Explorer (version 7 and later), Firefox (version 3.0 and later) and Netscape (version 8 and later) are the recommended web-browsers to use with the WebUI. Other browsers may also provide full support.

Remote Management Policies

Access to remote management interfaces can be regulated by a *remote management policy* so the administrator can restrict management access based on source network, source interface and username/password credentials.

2.1.2. Default Administrator Accounts

By default, CorePlus has a local user database, *AdminUsers*, which contains two predefined user accounts:

- Username *admin* with password *admin*.
This account has full administrative read/write privileges.
- Username *audit* with password *audit*.
This account is for monitoring purposes only and has read-only privileges.



Important

For security reasons, it is recommended to change the default passwords of the default accounts as soon as possible after connecting with the Clavister Security Gateway.

Creating Additional Accounts

Extra user accounts can be created as required. Accounts can either belong to the **Administrator** user group, in which case they have complete read/write administrative access. Alternatively, they can belong to the **Auditor** user group, in which case they have read-only access.

Multiple Administration Logins

CorePlus doesn't allow more than one administrator account to be logged in at the same time. If one administrator logs in, then a second or more will be allowed to login but they will only have audit privileges. In other words the second or more administrators who login will only be able to read configurations and will not be able to change them.

2.1.3. The Web Interface

CorePlus provides an intuitive *Web Interface* (WebUI) for management of the system via an Ethernet interface using a standard web browser. This allows the administrator to perform remote management from anywhere on a private network or the public Internet using a standard computer without having to install client software.

Assignment of a Default IP Address

For new Clavister product models with factory defaults, a default internal IP address of *192.168.1.1* is assigned by CorePlus to the interface indicated in the list below.

Clavister Product	Default WebUI Management Interface
SG10/SG50	lan
SG3100	if1
SG3200/SG4200/SG4300/SG4400	ge1
SG5500	cmm
ATCA SG6010	ge1
Software Series/VMware VSG	lf1

For the Clavister Software Series product, when CorePlus runs on non-Clavister hardware, CorePlus scans the available interfaces and allocates the *192.168.1.1* IP address to the first interface it finds and gives this the logical name *lf1*. Subsequent interfaces are then named *lf2*, *lf3* and so on. Trying to connect to each interface in turn with a web browser can reveal which has been selected if it is not clear. CorePlus running under VMware names the virtual interfaces found in a similar way.

Setting the Workstation IP


The assigned Clavister Security Gateway interface and the workstation interface must be members of the same logical IP network for initial communication between them to succeed so the connecting interface of the workstation must be manually given the following static IP values:

- **IP address:** *192.168.1.30*
- **Subnet mask:** *255.255.255.0*
- **Default gateway:** *192.168.1.1*

For details on how to set the static IP address for Windows and MacOS workstations, see the relevant *Getting Started Guide* for the platform you are using.

Logging on to the Web Interface

To access the Web Interface using the factory default settings, launch a web browser on the workstation (the latest version of Internet Explorer or Firefox is recommended) and point the browser at the address *192.168.1.1*.



When performing initial connection to CorePlus, the administrator should use **https://** as the URL protocol in the browser (in other words, **https://192.168.1.1**). Using HTTPS as the protocol makes communication with CorePlus secure.

The *http://* protocol can be used instead, for logon but this is not secure and should be used only across internal networks.

If communication with the CorePlus is successfully established, a user authentication dialog similar to the one shown below will then be shown in the browser window.


Authentication required

Please enter your username and password

Username:

Password:

Language: English



After entering a valid username and password the **Login** button is clicked. If the user credentials are valid, the administrator is taken to the main Web Interface page.

First Time Web Interface Logon and the Setup Wizard

When logging on for the first time, the default username is always **admin** and the password is **admin**.

After successful login, the *WebUI* user interface will be presented in the browser window. If no configuration changes have yet been uploaded to the Clavister Security Gateway, the *CorePlus Setup Wizard* will start automatically to take a new user through the essential steps for CorePlus setup and establishing public Internet access.



Important: Switch off popup blocking

*Popup blocking must be disabled in the web browser to allow the **CorePlus Setup Wizard** to run since this appears in a popup window.*

The wizard can be terminated and setup up done as a series of separate steps through the Web Interface if desired or alternatively through the CLI. Initial setup and the wizard are described in detail in the relevant *Getting Started Guide*.

Multi-language Support

The Web Interface login dialog offers the option to select a language other than English for the interface. Language support is provided by a set of separate resource files.

It may occasionally be the case that a CorePlus upgrade can contain features that temporarily lack a complete non-english translation because of time constraints. In this case the original english will be used as a temporary solution in place of a translation to the selected language.

The Web Browser Interface

On the left hand side of the Web Interface is a tree which allows navigation to the various sets of CorePlus objects. The central area of the Web Interface displays information about those modules. Current performance information is shown by default.

The screenshot displays the Clavister Web Interface. The top navigation bar includes 'Home', 'Configuration', 'Tools', 'Status', and 'Maintenance'. The user is logged in as 'administrator' (admin - 192.168.1.10). The main content area is titled 'Device' and is divided into several sections:

- System Resources:** Contains four charts: CPU Load (0% to 100%), Throughput (200kpps to 500kpps), Connections (0 to 20), and Memory Usage (0MB to 128MB).
- System Information:** Lists details such as Model, System Time (2007-09-17 07:58:24), Uptime (0 days, 00:28:31), Configuration (Version 2), Firmware Version (8-81.00.00-0, Sep 12 2007), Last Startup (Shutdown reason: 'shutdown.txt' is empty), and Boot Log (Error(s): 0, Warning(s): 0).
- xUTM Statistics:** Shows 'Top 5 Web Content Filtering Categories' with a pie chart for 'Other' (1434641 hits, 1%) and a total classification count of 1434641.
- xUTM Information:** Lists AV Signatures, IDP Signatures, and their last updated times.

Additional metrics at the bottom left include CPU Load (0%), RAM (52 / 128 MB), Connections (2 / 8190), IPsec (0 / ∞), PPP (0 / ∞), VLAN (0 / ∞), and Rules (0 / ∞). A 'Log History' link is visible at the bottom.



Note: Remote management access

Access to the Web Interface is regulated by the configured remote management policy. By default, the system will only allow web access from the internal network.

Interface Layout

The main Web Interface page is divided into three major sections:

A. Menu bar

The menu bar located at the top of the Web Interface contains a number of buttons and drop-down menus that are used to perform configuration tasks as well as for navigation to various tools and status pages.

- **Home** - Navigates to the first page of the Web Interface.
- **Configuration**
 - **Save and Activate** - Saves and activates the configuration.
 - **Discard Changes** - Discards any changes made to the configuration during the current session.
 - **View Changes** - List the changes made to the configuration since it was last saved.
- **Tools** - Contains a number of tools that are useful for maintaining the system.

- **Status** - Provides various status pages that can be used for system diagnostics.
- **Maintenance**
 - **Update Center** - Manually update or schedule updates of the intrusion detection and antivirus signatures.
 - **License** - View license details or enter activation code.
 - **Backup** - Make a backup of the configuration to your local computer or restore a previously downloaded backup.
 - **Reset** - Restart the gateway or reset to factory default.
 - **Upgrade** - Upgrade the gateway's firmware.
 - **Technical support** - This option provides the option to download a file from the gateway which can be studied locally or sent to a technical support specialist to analyze a problem. This can be very useful since the information provided automatically includes many details that are required for troubleshooting.

B. Navigator

The navigator located on the left-hand side of the Web Interface contains a tree representation of the system configuration. The tree is divided into a number of sections corresponding to the major building blocks of the configuration. The tree can be expanded to expose additional sections.

C. Main Window

The main window contains configuration or status details corresponding to the section selected in the navigator or the menu bar.

Controlling Access to the Web Interface

By default, the Web Interface is accessible only from the internal network. If you need to enable access from other parts of the network, you can do so by modifying the remote management policy.

Example 2.1. Enabling remote management via HTTPS**Command-Line Interface**

```
Device:/> add RemoteManagement RemoteMgmtHTTP https
           Network=all-nets Interface=any
           LocalUserDatabase=AdminUsers HTTPS=Yes
```

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Remote Management > Add > HTTP/HTTPS Management**
2. Enter a **Name** for the HTTP/HTTPS remote management policy, for example *https*
3. Check the **HTTPS** checkbox
4. Select the following from the dropdown lists:

- **User Database:** AdminUsers
 - **Interface:** any
 - **Network:** all-nets
5. Click **OK**



Caution: Don't expose the management interface

The above example is provided for informational purposes only. It is never recommended to expose any management interface to any user on the Internet.

Logging out from the Web Interface

When you have finished working in the Web Interface, you should always logout to prevent other users with access to your workstation to get unauthorized access to the system. Logout by clicking on the **Logout** button at the right of the menu bar.



Tip: Correctly routing management traffic

*If there is a problem with the management interface when communicating alongside VPN tunnels, check the main routing table and look for an **all-nets** route to the VPN tunnel. Management traffic may be using this route.*

If no specific route is set up for the management interface then all management traffic coming from CorePlus will automatically be routed into the VPN tunnel. If this is the case then a route should be added by the administrator to route management traffic destined for the management network to the correct interface.

2.1.4. The CLI

CorePlus provides a *Command Line Interface* (CLI) for administrators who prefer or require a command line approach to administration, or who need more granular control of system configuration. The CLI is available either locally through the serial console port (connection to this is described below), or remotely via an Ethernet interface using the *Secure Shell* (SSH) protocol from an SSH client.

The CLI provides a comprehensive set of commands that allow the display of configuration data as well as allowing runtime data to be displayed and allowing system maintenance tasks to be performed.

This section only provides a summary for using the CLI. For a complete reference for all CLI commands, see the separate Clavister *CLI Reference Guide*.

The most often used CLI commands are:

- *add* - Adds an object such as an IP address or a rule to a CorePlus configuration.
- *set* - Sets some property of an object to a value. For example, this might be used to set the source interface on an IP rule.

- *show* - Displays the current categories or display the values of a particular object.
- *delete* - Deletes a specific object.

CLI Command Structure

CLI commands usually begin with the structure: `<command> <object_type> <object_name>`. For example, to display an IP address object called *my_address*, the command would be:

```
Device:/> show Address IP4Address my_address
```

The second part of the command specifies the *object type* and is necessary to identify what category of object the object name refers to (consider that the same name might exist in two different categories).



Note: Category and Context

The term **category** is sometimes referred to as the **context** of an object.

A command like *add* can also include *object properties*. To add a new IP4Address object with an IP address of *10.49.02.01*, the command would be:

```
Device:/> add IP4Address my_address Address=10.49.02.01
```

The object *type* can be optionally preceded by the object *category*. A *category* groups together a set of *types* and mainly used with *tab completion* which is described below.

CLI Help

The CLI *help* command will show all available command options. A screen shot of the first part of the output from the *help* command is shown below:

```
CorePlus:/> help
Available commands (type "help help" for more help):

Set or show configuration data:
  activate add cc delete pskgen reject reset set show undelete

Set or show runtime parameters:
  about      dhcp      igmp      natpool    shutdown
  alarm     dhcprelay  ikesnoop  netcon     sipalg
  arp       dhcpserver ippool    ospf       sshserver
  arpsnoop  dns       ipsecglobalstats  pcapdump  stats
  ats       dnsbl     ipseckeepalive  pciscan   sysmsgs
  blacklist dynroute  ipsecstats    pipes     techsupport
  buffers   frags     ipsectunnels  reconfigure  time
  cam       ha        killsa      routemon   uarules
  certcache hostmon   languagefiles  routes     updatecenter
  cfglog    httposter license   rtmonitor  userauth
  connections hwaccel  linkmon     rules      vlan
  cpuid     hwm      lockdown    services   vpnstats
  crashdump idppipes  logout     sessionmanager
  dconsole  ifstat   memory      settings
```

Utilities:
ping



Tip: Getting help about help

Typing the CLI command:

```
Device:/> help help
```

will give information about the help command itself.

The CLI Command History

Just like the console in many versions of Microsoft Windows™, the up and down arrow keys allow the user to move through the list of commands in the *CLI command history*. For example, pressing the up arrow key once will make the last command executed appear at the current CLI prompt. After a command appears it can be re-executed in its original form or changed first before execution.

Tab Completion

Remembering all the commands and their options can be difficult. CorePlus provides a feature called *tab completion* which means that pressing the tab key will cause automatic completion of the current part of the command. If completion is not possible then pressing the tab key will alternatively display the possible command options that are available.

Tab Completion of Parameters

Another useful feature with tab completion is the ability to automatically fill in the current values of data parameters in a command line. This is done by typing a period "." character followed by the tab key after the "=" character. For example, we may have typed the unfinished command:

```
set Address IP4Address lan_ip Address=
```

If we now type "." followed by a tab, CorePlus will display the current value for the *Address* parameter. If that value is, for example, *10.6.58.10* then the unfinished command line will automatically become:

```
set Address IP4Address lan_ip Address=10.6.58.10
```

CorePlus automatically inserts the current value of *10.6.58.10* and this can then be easily changed with the backspace or back arrow keys before completing the command.

In a similar way, the "<" character before a tab can be used to automatically fill in the default value for a parameter if no value has yet been set. For example:

```
add LogReceiverSyslog example Address=example_ip LogSeverity=< (tab)
```

Will fill in the default value for *LogSeverity*:

```
add LogReceiverSyslog example Address=example_ip
    LogSeverity=Emergency
```

However, if the "." character is used instead:

```
add LogReceiverSyslog example Address=example_ip LogSeverity=. (tab)
```

A list of all possible values is given:

```
add LogReceiverSyslog example Address=example_ip
    LogSeverity=Emergency,Alert,Critical,Error,Warning,Notice,Info
```

This list can then be edited with the back arrow and backspace keys.

Object Categories

It has been mentioned that objects are grouped by *type*, such as *IP4Address*. Types themselves are grouped by *category*. The type *IP4Address* belongs to the category *Address*. The main use of categories is in tab completion when searching for the right object type to use.

If a command such as *add* is entered and then the tab key is pressed, CorePlus displays all the available categories. By choosing a category and then pressing tab again all the object types for that category is displayed. Using categories means that the user has a simple way to specify what kind of object they are trying to specify and a manageable number of options are displayed after pressing tab.

Not all object types belong in a category. The object type *UserAuthRule* is a type without a category and will appear in the category list after pressing tab at the beginning of a command.

The category is sometimes also referred to as a *context*.

Selecting Object Categories

With some categories, it is necessary to first choose a member of that category with the *cc* (change category) command before individual objects can be manipulated. This is the case, for example, with routes. There can be more than one routing table, so when adding or manipulating a route we first have to use the *cc* command to identify which routing table we are interested in.

Suppose a route is to be added to the routing table *main*. The first command would be:

```
Device:/> cc RoutingTable main
Device:/main>
```

Notice that the command prompt changes to indicate the current category. We can now add the route:

```
Device:/main> add Route Name=new_route1 Interface=lan Network=lannet
```

To deselect the category, the command is *cc* on its own:

```
Device:/main> cc
Device:/>
```

The categories that require an initial *cc* command before object manipulation have a "/" character following their names when displayed by a *show* command. For example: *RoutingTable/*.

Specifying Multiple Property Values

Sometimes a command property may need multiple values. For example, some commands use the property *AccountingServers* and more than one value can be specified for this property. When specifying multiple values, they should be separated by a comma "," character. For example, if three servers *server1*, *server2*, *server3* need to be specified then the property assignment in the command would be:

```
AccountingServers=server1,server2,server3
```

Inserting into Rule Lists

Rule lists such as the IP rule set have an ordering which is important. When adding using the CLI *add* command, the default is to add a new rule to the end of a list. When placement at a

particular position is crucial, the *add* command can include the *Index=* parameter as an option. Inserting at the first position in a list is specified with the parameter *Index=1* in an *add* command, the second position with the parameter *Index=2* and so on.

Referencing by Name

The naming of some objects is optional and is done with the *Name=* parameter in an *add* command. An object, such as a threshold rule, will always have an *Index* value which indicates its position in the rule list but can optionally be allocated a name as well. Subsequent manipulation of such a rule can be done either by referring to it by its index, that is to say its list position, or by alternatively using the name assigned to it.

The *CLI Reference Guide* lists the parameter options available for each CorePlus object, including the *Name=* and *Index=* options.

Using Unique Names

For convenience and clarity, it is recommended that a name is assigned to all objects so that it can be used for reference if required. Reference by name is particularly useful when writing CLI scripts. For more on scripts see *Section 2.1.5, "CLI Scripts"*.

The CLI will enforce unique naming within an object type. For reasons of backward compatibility to earlier CorePlus releases, an exception exists with IP rules which can have duplicate names, however it is strongly recommended to avoid this. If a duplicate IP rule name is used in two IP rules then only the *Index* value can uniquely identify each IP rule in subsequent CLI commands. Referencing an IP rule with a duplicated name will fail and result in an error message.

Using Hostnames in the CLI

For certain CLI commands, IP addresses can optionally be specified as a textual hostname instead an IP4Address object or raw IP address such as *192.168.1.10*. When this is done, the hostname must be prefixed with the letters *dns:* to indicate that a DNS lookup must be done to resolve the hostname to an IP address. For example, the hostname *host.company.com* would be specified as *dns:host.company.com* in the CLI.

The parameters where URNs might be used with the CLI are:

- The *Remote Endpoint* for IPsec, L2TP and PPTP tunnels.
- The *Host* for LDAP servers.

When DNS lookup needs to be done, at least one public DNS server must be configured in CorePlus for hostnames to be translated to IP addresses.

Serial Console CLI Access

The serial console port is a local RS-232 port on the Clavister Security Gateway that allows direct access to the CorePlus CLI through a serial connection to a PC or dumb terminal. To locate the serial console port on your Clavister hardware, see the corresponding hardware installation guide.

To use the console port, you need the following equipment:

- A terminal or a computer with a serial port and the ability to emulate a terminal (such as using the *Hyper Terminal* software included in some Microsoft Windows™ editions). The serial console port uses the following default settings: *9600 bps, No parity, 8 data bits and 1 stop bit*.

- A RS-232 cable with appropriate connectors. An appliance package includes a RS-232 null-modem cable.

To now connect a terminal to the console port, follow these steps:

1. Set the terminal protocol as described previously.
2. Connect one of the connectors of the RS-232 cable directly to the console port on your system hardware.
3. Connect the other end of the cable to the terminal or the serial connector of the computer running the communications software.
4. Press the *enter* key on the terminal. The CorePlus login prompt should appear on the terminal screen.

Changing the Serial Console Line Speed

The console line speed can be changed either through the WebUI or through the CLI command. The new speed will only come into effect after restarting CorePlus.

Example 2.2. Setting the Console Line Speed

In this example the console line speed is set to 19200 bps.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> set COMPortDevice COM1 BitsPerSecond=19200
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Go to **System > Com Port Devices**

Click the console port line, configure the speed and then click **OK**

SSH (Secure Shell) CLI Access

The SSH (Secure Shell) protocol can be used to access the CLI over the network from a remote host. SSH is a protocol primarily used for secure communication over insecure networks, providing strong authentication and data integrity. SSH clients are freely available for almost all hardware platforms.

CorePlus supports version 1, 1.5 and 2 of the SSH protocol. SSH access is regulated by the remote management policy in CorePlus, and is disabled by default.

Example 2.3. Enabling SSH Remote Access

This example shows how to enable remote SSH access from the *lan* network through the *lan*

interface by adding a rule to the remote management policy.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add RemoteManagement RemoteMgmtSSH ssh Network=lannet
           Interface=lan LocalUserDatabase=AdminUsers
```

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Remote Management > Add > Secure Shell Management**
2. Enter a **Name** for the SSH remote management policy, for example *ssh_policy*
3. Select the following from the dropdown lists:
 - **User Database:** AdminUsers
 - **Interface:** lan
 - **Network:** lannet
4. Click **OK**

Logging on to the CLI

When access to the CLI has been established to CorePlus through the serial console or an SSH client, the administrator will need to logon to the system before being able to execute any CLI command. This authentication step is needed to ensure that only trusted users can access the system, as well as providing user information for auditing.

When accessing the CLI remotely through SSH, CorePlus will respond with a login prompt. Enter your username and press the *Enter* key, followed by your password and then *Enter* again.

After a successful logon, the CLI command prompt will appear:

```
Device:/>
```

If a welcome message has been set then it will be displayed directly after the logon. For security reasons, it is advisable to either disable or anonymize the CLI welcome message.

Changing the *admin* User Password

It is recommended to change the default password of the *admin* account from *admin* to something else as soon as possible after initial startup. User passwords can be any combination of characters and cannot be greater than 256 characters in length. It is recommended to use only printable characters.

To change the password to, for example, *my-password* the following CLI commands are used. First we must change the current category to be the *LocalUserDatabase* called *AdminUsers* (which exists by default):

```
Device:/> cc LocalUserDatabase AdminUsers
```

We are now in *AdminUsers* and can change the password of the *admin* user:

```
Device:/AdminUsers> set User admin Password="my-password"
```

Finally, we return the current category to the top level:

```
Device:/AdminUsers> cc ..
```



Note: The console password is separate

*The password that can be set to protect direct serial console access is a separate password and should not be confused with the passwords related to user accounts. The console password is described in **Section 2.1.7, "The Console Boot Menu"**.*

Changing the CLI Prompt

The default CLI prompt is:

```
Device: />
```

This can be customized, for example, to *my-prompt:/>*, by using the CLI command:

```
Device: /> set device name="my-prompt"
```

The *CLI Reference Guide* uses the command prompt *Device: />* throughout.



Tip: The CLI prompt is the WebUI device name

When the command line prompt is changed to a new string value, this string also appears as the new device name in the top level node of the WebUI tree-view.

Activating and Committing Changes

If any changes are made to the current configuration through the CLI, those changes will not be uploaded to CorePlus until the command:

```
Device: /> activate
```

is issued. Immediately following the *activate* command, the command:

```
Device: /> commit
```

should be issued to make those changes permanent.

If a *commit* command is not issued within a default time period of 30 seconds then the changes are automatically undone and the old configuration restored.

Checking Configuration Integrity

After changing a CorePlus configuration and before issuing the *activate* and *commit* commands, it is possible to explicitly check for any problems in a configuration using the command:

```
Device: /> show -errors
```

This will cause CorePlus to scan the configuration about to be activated and list any problems. A possible problem that might be found in this way is a reference to an IP object in the address book that does not exist in a restored configuration backup.

Logging off from the CLI

After finishing working with the CLI, it is recommended to logout in order to avoid letting anyone getting unauthorized access to the system. Log off by using the *exit* or the *logout* command.

Configuring Remote Management Access on an Interface

Remote management access may need to be configured through the CLI. Suppose management access is to be through Ethernet interface *if2* which has an IP address *10.8.1.34*.

Firstly, we set the values for the IP address objects for *if2* which already exist in the CorePlus address book, starting with the interface IP:

```
Device:/> set Address IP4Address if2_ip Address=10.8.1.34
```

The network IP address for the interface must also be set to the appropriate value:

```
Device:/> set Address IP4Address if2_net Address=10.8.1.0/24
```

In this example, local IP addresses are used for illustration but these could be public IP addresses instead.

Next, create a remote HTTP management access object, in this example called *HTTP_if2*:

```
Device:/> add RemoteManagement RemoteMgmtHTTP HTTP_if2
           Interface=if2 Network=all-nets
           LocalUserDatabase=AdminUsers
           AccessLevel=Admin HTTP=Yes
```

If we now *activate* and *commit* the new configuration, remote management access via the IP address *10.8.1.34* is now possible using a web browser. If SSH management access is required then a *RemoteMgmtSSH* object should be added.

The assumption made with the above commands is that an *all-nets* route exists to the ISP's gateway. In other words, Internet access has been enabled for the Clavister Security Gateway.

Managing Management Sessions with *sessionmanager*

The CLI provides a command called *sessionmanager* for managing management sessions themselves. The command be used to manage all types of management sessions, including:

- Secure Shell (SSH) CLI sessions.
- Any CLI session through the serial console interface.
- Secure Copy (SCP) sessions.
- Web Interface sessions connected by HTTP or HTTPS.
- Sessions based on the Clavister proprietary NetCon protocol.

The command without any options gives a summary of currently open sessions:

```
Device:/> sessionmanager

Session Manager status
-----
Active connections      :      3
Maximum allowed connections :    64
```

```
Local idle session timeout : 900
NetCon idle session timeout : 600
```

To see a list of all sessions use the `-list` option. Below is some typical output showing the local console session:

```
Device:/> sessionmanager -list
```

User	Database	IP	Type	Mode	Access
local	(none)	0.0.0.0	local	console	admin

If the user has full administrator privileges, they can forcibly terminate another management session using the `-disconnect` option of the `sessionmanager` command.

The `sessionmanager` command options are fully documented in the *CLI Reference Guide*.

2.1.5. CLI Scripts

To allow the administrator to easily store and execute sets of CLI commands, CorePlus provides a feature called *CLI scripting*. A *CLI script* is a predefined sequence of CLI commands which can be executed after they are saved to a file and the file is then uploaded to the Clavister Security Gateway.

The steps for creating a CLI script are as follows:

1. Create a text file with a text editor containing a sequential list of CLI commands, one per line.

The Clavister recommended convention is for these files to use the file extension `.sgs` (*Security Gateway Script*). The filename, including the extension, should not be more than 16 characters.

2. Upload the file to the Clavister Security Gateway using Secure Copy (SCP). Script files must be stored in a directory under the root called `/scripts`. SCP uploading is discussed in detail in *Section 2.1.6, "Secure Copy"*.
3. Use the CLI command `script -execute` to run the script file.

The CLI `script` command is the tool used for script management and execution. The complete syntax of the command is described in the *CLI Reference Guide* and specific examples of usage are detailed in the following sections. See also *Section 2.1.4, "The CLI"* in this manual.

Only Four Commands are Allowed in Scripts

The commands allowed in a script file are limited to four and these are:

```
add
set
delete
cc
```

If any other command appears in a script file, it is ignored during execution and a warning message is output. For example, the `ping` command will be ignored.

Executing Scripts

As mentioned above, the `script -execute` command launches a named script file that has been

previously uploaded to the Clavister Security Gateway. For example, to execute the script file `my_script.sgs` which has already been uploaded, the CLI command would be:

```
Device:/> script -execute -name=my_script.sgs
```

Script Variables

A script file can contain any number of *script variables* which are called:

`$1, $2, $3, $4.....$n`

The values substituted for these variable names are specified as a list at the end of the *script -execute* command line. The number *n* in the variable name indicates the variable value's position in this list. `$1` comes first, `$2` comes second and so on.



Note: The symbol \$0 is reserved

Notice that the name of the first variable is `$1`. The variable `$0` is reserved and is always replaced before execution by the name of the script file itself.

For example, a script called `my_script.sgs` is to be executed with IP address `126.12.11.01` replacing all occurrences of `$1` in the script file and the string `If1 address` replacing all occurrences of `$2`.

The file `my_script.sgs` contains the single CLI command line:

```
add IP4Address If1_ip Address=$1 Comments=$2
```

To run this script file after uploading, the CLI command would be:

```
> script -execute -name=my_script.sgs 126.12.11.01 "If1 address"
```

When the script file runs, the variable replacement would mean that the file becomes:

```
add IP4Address If1_ip Address=126.12.11.01 Comments="If1 address"
```

Script Validation and Command Ordering

CLI scripts are not, by default, validated. This means that the written ordering of the script does not matter. There can be a reference to a configuration object at the beginning of a script which is only created at the end of the script. Although this might seem illogical, it is done to improve the readability of scripts. If something always has to be created before it is referred to then this can result in a confused and disjointed script file and in large script files it is often preferable to group together CLI commands which are similar.

Error Handling

If an executing CLI script file encounters an error condition, the default behavior is for the script to terminate. This behavior can be overridden by using the `-force` option. To run a script file called `my_script2.sgs` in this way, the CLI command is:

```
Device:/> script -execute -name=my_script2.sgs -force
```

If `-force` is used, the script will continue to execute even if errors are returned by a command in the script file.

Script Output

Any output from script execution will appear at the CLI console. Normally this output only consists of any error messages that occur during execution. To see the confirmation of each command completing, the `-verbose` option should be used:

```
Device: /> script -execute -name=my_script2.sgs -verbose
```

Saving Scripts

When a script file is uploaded to the Clavister Security Gateway, it is initially kept only in temporary RAM memory. If CorePlus restarts then any uploaded scripts will be lost from this volatile memory and must be uploaded again to run. To store a script between restarts, it must explicitly be moved to non-volatile CorePlus *disk* memory by using the `script -store` command.

To move the example `my_script.sgs` to non-volatile memory the command would be:

```
Device: /> script -store -name=my_script.sgs
```

Alternatively, all scripts can be moved to non-volatile memory with the command:

```
Device: /> script -store -all
```

Removing Scripts

To remove a saved script, the `script -remove` command can be used.

To remove the example `my_script.sgs` script file, the command would be:

```
Device: /> script -remove -name=my_script.sgs
```

Listing Scripts

The `script` on its own, command without any parameters, lists all the scripts currently available and indicates the size of each script as well as the type of memory where it resides (residence in non-volatile memory is indicated by the word "Disk" in the *Memory* column).

```
Device: /> script
```

Name	Storage	Size (bytes)
my_script.sgs	RAM	8
my_script2.sgs	Disk	10

To list the content of a specific uploaded script file, for example `my_script.sgs` the command would be:

```
Device: /> script -show -name=my_script.sgs
```

Creating Scripts Automatically

When the same configuration objects needs to be copied between multiple Clavister Security Gateways, then one way to do this with the CLI is to create a script file that creates the required objects and then upload to and run the same script on each device.

If we already have a CorePlus installation that already has the objects configured that need to be copied, then running the `script -create` command on that installation provides a way to automatically create the required script file. This script file can then be downloaded to the local management workstation and then uploaded to and executed on other Clavister Security Gateways to duplicate the objects.

For example, suppose the requirement is to create the same set of **IP4Address** objects on several Clavister Security Gateways that already exist on a single unit. The administrator would connect to the single unit with the CLI and issue the command:

```
Device:/> script -create Address IP4Address -name new_script.sgs
```

This creates a script file called `new_script.sgs` which contains all the CLI commands necessary to create all **IP4Address** address objects in that unit's configuration. The created file's contents might, for example, be:

```
add IP4Address If1_ip Address=10.6.60.10
add IP4Address If1_net Address=10.6.60.0/24
add IP4Address If1_br Address=10.6.60.255
add IP4Address If1_dns1 Address=141.1.1.1
"
"
"
```

The file `new_script.sgs` can then be downloaded with SCP to the local management workstation and then uploaded and executed on the other Clavister Security Gateways. The end result is that all units will have the same **IP4Address** objects in their address book.

The name of the file created using the `-create` option cannot be greater than 16 characters in length (including the extension) and the filetype should be `.sgs`.



Tip: Listing commands at the console

To list the created CLI commands on the console instead of saving them to a file, leave out the option `-name=` in the `script -create` command.

Certain aspects of a configuration which are hardware dependent cannot have a script created using the `-create` option. This is true when the CLI node type in the `script -create` command is one of:

COMPortDevice
Ethernet
EthernetDevice
Device

If one of these node types is used then the error message `script file empty` is returned by CorePlus.

Commenting Script Files

Any line in a script file that begins with the `#` character is treated as a comment. For example:

```
# The following line defines the If1 IP address
add IP4Address If1_ip Address=10.6.60.10
```

Scripts Running Other Scripts

It is possible for one script to run another script. For example, the script `my_script.sgs` could

contain the line:

```
"
"
script -execute -name my_script2.sgs
"
"
```

CorePlus allows the script file *my_script2.sgs* to execute another script file and so on. The maximum depth of this script nesting is 5.

2.1.6. Secure Copy

To upload and download files to or from the Clavister Security Gateway, the *secure copy* (SCP) protocol can be used. SCP is based on the SSH protocol and many freely available SCP clients exist for almost all platforms. The command line examples below are based on the most common command format for SCP client software.

SCP Command Format

SCP command syntax is straightforward for most console based clients. The basic command used here is *scp* followed by the source and destination for the file transfer.

Upload is performed with the command:

```
> scp <local_filename> <destination_gateway>
```

Download is done with the command:

```
> scp <source_gateway> <local_filename>
```

The source or destination Clavister Security Gateway is of the form:
<user_name>@<gateway_ip_address>:<filepath>.

For example: *admin@10.62.11.10:config.bak*. The <user_name> must be a defined CorePlus user in the administrator user group.



Note: SCP examples do not show the password prompt

SCP will normally prompt for the user password after the command line but that prompt is not shown in the examples given here.

The following table summarizes the operations that can be performed between an SCP client and CorePlus:

File type	Upload possible	Download possible
Configuration Backup (config.bak)	Yes (also with WebUI)	Yes (also with WebUI)
System Backup (full.bak)	Yes (also with WebUI)	Yes (also with WebUI)
Firmware upgrades	Yes	No
Licenses (license.lic)	Yes (also with WebUI)	No
Certificates	Yes	No
SSH public keys	Yes	No
Web auth banner files	Yes	Yes
Web content filter banner files	Yes	Yes

CorePlus File organization

CorePlus maintains a simple 2 level directory structure which consists of the top level *root* and a number of sub-directories. However, these "directories" such as *sshclientkey* should be more correctly thought of as *object types*. All the files stored in the CorePlus root as well as all the object types can be displayed using the CLI command *ls*.

The resulting output is shown below:

```
Device: /> ls
HTTPALGBanners/
HTTPAuthBanners/
certificate/
config.bak
full.bak
license.lic
script/
sshclientkey/
```

Apart from the individual files, the objects types listed are:

- *HTTPALGBanners/* - The banner files for user authentication HTML. Uploading these is described further in *Section 6.3.4.4, "Customizing HTML Pages"*.
- *HTTPAuthBanner/* - The banner files for HTML ALG dynamic content filtering. Uploading these is described further in *Section 6.3.4.4, "Customizing HTML Pages"*.
- *certificate/* - The object type for all digital certificates.
- *script/* - The object type for all CLI scripts. Scripts are described further in *Section 2.1.5, "CLI Scripts"*.
- *sshclientkey/* - The SSH client key object type.

Examples of Uploading and Downloading

In some cases, a file is located in the CorePlus root. The license file (*license.lic*) falls into this category, as well as backup files for configurations (*config.bak*) and the complete system (*full.bak*). When uploading, these files contain a unique header which identifies what they are. CorePlus checks this header and ensures the file is stored only in the root (all files do not have a header).

If an administrator username is *admin1* and the IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway is *10.5.62.11* then to upload a configuration backup, the SCP command would be:

```
> scp config.bak admin1@10.5.62.11:
```

To download a configuration backup to the current local directory, the command would be:

```
> scp admin1@10.5.62.11:config.bak ./
```

To upload a file to an object type under the root, the command is slightly different. If we have a local CLI script file called *my_script.sgs* then the upload command would be:

```
> scp my_script.sgs admin1@10.5.62.11:script/
```

If we have the same CLI script file called *my_scripts.sgs* stored on the Clavister Security Gateway

then the download command would be:

```
> scp admin1@10.5.62.11:script/my_script.sgs ./
```

Activating Uploads

Like all configuration changes, SCP uploads only become active after the CLI commands *activate* have been issued and this must be followed by *commit* to make the change permanent.

Uploads of firmware upgrades (packaged in *.upg* files) or a full system backup (*full.bak*) are the exception. Both of these file types will result in an automatic system reboot. The other exception is for script uploads which do not affect the configuration.

2.1.7. The Console Boot Menu

The Clavister *firmware loader* is the base software on top of which CorePlus runs and the administrator's direct interface to this loader is called the *console boot menu*. This section discusses the boot menu and also how the serial console can be used to issue CorePlus CLI commands.

The boot menu is only accessible from the serial console located on the hardware chassis, and is only available if CorePlus has been shutdown or not yet started and power is on to the hardware.

Initial Menu without a Password Set

After powering up the Clavister Security Gateway, there is a five second interval before CorePlus starts up, and in that time the message *Press any key to abort and load boot menu* is displayed on the console. If any console key is pressed during these 5 seconds then CorePlus startup pauses and the following menu is displayed:

- **Start System**
This initiates the startup of CorePlus.
- **Display Latest Shutdown Message**
This shows the last console message shown before system shutdown.
- **Display Latest Crash Dump Message**
This shows the latest crash dump message caused by a CorePlus problem.
- **Reset Options**
This displays a sub-menu of reset options which are described below.
- **Enable Console Password**
Set a password for console access. Until a password is set, anyone can utilize the console so selecting this option is recommended. The console will prompt for a password and ask for confirmation.

The console password can be any sequence of characters but must be no greater than 64 characters in length. It is recommended to use only printable characters.

Options after Setting a Password

After a password is set with the **Enable Console Password** step above, the following menu options are displayed (and this menu will be displayed after a successful logon):

- **Start System**

This initiates the startup of CorePlus.

- **Display Latest Shutdown Message**
This shows the last console message shown before system shutdown.
- **Display Latest Crash Dump Message**
This shows the latest crash dump message caused by a CorePlus problem.
- **Reset Options**
This displays a sub-menu of reset options which are described below.
- **Change Console Password**
This option allows the administrator to change the current password for console access and it is recommended this is set as soon as possible. If it is not set, anyone can gain access to the local console port to reconfigure CorePlus.



Note: The console password is just for console access

The console password is just used for console access and is not related to the username/password combinations used for login through other management interfaces, such as the Web Interface. The console password is used only with a console connected directly to the local RS232 port and no username is associated with it.

Initial Menu with a Password Set

Once a password is set by the administrator, the initial menu that is displayed on interrupting startup will become altered so that it contains the following options:

- **Login**
- **Start System**
This initiates the startup of CorePlus.
- **Display Latest Shutdown Message**
This shows the last console message shown before system shutdown.
- **Display Latest Crash Dump Message**
This shows the latest crash dump message caused by a CorePlus problem.

The Reset Menu

The *Reset Options* menu offers the following choices:

- **Reset to Factory Defaults**
This option will restore the hardware to its initial factory state. The operations performed if this option is selected are the following:
 - i. Remove the CorePlus configuration files. This includes all certificates as well as HA and DHCP lease settings.
 - ii. Reset the loader settings.
 - iii. Remove console security so there is no console password.
 - iv. Restore default CorePlus and loader executables. If the hardware was delivered as a CorePlus 8.nn system then the WebUI will no longer function and the upgrade wizard

will have to be re-run.

v. The license will NOT be removed.

- **Reset to Base Configuration**

This will only reset the configuration to be the original, default CorePlus configuration file. Other options, such as console security, will not be affected.

- **Transfer System**

This option is for software only installations running on non-Clavister hardware. It makes it possible to transfer (or copy) an image of the complete CorePlus system to another portable media, such as a USB stick. Booting can then be done using this media on another computer so that the CorePlus system can be installed there on local disk with another "Transfer System" operation.

- **Return to main menu** - Go back to the previous, main menu.



Note: A reset does not delete all files from memory

*Resetting to factory defaults will not delete any auxiliary files that have been created in the Clavister Security Gateway memory. For example, any files created by the **pcapdump** command will not be deleted. Files related to Anti-Virus or IDP will also not be deleted.*

If any of these undeleted files need to be deleted then this must be done explicitly through the appropriate CLI command.

Using the Console for CLI Commands

CorePlus will start up either because the initial start up sequence wasn't interrupted to enter the boot menu or because start up was commenced from the boot menu. Once CorePlus is up and running, the serial console can also be used to enter any CLI command in the same way that a SSH client can.

If a console password has been set and a login has not yet been performed then CorePlus will prompt for the console password before CLI commands can be entered and it is therefore recommended the console password is enabled as soon as possible in order to prevent unauthorized access.



Note: Output buffer limitations

The only limitation with issuing CLI commands through the serial console is that there is a finite buffer allocated for output. This buffer limit means that a large volume of console output may be truncated. This happens rarely and usually only with data dumps from certain diagnostic commands. In such cases it is better to issue the commands using an SSH client instead.

2.1.8. Management Advanced Settings

Under the **Remote Management** section of the Web Interface or InControl a number of advanced settings can be found. These are:

SSH Before Rules

Enable SSH traffic to the security gateway regardless of configured IP Rules.

Default: *Enabled*

WebUI Before Rules

Enable HTTP(S) traffic to the security gateway regardless of configured IP Rules.

Default: *Enabled*

Local Console Timeout

Number of seconds of inactivity until the local console user is automatically logged out.

Default: *900*

NetCon Idle Timeout

Number of seconds of inactivity until the Netcon session is close.

Default: *600*

NetCon Before Rules

For NetCon traffic to CorePlus: add an invisible rule to the IP rule set to allow Netcon traffic. If this setting is disabled then NetCon traffic will be subject to the IP rule set like any other traffic.

Default: *Enabled*

NetConMaxChannels

For NetCon traffic to CorePlus the following number of connections are guaranteed for each connection type:

- Consoles: 4
- Realtime loggers: 4
- Stat pollers: 4
- Receive contexts: 2
- Send contexts: 4

NetConMaxChannels is the maximum total allowed for all these connection types. This means that with the default value of 18, 2 extra connections are allowed and they can be of any of the above types.

Default: *18*

Validation Timeout

Specifies the amount of seconds to wait for the administrator to log in before reverting to the

previous configuration.

Default: 30

WebUI HTTP port

Specifies the HTTP port for the Web Interface.

Default: 80

WebUI HTTPS port

Specifies the HTTP(S) port for the Web Interface.

Default: 443

HTTPS Certificate

Specifies which certificate to use for HTTPS traffic. Only RSA certificates are supported.

Default: *HTTPS*

2.1.9. Working with Configurations

Configuration Objects

The system configuration is built up by *Configuration Objects*, where each object represents a configurable item of any kind. Examples of configuration objects are routing table entries, address book entries, service definitions, IP rules and so on. Each configuration object has a number of properties that constitute the values of the object.

Object Types

A configuration object has a well-defined type. The type defines the properties that are available for the configuration object, as well as the constraints for those properties. For instance, the *IP4Address* type is used for all configuration objects representing a named IPv4 address.

Object Organization

In the Web Interface the configuration objects are organized into a tree-like structure based on the type of the object.

In the CLI, similar configuration object types are grouped together in a *category*. These categories are different from the structure used in the Web Interface to allow quick access to the configuration objects in the CLI. The *IP4Address*, *IP4Group* and *EthernetAddress* types are, for instance, grouped in a category named *Address*, as they all represent different addresses. Consequently, *Ethernet* and *VLAN* objects are all grouped in a category named *Interface*, as they are all interface objects. The categories have actually no impact on the system configuration; they are merely provided as means to simplify administration.

The following examples show how to manipulate objects.

Example 2.4. Listing Configuration Objects

To find out what configuration objects exist, you can retrieve a listing of the objects. This example shows how to list all service objects.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> show Service
```

A list of all services will be displayed, grouped by their respective type.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Services**
2. A web page listing all services will be presented.

A list contains the following basic elements:

- **Add Button** - Displays a dropdown menu when clicked. The menu will list all types of configuration items that can be added to the list.
- **Header** - The header row displays the titles of the columns in the list. The tiny arrow images next to each title can be used for sorting the list according to that column.
- **Rows** - Each row in the list corresponds to one configuration item. Most commonly, each row starts with the name of the object (if the item has a name), followed by values for the columns in the list.

A single row in the list can be selected by clicking on the row on a spot where there is no hyperlink. The background color of the row will turn dark blue. Right-clicking the row will display a menu where you can choose to edit or delete the object as well as modify the order of the objects.

Example 2.5. Displaying a Configuration Object

The simplest operation on a configuration object is to show its contents, in other words the values of the object properties. This example shows how to display the contents of a configuration object representing the *telnet* service.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> show Service ServiceTCPUDP telnet
```

Property	Value
Name:	telnet
DestinationPorts:	23
Type:	TCP
SourcePorts:	0-65535
SYNRelay:	No
PassICMPReturn:	No
ALG:	(none)
MaxSessions:	1000
Comments:	Telnet

The Property column lists the names of all properties in the ServiceTCPUDP class and the Value column lists the corresponding property values.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Services**
2. Click on the **telnet** hyperlink in the list
3. A web page displaying the telnet service will be presented

Example 2.6. Editing a Configuration Object

When you need to modify the behavior of CorePlus, you will most likely need to modify one or several configuration objects. This example shows how to edit the *Comments* property of the *telnet* service.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> set Service ServiceTCPUDP telnet
           Comments="Modified Comment"
```

Show the object again to verify the new property value:

```
Device:/> show Service ServiceTCPUDP telnet

      Property  Value
-----
      Name:     telnet
DestinationPorts: 23
      Type:     TCP
SourcePorts:    0-65535
      SYNRelay: No
PassICMPReturn: No
      ALG:      (none)
MaxSessions:   1000
Comments:      Modified Comment
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Services**
2. Click on the **telnet** hyperlink in the list
3. In the **Comments** textbox, enter your new comment
4. Click **OK**

Verify that the new comment has been updated in the list.



Important: Configuration changes must be activated

Changes to a configuration object will not be applied to a running system until the new CorePlus configuration is activated.

Example 2.7. Adding a Configuration Object

This example shows how to add a new *IP4Address* object, here creating the IP address *192.168.10.10*, to the address book.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Address IP4Address myhost Address=192.168.10.10
```

Show the new object:

```
Device: /> show Address IP4Address myhost
```

Property	Value
Name:	myhost
Address:	192.168.10.10
UserAuthGroups:	(none)
NoDefinedCredentials:	No
Comments:	(none)

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book**
2. Click on the **Add** button
3. In the dropdown menu displayed, select **IP Address**
4. In the **Name** text box, enter *myhost*
5. Enter 192.168.10.10 in the **IP Address** textbox
6. Click **OK**
7. Verify that the new IP4 address object has been added to the list

Example 2.8. Deleting a Configuration Object

This example shows how to delete the newly added *IP4Address* object.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> delete Address IP4Address myhost
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book**
2. Right-click on the row containing the **myhost** object
3. In the dropdown menu displayed, select **Delete**

The row will be rendered with a strike-through line indicating that the object is marked for deletion.

Example 2.9. Undeleting a Configuration Object

A deleted object can always be restored until the configuration has been activated and committed. This example shows how to restore the deleted IP4Address object shown in the previous example.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> undelete Address IP4Address myhost
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book**
2. Right-click on the row containing the **myhost** object
3. In the dropdown menu displayed, select **Undo Delete**

Listing Modified Objects

After modifying several configuration objects, you might want to see a list of the objects that were changed, added and removed since the last commit.

Example 2.10. Listing Modified Configuration Objects

This example shows how to list configuration objects that have been modified.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> show -changes
```

	Type	Object
-	IP4Address	myhost
*	ServiceTCPUDP	telnet

A "+" character in front of the row indicates that the object has been added. A "*" character indicates that the object has been modified. A "-" character indicates that the object has been marked for deletion.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Configuration > View Changes** in the menu bar

A list of changes is displayed

Activating and Committing a Configuration

After changes to a configuration have been made, the configuration has to be activated for those changes to have an impact on the running system. During the activation process, the new proposed configuration is validated and CorePlus will attempt to initialize affected subsystems with the new configuration data.



Important: Committing IPsec Changes

The administrator should be aware that if any changes that affect the configurations of live IPsec tunnels are committed, then those live tunnels connections will be terminated and must be re-established.

If the new configuration is validated, CorePlus will wait for a short period (30 seconds by default) during which a connection to the administrator must be re-established. If a lost connection could not be re-established then CorePlus will revert to using the previous configuration. This is a fail-safe mechanism and, amongst others things, can help prevent a remote administrator from locking themselves out.

Example 2.11. Activating and Committing a Configuration

This example shows how to activate and commit a new configuration.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> activate
```

The system will validate and start using the new configuration. When the command prompt is shown again:

```
Device:/> commit
```

The new configuration is now committed.

InControl

Activating and committing changes with InControl is done in a different way to the Web Interface

Web Interface

1. Go to **Configuration > Save and Activate** in the menu bar
2. Click **OK** to confirm

The web browser will automatically try to connect back to the Web Interface after 10 seconds. If the connection succeeds, this is interpreted by CorePlus as confirmation that remote management is still working. The new configuration is then automatically committed.

**Note: Changes must be committed**

The configuration must be committed before changes are saved. All changes to a configuration can be ignored simply by not committing a changed configuration.

Configuration Revision Numbers

Everytime a new configuration version is created and activated, a *configuration revision number* is allocated to the version. This number has two parts and is of the form *nn:mm*.

The first part of the number, *nn*, is incremented everytime a new configuration is activated through a non-InControl interface such as the Web Interface or CLI. The second part of the number, *mm*, is incremented everytime a new configuration is activated through a InControl client. In the Web Interface, only the first part is displayed as the revision number in the start page.

2.2. Events and Logging

2.2.1. Overview

The ability to log and analyze system activities is an essential feature of CorePlus. Logging enables not only monitoring of system status and health, but also allows auditing of network usage and assists in trouble-shooting.

Log Message Generation

CorePlus defines a large number of different *log event messages*, which are generated as a result of corresponding system events. Examples of such events are the establishment and teardown of connections, receipt of malformed packets as well as the dropping of traffic according to filtering policies.

Log events are always generated for certain aspects of CorePlus such as buffer usage, DHCP clients, High Availability and IPsec. The generation of events for other CorePlus subsystems such as DHCP Relay, DHCP Servers and IP Rules can be enabled as needed.

Whenever an event message is generated, it can be filtered and distributed to a variety of *Event Receivers*, including Syslog and SNMP Trap receivers. Up to eight event receivers can be defined per Clavister Security Gateway, with each receiver having its own customizable event filter.

2.2.2. Log Messages

Event Types

CorePlus defines several hundred events for which log messages can be generated. The events range from high-level, customizable, user events down to low-level and mandatory system events.

The *conn_open* event, for example, is a typical high-level event that generates an event message whenever a new connection is established, given that the matching security policy rule has defined that event messages should be generated for that connection.

An example of a low-level event would be the *startup_normal* event, which generates a mandatory event message as soon as the system starts up.

Message Format

All event messages have a common format, with attributes that include category, severity and recommended actions. These attributes enable easy filtering of messages, either within CorePlus prior to sending to an event receiver, or as part of the analysis after logging and storing messages on an external log server.

A list of all event messages can be found in the CorePlus *Log Reference Guide*. That guide also describes the design of event messages, the meaning of severity levels and the various attributes available.

Event Severity

The *severity* of each event is predefined and it can be, in order of severity, one of:

Emergency

Alert
Critical
Error
Warning
Notice
Info
Debug

By default, CorePlus sends all messages of level **Info** and above to configured log servers. The **Debug** category is intended for troubleshooting only and should only be turned on if required when trying to solve a problem. All log messages of all severity levels are found listed in the *CorePlus Log Reference Guide*.

2.2.3. Creating Log Receivers

To distribute and log the event messages generated by CorePlus, it is necessary to define one or more event receivers that specify *what* events to capture, and *where* to send them.

CorePlus can distribute event messages to different types of receivers and these are enabled by creating any of the following *Log Receiver* objects.

- **MemoryLogReceiver**

CorePlus has a single built in logging mechanism also known as the *MemLog*. This retains all event log messages in memory and allows direct viewing of recent log messages through the Web Interface.

This is enabled by default but can be disabled.

This receiver type is discussed further below in *Section 2.2.4, "Logging to MemoryLogReceiver"*.

- **Syslog Receiver**

Syslog is the de-facto standard for logging events from network devices. If other network devices are already logging to Syslog servers, using syslog with CorePlus messages can simplify overall administration.

This receiver type is discussed further below in *Section 2.2.5, "Logging to Syslog Hosts"*.

- **FWLog**

The Clavister proprietary format for logging event messages, the FWLog format has a high level of detail and is suitable for analyzing large amounts of log data.

This receiver type is discussed further below in *Section 2.2.6, "Logging to the Clavister Logger"*.

- **SNMP Traps**

An *SNMP2c Event Receiver* can be defined to collect *SNMP Trap* log messages. These receivers are typically used to collect and respond to critical alerts from network devices.

This receiver type is discussed further below in *Section 2.2.7, "SNMP Traps"*.

2.2.4. Logging to MemoryLogReceiver

The *MemoryLogReceiver* (also known as *Memlog*) is an optional CorePlus feature that allows logging direct to memory in the Clavister Security Gateway instead of sending messages to an external server. These messages can be examined through the standard user interfaces.

Memory for Logging is Limited

Memlog memory available for new messages is limited to a fixed predetermined size. When the allocated memory is filled up with log messages, the oldest messages are discarded to make room for newer incoming messages. This means that MemLog holds a limited number of messages since the last system initialization and once the buffer fills they will only be the most recent. This means that when CorePlus is creating large numbers of messages in systems with, for example, large numbers of VPN tunnels, the Memlog information becomes less meaningful since it reflects a limited recent time period.

Disabling Memory Logging

The *MemoryLogReceiver* object exists by default in CorePlus. If this receiver is not required then it can be deleted and this type of logging will be switched off.

2.2.5. Logging to Syslog Hosts

Overview

Syslog is a standardized protocol for sending log data although there is no standardized format for the log messages themselves. The format used by CorePlus is well suited to automated processing, filtering and searching.

Although the exact format of each log entry depends on how a Syslog receiver works, most are very much alike. The way in which logs are read is also dependent on how the syslog receiver works. Syslog daemons on UNIX servers usually log to text files, line by line.

Message Format

Most Syslog recipients preface each log entry with a timestamp and the IP address of the machine that sent the log data:

```
Feb 5 2000 09:45:23 gateway.ourcompany.com
```

This is followed by the text the sender has chosen to send.

```
Feb 5 2000 09:45:23 gateway.ourcompany.com EFW: DROP:
```

Subsequent text is dependent on the event that has occurred.

In order to facilitate automated processing of all messages, CorePlus writes all log data to a single line of text. All data following the initial text is presented in the format *name=value*. This enables automatic filters to easily find the values they are looking for without assuming that a specific piece of data is in a specific location in the log entry.



The Prio and Severity fields

The **Prio=** field in SysLog messages contains the same information as the **Severity** field for Clavister Logger messages. However, the ordering of the numbering is reversed.

Example 2.12. Enable Logging to a Syslog Host

To enable logging of all events with a severity greater than or equal to Notice to a Syslog server with IP address 195.11.22.55, follow the steps outlined below:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add LogReceiverSyslog my_syslog IPAddress=195.11.22.55
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Log and Event Receivers > Add > Syslog Receiver**
2. Specify a suitable name for the event receiver, for example *my_syslog*
3. Enter *195.11.22.55* as the **IP Address**
4. Select an appropriate facility from the **Facility** list - the facility name is commonly used as a filter parameter in most syslog daemons.
5. Click **OK**

The system will now be logging all events with a severity greater than or equal to Notice to the syslog server at *195.11.22.55*.



Note: Syslog server configuration

The syslog server may have to be configured to receive log messages from CorePlus. Please see the documentation for your specific Syslog server software in order to correctly configure it.

2.2.6. Logging to the Clavister Logger

The *Clavister Logger* is a proprietary Clavister logging product that uses the proprietary Clavister *FWLog* message format for sending and storing log data. This logger is also referred to as the *FWLog Receiver*.

For backwards compatibility, CorePlus versions older than 8.90 support output to this logger but the software itself is not included with the distribution packet since analysis of logger output is only possible through older versions of CorePlus.

Example 2.13. Enabling Logging to Clavister Loggers

To enable logging of all events with a severity greater than or equal to *Notice* to the Clavister Logger (*FWLog Receiver*) with IP address *195.11.22.55* listening on port 999 (the default), follow the steps below:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add LogReceiver LogReceiverFWLog my_fwlog
           IPAddress=195.11.22.55 Port=999
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Log and Event Receivers > Add > FWLog Receiver**
2. Specify a suitable name for the event receiver, for example *my_fwlog*
3. Enter *195.11.22.55* as the **IP Address**
4. Click **OK**

The system will now be logging all events with a severity greater than or equal to *Notice* to the Clavister FWLogger at *195.11.22.55*.

2.2.7. SNMP Traps

The SNMP protocol

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a means for communicating between a Network Management System (NMS) and a managed device. SNMP defines 3 types of messages: a *Read* command for an NMS to examine a managed device, a *Write* command to alter the state of a managed device and a *Trap* which is used by managed devices to send messages asynchronously to an NMS about a change of state.

SNMP Traps in CorePlus

CorePlus takes the concept of an SNMP Trap one step further by allowing *any* event message to be sent as an SNMP trap. This means that the administrator can set up SNMP Trap notification of events that you consider significant for the operation of a network.

The file *Clavister-TRAP.MIB* which is included under the *SNMP* directory in the CorePlus distribution, defines the SNMP objects and data types that are used to describe an SNMP Trap received from CorePlus.

There is one generic trap object called *OSGenericTrap*, that is used for all traps. This object includes the following parameters:

- *System* - The system generating the trap
- *Severity* - Severity of the message
- *Category* - What CorePlus subsystem is reporting the problem
- *ID* - Unique identification within the category
- *Description* - A short textual description
- *Action* - What action is CorePlus taking

This information can be cross-referenced to the *Log Reference Guide*.



Note: SNMP Trap standards

CorePlus sends SNMP Traps which are based on the SNMPv2c standard as defined by RFC1901, RFC1905 and RFC1906.

Example 2.14. Sending SNMP Traps to an SNMP Trap Receiver

To enable generation of SNMP traps for all events with a severity greater than or equal to Alert to an SNMP trap receiver with an IP address of 195.11.22.55, follow the steps outlined below:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add LogReceiver EventReceiverSNMP2c my_snmp
                IPAddress=195.11.22.55
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Log & Event Receivers > Add > SNMP2cEventReceiver**
2. Specify a name for the event receiver, for example *my_snmp*
3. Enter 195.11.22.55 as the **IP Address**
4. Enter an SNMP **Community String** if needed by the trap receiver
5. Click **OK**

The system will now be sending SNMP traps for all events with a severity greater than or equal to Alert to an SNMP trap receiver at 195.11.22.55.

2.2.8. Customizing Log Messages

The sending of log messages can be customized to meet specific needs. This is done on a per log receiver basis. There are two types of customization that can be performed for a log receiver:

- Specific log messages or categories of log messages may be excluded from sending.
- The default severity of specific log messages or categories of log messages can be changed.

Log Message Categories

A log message is identified by a unique number. The first 3 digits of that number identify the *Category* to which the log message belongs. Categories relate to specific subsystems in CorePlus. For example, IPsec is such a subsystem and is identified by the category ID *018*. The *CorePlus Log Reference Guide* details all such log messages along with their unique ID number identifiers.

Changing the Default Severity Level

A log message has a default severity level, based on the importance of the event that caused the log message to be sent. However, this might differ between different installations. An event that is crucial in one scenario might not be of interest in another. For this reason it is possible to change the default severity level for a particular log message or for an entire category of messages.

The Severity Filter

Each configured log message server has a *Severity Filter* specified which, by default, contains all the available severity levels. This list can be changed so that only some of the severities are selected and only these are then sent to the log server.

Log Message Exceptions

CorePlus provides a *Log Message Exceptions* feature for each log receiver definition. Using this, an entire log category or a particular event within a category can be *Excluded* or *Included*.

The event ID or category can be identified from the *CorePlus Log Reference Guide*.

Generating Log Messages for One Event Type Only

The list of included and excluded log messages overrides what is defined for the *Severity Filter*. For example, if the severity filter specifies no severity then no events will cause a log message to be sent. However, if in the *Log Message Exceptions* we include the ALG event category, all ALG events will still be sent. This is useful if the administrator is interested in only a particular log event or event category.

A specific message or messages may be included whereas the group is excluded. This means that only the included messages will be sent from the category. Likewise, only specific messages might be excluded from a category.

2.2.9. Advanced Log Settings

The following advanced settings for logging are available to the administrator:

Send Limit

This setting limits how many log packets CorePlus may send out per second. This value should never be set too low, as this may result in important events not being logged, nor should it be set too high.

A situation where setting too high a value may cause damage is when CorePlus sends a log message to a server whose log receiver is not active. The server will send back an *ICMP Unreachable* message, which may cause CorePlus to send another log message, which in turn will result in another *ICMP Unreachable* message, and so on. By limiting the number of log messages CorePlus sends every second, the administrator can avoid encountering such an undesirable situation where bandwidth is consumed unnecessarily.

Default: 3600 (once per hour)

Alarm Repetition Interval

The delay in seconds between alarms when a continuous alarm is used. Minimum 0, Maximum 10,000.

Default: 60 (one minute)

-->

2.3. RADIUS Accounting

2.3.1. Overview

Within a network environment containing large numbers of users, it is advantageous to have one or a cluster of central servers that maintain user account information and are responsible for authentication and authorization tasks. The central database residing on the dedicated server(s) contains all user credentials as well as details of connections, significantly reducing administration complexity. The *Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service* (RADIUS) is an *Authentication, Authorization and Accounting* (AAA) protocol widely used to implement this approach and is used by CorePlus to implement user accounting.

RADIUS Architecture

The RADIUS protocol is based on a client/server architecture. The Clavister Security Gateway acts as the client of the RADIUS server, creating and sending requests to a dedicated server(s). In RADIUS terminology the security gateway acts as the *Network Access Server* (NAS).

For user authentication, the RADIUS server receives the requests, verifies the user's information by consulting its database, and returns either an "accept" or "reject" reply. decision to the requested client. In RFC2866, RADIUS was extended to handle the delivery of accounting information and this is the standard followed by CorePlus for user accounting. The benefits of having centralized servers are thus extended to user connection accounting. (For details of the usage of RADIUS for CorePlus authentication see *Section 8.2, "Authentication Setup"*).

2.3.2. RADIUS Accounting Messages

Statistics, such as number of bytes sent and received, and number of packets sent and received are updated and stored throughout RADIUS sessions. All statistics are updated for an authenticated user whenever a connection related to an authenticated user is closed.

When a new client session is started by a user establishing a new connection through the Clavister Security Gateway, CorePlus sends an *AccountingRequest* **START** message to a nominated RADIUS server, to record the start of the new session. User account information is also delivered to the RADIUS server. The server will send back an *AccountingResponse* message to CorePlus, acknowledging that the message has been received.

When a user is no longer authenticated, for example, after the user logs out or the session time expires, an *AccountingRequest* **STOP** message is sent by CorePlus containing the relevant session statistics. The information included in these statistics is user configurable. The contents of the **START** and **STOP** messages are described in detail below:

START Message Parameters

Parameters included in **START** messages sent by CorePlus are:

- **Type** - Marks this AccountingRequest as signalling the beginning of the service (START).
- **ID** - A unique identifier to enable matching of an AccountingRequest with Acct-Status-Type set to STOP.
- **User Name** - The user name of the authenticated user.
- **NAS IP Address** - The IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway.
- **NAS Port** - The port of the NAS on which the user was authenticated (this is a physical port

and not a TCP or UDP port).

- **User IP Address** - The IP address of the authenticated user. This is sent only if specified on the authentication server.
- **How Authenticated** - How the user was authenticated. This is set to either *RADIUS* if the user was authenticated via RADIUS, or *LOCAL* if the user was authenticated via a local user database.
- **Delay Time** - The time delay (in seconds) since the AccountingRequest packet was sent and the authentication acknowledgement was received. This can be subtracted from the time of arrival on the server to find the approximate time of the event generating this AccountingRequest. Note that this does not reflect network delays. The first attempt will have this parameter set to 0.
- **Timestamp** - The number of seconds since 1st January, 1970. Used to set a timestamp when this packet was sent from CorePlus.

STOP Message Parameters

Parameters included in **STOP** messages sent by CorePlus are:

- **Type** - Marks this accounting request as signalling the end of a session (STOP).
- **ID** - An identifier matching a previously sent AccountingRequest packet, with Acct-Status-Type set to START.
- **User Name** - The user name of the authenticated user.
- **NAS IP Address** - The IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway.
- **NAS Port** - The port on the NAS on which the user was authenticated. (This is a physical port and not a TCP or UDP port).
- **User IP Address** - The IP address of the authenticated user. This is sent only if specified on the authentication server.
- **Input Bytes** - The number of bytes received by the user. (*)
- **Output Bytes** - The number of bytes sent by the user. (*)
- **Input Packets** - The number of packets received by the user. (*)
- **Output Packets** - The number of packets sent by the user. (*)
- **Session Time** - The number of seconds this session lasted. (*)
- **Termination Cause** - The reason why the session was terminated.
- **How Authenticated** - How the user was authenticated. This is set to either *RADIUS* if the user was authenticated via RADIUS, or *LOCAL* if the user was authenticated via a local user database.
- **Delay Time** - See the above comment about this parameter.
- **Timestamp** - The number of seconds since 1970-01-01. Used to set a timestamp when this packet was sent from the Clavister Security Gateway.

In addition, two more attributes may be sent:

- **Input Gigawords** - Indicates how many times the Input Bytes counter has wrapped. This is only sent if Input Bytes has wrapped, and if the Input Bytes attribute is sent.
- **Output Gigawords** - Indicates how many times the Output Bytes counter has wrapped. This is only sent if Output Bytes has wrapped, and if the Output Bytes attribute is sent.



Tip: The meaning of the asterisk after a list entry

The asterisk "*" symbol after an entry in the list above indicates that the sending of the parameter is optional and is configurable.

2.3.3. Interim Accounting Messages

In addition to **START** and **STOP** messages CorePlus can optionally periodically send *Interim Accounting Messages* to update the accounting server with the current status of an authenticated user. An Interim Accounting Message can be seen as a snapshot of the network resources that an authenticated user has used up until a given point. With this feature, the RADIUS server can track how many bytes and packets an authenticated user has sent and received up until the point when the last message was sent.

An Interim Accounting Message contains the current values of the statistics for an authenticated user. It contains more or less the same parameters as found in an AccountingRequest Stop message, except that the *Acct-Terminate-Cause* is not included (as the user has not disconnected yet).

The frequency of Interim Accounting Messages can be specified either on the authentication server, or in CorePlus. Switching on the setting in CorePlus will override the setting on the accounting server.

2.3.4. Activating RADIUS Accounting

In order to activate RADIUS accounting a number of steps must be followed:

- The RADIUS accounting server must be specified.
- A user authentication object must have a rule associated with it where a RADIUS server is specified.

Some important points should be noted about activation:

- RADIUS Accounting will not function where a connection is subject to a *FwdFast* rule in the IP rule set.
- The same RADIUS server does not need to handle both authentication and accounting; one server can be responsible for authentication while another is responsible for accounting tasks.
- Multiple RADIUS servers can be configured in CorePlus to deal with the event when the primary server is unreachable.

2.3.5. RADIUS Accounting Security

Communication between CorePlus and any RADIUS accounting server is protected by the use of a shared secret. This secret is never sent over the network but instead a 16 byte long

Authenticator code is calculated using a one way MD5 hash function and this is used to authenticate accounting messages.

The shared secret is case sensitive, can contain up to 100 characters, and must be typed exactly the same for CorePlus and for the RADIUS server.

Messages are sent using the UDP protocol and the default port number used is 1813 although this is user configurable.

2.3.6. RADIUS Accounting and High Availability

In an HA cluster, accounting information is synchronized between the active and passive Clavister Security Gateways. This means that accounting information is automatically updated on both cluster members whenever a connection is closed. Two special accounting events are also used by the active unit to keep the passive unit synchronized:

- An **AccountingStart** event is sent to the inactive member in an HA setup whenever a response has been received from the accounting server. This specifies that accounting information should be stored for a specific authenticated user.
- A problem with accounting information synchronization could occur if an active unit has an authenticated user for whom the associated connection times out before it is synchronized on the inactive unit. To get around this problem, a special **AccountingUpdate** event is sent to the passive unit on a timeout and this contains the most recent accounting information for connections.

2.3.7. Handling Unresponsive Servers

A question arises in the case of a client that sends an *AccountingRequest* **START** packet which the RADIUS server never replies to. CorePlus will re-send the request after the user-specified number of seconds. This will however mean that a user will still have authenticated access while CorePlus is trying to contact to the accounting server.

Only after CorePlus has made three attempts to reach the server will it conclude that the accounting server is unreachable. The administrator can use the CorePlus advanced setting **Allow on error** to determine how this situation is handled. If this setting is enabled then an already authenticated user's session will be unaffected. If it is not enabled, any affected user will automatically be logged out even if they have already been authenticated.

2.3.8. Accounting and System Shutdowns

In the case that the client for some reason fails to send a RADIUS *AccountingRequest* **STOP** packet, the accounting server will never be able to update its user statistics, but will most likely believe that the session is still active. This situation should be avoided.

In the case that the Clavister Security Gateway administrator issues a shutdown command while authenticated users are still online, the *AccountingRequest* **STOP** packet will potentially never be sent. To avoid this, the advanced setting **Logout at shutdown** allows the administrator to explicitly specify that CorePlus must first send a **STOP** message for any authenticated users to any configured RADIUS servers before commencing with the shutdown.

2.3.9. Limitations with NAT

The User Authentication module in CorePlus is based on the user's IP address. Problems can therefore occur with users who have the same IP address.

This can happen, for example, when several users are behind the same network using NAT to

allow network access through a single external IP address. This means that as soon as one user is authenticated, traffic coming through that NAT IP address could be assumed to be coming from that one authenticated user even though it may come from other users on the same network. CorePlus RADIUS Accounting will therefore gather statistics for all the users on the network together as though they were one user instead of individuals.

2.3.10. RADIUS Advanced Settings

The following advanced settings are available with RADIUS accounting:

Allow on error

If there is no response from a configured RADIUS accounting server when sending accounting data for a user that has already been authenticated, then enabling this setting means that the user will continue to be logged in.

Disabling the setting will mean that the user will be logged out if the RADIUS accounting server cannot be reached even though the user has been previously authenticated.

Default: *Enabled*

Logout at shutdown

If there is an orderly shutdown of the Clavister Security Gateway by the administrator, then CorePlus will delay the shutdown until it has sent RADIUS accounting **STOP** messages to any configured RADIUS server.

If this option is not enabled, CorePlus will shutdown even though there may be RADIUS accounting sessions that have not been correctly terminated. This could lead to the situation that the RADIUS server will assume users are still logged in even though their sessions have been terminated.

Default: *Enabled*

Maximum Radius Contexts

The maximum number of contexts allowed with RADIUS. This applies to RADIUS use with both accounting and authentication.

Default: *1024*

Example 2.15. RADIUS Accounting Server Setup

This example shows configuring of a local RADIUS server known as *radius-accounting* with IP address *123.04.03.01* using port *1813*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **User Authentication > Accounting Servers > Add > Radius Server**

2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** radius-accounting
 - **IP Address:** 123.04.03.01
 - **Port:** 1813
 - **Retry Timeout:** 2
 - **Shared Secret:***enter a password*
 - **Confirm Secret:***re-enter the password*
 - **Routing Table:** main
3. Click **OK**

2.4. Monitoring

The real-time performance of CorePlus can be monitored in a number of ways which are described in this section. They are:

- Using the Real-time Monitoring functionality in CorePlus.
- CorePlus Real-time monitor alerts.
- The CorePlus Link Monitor.
- Monitoring through an SNMP client.
- Hardware Monitoring.

Monitoring with PinPoint™

Clavister *PinPoint* is a separate software product that was used with earlier versions of CorePlus for real-time monitoring.

2.4.1. Real-time Monitor Alerts

A number of CorePlus statistical values can graphically monitored through the *Real-time Monitoring*. *Real-time Monitor Alert* thresholds can be specified in CorePlus for any of these monitored values so that they can have a maximum and/or a minimum numerical threshold.

Should a specified maximum or minimum threshold be crossed, CorePlus will automatically generate a log message which will be sent to all configured log receivers. All such log messages belong to the **REALTIMEMONITOR** message category which has the identity number **54**. The log message identity will therefore take the form **054XXXXX** where **XXXXX** represents the position of the statistic generating the event in the list of alert rules. A log message with identity **05400003**, for example, identifies the third rule in the rule list.

Each Monitor Alert Rule consists of the following fields:

Name	User assigned name for the rule.
Sample time	The interval in seconds between checking the statistic.
Low threshold	The lower threshold (if specified).
High threshold	A higher threshold (if specified).
Continuous	This determines if an event is also generated when the threshold is crossed in the other direction. In other words, the statistic moves back to within acceptable limits. This field can be Yes or No .
Backoff	The minimum number of seconds between consecutive <i>Monitor Threshold Rule</i> log messages. This value can be useful in preventing a flood of log messages when a statistic is repeatedly passing a threshold and then receding from it again.

2.4.2. The Link Monitor

Overview

The *Link Monitor* is a CorePlus feature that allows monitoring of the connectivity to one or more IP addresses external to the Clavister Security Gateway. This monitoring is done using standard ICMP "Ping" requests and allows CorePlus to assess the availability of the network pathways to these IP addresses. The administrator can select one of a number of actions to occur should a pathway appear to be broken for some reason.

Link Monitor Actions

If sufficient replies are not received to Link Monitor polling, CorePlus makes the assumption that the common link to those IP address is down and can then initiate one of 3 configurable actions:

1. A CorePlus reconfigure.
2. A High Availability (HA) cluster failover.
3. An HA cluster failover followed by a CorePlus reconfigure.

The Link Monitor Reconfigure is Different

The reconfigure that can be triggered by the Link Monitor has one special aspect to it. The Link Monitor reconfigure has the additional action of restarting all interfaces. This means that if there is a problem related to a particular Ethernet NIC, perhaps due to overload, then this can be cleared by interface initialization. This results in only a momentary delay in throughput while the reconfigure takes place.

Link Monitor Uses

The Link Monitor is useful in two distinct scenarios:

- An external device develops an occasional problem with its link to the Clavister Security Gateway and the physical link needs to be renegotiated. Such problems can occur sometimes with some older equipment such as ADSL Modems. For this scenario action **1. Reconfigure** should be selected.

A reconfigure means that the CorePlus configuration will be reloaded. All connections and states are saved for the reconfiguration but reloading means all traffic is suspended for a short period and all interface links to external devices are renegotiated.

- In an HA cluster setup, the link from the master to the external Internet (or other part of a network) can be continually monitored so that should the link fail, the slave will take over (assuming that the slave has a different physical connection to the monitored address). The action chosen for HA should be either **2. Failover** or **3. Failover and reconfigure**.

If the first action option **1. Reconfigure** is chosen in an HA cluster, then the reconfigure will also cause a failover since it will temporarily suspend the master's operation while the reconfigure takes place and the slave will take over when it detects this inactivity. If reconfiguration with failover is desirable it is better to select the option **3. Failover and reconfigure** since this does the failover first and is almost instantaneous with almost no traffic interruption. Reconfigure first is slower and results in some traffic interruption.

To preserve all tunnels in a VPN scenario, it is best to choose the **2. Failover** option since a reconfiguration can cause some tunnels to be lost.

Link Monitoring with HA Clusters

The most common use for link monitoring is in the HA cluster scenario described above. It is

important that the master and slave do not duplicate the same condition that triggered the Link Monitor. For example, if a particular router connected to the master Clavister Security Gateway was being "pinged" by Link Monitoring, the slave should not also be connected to that router. If it is, the continued triggering of a reconfiguration by the Link Monitor will then cause the slave to failover back to the master, which will then failover back to the slave again and so on.

If it is important to not allow a failover during reconfiguration of the active unit in an HA cluster then the advanced setting **Reconf Failover Time** should be set to a value which is neither too low or too high.

Reconf Failover Time controls how long the inactive unit will wait for the active unit to reconfigure before taking over. Setting this value too low will mean the inactive unit does not wait long enough. Setting the value too high could mean significant downtime if the active unit fails during reconfiguration and the inactive unit needs to take over.

More information on clusters can be found in *Chapter 11, High Availability*.

Link Monitoring Parameters

The Link Monitor takes the following parameters:

Action	Specifies which of the 3 actions described above CorePlus should take.
Addresses	<p>Specifies a group of hosts to monitor. If at least half of them do not respond, CorePlus assumes that there is a link problem. A host's responses are ignored until CorePlus has been able to reach it at least once. This means that an unreachable host can be responsible for triggering an action once but not twice.</p> <p>A group of three hosts where one has been unreachable since the last configuration will therefore be treated as a two-host group until the third host becomes reachable. This also means that if a link problem triggers an action and the problem is not solved, CorePlus will not attempt to repeat the same action until the problem is solved and the hosts are again reachable.</p>
Maximum Loss	A single host is considered unreachable if this number of consecutive ping responses to that host are not replied to.
Grace Period	Do not allow the link monitor to trigger an action for this number of seconds after the last reconfiguration. This avoids false positives during initial link negotiation. The default value is 45 seconds.
Send from Shared IP Address	This option only appears in an HA cluster and should be used if individual public IP addresses are not available to the devices in a cluster.

2.4.3. SNMP Monitoring

Overview

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a standardized protocol for management of network devices. An SNMP compliant client can connect to a network device which supports the SNMP protocol to query and control it.

CorePlus supports SNMP version 1 and version 2. Connection can be made by any SNMP compliant clients to devices running CorePlus. However, only query operations are permitted for security reasons. Specifically, CorePlus supports the following SNMP request operations by a client:

- The *GET REQUEST* operation
- The *GET NEXT REQUEST* operation
- The *GET BULK REQUEST* operation (SNMP Version 2c only)

The CorePlus MIB

The *Management Information Base* (MIB) is a database, usually in the form of a text file, which defines the parameters on a network device that an SNMP client can query or change. The MIB file for a device running CorePlus is distributed with the standard CorePlus distribution pack as a file with the name *CLAVISTER-MIB*.

This MIB file should be transferred to the hard disk of the workstation that will run the SNMP client so it can be imported by the client software. When the SNMP client runs, the MIB file is read and tells the client which values can be queried on a CorePlus device.

Each entry in the MIB includes a textual explanation of what the value is and a complete list is not reproduced in this guide. A typical MIB file entry for the total number of packets transmitted by an interface appears as follows:

```
clvIfPktsTotCnt OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      Counter32
    MAX-ACCESS  read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "Total number of packets transmitted by the interface"
    ::= { clvIfStatsEntry 10 }
```

Defining SNMP Access

SNMP access is defined through the definition of a CorePlus *Remote* object with a *Mode* value of *SNMP*. The Remote object requires the entry of:

- **Interface** - The CorePlus interface on which SNMP requests will arrive.
- **Network** - The IP address or network from which SNMP requests will come.
- **Community** - The community string which provides password security for the accesses.

The Community String

Security for SNMP Versions 1 and 2c is handled by the *Community String* which is the same as a password for SNMP access. The Community String should be difficult to guess and should therefore be constructed in the same way as any other password, using combinations of upper and lower case letters along with digits.

Enabling an IP Rule for SNMP

The advanced setting **SNMP Before Rules** controls if the IP rule set checks all accesses by SNMP clients. This is by default disabled and the recommendation is to always enable this setting.

The effect of enabling this setting is to add an invisible **Allow** rule at the top of the IP rule set which automatically permits accesses on port 161 from the network and on the interface specified for SNMP access. Port 161 is usually used for SNMP and CorePlus always expects SNMP traffic on that port.

Remote Access Encryption

It should be noted that SNMP Version 1 or 2c access means that the community string will be sent as plain text over a network. This is clearly insecure if a remote client is communicating over the public Internet. It is therefore advisable to have remote access take place over an encrypted VPN tunnel or similarly secure means of communication.

Preventing SNMP Overload

The advanced setting **SNMP Request Limit** restricts the number of SNMP requests allowed per second. This can help prevent attacks through SNMP overload.

Example 2.16. Enabling SNMP Monitoring

This example enables SNMP access through the internal **lan** interface from the network **mgmt-net** using the community string *Mg1RQqR*. Since the management client is on the internal network it isn't needed to implement a VPN tunnel for it.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add RemoteManagement RemoteMgmtSNMP my_snmp Interface=lan
                Network=mgmt-net SNMPGetCommunity=Mg1RQqR
```

Should it be necessary to enable **SNMPBeforeRules** (which is enabled by default) then the command is:

```
Device:/> set Settings RemoteMgmtSettings SNMPBeforeRules=Yes
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Goto **System > Remote Management > Add > SNMP management**
2. For **Remote access type** enter:
 - **Name:** a suitable name, for example *snmp_access*
 - **Community:** Mg1RQqR
3. For **Access Filter** enter:
 - **Interface:** lan
 - **Network:** mgmt-net
4. Click **OK**

Should it be necessary to enable **SNMPBeforeRules** (which is enabled by default) then the setting can be found in **System > Remote Management > Advanced Settings**.

2.4.3.1. SNMP Advanced Settings

The following SNMP advanced settings can be found under the **Remote Management** section in the WebUI.

SNMP Before RulesLimit

Enable SNMP traffic to the security gateway regardless of configured IP Rules.

Default: *Enabled*

SNMP Request Limit

Maximum number of SNMP requests that will be processed each second by CorePlus. Should SNMP requests exceed this rate then the excess requests will be ignored by CorePlus.

Default: *100*

System Contact

The contact person for the managed node.

Default: *N/A*

System Name

The name for the managed node.

Default: *N/A*

System Location

The physical location of the node.

Default: *N/A*

Interface Description (SNMP)

What to display in the SNMP MIB-II ifDescr variables.

Default: *Name*

Interface Alias

What to display in the SNMP ifMIB ifAlias variables.

Default: *Hardware*

2.4.4. Hardware Monitoring

Availability

Certain Clavister hardware models allow the administrator to use the CLI to query the current value of various hardware operational parameters such as the current temperature inside the security gateway. This feature is referred to as *Hardware Monitoring*.



Caution: Do NOT try this feature with non-Clavister hardware

Hardware monitoring is NOT supported on non-Clavister hardware. Using the HWM command by mistake on non-Clavister hardware can cause CorePlus to halt processing and a restart will be required to resolve the problem.

Configuring and performing hardware monitoring can be done either through the CLI or through the Web Interface.

Enabling Hardware Monitoring

The **System > Hardware Monitoring** section of the Web Interface provides the administrator with the following settings for enabling hardware monitoring when it is available:

Enable Sensors

Enable/disable all hardware monitoring functionality.

Default: *Disabled*

Poll Interval

Polling interval for the Hardware Monitor which is the delay in milliseconds between readings of hardware monitor values. Minimum value: *100*, Maximum value: *10000*.

Default: *500*

Using the *hwm* CLI Command

To get a list current values from all available sensors, the following command can be used:

```
Device:/> hwm -all
```

This can be abbreviated to:

```
Device:/> hwm -a
```

Some typical output from this command for two temperature sensors is shown below:

```
Device:/> hwm -a
Name                Current value (unit)
-----
SYS Temp            =   44.000 (C)      (x)
CPU Temp            =   41.500 (C)      (x)
```



Note

The "(x)" on the left side of the sensor listing indicates that the sensor is enabled.

The `-verbose` option displays the current values plus the configured ranges. Some typical output from this command for the Clavister SG3200 Series is shown below:

```
Device: /> hwm -a -v
4 sensors available
Poll interval time = 500ms

Name [type][number] = low_limit] current_value [high_limit (unit)
-----
SYS Temp          [TEMP ][( 0] =  44.000]    45.000 [ 0.000 (C)
CPU Temp          [TEMP ][( 1] =  42.000]    42.500 [ 0.000 (C)
AUX Temp          [TEMP ][( 2] =  41.000]    43.000 [ 0.000 (C)
CPU Fan1         [FANRPM][( 1] = 6125.000]  6250.000 [ 0.000 (RPM)

Time to probe sensors: 2.980000e-05 seconds
```

Each physical attribute listed on the left is given a minimum and maximum range within which it should operate. When the value returned after polling falls outside this range, CorePlus optionally generates a log message that is sent to the configured log servers.



Note: Different hardware models have different sensors and values

Each hardware model may have a different set of sensors and a different operating range. The above output and its values are for illustration only.

Setting the Minimum and Maximum Range

The minimum and maximum values shown in the output from the `hwm` command are set through the Web Interface by going to **System > Hardware Monitoring > Add** and selecting the hardware parameter to monitor. The desired operating range can then be specified.

A sensor is identified in the Web Interface by specifying a unique combination of the following parameters:

- **Type**

This is the *type* of sensor shown in the CLI output above and is presented as a list of choices in the Web Interface. For example, *Temp*.

- **Sensor**

This is the *number* of the sensor as shown in the CLI output above. For example, the *SYS Temp* number is *0*.

- **Name**

This is the *Name* of the sensor as shown in the CLI output above. For example, *SYS Temp*.

- **Enabled**

An individual sensor can be enabled or disabled used this setting. When enabled, an "(x)" is

displayed next to the sensor in the output from the *hwm* command.

2.4.5. Memory Monitoring

The **System > Hardware Monitoring** section of the Web Interface or InControl provides the administrator with a number of settings connected with monitoring of available memory. These are:

Memory Poll Interval

Memory polling interval which is the delay in minutes between readings of memory values. Minimum 1, Maximum 200.

Default: *15 minutes*

Memory Use Percentage

True if the memory monitor uses a percentage as the unit for monitoring, *False* if megabytes are used. Applies to Alert Level, Critical Level and Warning Level.

Default: *True*

Memory Log Repetition

Should we send a log message for each poll result that is in the Alert, Critical or Warning level, or should we only send when a new level is reached. If *True*, a message is sent each time Memory Poll Interval is triggered. If *False*, a message is sent when a value goes from one level to another.

Default: *False*

Alert Level

Generate an Alert log message if free memory is below this number of bytes. Disable by setting to 0. Maximum value is 10,000.

Default: *0*

Critical Level

Generate a Critical log message if free memory is below this number of bytes. Disable by setting to 0. Maximum value is 10,000.

Default: *0*

Warning Level

Generate a Warning log message if free memory is below this number of bytes. Disable by setting to 0. Maximum value 10,000.

Default: *0*

2.5. Diagnostic Tools

2.5.1. Overview

In the case of a serious system problem CorePlus provides some tools to aid in identifying the cause. These are:

- Diagnostic CLI commands
- The *pcapdump* CLI command

Both of these provide output which can be sent to support staff at Clavister to help identify the circumstances that led to the problem in question.

2.5.2. Diagnostic CLI Commands

The *stat* CLI Command

If a serious CorePlus problem is suspected then the first step should be to use the CLI command:

```
Device: /> stat
```

The *stat* command will indicate the date and time of the last system shutdown and can indicate if there has been a serious error in CorePlus operation. It should be remembered however that the buffer which *stat* uses is cleared by certain operations such as *reconfigure* and the output will not therefore show what occurred prior to buffer clearance.

The *dconsole* CLI Command

The next step is to use the CLI command:

```
Device: /> dconsole
```

This can be abbreviated to:

```
Device: /> dcon
```

The *dconsole* command provides a list of important events in CorePlus operation and can help to establish the date, time and nature of events leading up to a serious problem occurring. The output might look similar like the following:

```
Showing diagnose entries since 2008-05-22:
2008-06-21 11:54:58      Start (9.15.02-0:131)
2008-06-21 11:56:16      Stop (RECONFIGURE)
2008-06-21 11:56:21      Start (9.15.02-0:131)
2008-06-21 11:57:29      Stop (RECONFIGURE)
2008-06-21 11:59:31      Start (9.15.02-0:131)
2008-06-21 11:59:49      Stop (NORMAL)
'
```

Output from *dconsole* can include a dump of the system memory in the case of serious runtime errors. Such a dump will look similar to the following:

```
'
Reason: Exception 'DataAbort' occurred at address 0x7aaea34
```

```

Generation date/time: 2008-07-04 14:23:56 List of loaded PE-modules:
fwloader(1.07.04): BA:0x00100000, EP:0x00101028, SS:0x0, IS:0xe7000
fwcore(89.15.02-2336): BA:0x07761038, EP:0x0007c630 Register dump:
-----
r0 : 0xe1a0003c, r1 : 0x07c685dc, r2 : 0x00000004, r3 : 0x50013700,
r4 : 0x06cb2d04, r5 : 0x0753a740, r6 : 0x050ce1f8, r7 : 0x00000000,
r8 : 0x0753a79c, r9 : 0x050ce1f8, r10: 0x00000000, r11: 0x0775ff34,
r12: 0x00000004, sp : 0x0775fcec, lr : 0x079de7e4 Stack dump:
5da89306 c33613f4 c330cfc5 04411507 45515a49 86619f8b c0db0a81
4e395861 cb25b796 e3108934 932766c5 4dcff9e9 711c3463 b9cd5d1e
52149961 9324dea3 d340dc25 15458610 63582ded 689a0c54 dfb43131
02c7d971 a0ebb72c bfaae832 db216923 08ba693b 95e4de97 98d121a2
'
'

```

Although *dconsole* output may be difficult to interpret by the administrator, it can be emailed to Clavister support representatives for further investigation.

The *dconsole* command supersedes the *crashdump* command found in earlier versions of CorePlus.

2.5.3. The *pcapdump* CLI Command

A valuable diagnostic tool is the ability to examine the packets that enter and leave the interfaces of a Clavister Security Gateway. For this purpose, CorePlus provides the CLI command *pcapdump* which not only allows the examination of packet streams entering and leaving interfaces but also allows the filtering of these streams according to specified criteria.

The packets that are filtered out by *pcapdump* can then be saved in a file of type *.cap* which is the defacto *libpcap* library file format standard for packet capture.

The complete syntax of the *pcapdump* CLI command is described in the *CLI Reference Guide*.

A Simple Example

An example of *pcapdump* usage is the following sequence:

```

Device: /> pcapdump -size 1024 -start int
Device: /> pcapdump -stop int
Device: /> pcapdump -show
Device: /> pcapdump -write int -filename=cap_int.cap
Device: /> pcapdump -cleanup

```

Going through this line by line we have:

1. Recording is started for the *int* interface using a buffer size of 1024 Kbytes.

```
Device: /> pcapdump -size 1024 -start int
```

2. The recording is stopped for the *int* interface.

```
Device: /> pcapdump -stop int
```

3. The dump output is displayed on the console in a summarized form.

```
Device: /> pcapdump -show
```

4. The same information is written in its complete form to a file called *cap_int.cap*.

```
Device: /> pcapdump -write int -filename=cap_int.cap
```

At this point, the file *cap_int.cap* should be downloaded to the management workstation for analysis.

5. A final cleanup is performed and all memory taken is released.

```
Device: /> pcapdump -cleanup
```

Re-using Capture Files

Since the only way to delete files from the Clavister Security Gateway is through the serial console, the recommendation is to always use the same filename when using the *pcapdump* *-write* option. Each new write operation will then overwrite the old file.

Running on Multiple Interfaces

It is possible to have multiple *pcapdump* executions being performed at the same time. The following points describe this feature:

1. All capture from all executions goes to the same memory buffer.

The command can be launched multiple times with different interfaces specified. In this case the packet flow for the different executions will be grouped together in different sections of the report.

If a clearer picture of packets flowing between interfaces is required in the output then it is best to issue one *pcapdump* command with the interfaces of interest specified.

2. If no interface is specified then the capture is done on all interfaces.
3. The *-stop* option without an interface specified will halt capture on all interfaces.
4. *pcapdump* prevents capture running more than once on the same interface by detecting command duplication.

Filter Expressions

Seeing all packets passing through a particular interface often provides an excess of information to be useful. To focus on particular types of traffic the *pcapdump* command has the option to add a *filter expression* which has one of the following forms:

- eth=<macaddr> - Filter on source or destination MAC address.
- ethsrc=<macaddr> - Filter on source MAC address.
- ethdest=<macaddr> - Filter on destination MAC address.
- ip=<ipaddr> - Filter source or destination IP address.
- ipsrc=<ipaddr> - Filter on source IP address.
- ipdest=<ipaddr> - Filter on destination IP address.
- port=<portnum> - Filter on source or destination port number.
- srcport=<portnum> - Filter on source port number.
- destport=<portnum> - Filter on destination port number.
- proto=<id> - Filter on protocol where id is the decimal protocol id.
- <protocolname> - Instead of using *-proto=*, the protocol name alone can be specified and can be one of *-tcp*, *-udp* or *-icmp*.

Downloading the Output File

As shown in one of the examples above, the *-write* option of *pcapdump* can save buffered packet

information to a file on the Clavister Security Gateway.

These output files are placed into the CorePlus root directory and the file name is specified in the *pcapdump* command line, usually with a filetype of *.cap*. The name of output files must follow certain rules which are described below. Files can be downloaded to the local workstation using Secure Copy (SCP) (see *Section 2.1.6, "Secure Copy"*). A list of all files in the CorePlus root directory can be viewed by issuing the *ls* CLI command.

The *-cleanup* option will erase the files so cleanup should only be done after file download is complete.

Output File Naming Restrictions

The name of the file used for *pcapdump* output must comply with the following rules:

- Excluding the filename extension, the name may not exceed 8 characters in length.
- The filename extension cannot exceed 3 characters in length.
- The filename and extension can only contain the characters A-Z, 0-9, "-" and "_".

Combining Filters

It is possible to use several of these filter expressions together in order to further refine the packets that are of interest. For example we might want to examine the packets going to a particular destination port at a particular destination IP address.

Compatibility with Wireshark

The open source tool *Wireshark* (formerly called *Ethereal*) is an extremely useful analysis tool for examining logs of captured packets. The industry standard *.pcap* file format used by *pcapdump* with its *-write* option means that it is compatible with Wireshark.

For more complete information about this topic, see <http://www.wireshark.org>.

2.5.4. Hardware Fault Troubleshooting

It may be the case that operational problems are caused by a problem with hardware and not firmware. For this reason, CorePlus provides the CLI command *selftest* to perform tests on various aspects of the hardware.

Do Not Conduct Tests in a Live Environment

It is important to bear in mind that the *selftest* command **should never be used on a CorePlus system that is carrying live traffic**. The command can cause connections and associated data to be lost so it is important that the system tested is isolated from live traffic.

A Simple Example

A simple use of *selftest* is to test the memory:

```
Device: /> selftest -memory
```

This writes a one megabyte block of data to memory and reads it back. The number of megabytes written can be varied with the *-num=* parameter. The test is repeated once but we

could repeat the test 10 times with the `-num` option:

```
Device: /> selftest -memory -num=10
```

The `-burnin` Option

If the `-burnin` option is used, a set of tests, known as the *test subset*, is repeated continuously for a period of time. The default test period is two hours and the default subset is `-memory`, `-ping`, `-throughput`, `-traffic` and `-cryptoaccel`.

The duration of the `-burnin` test can be changed, as can the test subset. For example, a test of the memory and media that is repeated for 30 minutes would be:

```
Device: /> selftest -burnin -minutes=30 -memory -media
```

The `-burnin` option could, for example, be used to detect errors that only occur sporadically or possibly only occur after some hardware component has reached a certain critical operating temperature.

The full list of options for `selftest` CLI command can be found in the *CLI Reference Guide* along with more command line examples.

2.6. Maintenance

2.6.1. Software Upgrades

Clavister Security Gateways are driven and controlled by CorePlus and this consists of two major components: the CorePlus *Core* and the CorePlus *Loader*. Usually it is the CorePlus *Core* which is the main concern of the administrator since this is the executable binary of CorePlus and contains all its principal components. The *Loader*, as described below, is a low level firmware loader used by the *Core* that is updated only with some major revisions of CorePlus.




Figure 2.1. CorePlus Firmware Structure

2.6.1.1. The Core Executable

Whenever new functionality is added to CorePlus, or when defects have been found and corrected, a new *Core* is produced which is the CorePlus executable binary. The new *Core* is packaged as a single file which is digitally signed and made available for download from the Clavister *Customer Web*. The *Customer Web* can be found at the URL: <https://clientweb.clavister.com>.

In the distribution of software upgrades, a *Core* file name will indicate that it is either a **Full** version designed for most hardware models or the file name will indicate a specific hardware model. If there is a *Core* file with a filename related to your hardware then use that file for upgrading, otherwise use the version with **Full** in the filename.



Important: Some Core files are hardware model specific

The CorePlus **Core** executable file for some Clavister hardware models, for example the SG10 and SG50 series, are specific to these hardware models and such a model specific file will have a filename which includes the model number.

Do **NOT** use the version called **Full** for upgrading the SG10 and SG50. Use the model specific files instead.

The Two Types of Upgrade

There are two types of CorePlus *Core* upgrades:

- Minor upgrades, for example, from version 8.90.01 to 8.90.02, include bug fixes and minor feature enhancements and are freely available to all customers who are licensed to run the major version.
- Major upgrades, for example, from version 8.80 to 8.90, are only available for customers that have a valid software subscription service contract.

Upgrades Under VMware

When running CorePlus under a VMware server, upgrades of CorePlus can be done just as they are done on a single physical computer. It is not necessary to create a new virtual machine for a new version.

Checking the *Dynamic High Buffers* Setting

Make sure that the advanced setting *Dynamic High Buffers* is enabled after an upgrade. This setting ensures that sufficient memory is allocated for handling connections.

This setting requires a hardware restart for a new value to take effect. A reconfiguration is not sufficient.

Where CorePlus is handling tens of thousands of simultaneous connections then it may be necessary to manually set a value above the automatic value. If the **HighBuffers** value is set too high this may impact throughput latency.

New Release Notifications

Clavister maintains an RSS feed of announcements that can be subscribed to at <https://forums.clavister.com/rss-feeds/announcements/>. It is recommended to subscribe to this feed so that you receive notifications when new releases of CorePlus versions are available for download and installation. Alternatively, announcements can be read directly from the Clavister forums which can be found at <https://forums.clavister.com/>.

2.6.2. Auto-Update Mechanism

A number of the CorePlus security features rely on external servers for automatic updates and content filtering. The Intrusion Prevention and Detection system and Anti-Virus modules require access to updated signature databases in order to provide protection against the latest threats.

To facilitate the Auto-Update feature Clavister maintains a global infrastructure of servers providing update services for Clavister Security Gateways. To ensure availability and low response times, CorePlus employs a mechanism for automatically selecting the most appropriate server to supply updates.

For more details on these features see the following sections:

- *Section 6.5, "Intrusion Detection and Prevention"*
- *Section 6.4, "Anti-Virus Scanning"*
- *Section 6.3, "Web Content Filtering"*
- *Appendix A, Update Subscriptions*

2.6.3. Backing Up Configurations

The administrator has the ability to take a snapshot of a CorePlus system at a given point in time and restore it when necessary. The snapshot can be of two types:

- A *configuration backup* which does not include the installed CorePlus version. This is useful if the CorePlus version does not change.
- A *system backup* which is a complete backup of both the configuration and the installed CorePlus software. This is useful if both the configuration is to be changed and the CorePlus version upgraded.

Backup files can be created both by downloading the files directly from the Clavister Security Gateway using SCP (Secure Copy) or alternatively using the WebUI. It cannot be done though the CLI.

Operation Interruption

Backups can be created at any time without disturbing CorePlus operation. After restoring a backup it is necessary to perform an **Activate** to make the restored configuration/system active.

Restoring and activating a configuration-only backup should not, in most cases, disturb system operation. Complete system restore, however, is more involved and will require that CorePlus reinitializes, with the loss of all existing connections. Initialization may require some seconds to complete depending on the hardware type and normal operation will not be possible during this time.

Backup and Restore using SCP

There are two files located in the CorePlus root directory:

- *config.bak* - This is the backup of the current configuration.
- *full.bak* - This is the backup of the complete system.

SCP can be used to download either of these files. When the download is complete the filename will be altered to include the date. For example, *full.bak* might become *full-20081121.bak* to show it is a snapshot of the state on November 21st, 2008.

To restore a backup file, the administrator should upload the file to the Clavister Security Gateway. The name of the file does not need to be changed in any way and can retain the date since CorePlus will read a header in the file to determine what it is.

Backup and Restore using the WebUI

As an alternative to using SCP, the administrator can initiate a backup or restore of the configuration or complete system directly through the WebUI. The example below illustrates how this is done.

Example 2.17. Backing up the Entire System

In this example we will backup the entire system on 12 December 2008.

InControl

Backing up the system with InControl is done in a different way to the Web Interface

Web Interface

1. Go to **Maintenance > Backup**
2. The *Backup* dialog will be shown
3. Press the **Backup configuration** button
4. A file dialog is shown - choose a directory for the created file
5. Download of the backup file will then start

The same *maintenance* menu option can be used for restoring a previously created backup.

**Note: Backups do not contain everything**

Backups include only static information from the CorePlus configuration. Dynamic information such as the DHCP server lease database or Anti-Virus/IDP databases will not be backed up.

2.6.4. Restore to Factory Defaults

A *restore to factory defaults* can be applied so that it is possible to return to the original hardware state that existed when the Clavister Security Gateway was shipped by Clavister. When a restore is applied, data such as the IDP and Anti-Virus databases as well as *pcapdump* files are not deleted. These must be explicitly removed by using the appropriate command.

Example 2.18. Complete Hardware Reset to Factory Defaults**Command-Line Interface**

```
Device: /> reset -unit
```

InControl

This operation cannot be performed with InControl.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Maintenance > Reset**
2. Select **Restore the entire unit to factory defaults** then confirm and wait for the restore to complete.

**Important: Any upgrades will be lost after a factory reset**

*It should be understood that a reset to **factory defaults** is exactly that. Any CorePlus upgrades performed since the unit left the factory will be lost.*

Reset via the Console Boot Menu

Connect the serial cable and connect with a console using a terminal emulator software product. The *HyperTerminal* application shipped with some Microsoft PCs can be used for this purpose. Restart the Clavister Security Gateway and press a key when the "Press any key to abort and load boot menu" message appears at the console. When the console boot menu appears, select the hardware reset option, then confirm and wait for the process to complete. Using the console boot menu is fully described in *Section 2.1.7, "The Console Boot Menu"*.



Warning: Do NOT abort a reset to defaults

If the process of resetting to factory defaults is aborted before it finishes, the Clavister Security Gateway can then cease to function properly with the complete loss of all stored user data.

End of Life Procedures

The restore to factory defaults option should also be used as part of the end of life procedure when a Clavister Security Gateway is taken out of operation and will no longer be used. As part of the decommissioning procedure, a restore to factory defaults should always be run in order to remove all sensitive information such as VPN settings.



Note: Original 8.nn systems need 2 resets

If an upgrade from a CorePlus 8.nn version has been done previously, the restore to factory defaults operation must be done twice since the first time will only return the device to the state it was in before the upgrade.

As a further precaution at the end of the product's life, it is also recommended that the memory media in a Clavister Security Gateway is destroyed and certified as destroyed by a suitable provider of computer disposal services.

2.6.5. Listing and Adding Ethernet Ports

The CLI command *pciscan* is a tool that is used in listing and upgrading the Ethernet ports for the Clavister Security Gateway. It is usually relevant only for non-Clavister hardware although it can be used for examining the PCI hardware in Clavister devices.

Checking Ethernet Ports

If the *pciscan* command is used without parameters then a list of all the supported Ethernet ports in the Clavister Security Gateway is obtained:

```
Device: /> pciscan

Idx VendorID DeviceID Bus Slot IRQ Driver Info
012 0x8086 0x1010 2 4 0 "E1000" Intel NETWORK - ETHERNET
013 0x8086 0x1010 2 4 1 "E1000" Intel NETWORK - ETHERNET
```

```
020 0x8086 0x1012 5 4 0 "E1000" Intel NETWORK - ETHERNET
021 0x8086 0x1012 5 4 1 "E1000" Intel NETWORK - ETHERNET
022 0x8086 0x1012 6 4 0 "E1000" Intel NETWORK - ETHERNET
"
"
```

Each line in the output shows the current configuration for each Ethernet port.

To see all Ethernet ports on the Clavister Security Gateway, regardless if they are supported or not, the command is:

```
Device: /> pciscan -ethernet
```

To see all hardware on the PCI bus, both Ethernet and non-Ethernet, the command is:

```
Device: /> pciscan -all
```

Automatic Reconfiguration

If a new Ethernet port is added to the Clavister Security Gateway, this can be detected and the configuration updated automatically with the command:

```
Device: /> pciscan -cfgupdate
```

Forcing the Choice of Driver

When using non-Clavister hardware, there may be PCI cards installed that require a driver that cannot be automatically selected using the `-cfgupdate` option. In such a case the administrator can explicitly choose the driver from a list using the `-force_driver` option.

The index number of the PCI card is first identified from the output of the `pciscan -all` command. If the card number index is found to be 7 and the driver to choose is `E1000` then the command is:

```
Device: /> pciscan -force_driver 7 E1000
```

The command offers tab completion for the available driver names so it is not necessary to know them in advance. It may be the case that a process of trial and error is required to identify the correct driver for the card.

2.7. Licensing

2.7.1. Overview

To use CorePlus in a live environment, a CorePlus *license file* must be deployed to the Clavister Security Gateway. A unique license file is needed for each processor on which CorePlus runs and in the case of the multi-bladed systems, a different license file is required for each installed blade since these operate as autonomous Clavister Security Gateways.

The purpose of the license file is to define what the capabilities and limitations a CorePlus installation will have. Such capabilities include parameters such as the number of VPN tunnels allowed, the number of routing tables or the number of virtual interfaces. This manual does not cover license pricing. Please refer to your local Clavister sales office for pricing information.

2.7.2. Evaluation Mode

Each installation of CorePlus requires a unique license, issued by Clavister, to have full functionality. Without correct licensing, CorePlus will only operate for 2 hours from hardware boot up. After 2 hours, CorePlus will cease to function and will output an expiry message to the local console.

The hardware must be re-booted to enable CorePlus for a further 2 hour period although there are no limits on how many times this can be done. The 2 hour limit is designed to allow a reasonable window of time for product evaluation. To remove the time limit, a valid license must be made available to the CorePlus by *binding* it to the installation.

2.7.3. License Purchase

A license is required for each of the two types of CorePlus usage:

1. A software-only license purchase is made and a License *Registration Key* is supplied to the licensee by Clavister. Delivery of the software-only registration key can be in one of 2 ways:
 - Software can be downloaded from the Clavister website and a registration key from a *Certificate of Authenticity* is then sent to the customer via email after purchase.
 - If preferred, a CD-ROM can be sent to the customer containing all software, along with the *Certificate of Authenticity* that bears a registration key. This can also be done in addition to email code notification if the customer requires it.
2. When purchasing Clavister hardware, the registration key is supplied in the following ways for different hardware:
 - For the SG10, SG50 and SG3100 units, the registration key is written on a label on the underside of the hardware unit. The MAC address of one of the interfaces is also written on this label.
 - For the SG4200 and SG4400 a *Certificate of Authenticity* bearing the registration key is packaged with the hardware.
 - For the SG5500, a separate *Certificate of Authenticity* is packaged with each Secure Blade Module (SBM) purchased since each blade is an autonomous processor running its own copy of CorePlus and each requires a separate license.

It should be noted that the registration key and the license number are different. The registration key may not be required again after initial registration but should be retained as proof of purchase. The license number has the form of 4 sets of 4 digits of the form:

nnnn-nnnn-nnnn-nnnn

HA Cluster Licensing

In a High Availability Cluster, two identical licenses must be purchased, one for the master and one for the slave unit. Both licenses must include the ability to allow HA clustering.



Important: Use the right license for the right hardware unit

In any installation with more than one Clavister Security Gateway it is important to always use the right license file for the right Clavister Security Gateway. If licenses are not matched correctly to the hardware, complex administrative problems can arise later which can cause delays in rectifying a hardware fault.

VMware Licensing

When CorePlus runs with VMware as a virtual Clavister Security Gateway, it requires a special license from Clavister in order to allow virtualization. A key parameter in this license is the number of virtual Ethernet interfaces allowed.

A CorePlus license for VMware is uploaded to the installed virtual CorePlus in the same way as a normal non-virtual installation. VMware allocates virtual MAC addresses to the CorePlus virtual interfaces and these can be queried in the normal way using, for example, the CLI *ifstat* command before generating a license from the Clavister Customer Web.

2.7.4. The Clavister Customer Web

The Clavister Customer Web is found at <http://clientweb.clavister.com> and is used for the administration of CorePlus licenses. It can be used for first time license registration as well as allowing customers to download license updates and to get access to software upgrades.

Customer Web License Registration

Following purchase, the administrator can access the Clavister Customer Web to complete the registration process and obtain the corresponding license file. The first time it is accessed, the Customer Web requires that you enter your contact details, the registration key, as well as the MAC address of one of the Ethernet ports of the hardware on which the license will be used. A user name and password must also be specified for subsequent Customer Web access. After successful registration a license file can then be downloaded.

2.7.5. License Files

A license file is a text file that defines all the capabilities allowed by the license plus a digital signature to ensure the file cannot be altered. It can be opened and read in a normal text editor and the file name is always the license number followed by a file type of *.lic*. Once the license file is available to a CorePlus installation, the 2 hour usage time limit disappears and functionality will be limited only by the usage limits specified by the license file, for example the number of VPN tunnels.

2.7.6. Registering Additional Licenses

A licensee need register themselves only once on the Clavister Customer Web. After logging in

they are shown a list of existing licenses and have the option to register additional licenses. Additional license registration requires only the new registration key with the associated MAC address. A license file for the new license can then be downloaded.

Changing MAC Addresses

The Customer Web also allows the option to change the MAC Address associated with a given license. This can only be done twice per license.

2.7.7. Lockdown Mode

CorePlus will enter a state known as *Lockdown Mode* if certain license violations occur. While in Lockdown Mode, only remote management traffic is allowed by the Clavister Security Gateway and all other traffic will be dropped. Unlike the two hour time limit of *Demonstration Mode*, there is no time limit with Lockdown Mode and it will continue until CorePlus is restarted.

Causes of Lockdown Mode

Lockdown Mode is usually caused by the license file bound to the Clavister Security Gateway being in some way invalid. Conditions that trigger Lockdown Mode include license date expiry, invalid MAC address or invalid license file signature. It is also triggered if the administrator tries to configure CorePlus beyond the limits of its license file. Trying to configure more VPN tunnels than the license allows is an example of this.

Ending Lockdown Mode

When Lockdown Mode is entered, the condition can be terminated by binding a valid License to CorePlus or removing the configuration violation that triggered the condition. Unbinding the license will cause CorePlus to enter the 2 hour demonstration mode from Lockdown Mode, and this may be necessary to allow traffic to flow to the Internet in order to download a new license file.

2.7.8. Uploading Licenses

When a license file needs to be uploaded to the Clavister Security Gateway, this can be done in one of two ways:

1. By using SCP (Secure Copy).

Only one license file can exist on the Clavister Security Gateway. The name of the file is not mandatory, nor the location since CorePlus will detect the file by examining its contents. As a convention it is strongly recommended that the license file is called *license.lic* and it is uploaded to the top level of the CorePlus directory structure.

Under Linux the SCP upload command to a security gateway called *sgw_name* might be:

```
> scp license.lic user@sgw_name:license.lic
```

Under windows the SCP upload would be done using an appropriate utility with SCP support.

2. Through the WebUI:
 - Select **Maintenance** from the WebUI's menu bar.
 - Choose the **Upgrade** option.

- Select the license file to upload.
- Click the **Upload license** button.

After license uploading is complete, CorePlus will restart **and all current connections will be lost**. For this reason, it is recommended that license upload is done during routine maintenance times or other non-critical periods. The reason for the restart is that a new license may have new requirement, such as extra VPN tunnel limits, which require a different initial memory allocation.

Should the license be invalid, CorePlus will enter *lockdown mode* as described in 2.7.7 above. Deleting the license entirely will put CorePlus into the 2 hour *evaluation mode* which is also described in 2.7.2.

2.7.9. The Maximum Connections Should Be Adequate

The CorePlus license file specifies the maximum number of concurrent traffic connections that CorePlus will allow. This is the parameter *Max Connections* in the file. It is important to have the appropriate value for this parameter so that it is never exceeded.

If the limit is exceeded then a *connection table full* condition occurs and the action specified by the advanced setting **Connection Replace** is followed.

By default, this action is *ReplaceLog* which means that the log message *connection_table_full* is generated and the oldest connection is dropped by CorePlus to allow the new connection to succeed.

See Section 12.4, "State Settings" for more information about the **Connection Replace** setting.

Chapter 3: Fundamentals

This chapter describes the fundamental logical objects which make up a CorePlus configuration. These objects include such items as IP addresses and IP rules. Some exist by default and some must be defined by the administrator.

In addition, the chapter explains the different interface types and explains how security policies are constructed the administrator.

- The Address Book, page 101
- Services, page 107
- Interfaces, page 116
- ARP, page 143
- IP Rule Sets, page 152
- Schedules, page 164
- Certificates, page 167
- Date and Time, page 172
- DNS, page 179
- Internet Access Setup, page 181

3.1. The Address Book

3.1.1. Overview

The CorePlus *Address Book* contains named objects representing various types of IP addresses, including single IP addresses, networks as well as ranges of IP addresses. Ethernet MAC addresses can also be defined in the address book.

Using address book objects has a number of important benefits:

- It increases understanding of the configuration by using meaningful symbolic names.
- Using address object names instead of entering numerical addresses reduces errors.

- By defining an IP address object just once in the address book and then referencing this definition, changing the definition automatically also changes all references to it.

3.1.2. IP Addresses

IP Address objects are used to define symbolic names for various types of IP addresses. Depending on how the address is specified, an IP Address object can represent either a single IP address (a specific host), a network or a range of IP addresses and even a DNS name.

In addition, IP Address objects can be used for specifying the credentials used in user authentication. For more information about this topic, see *Chapter 8, User Authentication*.

The following list presents the various types of addresses an IP Address object can hold, along with what format that is used to represent that specific type:

- Host** A single host is represented simply by its IP address. For example, *192.168.0.14*.
- IP Network** An IP Network is represented using *Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR)* form. CIDR uses a forward slash and a digit (0-32) to denote the size of the network as a postfix. This is also known as the *netmask*.
- /24* corresponds to a class C net with 256 addresses (netmask *255.255.255.0*), */27* corresponds to a 32 address net (netmask *255.255.255.224*) and so on.
- The numbers 0-32 correspond to the number of binary ones in the netmask. For example: *192.168.0.0/24*.
- IP Range** A range of IP addresses is represented with the form *a.b.c.d - e.f.g.h*.
- Note that ranges are not limited to netmask boundaries. They may include any span of IP addresses. For example, *192.168.0.10-192.168.0.15* represents six hosts in consecutive order.

Example 3.1. Adding an IP Host

This example adds the IP host *www_srv1* with IP address *192.168.10.16* to the address book:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Address IP4Address www_srv1 Address=192.168.10.16
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP address**
2. Specify a suitable name for the IP host, in this case *www_srv1*
3. Enter *192.168.10.16* for the **IP Address**
4. Click **OK**

Example 3.2. Adding an IP Network

This example adds an IP network named *wwwsrvnet* with address *192.168.10.0/24* to the address book:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Address IP4Address wwwsrvnet Address=192.168.10.0/24
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP address**
2. Specify a suitable name for the IP network, for example *wwwsrvnet*
3. Enter *192.168.10.0/24* as the **IP Address**
4. Click **OK**

Example 3.3. Adding an IP Range

This example adds a range of IP addresses from *192.168.10.16* to *192.168.10.21* and names the range *wwwservers*:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Address IP4Address wwwservers  
                Address=192.168.10.16-192.168.10.21
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP address**
2. Specify a suitable name for the IP Range, for example *wwwservers*.
3. Enter *192.168.10.16-192.168.10.21* as the **IP Address**
4. Click **OK**

Example 3.4. Deleting an Address Object

To delete an object named *wwwsrv1* in the address book, do the following:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> delete Address IP4Address wwwsrv1
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book**
2. Select the address object *wwwsrv1*
3. Choose **Delete** from the menu
4. Click **OK**

Deleting In-use IP Objects

If an IP object is deleted that is in use by another object then CorePlus will not allow the configuration to be deployed and will produce a warning message. In other words, it will appear that the object has been successfully deleted but CorePlus will not allow the configuration to be saved to the Clavister Security Gateway.

3.1.3. Ethernet Addresses

Ethernet Address objects are used to define symbolic names for Ethernet addresses (also known as MAC addresses). This is useful, for example, when populating the ARP table with static ARP entries, or for other parts of the configuration where symbolic names are preferred over numerical Ethernet addresses.

When specifying an Ethernet address the format *aa-bb-cc-dd-ee-ff* should be used. Ethernet addresses are also displayed using this format.

Example 3.5. Adding an Ethernet Address

The following example adds an Ethernet Address object named *wwwsrv1_mac* with the numerical MAC address *08-a3-67-bc-2e-f2*.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Address EthernetAddress wwwsrv1_mac  
Address=08-a3-67-bc-2e-f2
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > Ethernet Address**
2. Specify a suitable name for the Ethernet Address object, for example `wwwsrv1_mac`
3. Enter `08-a3-67-bc-2e-f2` as the **MAC Address**
4. Click **OK**

3.1.4. Address Groups

Groups Simplify Configuration

Address objects can be grouped in order to simplify configuration. Consider a number of public servers that should be accessible from the Internet. The servers have IP addresses that are not in a sequence, and can therefore not be referenced to as a single IP range. Consequently, individual IP Address objects have to be created for each server.

Instead of having to cope with the burden of creating and maintaining separate filtering policies allowing traffic to each server, an *Address Group* named, for example *web-servers*, could be created with the web server hosts as group members. Now, a single policy can be used with this group, thereby greatly reducing the administrative workload.

IP Addresses Can Be Excluded

When groups are created with the Web Interface or InControl, it is possible to not only add address objects to a group but also to explicitly exclude addresses from the group. However, exclusion is not possible when creating groups with the CLI.

For example, if a network object is the network `192.168.2.0/24` and this is added to a group, it is possible to then explicitly exclude the IP address `192.168.2.1`. This means that the group will then contain the range `192.168.2.2` to `192.168.2.255`.

Groups Can Contain Different Subtypes

Address Group objects are not restricted to contain members of the same subtype. IP host objects can be teamed up with IP ranges, IP networks, with DNS names and so on. All addresses of all group members are then combined by CorePlus, effectively resulting in the union of all the addresses.

For example, if a group contains the following two IP address ranges:

- `192.168.0.10 - 192.168.0.15`
- `192.168.0.14 - 192.168.0.19`

The result of combining these two will be a single address range containing `192.168.0.10 - 192.168.0.19`.

**Note: IP and MAC Addresses**

Address book objects can never contain both IP addresses and Ethernet MAC addresses since these are entirely different in their usage. MAC address book objects are primarily used with the CorePlus Proxy ARP feature.

3.1.5. Auto-Generated Address Objects

To simplify the configuration, a number of address objects in the address book are automatically created by CorePlus when the system starts for the first time and these objects are used in various parts of the initial configuration.

The following address objects are auto-generated:

Interface Addresses For each Ethernet interface in the system, two IP Address objects are predefined; one object for the IP address of the actual interface, and one object representing the local network for that interface.

Interface IP address objects are named *<interface-name>_ip* and network objects are named *<interface-name>_net*. As an example, an interface named *lan* will have an associated interface IP object named *ip_lan*, and a network object named *lannet*.

Default Gateway An IP Address object named *defaultgw* is auto-generated and represents the default gateway of the system. The *defaultgw* object is used primarily by the routing table, but is also used by the DHCP client subsystem to store gateway address information acquired from a DHCP server. The object will have an empty IP address (0.0.0.0/0), and the correct IP address for the default gateway needs to be defined unless DHCP is being used.

all-nets The *all-nets* IP address object is initialized to the IP address *0.0.0.0/0*, which represents all possible IP addresses. The *all-nets* IP object is used extensively in the configuration of CorePlus and it is important to understand its significance.

3.1.6. Address Book Folders

In order to help organise large numbers of entries in the address book, it is possible to create address book *folders*. These folders are just like a folder in a computer's file system. They are created with a given name and can then be used to contain all the IP address objects that are related together as a group.

Using folders is simply a way for the administrator to conveniently divide up address book entries and no special properties are given to entries in different folders. CorePlus continues to see all entries as though they were in large table of IP address objects.

The folder concept is also used by CorePlus in other contexts such as IP rule sets, where related IP rules can be grouped together in administrator created folders.

3.2. Services

3.2.1. Overview

A *Service* object is a reference to a specific IP protocol with associated parameters. A service definition is usually based on one of the major transport protocols such as TCP or UDP which is associated with a specific source and/or destination port number(s). For example, the *HTTP* service is defined as using the TCP protocol with the associated destination port 80 and any source port.

However, service objects are not restricted to just the TCP or UDP protocols. They can be used to encompass ICMP messages as well as a user-definable IP protocol.

A Service is Passive

Services are passive CorePlus objects in that they do not themselves carry out any action in the configuration. Instead, service objects must be associated with the security policies defined by various CorePlus rule sets and then act as a filter to apply those rules only to a specific type of traffic.

For example, an IP rule in a CorePlus IP rule set has a service object associated with it as a filtering parameter to decide whether or not to allow a specific type of traffic to traverse the Clavister Security Gateway. Inclusion in IP rules is one of the most important usages of service objects and it is also how ALGs become associated with IP rules since an ALG is associated with a service and not directly with an IP rule.

For more information on how service objects are used with IP rules, see *Section 3.5, "IP Rule Sets"*.

Predefined Services

A large number of service objects are predefined in CorePlus. These include common services such as *HTTP, FTP, Telnet* and *SSH*.

Predefined services can be used and also modified just like custom, user defined services. However, it is recommended to **NOT** make any changes to predefined services and instead create custom services with the desired characteristics.

Custom service creation in detail later in *Section 3.2.2, "Creating Custom Services"*.

Example 3.6. Listing the Available Services

To produce a listing of the available services in the system:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> show Service
```

The output will look similar to the following listing with the services grouped by type with the service groups appearing first:

```
ServiceGroup
  Name          Comments
  -----
  all_services  All ICMP, TCP and UDP services
  all_tcpudp    All TCP and UDP services
```

```

ipsec-suite      The IPsec+IKE suite
l2tp-ipsec      L2TP using IPsec for encryption and authentication
l2tp-raw        L2TP control and transport, unencrypted
pptp-suite      PPTP control and transport

```

ServiceICMP

Name	Comments
all_icmp	All ICMP services
"	
"	

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Services**

Example 3.7. Viewing a Specific Service

To view a specific service in the system:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> show Service ServiceTCPUDP echo
```

The output will look similar to the following listing:

Property	Value
Name:	echo
DestinationPorts:	7
Type:	TCPUDP (TCP/UDP)
SourcePorts:	0-65535
PassICMPReturn:	No
ALG:	(none)
MaxSessions:	1000
Comments:	Echo service

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Services**
2. Select the specific service object in the table
3. A listing all services will be presented

3.2.2. Creating Custom Services

If the list of predefined CorePlus service objects does not meet the requirements for certain traffic then a new service can be created. Reading this section will explain not only how new services are created but also provides an understanding of the properties of predefined services.

The *Type* of service created can be one of the following:

- **TCP/UDP Service** - A service based on the UDP or TCP protocol or both. This type of service is discussed further in this section.
- **ICMP Service** - A service based on the ICMP protocol. This is discussed further in *Section 3.2.3, "ICMP Services"*.
- **IP Protocol Service** - A service based on a user defined protocol. This is discussed further in *Section 3.2.4, "Custom IP Protocol Services"*.
- **Service Group** - A service group consisting of a number of services. This is discussed further in *Section 3.2.5, "Service Groups"*.

Let us now take a closer look at TCP/UDP services.

TCP and UDP Based Services

Most applications use TCP and/or UDP as transport protocol for transferring data over IP networks.

Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a connection-oriented protocol that includes mechanisms for reliable point to point transmission of data. TCP is used by many common applications where error-free transfers are mandatory, such as HTTP, FTP and SMTP.

UDP Orientated Applications

For applications where data delivery speed is of greatest importance, for example with streaming audio and video, the *User Datagram Protocol (UDP)* is the preferred protocol. UDP is connectionless, provides minimal transmission error recovery, and has a much lower overhead when compared with TCP. Due to the lower overhead, UDP is also used for some non-streaming services and in those cases the applications themselves must provide any error recovery mechanisms.

TCP and UDP Service Definition

To define a TCP or UDP based protocol to CorePlus, a *TCP/UDP* service object is used. Apart from a unique name describing the service, the object contains information about what protocol (TCP, UDP or both) and what source and destination ports are applicable for the service.

Specifying Port Numbers

Port numbers are specified with all types of services and it is useful to understand how these can be entered in user interfaces. They can be specified for both the *Source Port* and/or the *Destination Port* of a service in the following ways:

Single Port

For many services, a single destination port is sufficient. For example, HTTP usually uses destination port 80. The SMTP protocol uses port 25 and so on. For these types of service,

the single port number is simply specified in the service definition as a single number.

Port Ranges

Some services use a range of destination ports. As an example, the NetBIOS protocol used by Microsoft Windows™ uses destination ports 137 to 139.

To define a range of ports in a TCP/UDP service object, the format *mmm-nnn* is used. A port range is inclusive, meaning that a range specified as *137-139* covers ports 137, 138 and 139.

Multiple Ports and Port Ranges

Multiple ranges or individual ports may also be entered, separated by commas. This provides the ability to cover a wide range of ports using only a single TCP/UDP service object.

For example, all Microsoft Windows networking can be covered using a port definition specified as *135-139,445*. HTTP and HTTPS can be covered by specifying destination ports *80,443*.



Tip: Specifying source ports

It is usual with many services that the source ports are left as their default value which is the range 0-65535 (corresponding to all possible source ports).

With certain application, it can be useful to also specify the source port if this is always within a limited range of values. Making the service definition as narrow as possible is the recommended approach.

Other Service Properties

Apart from the basic protocol and port information, TCP/UDP service objects also have several other properties:

- **SYN Flood Protection**

This option allows a TCP based service to be configured with protection against *SYN Flood* attacks. This option only exists for the *TCP/IP* service type.

For more details on how this feature works see *Section 6.6.8, "TCP SYN Flood Attacks"*.

- **Pass ICMP Errors**

If an attempt to open a TCP connection is made by a user application behind the Clavister Security Gateway and the remote server is not in operation, an ICMP error message is returned as the response. Such ICMP messages are interpreted by CorePlus as new connections and will be dropped unless an IP rule explicitly allows them.

The **Pass returned ICMP error messages from destination** option allows such ICMP messages to be automatically passed back to the requesting application. In some cases, it is useful that the ICMP messages are not dropped. For example, if an ICMP *quench* message is sent to reduce the rate of traffic flow. On the other hand, dropping ICMP messages increases security by preventing them being used as a means of attack.

- **ALG**

A TCP/UDP service can be linked to an *Application Layer Gateway* (ALG) to enable deeper inspection of certain protocols. This is the way that an ALG is associated with an IP rule. First, associate the ALG with a service and then associate the service with an IP rule.

For more information on this topic see *Section 6.2, "ALGs"*.

- **Max Sessions**

An important parameter associated with a service is *Max Sessions*. This parameter is allocated a default value when the service is associated with an ALG. The default value varies according to the ALG it is associated with. If the default is, for example *100*, this would mean that only 100 connections are allowed in total for this service across all interfaces.

For a service involving, for example, an HTTP ALG the default value can often be too low if there are large numbers of clients connecting through the Clavister Security Gateway. It is therefore recommended to consider if a higher value is required for a particular scenario.

Specifying All Services

When setting up rules that filter by services it is possible to use the service object called *all_services* to refer to all protocols. However, using this is not recommended and specifying a narrower service provides better security.

If, for example, the requirement is only to filter using the principal protocols of TCP, UDP and ICMP then the service group *all_tcpudpicmp* can be used instead.



Tip: The *http-all* service does not include DNS

*A common mistake is to assume that the predefined service **http-all** includes the DNS protocol. It does not so the predefined service **dns-all** is usually also required for most web surfing. This could be included in a group with **http-all** and then associated with the IP rules that allow web surfing.*

Restrict Services to the Minimum Necessary

When choosing a service object to construct a policy such as an IP rule, the protocols included in that object should be as few as necessary to achieve the traffic filtering objective. Using the *all_services* object may be convenient but removes any security benefits that a more specific service object could provide.

The best approach is to narrow the service filter in a security policy so it allows only the protocols that are absolutely necessary. The *all_tcpudpicmp* service object is often a first choice for general traffic but even this may allow many more protocols than are normally necessary and the administrator can often narrow the range of allowed protocols further.

Example 3.8. Creating a Custom TCP/UDP Service

This example shows how to add a TCP/UDP service, using destination port 3306, which is used by MySQL:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Service ServiceTCPUDP MySQL
           DestinationPorts=3306 Type=TCP
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP service**
2. Specify a suitable name for the service, for example *MySQL*
3. Now enter:
 - **Type:** TCP
 - **Source:** 0-65535
 - **Destination:** 3306
4. Click **OK**

3.2.3. ICMP Services

Another type of custom service that can be created is an *ICMP Service*.

The *Internet Control Message Protocol* (ICMP) is a protocol that is integrated with IP for error reporting and transmitting control information. For example, the *ICMP Ping* feature uses ICMP to test Internet connectivity.

ICMP Types and Codes

ICMP messages are delivered in IP packets, and includes a *Message Type* that specifies the format of the ICMP message and a *Code* that is used to further qualify the message. For example, the message type *Destination Unreachable* uses the *Code* parameter to specify the exact reason for the error.

Either all ICMP message types can be accepted by a service (there are 256 possible types) or it is possible to filter the types.

Specifying Codes

If a type is selected then the codes for that type can be specified in the same way that port numbers are specified. For example, if the *Destination Unreachable* type is selected with the comma delimited code list *0,1,2,3* then this will filter *Network unreachable*, *Host unreachable*, *Protocol unreachable* and *Port unreachable*.

When a message type is selected but no code values are given then all codes for that type is assumed.

ICMP Message Types

The message types that can be selected are as follows:

Echo Request	Sent by PING to a destination in order to check connectivity.
Destination Unreachable	The source is told that a problem has occurred when delivering a packet. There are codes from 0 to 5 for this type: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Code 0: Net Unreachable • Code 1: Host Unreachable • Code 2: Protocol Unreachable • Code 3: Port Unreachable • Code 4: Cannot Fragment • Code 5: Source Route Failed
Redirect	The source is told that there is a better route for a particular packet. Codes assigned are as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Code 0: Redirect datagrams for the network • Code 1: Redirect datagrams for the host • Code 2: Redirect datagrams for the Type of Service and the network • Code 3: Redirect datagrams for the Type of Service and the host
Parameter Problem	Identifies an incorrect parameter on the datagram.
Echo Reply	The reply from the destination which is sent as a result of the Echo Request.
Source Quenching	The source is sending data too fast for the receiver, the buffer has filled up.
Time Exceeded	The packet has been discarded as it has taken too long to be delivered.

3.2.4. Custom IP Protocol Services

Services that run over IP and perform application/transport layer functions can be uniquely identified by *IP protocol numbers*. IP can carry data for a number of different protocols. These protocols are each identified by a unique IP protocol number specified in a field of the IP header. For example, ICMP, IGMP and EGP have protocol numbers 1, 2 and 8 respectively.

Similar to the TCP/UDP port ranges described previously, a range of IP protocol numbers can be used to specify multiple applications for one service. For example, specifying the range 1-4,7 will match the protocols *ICMP, IGMP, GGP, IP-in-IP* and *CBT*.

IP protocol numbers

The currently assigned IP protocol numbers and references are published by the *Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)* and can be found at:

<http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers>

Example 3.9. Adding an IP Protocol Service

This example shows how to add an IP Protocol service, with the Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Service ServiceIPProto VRRP IPProto=112
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Services > Add > IP protocol service**
2. Specify a suitable name for the service, for example *VRRP*
3. Enter *112* in the **IP Protocol** control
4. Optionally enter *Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol* in the **Comments** control
5. Click **OK**

3.2.5. Service Groups

A *Service Group* is, exactly as the name suggests, a CorePlus object that consists of a collection of services. Although the group concept is simple, it can be very useful when constructing security policies since the group can be used instead of an individual service.

The Advantage of Groups

For example, there may be a need for a set of IP rules that are identical to each other except for the service parameter. By defining a service group which contains all the service objects from all the individual rules, we can replace all of them with just one IP rule that uses the group.

Suppose that we create a service group called *email-services* which combines the three services objects for *SMTP*, *POP3* and *IMAP*. Now only one IP rule needs to be defined that uses this group service to allow all email related traffic to flow.

Groups Can Contain Other Groups

When a group is defined then it can contain individual services and/or service groups. This ability to have groups within groups should be used with caution since it can increase the complexity of a configuration and decrease the ability to troubleshoot problems.

3.2.6. Custom Service Timeouts

Any service can have its *custom timeouts* set. These can also be set globally in CorePlus but it is more usual to change these values individually in a custom service.

The timeout settings that can be customized are as follows:

- **Initial Timeout**

This is the time allowed for a new connection to be open.

- **Establish (Idle) Timeout**

If there is no activity on a connection for this amount of time then it is considered to be closed and is removed from the CorePlus state table. The default setting for this time with TCP/UDP connections is 3 days.

- **Closing Timeout**

The is the time allowed for the connection to be closed.

The administrator must make a judgement as what the acceptable values should be for a particular protocol. This may depend, for example, on the expected responsiveness of servers to which clients connect.

3.3. Interfaces

3.3.1. Overview

An *Interface* is an important logical building block in CorePlus. All network traffic that transits through, originates from or is terminated in the Clavister Security Gateway, does so through one or more interfaces.

Source and Destination Interfaces

An interface can be viewed as a doorway through which network traffic passes to or from CorePlus. A CorePlus interface has one of two functions:

- **The Source Interface**

When traffic arrives through an interface, that interface is referred to in CorePlus as the *source* interface (also sometimes known as the *receiving* or *incoming* interface).

- **The Destination Interface**

When traffic leaves after being checked against CorePlus's security policies, the interface used to send the traffic is referred to in CorePlus as the *destination* interface (also sometimes known as the *sending* interface).

All traffic passing through CorePlus has both a *source* and *destination* interface. As explained in more depth later, the special logical interface *core* is used when CorePlus itself is the source or destination for traffic.

Interface Types

CorePlus supports a number of interface types, which can be divided into the following four major groups:

- **Ethernet Interfaces**

Each *Ethernet interface* represents a physical Ethernet port on a CorePlus-based product. All network traffic that originates from or enters a Clavister Security Gateway will pass through one of the physical interfaces.

CorePlus currently supports *Ethernet* as the only physical interface type. For more information about Ethernet interfaces, see *Section 3.3.2, "Ethernet Interfaces"*.



Note: Ethernet interfaces under hypervisors

When CorePlus runs under a hypervisor such as VMware then the physical CorePlus interfaces are not in fact physical but are virtual. However, CorePlus still treats them as though they were physical.

- **Sub-interfaces**

Some interfaces require a binding to an underlying physical interface in order to transfer data. This group of interfaces is called *Physical Sub-Interfaces*.

CorePlus has support for two types of sub-interfaces:

- *Virtual LAN (VLAN)* interfaces as specified by IEEE 802.1Q. When routing IP packets over a Virtual LAN interface, they will be encapsulated in VLAN-tagged Ethernet frames. For more information about Virtual LAN interfaces, please see *Section 3.3.3, "VLAN"*.
- *PPPoE (PPP-over-Ethernet)* interfaces for connections to PPPoE servers. More information about this topic can be found in *Section 3.3.4, "PPPoE"*.

- **Tunnel Interfaces**

Tunnel interfaces are used when network traffic is being tunneled between the system and another tunnel end-point in the network, before it gets routed to its final destination. VPN tunnels are often used to implement *virtual private networks (VPNs)* which can secure communication between two security gateways.

To accomplish tunneling, additional headers are added to the traffic that is to be tunneled. Furthermore, various transformations can be applied to the network traffic depending on the type of tunnel interface. For example, when routing traffic over an IPsec interface, the payload is usually encrypted to achieve confidentiality.

CorePlus supports the following tunnel interface types:

- IPsec** interfaces are used as end-points for IPsec VPN tunnels. More information about this topic can be found in *Section 9.3, "IPsec Components"*.
- PPTP/L2TP** interfaces are used as end-points for PPTP or L2TP tunnels. More information about this topic can be found in *Section 9.5, "PPTP/L2TP"*.
- GRE** interfaces are used to establish GRE tunnels. More information about this topic can be found in *Section 3.3.5, "GRE Tunnels"*.

- **Loopback Interfaces**

A *loopback interface* is a special type of interface that will take all packets sent through it and pass them on out through the loopback interface configured as the one to loop to. These are almost exclusively used for *Virtual Routing* scenarios.

More information about loopback interfaces can be found in *Section 3.3.6, "Loopback Interfaces"*.

All Interfaces are Logically Equivalent

Even though the different types of interfaces may be very different in the way they function, CorePlus treats all interfaces as logically equivalent. This is an important and powerful concept and means that all types of interfaces can be used almost interchangeably in the various CorePlus rule sets and other configuration objects. This results in a high degree of flexibility in how traffic can be examined, controlled and routed.

Interfaces have Unique Names

Each interface in CorePlus is given a unique name to be able to identify and select it for use with other CorePlus objects in a configuration. Some interface types, such as physical Ethernet interfaces, are already provided by CorePlus with relevant default names that are possible to modify if required. New interfaces defined by the administrator will always require a user-provided name to be specified.

The *any* and *core* Interfaces

In addition, CorePlus provides two special logical interfaces which are named **any** and **core**. The meaning of these are:

- **any** represents all possible interfaces including the **core** interface.
- **core** indicates that it is CorePlus itself that will deal with traffic to and from this interface. Examples of the use of **core** are when the Clavister Security Gateway acts as a PPTP or L2TP server or responds to ICMP "Ping" requests. By specifying the **Destination Interface** of a route as **core**, CorePlus will then know that it is itself that is the ultimate destination of the traffic.

Disabling an Interface

Should it be desirable to disable an interface so that no traffic can flow through it, this can be done with the CLI using the command:

```
Device:/> set Interface Ethernet <interface-name> -disable
```

Where <interface-name> is the interface to be disabled.

To re-enable an interface, the command is:

```
Device:/> set Interface Ethernet <interface-name> -enable
```

3.3.2. Ethernet Interfaces

CorePlus supports Ethernet, Fast Ethernet and Gigabit Ethernet interfaces as defined by the IEEE 802.3 standard.

The IEEE 802.3 Ethernet standard allows various devices to be attached at arbitrary points or "ports" to a physical transport mechanism such as a coaxial cable. Using the CSMA/CD protocol, each Ethernet connected device "listens" to the network and sends data to another connected device when no other is sending. If 2 devices broadcast simultaneously, algorithms allow them to re-send at different times.

Ethernet Frames

Devices broadcast data as Ethernet *frames* and other devices "listen" to determine if they are the intended destination for any of these frames. A frame is a sequence of bits which specify the originating device plus the destination device plus the data payload along with error checking bits. A pause between the broadcasting of individual frames allows devices time to process each frame before the next arrives and this pause is progressively smaller with the faster data transmission speeds found in normal Ethernet, then Fast Ethernet and finally Gigabit Ethernet.

Physical Ethernet Interfaces

Each logical Ethernet interface in the CorePlus usually corresponds to a physical Ethernet port in the system. The number of ports, their link speed and the way the ports are realized, is dependent on the hardware model. A smaller Clavister model will have a limited number of Fast Ethernet ports as integrated product components, while a more powerful unit designed for telecom applications might be expandable with separate port modules.

If CorePlus is being run on non-Clavister Intel x86 compatible server hardware, it is likely that the Ethernet hardware ports are implemented using common Ethernet PCI adapters.



Note: Additional switch ports

Some systems use an integrated layer 2 switch for providing additional physical Ethernet ports. Such additional ports are seen as a single interface by CorePlus.

Ethernet Interface Parameters

The following are the various parameters that can be set for an Ethernet interface:

- **Interface Name**

The names of the Ethernet interfaces are predefined by the system, and are mapped to the names of the physical ports; a system with a *wan* port will have an Ethernet interface named *wan* and so on.

The names of the Ethernet interfaces can be changed to better reflect their usage. For example, if an interface named *dmz* is connected to a wireless LAN, it might be convenient to change the interface name to *radio*. For maintenance and troubleshooting, it is recommended to tag the corresponding physical port with the new name.



Note: Interface enumeration

The startup process will enumerate all available Ethernet interfaces. Each interface will be given a name of the form **lan**, **wan** and **dmz** or **ifN** or **sfpN**, **geN** and **feN** depending on your Clavister Security Gateway model, where **N** represents the number of the interface.

In most of the examples in this guide, **lan** is used for the interface connected to a local protected network and **wan** is used for the interface connected to the public internet. Please substitute in the names of the actual interfaces.

- **IP Address**

Each Ethernet interface is required to have an *Interface IP Address*, which can be either a static address or an address provided by DHCP. The interface IP address is used as the primary address for communicating with the system through the specific Ethernet interface.

CorePlus *IP4 Address* objects are usually used to define the IP addresses of Ethernet interfaces. Those objects are normally auto-generated by the system. For more information, please see *Section 3.1.5, "Auto-Generated Address Objects"*. When the system is first started, all unconfigured Ethernet interfaces will be assigned default addresses from the *localhost* sub-network (127.0.0.0/8).



Tip: Specifying multiple IP addresses on an interface

Multiple IP addresses can be specified for an Ethernet interface by using the *ARP Publish* feature. (For more information, see *Section 3.4, "ARP"*).

- **Network**

In addition to the interface IP address, a *Network* address is also specified for an Ethernet interface. The Network address provides information to CorePlus about what IP addresses are directly reachable through the interface. In other words, those residing on the same LAN

segment as the interface itself. In the routing table associated with the interface, CorePlus will automatically create a direct route to the specified network over the actual interface.

- **Default Gateway**

A *Default Gateway* address can optionally be specified for an Ethernet interface. This is a normally the address of a router and very often the router which acts as the gateway to the Internet.

When a default gateway is specified then, by default, a route to the network *all-nets* is automatically created in the CorePlus routing table for the interface. This means that any traffic which does not have a more specific matching route will be sent via that interface to the default gateway. This behaviour can be changed by disabling an interface's advanced option for creating the default route automatically.

Normally, only one default *all-nets* route to the default gateway needs to exist in the routing table.



Note: The *all-nets* IP address object

The ***all-nets*** IP object (IP address: 0.0.0.0/0) includes the multicast IP address range (224.0.0.0 => 239.255.255.255). For more information about this topic, see Section 4.7, "Multicast Routing".

- **Receive Multicast Traffic**

This option controls the reception of multicast IP packets on that interface. There are three options available for multicast packet handling:

- i. **Off** - Multicast packets are silently dropped.
- ii. **On** - Multicast traffic can always be received by the interface.
- iii. **Auto** - If an IP rule exists in the rule set which applies to a multicast packet's destination IP address, then the Ethernet interface is automatically enabled to receive multicast packets.

Auto is the default behavior.

- **Enable DHCP Client**

CorePlus includes a DHCP client feature for dynamic assignment of address information by a connected DHCP server. This feature is often used for receiving external IP address information from an ISP's DHCP server for public Internet connection.

The information that can be set using DHCP includes the IP and broadcast address of the interface, the local network that the interface is attached to, and the default gateway.

All addresses received from the DHCP server are assigned to corresponding IP4Address objects. In this way, dynamically assigned addresses can be used throughout the configuration in the same way as static addresses. By default, the objects in use are the same ones as defined in Section 3.1.5, "Auto-Generated Address Objects". However, the administrator can specify their own set of address objects if there is a need to modify this behavior.

By default, DHCP is disabled on Ethernet interfaces. If the interface is being used for connection to the public Internet via an ISP using fixed IP addresses then DHCP shouldn't be used.

DNS server addresses received through DHCP on an interface named <interface-name> will be allocated to CorePlus address objects with the names <interface-name>_dns1 and <interface-name>_dns2.



Note: A gateway IP cannot be deleted with DHCP enabled

If DHCP is enabled for a given Ethernet interface then any gateway IP address that is defined for that interface cannot be deleted. To remove the gateway address, the DHCP option must be first disabled.

If DHCP is enabled then there is a set of interface specific advanced settings:

- i. A preferred IP address can be requested.
- ii. A preferred lease time can be requested.
- iii. Static routes can be sent from the DHCP server.
- iv. Do not allow IP address collisions with static routes.
- v. Do not allow network collisions with static routes.
- vi. Specify an allowed IP address for the DHCP lease.
- vii. Specify an address range for DHCP servers from which leases will be accepted.

- **DHCP Hostname**

In some, infrequent cases a DHCP server may require a *hostname* to be sent by the DHCP client.

- **Enable Transparent Mode**

The recommended way to enable Transparent Mode is to add switch routes, as described in *Section 4.8, "Transparent Mode"*. An alternative method is to enable transparent mode directly on an interface with this option.

When enabled, default switch routes are automatically added to the routing table for the interface and any corresponding non-switch routes are automatically removed.

- **Hardware Settings**

In some circumstances it may be necessary to change hardware settings for an interface. The available options are:

- i. The speed of the link can be set. Usually this is best left as *Auto*.
- ii. The MAC address can be set if it needs to be different to the MAC address inbuilt into the hardware. Some ISP connections might require this.

- **Virtual Routing**

To implement *virtual routing* where the routes related to different interfaces are kept in separate routing table, there are a number of options:

- i. Make the interface a member of all routing tables. This option is enabled by default and means that traffic arriving on the interface will be routed according to the *main* routing table. Routes for the interface IP will be inserted into all routing tables.

- ii. The alternative to the above is to insert the route for this interface into only a specific routing table. The specified routing table will be used for all route lookups unless overridden by a routing rule.

- **Automatic Route Creation**

Routes can be automatically added for the interface. This addition can be of the following types:

- i. Add a route for this interface for the given network. This is enabled by default.
- ii. Add a default route for this interface using the given default gateway. This is enabled by default.

- **MTU**

This determines the maximum size of packets in bytes that can be sent on this interface. By default, the interface uses the maximum size supported.

- **High Availability**

There are two options which are specific to high availability clusters:

1. A private IP address can be specified for this interface.
2. An additional option is to disable the sending of HA cluster heartbeats from this interface.

- **Quality Of Service**

The option exists to copy the IP *DSCP* precedence to the VLAN priority field for any VLAN packets. This is disabled by default.

Changing the IP Address of an Ethernet Interface

To change the IP address on an interface, we can use one of two methods:

- Change the IP address directly on the interface. For example, if we want to change the IP address of the **lan** interface to *10.1.1.2*, we could use the CLI command:

```
Device:/> set Interface Ethernet lan IP=10.1.1.2
```

As explained next, this way of changing the IP address is not recommended.

- Instead, the **ip_lan** object in the CorePlus *Address Book* should be assigned the new address since it is this object that is used by many other CorePlus objects such as IP rules. The CLI command to do this would be:

```
Device:/> set Address IP4Address ip_lan Address=10.1.1.2
```

This same operation could also be done through the Web Interface or InControl.

A summary of CLI commands that can be used with Ethernet interfaces can be found in *Section 3.3.2.1, "Useful CLI Commands for Ethernet Interfaces"*.

Ethernet Interfaces with VMware

When CorePlus runs under VMware in a virtual machine, it has a number of *virtual interfaces*. A

default number of interfaces is provided but can be increased if required provided VMware and the CorePlus license allow it.

Virtual interfaces can be connected to physical interfaces with the VMware *Bridged* mode. Alternatively, *Custom* (non-bridged) mode can be used to connect interfaces to a VMware virtual network and another virtual machine running on the same VMware host.

CorePlus usage with VMware is more fully described in the separate *Clavister VMware VSG Getting Started Guide*.

3.3.2.1. Useful CLI Commands for Ethernet Interfaces

This section summarizes the CLI commands most commonly used for examining and manipulating CorePlus Ethernet interfaces.

Ethernet interfaces can also be examined through the Web Interface or InControl, but for some operations the CLI must be used.

To show the current interface assigned to the IP address *wan_ip*:

```
Device:/> show Address IP4Address InterfaceAddresses/wan_ip
```

Property	Value
Name:	wan_ip
Address:	0.0.0.0
UserAuthGroups:	<empty>
NoDefinedCredentials:	No
Comments:	IP address of interface wan

To show the current interface assigned to the network *wan_net*:

```
Device:/> show Address IP4Address InterfaceAddresses/wan_net
```

Property	Value
Name:	wan_net
Address:	0.0.0.0/0
UserAuthGroups:	<empty>
NoDefinedCredentials:	No
Comments:	Network on interface wan

To show the current interface assigned to the gateway *wan_gw*:

```
Device:/> show Address IP4Address InterfaceAddresses/wan_gw
```

Property	Value
Name:	wan_gw
Address:	0.0.0.0
UserAuthGroups:	<empty>
NoDefinedCredentials:	No
Comments:	Default gateway for interface wan

By using the tab key at the end of a line, tab completion can be used to complete the command:

```
Device:/> show Address IP4Address InterfaceAddresses/wan_<tab>
```

```
[<Category>] [<Type> [<Identifier>]]:
```

InterfaceAddresses/wan_br	InterfaceAddresses/wan_gw
InterfaceAddresses/wan_dns1	InterfaceAddresses/wan_ip
InterfaceAddresses/wan_dns2	InterfaceAddresses/wan_net

Here, tab completion is used again at the end of the command line:

```
Device:/> set Address IP4Address<tab>
```

```
[<Category>] <Type> [<Identifier>]:
dnsserver1_ip          InterfaceAddresses/wan_br timesyncsrv1_ip
InterfaceAddresses/aux_ip InterfaceAddresses/wan_dns1
InterfaceAddresses/aux_net InterfaceAddresses/wan_dns2
InterfaceAddresses/dmz_ip InterfaceAddresses/wan_gw
InterfaceAddresses/dmz_net InterfaceAddresses/wan_ip
InterfaceAddresses/lan_ip InterfaceAddresses/wan_net
InterfaceAddresses/lan_net Server
```

The CLI can be used to set the address of the interface:

```
Device:/> set Address IP4Address
           InterfaceAddresses/wan_ip Address=172.16.5.1
Modified IP4Address InterfaceAddresses/wan_ip.
```

The CLI can be used to enable DHCP on the interface:

```
Device:/> set Interface Ethernet wan DHCPEnabled=yes
Modified Ethernet wan.
```

Some interface settings are accessible only through a related set of CLI commands. These are particularly useful if Clavister hardware has been replaced and Ethernet card settings are to be changed, or if configuring the interfaces when running CorePlus on non-Clavister hardware. For example, to display Ethernet port information use the command:

```
Device:/> show EthernetDevice
```

This command shows all Ethernet interfaces defined. This list includes those interfaces deleted but before an *activate* has been done. Deletions will be indicated with a "-" symbol before their name. If a deleted interface in the list is to be restored, this can be done with the *undelete* command:

```
Device:/> undelete EthernetDevice <interface>
```

The following command can also be used to list interface information:

```
Device:/> show Ethernet Interface
```

The *set* command can be used to control an Ethernet interface. For example, to enable an interface *lan* we can use the command:

```
Device:/> set EthernetDevice lan -enable
```

To set the driver on an Ethernet interface card the command is:

```
Device:/> set EthernetDevice lan EthernetDriver=<driver>
           PCIBus=<X> PCISlot=<Y> PCIPort=<Z>
```

For example, if the driver name is *IXP4NPEEthernetDriver* for the bus, slot, port combination *0, 0, 2* on the *wan* interface, the *set* command would be:

```
Device:/> set EthernetDevice lan
           EthernetDriver=IXP4NPEEthernetDriver
           PCIBus=0 PCISlot=0 PCIPort=2
```

For a complete list of all CLI options see the *CLI Reference Guide*.

3.3.2.2. Advanced Ethernet Interface Settings

This section details the advanced settings available for CorePlus Ethernet interfaces. The settings

are global and affect all physical interfaces.

DHCP Settings

Below is a list of the advanced DHCP settings for CorePlus Ethernet interfaces.

DHCP_AllowGlobalBcast

Allow DHCP server to assign 255.255.255.255 as broadcast. (Non-standard.)

Default: *Disabled*

DHCP_DisableArpOnOffer

Disable the ARP check done by CorePlus on the offered IP. The check issues an ARP request to see if the IP address is already in use.

Default: *Disabled*

DHCP_UseLinkLocalIP

If this is enabled CorePlus will use a Link Local IP (169.254.*.*) instead of 0.0.0.0 while waiting for a lease.

Default: *Disabled*

DHCP_ValidateBcast

Require that the assigned broadcast address is the highest address in the assigned network.

Default: *Enabled*

DHCP_MinimumLeaseTime

Minimum lease time (seconds) accepted from the DHCP server.

Default: *60*

Hardware Settings

Below is a list of the advanced hardware settings that are available for CorePlus Ethernet interfaces. These settings are only relevant to CorePlus running on non-Clavister hardware.

Ringsize_e1000_rx

Size of the rx buffer on e1000 cards.

Default: *64*

Ringsize_e1000_tx

Size of the tx buffer on e1000 cards.

Default: 256

Ringsize_e100_rx

Size of the rx buffer on e100 cards.

Default: 32

Ringsize_e100_tx

Size of the tx buffer on e100 cards.

Default: 128

Ringsize_yukon_rx

Size of Yukon receive ring (per interface).

Default: 256

Ringsize_yukon_tx

Size of Yukon send ring (per interface).

Default: 256

Ringsize_yukonii_rx

Size of Yukon-II receive ring (per interface).

Default: 256

Ringsize_yukonii_tx

Size of Yukon-II send ring (per interface).

Default: 256

Interface Monitor Settings

Below is a list of the monitor settings that are available for CorePlus Ethernet interfaces.

IfaceMon_e1000

Enable interface monitor for e1000 interfaces.

Default: *Enabled*

IfaceMon_BelowCPULoad

Temporarily disable ifacemon if CPU load goes above this percentage.

Default: 80

IfaceMon_BelowfaceLoad

Temporarily disable ifacemon on and interface if network load on the interface goes above this percentage.

Default: 70

IfaceMon_ErrorTime

How long a problem must persist before an interface is reset.

Default: 10

IfaceMon_MinInterval

Minimum interval between two resets of the same interface.

Default: 30

IfaceMon_RxErrorPerc

Percentage of errors in received packets at which to declare a problem.

Default: 20

IfaceMon_TxErrorPerc

Percentage of errors in sent packets at which to declare a problem.

Default: 7

3.3.3. VLAN

Overview

Virtual LAN (VLAN) support in CorePlus allows the definition of one or more *Virtual LAN interfaces* which are associated with a particular physical interface. These are then considered to be logical interfaces by CorePlus and can be treated like any other interfaces in CorePlus rule sets and routing tables.

VLANs are useful in several different scenarios. A typical application is to allow one Ethernet interface to appear as many separate interfaces. This means that the number of physical Ethernet ports on a Clavister Security Gateway need not limit how many totally separated external networks can be connected.

Another typical usage of VLANs is to group together clients in an organisation so that the traffic belonging to different groups is kept completely separate in different VLANs. Traffic can then only flow between the different VLANs under the control of CorePlus and is filtered using the security policies described by the CorePlus rule sets.

As explained in more detail below, VLAN configuration with CorePlus involves a combination of *VLAN trunks* from the Clavister Security Gateway to switches and these switches are configured

with *port based VLANs* on their interfaces. Any physical security gateway interface can, at the same time, carry both non-VLAN traffic as well VLAN trunk traffic for one or multiple VLANs.

VLAN Processing

CorePlus follows the IEEE 802.1Q specification. This specifies how VLAN functions by adding a *Virtual LAN Identifier* (VLAN ID) to Ethernet frame headers which are part of a VLAN's traffic.

The VLAN ID is a number between 0 and 4095 which is used to identify the specific Virtual LAN to which each frame belongs. With this mechanism, Ethernet frames can belong to different Virtual LANs but can still share the same physical Ethernet link.

The following principles underlie the CorePlus processing of VLAN tagged Ethernet frames at a physical interface:

- Ethernet frames received on a physical interface by CorePlus, are examined for a VLAN ID. If a VLAN ID is found and a matching VLAN interface has been defined for that interface, CorePlus will use the VLAN interface as the logical source interface for further rule set processing.
- If there is no VLAN ID attached to an Ethernet frame received on an interface then the source of the frame is considered to be the physical interface and not a VLAN.
- If VLAN tagged traffic is received on a physical interface and there is no VLAN defined for that interface in the CorePlus configuration with a corresponding VLAN ID then that traffic is dropped by CorePlus and an *unknown_vlanid* log message is generated.
- The VLAN ID must be unique for a single CorePlus physical interface but the same VLAN ID can be used on more than one physical interface. In other words, a same VLAN can span many physical interfaces.
- A physical interface does not need to be dedicated to VLANs and can carry a mixture of VLAN and non-VLAN traffic.

Physical VLAN Connection with VLAN

The illustration below shows the connections for a typical CorePlus VLAN scenario.




Figure 3.1. VLAN Connections

With CorePlus VLANs, the physical connections are as follows:

- One or more VLANs are configured on a physical Clavister Security Gateway interface and this is connected directly to a switch. This link acts as a *VLAN trunk*. The switch used must support *port based VLANs*. This means that each port on the switch can be configured with the ID of the VLAN or VLANs that a port is connected to. The port on the switch that connects to the security gateway should be configured to accept the VLAN IDs that will flow through the trunk.

In the illustration above the connections between the interfaces *if1* and *if2* to the switches *Switch1* and *Switch2* are *VLAN trunks*.

- Other ports on the switch that connect to VLAN clients are configured with individual VLAN IDs. Any device connected to one of these ports will then automatically become part of the VLAN configured for that port. In Cisco switches this is called configuring a *Static-access VLAN*.

On *Switch1* in the illustration above, one interface is configured to be dedicated to *VLAN1* and two others are dedicated to *VLAN2*.

The switch could also forward trunk traffic from the security gateway into another trunk if required.

- More than one interface on the security gateway can carry VLAN trunk traffic and these will connect to separate switches. More than one trunk can be configured to carry traffic with the same VLAN ID.



Note: 802.1ad is not supported

CorePlus does not support the IEEE 802.1ad (provider bridges) standard which allows VLANs to be run inside other VLANs.

Forwarding DSCP QoS Information

CorePlus forwards, from exiting packets, the 6 bits which make up the Diffserv *Differentiated Services Code Point* (DSCP) into VLANs. This is done by copying the bits into the quality of service bits in VLAN Ethernet frames and applies only for data leaving Clavister Security Gateway interfaces.

The *Diffserv* architecture provides quality of service (QoS) information to devices through which packets of data pass. Diffserv is discussed further in *Section 10.1, "Traffic Shaping"*.

License Limitations

The number of VLAN interfaces that can be defined for a CorePlus installation is limited by the parameters of the license used. Some licenses may restrict the total number of VLANs allowed in a CorePlus installation. License upgrades can be purchased to increase this limit if required.

Summary of VLAN Setup

Below are the key steps for setting up a VLAN interface.

1. Assign a name to the VLAN interface.
2. Select the physical interface for the VLAN.
3. Assign a **VLAN ID** that is unique on the physical interface.
4. Optionally specify an IP address for the VLAN.
5. Optionally specify an IP broadcast address for the VLAN.
6. Create the required route(s) for the VLAN in the appropriate routing table.
7. Create rules in the IP rule set to allow traffic through on the VLAN interface.

It is important to understand that the administrator should treat a VLAN interface just like a physical interface in that they require both appropriate IP rules and routes to exist in the CorePlus configuration for traffic to flow through them. For example, if no IP rule with a particular VLAN interface as the source interface is defined allowing traffic to flow then packets arriving on that interface will be dropped.

VLAN advanced settings

There is a single advanced setting for VLAN:

Unknown VLAN Tags

What to do with VLAN packets tagged with an unknown ID.

Default: *DropLog*

Example 3.10. Defining a VLAN

This simple example defines a virtual LAN called *VLAN10* with a VLAN ID of *10*. The IP address of the VLAN is assumed to be already defined in the address book as the object *vlan10_ip*.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Interface VLAN VLAN10 Ethernet=lan
                IP=vlan10_ip Network=all-nets VLANID=10
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > VLAN > Add > VLAN**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** Enter a name, for example *VLAN10*
 - **Interface:** lan
 - **VLAN ID:** 10
 - **IP Address:** vlan10_ip
 - **Network:** all-nets
3. Click **OK**

3.3.4. PPPoE

Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE) is a tunneling protocol used for connecting multiple users on an Ethernet network to the Internet through a common serial interface, such as a single DSL line, wireless device or cable modem. All the users on the Ethernet share a common connection, while access control can be done on a per-user basis.

Internet server providers (ISPs) often require customers to connect through PPPoE to their broadband service. Using PPPoE the ISP can:

- Implement security and access-control using username/password authentication
- Trace IP addresses to a specific user
- Allocate IP address automatically for PC users (similar to DHCP). IP address provisioning can be per user group

The PPP Protocol

Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP), is a protocol for communication between two computers using a serial interface, such as the case of a personal computer connected through a switched

telephone line to an ISP.

In terms of the layered OSI model, PPP provides a layer 2 encapsulation mechanism to allow packets of any protocol to travel through IP networks. PPP uses Link Control Protocol (LCP) for link establishment, configuration and testing. Once the LCP is initialized, one or several Network Control Protocols (NCPs) can be used to transport traffic for a particular protocol suite, so that multiple protocols can interoperate on the same link, for example, both IP and IPX traffic can share a PPP link.

PPP Authentication

PPP authentication is optional with PPP. Authentication protocols supported are *Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)*, *Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)* and *Microsoft CHAP (version 1 and 2)*. If authentication is used, at least one of the peers has to authenticate itself before the network layer protocol parameters can be negotiated using NCP. During the LCP and NCP negotiation, optional parameters such as encryption, can be negotiated.

PPPoE Client Configuration

Since the PPPoE protocol allows PPP to operate over Ethernet, the security gateway needs to use one of the normal physical Ethernet interfaces to run PPPoE over.

Each PPPoE tunnel is interpreted as a logical interface by CorePlus, with the same routing and configuration capabilities as regular interfaces and with IP rules being applied to all traffic. Network traffic arriving at the security gateway through the PPPoE tunnel will have the PPPoE tunnel interface as its source interface. For outbound traffic, the PPPoE tunnel interface will be the destination interface.

As with any interface, one or more routes are defined so CorePlus knows what IP addresses it should accept traffic from and which to send traffic to through the PPPoE tunnel. The PPPoE client can be configured to use a service name to distinguish between different servers on the same Ethernet network.

IP address information

PPPoE uses automatic IP address allocation which is similar to DHCP. When CorePlus receives this IP address information from the ISP, it stores it in a network object and uses it as the IP address of the interface.

User authentication

If user authentication is required by the ISP, the username and password can be setup in CorePlus for automatic sending to the PPPoE server.

Dial-on-demand

If dial-on-demand is enabled, the PPPoE connection will only be up when there is traffic on the PPPoE interface. It is possible to configure how the security gateway should sense activity on the interface, either on outgoing traffic, incoming traffic or both. Also configurable is the time to wait with no activity before the tunnel is disconnected.

Unnumbered PPPoE

When CorePlus acts as a PPPoE client, support for *unnumbered PPPoE* is provided by default. The additional option also exists to force unnumbered PPPoE to be used in PPPoE sessions.

Unnumbered PPPoE is typically used when ISPs want to allocate one or more preassigned IP addresses to users. These IP addresses are then manually entered into client computers. The ISP does not assign an IP address to the PPPoE client at the time it connects.

A further option with the unnumbered PPPoE feature in CorePlus is to allow the specification of a single IP address which is used as the address of the PPPoE client interface. This address can serve the following purposes:

- The IP address specified will be sent to the PPPoE server as the "preferred IP". If unnumbered PPPoE is not forced, the server may choose to not accept the preferred IP and instead assign another IP address to the PPPoE client.

When the option to force unnumbered PPPoE is selected, the client (that is to say CorePlus) will not accept assignment of another IP address by the server.

- The IP address specified, or possibly the address assigned by the PPPoE server when unnumbered PPPoE is not forced, will serve as the IP address of the PPPoE client interface. This will be used as the local IP address for traffic leaving the interface when the traffic is originated or NATed by the Clavister Security Gateway.



Note: PPPoE has a discovery protocol

To provide a point-to-point connection over Ethernet, each PPP session must learn the Ethernet address of the remote peer, as well as establish a unique session identifier. PPPoE includes a discovery protocol that provides this.

Example 3.11. Configuring a PPPoE Client

This example shows how to configure a PPPoE client on the *wan* interface with traffic routed over PPPoE.

CLI

```
Device: /> add Interface PPPoETunnel PPPoEClient
           EthernetInterface=wan Network=all-nets
           Username=exampleuser Password=examplepw
```

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > PPPoE > Add > PPPoE Tunnel**
2. Then enter:
 - **Name:** PPPoEClient
 - **Physical Interface:** wan
 - **Remote Network:** all-nets (as we will route all traffic into the tunnel)
 - **Service Name:** Service name provided by the service provider
 - **Username:** Username provided by the service provider
 - **Password:** Password provided by the service provider
 - **Confirm Password:** Retype the password

- Under **Authentication** specify which authentication protocol to use (the default settings will be used if not specified)
 - Disable the option **Enable dial-on-demand**
 - Under **Advanced**, if **Add route for remote network** is enabled then a new route will be added for the interface
3. Click **OK**

3.3.5. GRE Tunnels

Overview

The *Generic Router Encapsulation* (GRE) protocol is a simple, encapsulating protocol that can be used whenever there is a need to tunnel traffic across networks and/or through network devices. GRE does not provide any security features but this means that its use has extremely low overhead.

Using GRE

GRE is typically used to provide a method of connecting two networks together across a third network such as the Internet. The two networks being connected together communicate with a common protocol which is tunneled using GRE through the intervening network. Examples of GRE usage are:

- Traversing network equipment that blocks a particular protocol.
- Tunneling IPv6 traffic across an IPv4 network.
- Where a UDP data stream is to be multicast and it is necessary to transit through a network device which does not support multicasting. GRE allows tunneling through the network device.

GRE Security and Performance

A GRE tunnel does not use any encryption for the communication and is therefore not, in itself, secure. Any security must come from the protocol being tunneled. The advantage of GRE's lack of encryption is the high performance which is achievable because of the low traffic processing overhead.

The lack of encryption can be acceptable in some circumstances if the tunneling is done across an internal network that is not public.

Setting Up GRE

Like other tunnels in CorePlus such as an IPsec tunnel, a GRE Tunnel is treated as a logical interface by CorePlus, with the same filtering, traffic shaping and configuration capabilities as a standard interface. The GRE options are:

- **IP Address**

This is the IP address of the inside of the tunnel on the local side. This cannot be left blank and must be given a value.

The specified IP address is then used for the following:

- i. An ICMP *Ping* can be sent to this tunnel endpoint.
- ii. Log messages related to the tunnel will be generated with this IP address as the source.
- iii. If NAT is being used then it will not be necessary to set the source IP on the IP rule that performs NAT on traffic going through the tunnel. This IP address will be used as the source address for NAT.

- **Remote Network**

The remote network which the GRE tunnel will connect with.

- **Remote Endpoint**

This is the IP address of the remote device which the tunnel will connect with.

- **Outer PBR Table**

This defines the routing table to be used for the tunnel itself and not the traffic that it is carrying. In other words, the table used to look up the tunnel endpoint.

- **Use Session Key**

A unique number can optionally be specified for the tunnel. This allows more than one GRE tunnel to run between the same two endpoints. The *Session Key* value is used to distinguish between them.

- **Additional Encapsulation Checksum**

The GRE protocol allows for an additional checksum over and above the IPv4 checksum. This provides an extra check of data integrity.

The **Virtual Routing** options are used as with any other interface such as an Ethernet interface (see *Section 3.3.2, "Ethernet Interfaces"*). The routing tables specified here apply to the traffic carried by the tunnel and not the tunnel itself. The route lookup for the tunnel itself is specified in the earlier option **Outer PBR Table**.

The **Advanced** settings for a GRE interface are:

- **Automatically add route for remote network** - This option would normally be checked in order that the routing table is automatically updated. The alternative is to manually create the required route.
- **Address to use as source IP** - It is possible to specify a particular IP address as the source interface IP for the GRE tunnel. The tunnel setup will appear to be initiated by this IP address instead of the IP address of the interface that actually sets up the tunnel.

This might be done if, for example, you are using ARP publishing and want the tunnel to be setup by an ARP published IP address.


GRE and the IP Rule Set

An established GRE tunnel does not automatically mean that all traffic coming from or to that GRE tunnel is trusted. On the contrary, network traffic coming from the GRE tunnel will be

transferred to the CorePlus IP rule set for evaluation. The source interface of the network traffic will be the name of the associated GRE Tunnel.

The same is true for traffic in the opposite direction, that is, going into a GRE tunnel. Furthermore a **Route** has to be defined so CorePlus knows what IP addresses should be accepted and sent through the tunnel.

An Example GRE Scenario



The diagram above shows a typical GRE scenario, where two Clavister Security Gateways **A** and **B** must communicate with each other through the intervening internal network *172.16.0.0/16*.

Any traffic passing between **A** and **B** is tunneled through the intervening network using a GRE tunnel and since the network is internal and not public there is no need for encryption.

Setup for Clavister Security Gateway "A"

Assuming that the network *192.168.10.0/24* is **lanet** on the **lan** interface, the steps for setting up CorePlus on **A** are:

1. In the address book set up the following IP objects:
 - **remote_net_B:** 192.168.11.0/24
 - **remote_gw:** 172.16.1.1
 - **ip_GRE:** 192.168.0.1
2. Create a GRE Tunnel object called **GRE_to_B** with the following parameters:
 - **IP Address:** ip_GRE
 - **Remote Network:** remote_net_B
 - **Remote Endpoint:** remote_gw
 - **Use Session Key:** 1
 - **Additional Encapsulation Checksum:** Enabled

3. Define a route in the *main* routing table which routes all traffic to **remote_net_B** on the **GRE_to_B** GRE interface. This is not necessary if the option **Add route for remote network** is enabled in the **Advanced** tab, since this will add the route automatically.
4. Create the following rules in the IP rule set that allow traffic to pass through the tunnel:

Name	Action	Src Int	Src Net	Dest Int	Dest Net	Service
To_B	Allow	lan	lannet	GRE_to_B	remote_net_B	All
From_B	Allow	GRE_to_B	remote_net_B	lan	lannet	All

Setup for Clavister Security Gateway "B"

Assuming that the network *192.168.11.0/24* is **lannet** on the **lan** interface, the steps for setting up CorePlus on **B** are as follows:

1. In the address book set up the following IP objects:
 - **remote_net_A:** 192.168.10.0/24
 - **remote_gw:** 172.16.0.1
 - **ip_GRE:** 192.168.0.2
2. Create a GRE Tunnel object called **GRE_to_A** with the following parameters:
 - **IP Address:** ip_GRE
 - **Remote Network:** remote_net_A
 - **Remote Endpoint:** remote_gw
 - **Use Session Key:** 1
 - **Additional Encapsulation Checksum:** Enabled
3. Define a route in the *main* routing table which routes all traffic to **remote_net_A** on the **GRE_to_A** GRE interface. This is not necessary if the option **Add route for remote network** is enabled in the **Advanced** tab, since this will add the route automatically.
4. Create the following rules in the IP rule set that allow traffic to pass through the tunnel:

Name	Action	Src Int	Src Net	Dest Int	Dest Net	Service
To_A	Allow	lan	lannet	GRE_to_A	remote_net_A	All
From_A	Allow	GRE_to_A	remote_net_A	lan	lannet	All

Checking GRE Tunnel Status

IPsec tunnels have a status of being either up or not up. With GRE tunnels in CorePlus this doesn't really apply. The GRE tunnel is up if it exists in the configuration.

However, we can check on the what is going on with a GRE tunnel. For example, if the tunnel is called *gre_interface* then we can use the *ifstat* CLI command:

```
Device:/> ifstat gre_interface
```

This will show us what is happening with the tunnel and the *ifstat* command options can provide

various details.

3.3.6. Loopback Interfaces

A *Loopback Interface* is an interface that will take all traffic sent through it and send it out through a second configured loopback interface. Loopback interfaces are consequently always configured in pairs with each referring to the other.

Suppose that there is a pair of loopback interfaces defined called *LB1* and *LB2*. When traffic is sent through *LB1*, it is simultaneously received on *LB2* with the transfer occurring within CorePlus. Similarly, when traffic is sent through *LB2*, it is received on *LB1*. This is exactly the same as if the two interfaces were physical ports and they were connected together.

Usage with Virtual Routing

Loopback interfaces are usually used with *Virtual Routing*. With virtual routing, it is possible to divide up a single Clavister Security Gateway's operations so that it behaves as multiple virtual security gateways. This is done by having multiple routing tables so that each table handles the routing for one set of interfaces.

The routing tables and their associated routes can be totally isolated from each other so that related traffic flows are completely separate. However, if some traffic needs to flow between interfaces in separate routing tables, a loopback interface pair must be used (also see *Section 4.5, "Virtual Routing"*).

Loopback Interface Parameters

The following are the parameters for a loopback interface:

Name	The name of the interface for display and reference in CorePlus.
Loop to	This is the name of the other loopback interface in the pair. The other interface will have this loopback interface as its <i>Loop to</i> parameter. For a pair, the <i>Loop to</i> parameter must be left blank when the first interface is created and then filled in later after its partner is created.
IP Address	The IP address assigned to the loopback interface. This is the address that can be Pinged and can be used as the source address for dynamically translated connections.
Network	The network assigned to the loopback interface and to which the <i>IP Address</i> above belongs. This does not have to be the same network as the other loopback interface in the pair.

One of two options can then be selected depending on how the loopback interface is to be used with routing tables:

- **Make the interface a member of all routing tables**

Traffic arriving on this loopback interface will be routed according to the *main* routing table, by default.

With this option (which is the default), routes for this interface's IP will be inserted automatically into all routing tables.

- **Make interface a member of a specific routing table**

Specifies the routing table to insert the interface IP route into. It also means that the specified routing table will be used for all routing lookups for this interface unless overridden by a routing rule.

With this option, a single route for this interface's IP will be inserted automatically the specified routing table.



Note: Only the interface IP route is added automatically

Although routes are inserted automatically into routing tables when loopback interfaces are created these are only for the IP specified for the interface. Extra routes will most likely have to be added manually, such as the **all-nets** route in the example below.

Loopback Interface IP Addresses

Loopback interfaces are configured with IP addresses, just as with any other interface type. However, these IP addresses can be fictitious and the addresses for the pair do not need to be on the same network although they should be different.

The IP address assigned to a loopback interface is used as the source address for any dynamically translated connections that are routed over the interface.

If the interface is not used for this purposes then it is more consistent to set the address to one in the range of the standard loopback IP addresses which is 127.0.0.0 to 127.255.255.255.

A Summary of Loopback Interface Setup

It can be useful to outline the steps required to make use of loopback interfaces in the simplest possible example.



Figure 3.2. A Simple Network with Loopback Interfaces

Consider a single Clavister Security Gateway like the one above that has one protected local network called *LAN1*. The route to this network is contained in a single routing table called *RT1* which is isolated from all other routing tables with its **Ordering** parameter set to *Only*.

The security gateway is also connected to the Internet but the *all-nets* route to the Internet is in a totally separate and similarly isolated routing table called *RT2*. In this situation there is no way for clients on *LAN1* to reach the Internet since there is no *all-nets* route in *RT1*.

For *LAN1* clients to have access to the Internet, loopback interfaces must be used and the setup process can be summarized into three parts:

- Define a loopback interface pair with membership in different routing tables.
- Define routes which route traffic to the loopback interfaces.
- Define IP rules which allow traffic to flow to and from the loopback interfaces.

A more detailed description of these steps is as follows:

1. Create a pair of loopback interfaces called *LB1* and *LB2*, each has the other as its **Loop to** parameter. Also define *LB1* as a member of routing table *RT1* and *LB2* as a member of *RT2*.
2. Two configuration additions are now needed:
 - i. Define a route in *RT1* that routes *all-nets* traffic (traffic to the Internet) to the loopback interface *LB1*.
 - ii. Define an IP rule which allows Internet traffic to flow from *LAN1* to *LB1*.
3. The Internet traffic that is sent through loopback interface *LB1* now automatically arrives at its partner *LB2*. Because *LB2* is a member of the routing table *RT2* that contains the *all-nets* route, it can be successfully routed to the Internet.

However, two additions are still needed:

- i. An IP rule needs to be defined which allows traffic to flow from *LB2* to the Internet. This could be in the same IP rule set as the previous rule and will probably be a NAT rule which makes use of a single external IP address.
- ii. A route needs to be defined which routes *LAN1* traffic on the *LB2* interface. This is needed for traffic returning from the Internet.

The relationship of loopback interfaces with the routing tables and networks in this example are illustrated below.




Figure 3.3. Components of Loopback Interface Setup

The example below explains the detailed management user interface steps required for creating a loopback pair.

Example 3.12. Creating a Loopback Interface Pair

This example shows how to create a Loopback Interfaces pair.

Web Interface

A. Create the first loopback interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > Loopback Interfaces > Add**
2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** enter a suitable name. For example *vr1-main*
 - **Loop to:** Leave this field blank for now
3. Under **IP Address** enter:
 - **IP Address:** the IP address of the interface
 - **Network:** the network for the interface
4. Click **OK**

B. Create the second loopback interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > Loopback Interfaces > Add**
2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** enter a suitable name, for example *vr2-main*
 - **Loop to:** *vr1-main*
3. Under **IP Address** enter:
 - **IP Address:** the IP address of the interface
 - **Network:** the network for the interface
4. Click **OK**

C. Now go back to the first loopback interface and fill in the **Loop to:** field as *vr2-main*

Two interfaces have now been added; **main-vr1** and **vr1-main**. Packets being sent through the **main-vr1** interface will be received on the **vr1-main** interface and vice versa.

3.3.7. Interface Groups

Any set of CorePlus interfaces can be grouped together into an *Interface Group*. This then acts as

a single CorePlus configuration object which can be used in creating security policies in the place of a single group. When a group is used, for example, as the source interface in an IP rule, any of the interfaces in the group could provide a match for the rule.

A group can consist of ordinary Ethernet interfaces or it could consist of other types such as VLAN interfaces or VPN Tunnels. Also, the members of a group do not need to be of the same type. A group might consist, for example, of a combination of two Ethernet interfaces and four VLAN interfaces.

The *Security/Transport Equivalent* Option

When creating an interface group, the option *Security/Transport Equivalent* can be enabled (it is disabled by default). Enabling the option means that the group can be used as the destination interface in CorePlus rules where connections might need to be moved between two interfaces. For example, the interface might change with route failover or OSPF.

If a connection is moved from one interface to another within a group and *Security/Transport Equivalent* is enabled, CorePlus will not check the connection against the CorePlus rule sets with the new interface.

With the option disabled, a connection cannot be moved to another interface in the group and is instead dropped and must be reopened. This new connection is then checked against the CorePlus rule sets. In some cases, such as an alternative interface that is much slower, it may not be sensible to allow certain connections over the new interface.

Example 3.13. Creating an Interface Group

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Interface InterfaceGroup examplegroup
                Members=exampleif1,exampleif2
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > Interface Groups > Add > InterfaceGroup**
2. Enter the following information to define the group:
 - **Name:** The name of the group to be used later
 - **Security/Transport Equivalent:** If enabled, the interface group can be used as a destination interface in rules where connections might need to be moved between the interfaces.
 - **Interfaces:** Select the interfaces to be in the group
3. Click **OK**

3.4. ARP

3.4.1. Overview

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) allows the mapping of a network layer protocol (OSI layer 3) address to a data link layer hardware address (OSI layer 2). In data networks it is used to resolve an IP address into its corresponding Ethernet address. ARP operates at the OSI layer 2, data link layer, and is encapsulated by Ethernet headers for transmission.



Tip: OSI Layers

See **Appendix D, The OSI Framework** for an overview of the different OSI layers.

IP Addressing Over Ethernet

A host in an Ethernet network can communicate with another host only if it knows the Ethernet address (MAC address) of that host. Higher level protocols such as IP make use of IP addresses which are fundamentally different from a lower level hardware addressing scheme like the MAC address. ARP is used to retrieve the Ethernet MAC address of a host by using its IP address.

When a host needs to resolve an IP address to the corresponding Ethernet address, it broadcasts an ARP request packet. The ARP request packet contains the source MAC address, the source IP address and the destination IP address. Each host in the local network receives this packet. The host with the specified destination IP address, sends an ARP reply packet to the originating host with its MAC address.

3.4.2. The CorePlus ARP Cache

The *ARP Cache* in network equipment, such as switches and security gateways, is an important component in the implementation of ARP. It consists of a dynamic table that stores the mappings between IP addresses and Ethernet MAC addresses.

CorePlus uses an ARP cache in exactly the same way as other network equipment. Initially, the cache is empty at CorePlus startup and becomes populated with entries as traffic flows.

The typical contents of a minimal ARP Cache table might look similar to the following:

Type	IP Address	Ethernet Address	Expires
Dynamic	192.168.0.10	08:00:10:0f:bc:a5	45
Dynamic	193.13.66.77	0a:46:42:4f:ac:65	136
Publish	10.5.16.3	4a:32:12:6c:89:a4	-

The explanation for the table contents are as follows:

- The first entry in this ARP Cache is a dynamic ARP entry which tells us that IP address *192.168.0.10* is mapped to an Ethernet address of *08:00:10:0f:bc:a5*.
- The second entry in the table dynamically maps the IP address *193.13.66.77* to Ethernet address *0a:46:42:4f:ac:65*.
- The third entry is a static ARP entry binding the IP address *10.5.16.3* to Ethernet address *4a:32:12:6c:89:a4*.

The Expires Column

The third column in the table, *Expires*, is used to indicate how much longer the ARP entry will be valid for.

For example, the first entry has an expiry value of *45* which means that this entry will be rendered invalid and removed from the ARP Cache in 45 seconds. If traffic is going to be sent to the *192.168.0.10* IP address after the expiration, CorePlus will issue a new ARP request.

The default expiration time for dynamic ARP entries is 900 seconds (15 minutes). This can be changed by modifying the advanced setting **ARP Expire**.

The advanced setting **ARP Expire Unknown** specifies how long CorePlus will remember addresses that cannot be reached. This limit is needed to ensure that CorePlus does not continuously request such addresses. The default value for this setting is 3 seconds.

Example 3.14. Displaying the ARP Cache

The contents of the ARP Cache can be displayed from within the CLI.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> arp -show
ARP cache of iface lan
  Dynamic 10.4.0.1      = 1000:0000:4009   Expire=196
  Dynamic 10.4.0.165   = 0002:a529:1f65   Expire=506
```

Flushing the ARP Cache

If a host in a network is replaced with new hardware and retains the same IP address then it will probably have a new MAC address. If CorePlus has an old ARP entry for the host in its ARP cache then that entry will become invalid because of the changed MAC address and this will cause data to be sent to the host over Ethernet which will never reach its destination.

After the ARP entry expiration time, CorePlus will learn the new MAC address of the host but sometimes it may be necessary to manually force the update. The easiest way to achieve this is by *flushing* the ARP cache. This deletes all dynamic ARP entries from the cache and forces CorePlus to issue new ARP queries to discover the MAC/IP address mappings for connected hosts.

Flushing can be done with the CLI command *arp -flush*.

Example 3.15. Flushing the ARP Cache

This example shows how to flush the ARP Cache from within the CLI.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> arp -flush
ARP cache of all interfaces flushed.
```


The Size of the ARP Cache

By default, the ARP Cache is able to hold 4096 ARP entries at the same time. This is adequate for most scenarios but on rare occasions, such as when there are several very large LANs directly connected to the security gateway, it may be necessary to adjust this value upwards. This can be done by modifying the ARP advanced setting *ARP Cache Size*.

Hash tables are used to rapidly look up entries in the ARP Cache. For maximum efficiency, a hash table should be twice as large as the entries it is indexing, so if the largest directly connected LAN contains 500 IP addresses, the size of the ARP entry hash table should be at least 1000. The administrator can modify the ARP advanced setting **ARP Hash Size** to reflect specific network requirements. The default value of this setting is 512.

The setting **ARP Hash Size VLAN** setting is similar to the **ARP Hash Size** setting, but affects the hash size for VLAN interfaces only. The default value is 64.

3.4.3. Creating ARP Objects

To change the way CorePlus handles ARP on an interface, the administrator can create CorePlus *ARP objects*, each of which has the following parameters:

Mode	The type of ARP object. This can be one of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Static - Create a fixed mapping in the local ARP cache. • Publish - Publish an IP address on a particular MAC address (or this interface). • XPublish - Publish an IP address on a particular MAC address and "lie" about the sending MAC address of the Ethernet frame containing the ARP response.
Interface	The local physical interface for the ARP object.
IP Address	The IP address for the MAC/IP mapping.
MAC Address	The MAC address for the MAC/IP mapping.

The three ARP modes of *Static*, *Publish* and *XPublish* are discussed next.

Static Mode ARP Objects

A *Static* ARP object inserts a particular MAC/IP address mapping into the CorePlus ARP cache.

The most frequent use of static ARP objects is in situations where some external network device is not responding to ARP requests correctly and is reporting an incorrect MAC address. Some network devices, such as wireless modems, can have such problems.

It may also be used to lock an IP address to a specific MAC address for increasing security or to avoid denial-of-service if there are rogue users in a network. However, such protection only applies to packets being sent to that IP address. It does not apply to packets being sent from that IP address.

Example 3.16. Defining a Static ARP Entry

This example will create a static mapping between IP address *192.168.10.15* and Ethernet address *4b:86:f6:c5:a2:14* on the *lan* interface:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add ARP Interface=lan IP=192.168.10.15 Mode=Static
           MACAddress=4b-86-f6-c5-a2-14
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > ARP > Add > ARP**
2. Select the following from the dropdown lists:
 - **Mode:** Static
 - **Interface:** lan
3. Enter the following:
 - **IP Address:** 192.168.10.15
 - **MAC:** 4b-86-f6-c5-a2-14
4. Click **OK**

Published ARP Objects

CorePlus supports *publishing* IP addresses on a particular interface, optionally along with a specific MAC address instead of the interfaces MAC address. CorePlus will then send out these as ARP replies for any ARP requests received on the interface related to the published IP addresses.

This can done for a number of reasons:

- To give the impression that an interface in CorePlus has more than one IP address.

This is useful if there are several separate IP spans on a single LAN. The hosts on each IP span may then use a gateway in their own span when these gateway addresses are published on the corresponding CorePlus interface.
- Another use is publishing multiple addresses on an external interface, enabling CorePlus to statically address translate traffic to these addresses and send it onwards to internal servers with private IP addresses.
- A less common purpose is to aid nearby network equipment responding to ARP in an incorrect manner.

Publishing Modes

There are two publishing modes available when publishing a MAC/IP address pair:

- **Publish**
- **XPublish**

In both cases, an IP address and an associated MAC address are specified. If the MAC address is not specified (is all zeroes) then the MAC address of the sending physical interface is used.

To understand the difference between *Publish* and *XPublish* it is necessary to understand that when CorePlus responds to an ARP query, there are two MAC addresses in the Ethernet frame sent back with the ARP response:

1. The MAC address in the Ethernet frame of the Ethernet interface sending the response.
2. The MAC address in the ARP response which is contained within this frame. This is usually the same as (1) the source MAC address in the Ethernet frame but does not have to be.

These are shown in the illustration below of an Ethernet frame containing an ARP response:




Figure 3.4. An ARP Publish Ethernet Frame

The *Publish* option uses the real MAC address of the sending interface for the address (1) in the Ethernet frame.

In rare cases, some network equipment will require that both MAC addresses in the response (1 and 2 above) are the same. In this case *XPublish* is used since it changes both MAC addresses in the response to be the published MAC address. In other words, *XPublish* "lies" about the source address of the ARP response.

If a published MAC address is the same as the MAC address of the physical interface, it will make no difference if *Publish* or *XPublish* is selected, the result will be the same.

Publishing Entire Networks

When using ARP entries, IP addresses can only be published one at a time. However, the administrator can use the alternative **Proxy ARP** feature in CorePlus to handle publishing of entire networks (see Section 4.2.6, "Proxy ARP").

3.4.4. Using ARP Advanced Settings

This section presents some of the advanced settings related to ARP. In most cases, these settings need not to be changed, but in some deployments, modifications might be needed. A summary of all ARP advanced settings can be found in the next section.

Multicast and Broadcast

ARP requests and ARP replies containing multicast or broadcast addresses are usually never correct, with the exception of certain load balancing and redundancy devices, which make use of hardware layer multicast addresses.

The default behavior of CorePlus is to drop and log such ARP requests and ARP replies. This can, however, be changed by modifying the advanced settings **ARP Multicast** and **ARP Broadcast**.

Unsolicited ARP Replies

It is possible for a host on a connected network to send an ARP reply to CorePlus even though a corresponding ARP request was not issued. This is known as an *unsolicited ARP reply*.

According to the ARP specification, the recipient should accept these types of ARP replies. However, because this could be a malicious attempt to hijack a connection, CorePlus will by default drop and log unsolicited ARP replies.

This behavior can be changed by modifying the advanced setting **Unsolicited ARP Replies**.

ARP Requests

The ARP specification states that a host should update its ARP Cache with data from ARP requests received from other hosts. However, as this procedure can facilitate hijacking of local connections, CorePlus will normally not allow this.

To make the behavior compliant with the RFC 826 specification, the administrator can modify the setting **ARP Requests**. Even if this is set to *Drop* (meaning that the packet is discarded without being stored), CorePlus will reply to it provided that other rules approve the request.

Changes to the ARP Cache

A received ARP reply or ARP request can possibly alter an existing entry in the ARP cache. Allowing this to take place may allow hijacking of local connections. However, not allowing this may cause problems if, for example, a network adapter is replaced since CorePlus will not accept the new address until the previous ARP cache entry has timed out.

The advanced setting **Static ARP Changes** can modify this behavior. The default behavior is that CorePlus will allow changes to take place, but all such changes will be logged.

A similar issue occurs when information in ARP replies or ARP requests could collide with static entries in the ARP cache. This should not be allowed to happen and changing the setting **Static ARP Changes** allows the administrator to specify whether or not such situations are logged.

Sender IP 0.0.0.0

CorePlus can be configured for handling ARP queries that have a sender IP of *0.0.0.0*. Such sender IPs are never valid as responses, but network units that have not yet learned of their IP address sometimes ask ARP questions with an "unspecified" sender IP. Normally, these ARP replies are

dropped and logged, but the behavior can be changed by modifying the setting **ARP Query No Sender**.

Matching Ethernet Addresses

By default, CorePlus will require that the sender address at Ethernet level should comply with the Ethernet address reported in the ARP data. If this is not the case, the reply will be dropped and logged. The behavior can be changed by modifying the setting **ARP Match Ethernet Sender**.



Clavister SG10 Ethernet Connection Limitations

With the Clavister SG10 Series hardware there is a limit to how many devices can be connected via the Ethernet ports. This number is determined by the type of SG10 license purchased and the size of CorePlus ARP table that the license allows. There is no limitation on other Clavister hardware series.

3.4.5. ARP Advanced Settings Summary

The following advanced settings are available with ARP:

ARP Match Ethernet Sender

Determines if CorePlus will require the sender address at Ethernet level to comply with the hardware address reported in the ARP data.

Default: *DropLog*

ARP Query No Sender

Handles ARP queries that have a sender IP of *0.0.0.0*. Such sender IPs are never valid in responses, but network units that have not yet learned of their IP address sometimes ask ARP questions with an "unspecified" sender IP.

Default: *DropLog*

ARP Sender IP

Determines if the IP sender address must comply with the rules in the Access section.

Default: *Validate*

Unsolicited ARP Replies

Determines how CorePlus will handle ARP replies that it has not asked for. According to the ARP specification, the recipient should accept these. However, because this can facilitate hijacking of local connections, it is not normally allowed.

Default: *DropLog*

ARP Requests

Determines if CorePlus will automatically add the data in ARP requests to its ARP table. The ARP specification states that this should be done, but as this procedure can facilitate hijacking of local

connections, it is not normally allowed. Even if ARPRequests is set to "Drop", meaning that the packet is discarded without being stored, CorePlus will, provided that other rules approve the request, reply to it.

Default: *Drop*

ARP Changes

Determines how CorePlus will deal with situations where a received ARP reply or ARP request would alter an existing item in the ARP table. Allowing this to take place may facilitate hijacking of local connections. However, not allowing this may cause problems if, for example, a network adapter is replaced, as CorePlus will not accept the new address until the previous ARP table entry has timed out.

Default: *AcceptLog*

Static ARP Changes

Determines how CorePlus will handle situations where a received ARP reply or ARP request would alter a static item in the ARP table. Of course, this is never allowed to happen. However, this setting does allow you to specify whether or not such situations are to be logged.

Default: *DropLog*

ARP Expire

Specifies how long a normal dynamic item in the ARP table is to be retained before it is removed from the table.

Default: *900 seconds (15 minutes)*

ARP Expire Unknown

Specifies in seconds how long CorePlus is to remember addresses that cannot be reached. This is done to ensure that CorePlus does not continuously request such addresses.

Default: *3*

ARP Multicast

Determines how CorePlus is to deal with ARP requests and ARP replies that state that they are multicast addresses. Such claims are usually never correct, with the exception of certain load balancing and redundancy devices, which make use of hardware layer multicast addresses.

Default: *DropLog*

ARP Broadcast

Determines how CorePlus deals with ARP requests and ARP replies that state that they are broadcast addresses. Such claims are usually never correct.

Default: *DropLog*

ARP cache size

How many ARP entries there can be in the cache in total.

Default: *4096*

ARP Hash Size

Hashing is used to rapidly look up entries in a table. For maximum efficiency, the hash size should be twice as large as the table it is indexing. If the largest directly-connected LAN contains 500 IP addresses then the size of the ARP entry hash should be at least 1000 entries.

Default: *512*

ARP Hash Size VLAN

Hashing is used to rapidly look up entries in a table. For maximum efficiency, the hash size should be twice as large as the table it is indexing, so if the largest directly-connected VLAN contains 500 IP addresses, the size of the ARP entry hash should be at least 1000 entries.

Default: *64*

ARP IP Collision

Determines the behavior when receiving an ARP request with a sender IP address that collides with one already used on the receive interface. Possible actions: Drop or Notify.

Default: *Drop*

3.5. IP Rule Sets

3.5.1. Security Policies

Before examining IP rule sets in detail, we will first look at the generic concept of *security policies* to which IP rule sets belong.

Security Policy Characteristics

CorePlus security policies are configured by the administrator to regulate the way in which traffic can flow through the Clavister Security Gateway. Such policies are described by the contents of different CorePlus *rule sets*. These rule sets share a uniform means of specifying filtering criteria which determine the type of traffic to which they will apply. The possible filtering criteria consist of the following:

Source Interface	An Interface or Interface Group where the packet is received at the Clavister Security Gateway. This could also be a VPN tunnel.
Source Network	The network that contains the source IP address of the packet. This might be a CorePlus IP object which could define a single IP address or range of addresses.
Destination Interface	An Interface or an Interface Group from which the packet would leave the Clavister Security Gateway. This could also be a VPN tunnel.
Destination Network	The network to which the destination IP address of the packet belongs. This might be a CorePlus IP object which could define a single IP address or range of addresses.
Service	<p>The protocol type to which the packet belongs. Service objects define a protocol/port type. Examples are HTTP and ICMP. Service objects also define any ALG which is to be applied to the traffic</p> <p>CorePlus provides a large number of predefined service objects but administrator defined <i>custom services</i> can also be created. Existing service objects can also be collected together into <i>service groups</i>.</p> <p>See <i>Section 3.2, "Services"</i> for more information about this topic.</p>

The CorePlus Security Policy Rule Sets

The principle CorePlus rule sets that define CorePlus security policies, and which use the same filtering parameters described above (networks/interfaces/service), include:

- **IP Rules**

These determine which traffic is permitted to pass through the Clavister Security Gateway as well as determining if the traffic is subject to address translation. They are described below.

- **Pipe Rules**

These determine which traffic triggers traffic shaping to take place and are described in *Section 10.1, "Traffic Shaping"*.

- **Policy-based Routing Rules**

These rules determine the routing table to be used by traffic and are described in *Section 4.3, "Policy-based Routing"*.

- **IDP Rules**

These determine which traffic is subject to IDP scanning and are described in *Section 6.5, "Intrusion Detection and Prevention"*.

- **Authentication Rules**

These determine which traffic triggers authentication to take place (source net/interface only) and are described in *Chapter 8, User Authentication*.

IP Rules and the Default *main* IP Rule Set

IP rule sets are the most important of these security policy rule sets. They determine the critical packet filtering function of CorePlus, regulating what is allowed or not allowed to pass through the Clavister Security Gateway, and if necessary, how address translations like NAT are applied. By default, one CorePlus IP rule set always exist and this has the name *main*.

There are two possible approaches to how traffic traversing the Clavister Security Gateway could be dealt with:

- Everything is denied unless specifically permitted.
- **Or** everything is permitted unless specifically denied.

To provide the best security, the first of these approaches is adopted by CorePlus. This means that when first installed and started, the CorePlus has no IP rules defined in the *main* IP rule set and all traffic is therefore dropped. In order to permit any traffic to traverse the Clavister Security Gateway (as well as allowing CorePlus to respond to ICMP *Ping* requests), some IP rules must be defined by the administrator.

Each IP rule that is added by the administrator will define the following basic filtering criteria:

- From what interface to what interface traffic flows.
- From what network to what network the traffic flows.
- What kind of protocol is affected (the *service*).
- What action the rule will take when a match on the filter triggers.

Specifying Any Interface or Network

When specifying the filtering criteria in any of the rule sets specified above there are three useful predefined options that can be used:

- For a Source or Destination Network, the **all-nets** option is equivalent to the IP address *0.0.0.0/0* which will mean that any IP address is acceptable.
- For Source or Destination Interface, the **any** option can be used so that CorePlus will not care about the interface which the traffic is going to or coming from.
- The Destination Interface can be specified as **core**. This means that traffic, such as an ICMP

Ping, is destined for the Clavister Security Gateway itself and CorePlus will respond to it.

Creating a Drop All Rule

Traffic that does not match any rule in the IP rule set is, by default, dropped by CorePlus. For logging purposes it is nevertheless recommended that an explicit IP rule with an action of *Drop* for all source/destination networks/interfaces, and with logging enabled, is placed as the last rule in the IP rule set. This is often referred to as a *drop all* rule.

Traffic Flow Needs an IP Rule and a Route

As stated above, when CorePlus is started for the first time, the default IP rules drop all traffic so at least one IP rule must be added to allow traffic to flow. In fact, two CorePlus components need to be present:

- A *route* must exist in a CorePlus *routing table* which specifies on which interface packets should leave in order to reach their destination.

A second route must also exist that indicates the source of the traffic is found on the interface where the packets enter.

- An IP rule in a CorePlus *IP rule set* which specifies the security policy that allows the packets from the source interface and network bound for the destination network to leave the Clavister Security Gateway on the interface decided by the route.

If the IP rule used is an *Allow* rule then this is bi-directional by default.

The ordering of these steps is important. The route lookup occurs first to determine the exiting interface and then CorePlus looks for an IP rule that allows the traffic to leave on that interface. If a rule doesn't exist then the traffic is dropped.




Figure 3.5. Simplified CorePlus Traffic Flow

This description of traffic flow is an extremely simplified version of the full flow description found in *Section 1.3, "CorePlus State Engine Packet Flow"*.

For example, before the route lookup is done, CorePlus first checks that traffic from the source network should, in fact, be arriving on the interface where it was received. This is done by

CorePlus performing a *reverse route lookup* which means that the routing tables are searched for a route that indicates the network should be found on that interface.

This second route should logically exist if a connection is bi-directional and it must have a pair of routes associated with it, one for each direction.

3.5.2. IP Rule Evaluation

When a new connection, such as a TCP/IP connection, is being established through the Clavister Security Gateway, the list of IP rules are evaluated from top to bottom until a rule that matches the parameters of the new connection is found. The first matching rule's *Action* is then performed.

If the action allows it then the establishment of the new connection will go ahead. A new entry or *state* representing the new connection will then be added to the CorePlus internal *state table* which allows monitoring of opened and active connections passing through the Clavister Security Gateway. If the action is *Drop* or *Reject* then the new connection is refused.



Tip: Rules in the wrong order sometimes cause problems

It is important to remember the principle that CorePlus searches the IP rules from top to bottom, looking for the first matching rule.

If an IP rule seems to be ignored, check that some other rule above it isn't being triggered first.

Stateful Inspection

After initial rule evaluation of the opening connection, subsequent packets belonging to that connection will not need to be evaluated individually against the rule set. Instead, a highly efficient algorithm searches the state table for each packet to determine if it belongs to an established connection.

This approach is known as *stateful inspection* and is applied not only to stateful protocols such as TCP but also by means of "pseudo-connections" to stateless protocols such as UDP and ICMP. This approach means that evaluation against the IP rule set is only done in the initial opening phase of a connection. The size of the IP rule set consequently has negligible effect on overall throughput.

The First Matching Principle

If several rules match the same parameters, the first matching rule in a scan from top to bottom is the one that decides how the connection will be handled.

The exception to this is *SAT* rules since these rely on a pairing with a second rule to function. After encountering a matching *SAT* rule the search will therefore continue on looking for a matching second rule. See *Section 7.4, "SAT"* for more information about this topic.

Non-matching Traffic

Incoming packets that do not match any rule in the rule set and that do not have an already opened matching connection in the state table, will automatically be subject to a *Drop* action. To have control over non-matching traffic it is recommended to create an explicit rule called **DropAll** as the final rule in the rule set with an action of *Drop* with Source/Destination Network *all-nets* and Source/Destination Interface *all*. This allows logging to be turned on for traffic that

matches no IP rule.

3.5.3. IP Rule Actions

A rule consists of two parts: the filtering parameters and the action to take if there is a match with those parameters. As described above, the parameters of any CorePlus rule, including IP rules are:

- Source Interface
- Source Network
- Destination Interface
- Destination Network
- Service

The *Service* in an IP rule is also important because if an *Application Layer Gateway* object is to be applied to traffic then it must be associated with a service object (see *Section 6.2, "ALGs"*).

When an IP rule is triggered by a match then one of the following *Actions* can occur:

- Allow** The packet is allowed to pass. As the rule is applied to only the opening of a connection, an entry in the "state table" is made to record that a connection is open. The remaining packets related to this connection will pass through the CorePlus "stateful engine".
- FwdFast** Let the packet pass through the Clavister Security Gateway without setting up a state for it in the state table. This means that the stateful inspection process is bypassed and is therefore less secure than *Allow* or *NAT* rules. Packet processing time is also slower than *Allow* rules since every packet is checked against the entire rule set.
- NAT** This functions like an *Allow* rule, but with dynamic address translation (NAT) enabled (see *Section 7.2, "NAT" in Chapter 7, Address Translation* for a detailed description).
- SAT** This tells CorePlus to perform static address translation. A *SAT* rule always requires a matching *Allow*, *NAT* or *FwdFast* IP rule further down the rule set (see *Section 7.4, "SAT" in Chapter 7, Address Translation* for a detailed description).
- Drop** This tells CorePlus to immediately discard the packet. This is an "impolite" version of *Reject* in that no reply is sent back to the sender. It is often preferable since it gives a potential attacker no clues about what happened to their packets.
- Reject** This acts like *Drop* but will return a *TCP RST* or *ICMP Unreachable* message, informing the sending computer that the packet was dropped. This is a "polite" version of the *Drop* IP rule action.

Reject is useful where applications that send traffic wait for a timeout to occur before realizing that the traffic was dropped. If an explicit reply is sent indicating that the traffic was dropped, the application need not wait for the timeout.

Bi-directional Connections

A common mistake when setting up IP Rules is to define two rules, one rule for traffic in one direction and another rule for traffic coming back in the other direction. In fact nearly all IP Rules types allow *bi-directional* traffic flow once the initial connection is set up. The **Source Network** and **Source Interface** in the rule means the source of the initial connection request. If a connection is permitted and then becomes established, traffic can flow in either direction over it.

The exception to this bi-directional flow is *FwdFast* rules. If the *FwdFast* action is used, the rule will not allow traffic to flow from the destination back to the source. If bi-directional flow is required then two *FwdFast* rules are needed, one for either direction. This is also the case if a *FwdFast* rule is used with a *SAT* rule.

Using *Reject*

In certain situations the *Reject* action is recommended instead of the *Drop* action because a "polite" reply is required from CorePlus. An example of such a situation is when responding to the IDENT user identification protocol. Some applications will pause for a timeout if *Drop* is used and *Reject* can avoid such processing delays.

3.5.4. Multiple IP Rule Sets

Overview

CorePlus allows the administrator to define multiple IP rule sets which can both simplify and provide greater flexibility when defining security policies. The default IP rule set is known as *main* and is always present in CorePlus. Additional rule sets can be defined as needed and are given a name by the administrator.

Multiple IP rule sets offer many advantages, among them:

- The administrator can break a single large IP rule set into multiple, smaller and more manageable rule sets.
- A single named IP rule set can be associated with a routing table. This makes implementing Virtual Routing much simpler since each router can have a dedicated IP Rules-set associated with it. See *Section 4.5, "Virtual Routing"* for more information about this topic.

Searching Multiple rule sets

When multiple rule sets are defined, the way they are processed for a new connection is as follows:

- The primary *main* IP rule set is always searched first for matches of source/destination interface/network.
- User-defined rule sets are used in a rule look-up only when the action specified for a matching rule in *main* is **Goto**. The **Goto** action must have a named, administrator defined IP rule set associated with it and if the traffic matches the **Goto** rule then the rule look-up continues from the beginning of that named rule set.

A **Goto** may never use the *main* rule set as its target.

- If the search in the named rule set finds no match then the connection is dropped.
- If a match is found in the named rule set then the action is executed. The action might be another **Goto** in which case the rule scanning jumps to the beginning of another named rule set.

If the action is **Return** then the rule scanning resumes at the rule which follows the last **Goto** action (if there was no last **Goto** then the connection is dropped and rule scanning stops).

Loop Avoidance

It is conceivable that a sequence of **Goto** actions results in an infinite looping scanning sequence. CorePlus detects such logic when a configuration is initially uploaded. A new configuration is rejected if multiple IP rule set logic is detected that could potentially cause a loop condition.

The loop avoidance mechanism has to be efficient to enable fast configuration upload and for this reason it uses an algorithm that might sometimes find a fault in correct but complex logic. In this case it may be necessary to simplify the rule logic so the configuration can be uploaded.

A Usage Example

Below are two simple IP Rule set tables which illustrate how multiple rule sets might be used. The *main* rule set contains a first rule which has a **Goto** action which references the named administrator defined table called *ExtraRules*.

The administrator defined rule set *ExtraRules* contains a *NAT* and *SAT* rule. If neither are triggered then the final rule has a **Return** action which will cause the scanning process to go back to the rule in *main* which follows the **Goto** rule. In this case it will be the second rule in *main*.

The *main* IP rule set

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Service
1	Goto ExtraRules	any	all-nets	core	172.16.40.0/24	all
2	Allow	any	192.168.0.0/24	core	172.16.0.0/16	all

The *ExtraRules* IP rule set

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Service
1	SAT	any	all-nets	any	172.16.40.66	all
2	NAT	if2	176.16.0.0/16	any	all-nets	all
3	RETURN	if2	all-nets	any	all-nets	all

3.5.5. IP Rule Set Folders

In order to help organise large numbers of entries in IP rule sets, it is possible to create IP rule set *folders*. These folders are just like a folder in a computer's file system. They are created with a given name and can then be used to contain all the IP rules that are related together as a group.

Using folders is simply a way for the administrator to conveniently divide up IP rule set entries and no special properties are given to entries in different folders. CorePlus continues to see all entries as though they were in a single set of IP rules.

The folder concept is also used by CorePlus in the address book, where related IP address objects can be grouped together in administrator created folders.

Example 3.17. Adding an *Allow* IP Rule

This example shows how to create a simple *Allow* rule that will allow HTTP connections to be

opened from the *lannet* network on the *lan* interface to any network (*all-nets*) on the *wan* interface.

Command-Line Interface

First, change the current category to be the *main* IP rule set:

```
Device: /> cc IPRuleSet main
```

Now, create the IP rule:

```
Device: /main> add IPRule Action=Allow Service=http
                  SourceInterface=lan SourceNetwork=lannet
                  DestinationInterface=wan
                  DestinationNetwork=all-nets
                  Name=lan_http
```

Return to the top level:

```
Device: /main> cc
```

Configuration changes must be saved by then issuing an *activate* followed by a *commit* command.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the rule, for example *LAN_HTTP*
3. Now enter:
 - **Name:** A suitable name for the rule. For example *lan_http*
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Interface:** wan
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets
4. Click **OK**

3.5.6. Configuration Object Groups

The concept of *folders* can be used to organise groups of CorePlus objects into related collections. These work much like the folders concept found in a computer's file system. Folders are described in relation to the address book in *Section 3.1.6, "Address Book Folders"* and can also be used when organizing IP rules.

A compliment or alternative to folders for organizing different type of CorePlus object lists is the *configuration object groups* feature. Object groups gather together configuration objects under a

specified title text for the purpose of organizing their display in graphical user interfaces. Unlike folders, they do not require the folder to be opened for the individual objects to become visible. Instead, all objects are already visible and they are displayed in a way that indicates how they are grouped together.

Groups can be used in most cases where CorePlus objects are displayed as tables, where each line in the table is an instance of an object. The most common usage will be for the CorePlus Address Book to arrange IP addresses and in particular for organizing rules in IP rule sets which is why they are introduced in this section.



Tip: Object groups help to document configurations

Object groups are a recommended way to document the contents of CorePlus configurations.

This can be very useful for someone seeing a configuration for the first time, such as technical support staff. In an IP rule set that contains hundreds of rules it can often prove difficult to quickly identify those rules associated with a specific aspect of CorePlus operation.

Object Group Usage with InControl







Object groups are used in the same way in both the Web Interface and InControl. The description in this section applies to both user interfaces although the screen shots used come from the Web Interface. Both interfaces provide the same context menu options for manipulating groups.

Object Groups and the CLI

The display function of object groups means they do not have relevance to the command line interface (CLI). It is not possible to define or otherwise modify object groups with the CLI and they will not be displayed in CLI output. Any group editing must be done through the Web Interface or InControl and this is described next.

A Simple Example

As an example, consider the IP rule set *main* which contains just two rules to allow web surfing from an internal network and a third *Drop-all* rule to catch any other traffic so that it can be logged:

#	Name	Action
1	 lan-to-internet-http	 NAT
2	 lan-to-internet-dns	 NAT
3	 Drop-all	 Drop




Note

The screen images used in this example show just the first few columns of the object properties.

We would like to create an object group for the two IP rules for web surfing. This is done with the following steps:

- Select the first object to be in the new group by right clicking it.

- Select the **New Group** option from the context menu.




- A group is now created with a title line and the IP rule as its only member. The default title of "(new Group)" is used.

#	Name	Action
	(New Group)	
1	lan-to-internet-http	NAT
2	lan-to-internet-dns	NAT
3	Drop-all	Drop

The entire group is also assigned a default color and the group member is also indented. The object inside the group retains the same index number to indicate its position in the whole table. The index is not affected by group membership. The group title line doesn't have or need an index number since it is only a textual label.

Editing Group Properties

To change the properties of a group, right click the group title line and select the **Edit** option from the context menu.



A *Group* editing dialog will be displayed which allows two functions:

- **Specify the Title**

The title of the group can be any text that is required and can contain new lines as well as empty lines. There is also no requirement that the group name is unique since it is used purely as a label.

- **Change the Display Color**

Any color can be chosen for the group. The color can be selected from the 16 predefined color boxes or entered as a hexadecimal RGB value. In addition, when the hexadecimal value box is selected, a full spectrum color palette appears which allows selection by clicking any color in the box with the mouse.

In this example, we might change the name of the group to be *Web surfing* and also change the group color to green. The resulting group display is shown below:

#	Name	Action
Web surfing		
1	lan-to-internet-http	NAT
2	lan-to-internet-dns	NAT
3	Drop-all	Drop

Adding Additional Objects

A new group will always contain just one object. Now, we must add more objects to the group. By right clicking the object that immediately follows the group, we can select the **Join Preceding** option to add it to the preceding group.



Once we do this for the second IP rule in our example then the result will be the following:

#	Name	Action
Web surfing		
1	lan-to-internet-http	NAT
2	lan-to-internet-dns	NAT
3	Drop-all	Drop

To add any object to the group we must first position it immediately following the group and then select the **Join Preceding** option. This is explained in more detail next.

Adding Preceding Objects

If an object precedes a group or is in any position other than immediately following the group, then this is done in a multi-step process:

- i. Right click the object and select the **Move to** option.
- ii. Enter the index of the position immediately following the target group.
- iii. After the object has been moved to the new position, right click the object again and select the **Join Preceding** option.

Moving Group Objects

Once an object, such as an IP rule, is within a group, the context of move operations becomes the group. For example, right clicking a group object and selecting **Move to Top** will move the object to the top of the group, not the top of the entire table.

Moving Groups

Groups can be moved in the same way as individual objects. By right clicking the group title line, the context menu includes options to move the entire group. For example, the **Move to Top** option moves the entire group to the top of the table.

Leaving a Group

If an object in a group is right clicked then the context menu contains the option **Leave Group**. Selecting this removes the object from the group AND moves it down to a position immediately following the group.

Removing a Group

By right clicking on a group title, the context menu includes the **Ungroup** option. This removes the group, however the group's member objects remain. The group title line disappears and the individual members appear unindented and in the normal ungrouped color. Individual object index positions within the table are not affected.

Groups and Folders

It is important to distinguish between collecting together objects using a *folder* and collecting it together using groups.

Either can be used to group objects but a folder is similar to the concept of a folder in a computer's file system. However, a folder can not be part of a group. Groups collect together related basic objects and a folder is not of this type. It is possible, on the other hand, to use groups within a folder.

It is up to the administrator how to best use these features to best arrange CorePlus objects.

3.6. Schedules

In some scenarios, it might be useful to control not only what functionality is enabled, but also when that functionality is being used.

For instance, the IT policy of an enterprise might stipulate that web traffic from a certain department is only allowed access outside that department during normal office hours. Another example might be that authentication using a specific VPN connection is only permitted on weekdays before noon.

Schedule Objects

CorePlus addresses this requirement by providing *Schedule* objects (often referred to as simply *schedules*) that can be selected and used with various types of security policies to accomplish time-based control.

Multiple Time Ranges

A Schedule object also offers the possibility to enter multiple time ranges for each day of the week. Furthermore, a start and a stop date can be specified that will impose additional constraints on the schedule. For instance, a schedule can be defined as Mondays and Tuesdays, 08:30 - 10:40 and 11:30 - 14:00, Fridays 14:30 - 17:00.

Schedule Parameters

Each schedule object consists of the following parameters:

Name	The name of the schedule. This is used in user interface display and as a reference to the schedule from other objects.
Scheduled Times	These are the times during each week when the schedule is applied. Times are specified as being to the nearest hour. A schedule is either active or inactive during each hour of each day of a week.
Start Date	If this option is used, it is the date after which this schedule object becomes active.
End Date	If this option is used, it is the date after which this schedule object is no longer active.
Comment	Any descriptive text that should be associated with the object.

This functionality is not limited to IP Rules, but is valid for most types of policies, including Traffic Shaping rules, Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) rules and Virtual Routing rules. A Schedule object is, in other words, a very powerful component that can allow detailed regulation of when functions in CorePlus are enabled or disabled.



Important: Set the system date and time

As schedules depend on an accurate system date and time, it is very important that the system date and time are set correctly. This is also important for some other features such as certificate usage in VPN tunnels.

Preferably, time synchronization has also been enabled to ensure that scheduled policies will be enabled and disabled at the right time. For more information, please see

Section 3.8, "Date and Time".

Example 3.18. Setting up a Time-Scheduled Policy

This example creates a schedule object for office hours on weekdays, and attaches the object to an IP Rule that allows HTTP traffic.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add ScheduleProfile OfficeHours
           Mon=8-17 Tue=8-17 Wed=8-17 Thu=8-17 Fri=8-17
```

Now create the IP rule that uses this schedule. First, change the current category to be the *main* IP rule set:

```
Device:/> cc IPRuleSet main
```

Now, create the IP rule:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule Action=NAT Service=http
                  SourceInterface=lan SourceNetwork=lannet
                  DestinationInterface=any
                  DestinationNetwork=all-nets
                  Schedule=OfficeHours name=AllowHTTP
```

Return to the top level:

```
Device:/main> cc
```

Configuration changes must be saved by then issuing an *activate* followed by a *commit* command.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Schedules > Add > Schedule**
2. Enter the following:
 - **Name:** OfficeHours
3. Select 08-17, Monday to Friday in the grid
4. Click **OK**

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Enter the following:
 - **Name:** AllowHTTP

3. Select the following from the dropdown lists:

- **Action:** NAT
- **Service:** http
- **Schedule:** OfficeHours
- **SourceInterface:** lan
- **SourceNetwork:** lannet
- **DestinationInterface:** any
- **DestinationNetwork:** all-nets

4. Click **OK**

3.7. Certificates

3.7.1. Overview

X.509

CorePlus supports digital certificates that comply with the ITU-T X.509 standard. This involves the use of an X.509 certificate hierarchy with public-key cryptography to accomplish key distribution and entity authentication. References in this manual to a *certificate* means a *X.509 certificate*.

A certificate is a digital proof of identity. It links an identity to a public key in order to establish whether a public key truly belongs to the supposed owner. By doing this, it prevents data transfer interception by a malicious third-party who might post a fake key with the name and user ID of an intended recipient.

Certificates with VPN Tunnels

The main usage of certificates in CorePlus is with VPN tunnels. The simplest and fastest way to provide security between the ends of a tunnel is to use Pre-shared Keys (PSKs). As a VPN network grows so does the complexity of using PSKs. Certificates provide a means to better manage security in much larger networks.

Certificate Components

A certificate consists of the following:

- A public key: The "identity" of the user, such as name and user ID.
- Digital signatures: A statement that tells the information enclosed in the certificate has been vouched for by a Certificate Authority.

By binding the above information together, a certificate is a public key with identification attached, coupled with a stamp of approval by a trusted party.

Certificate Authorities

A *certificate authority (CA)* is a trusted entity that issues certificates to other entities. The CA digitally signs all certificates it issues. A valid CA signature in a certificate verifies the identity of the certificate holder, and guarantees that the certificate has not been tampered with by any third party.

A CA is responsible for making sure that the information in every certificate it issues is correct. It also has to make sure that the identity of the certificate matches the identity of the certificate holder.

A CA can also issue certificates to other CAs. This leads to a tree-like certificate hierarchy. The highest CA is called the root CA. In this hierarchy, each CA is signed by the CA directly above it, except for the root CA, which is typically signed by itself.

A certification path refers to the path of certificates from one certificate to another. When verifying the validity of a user certificate, the entire path from the user certificate up to the trusted root certificate has to be examined before establishing the validity of the user certificate.

The CA certificate is just like any other certificates, except that it allows the corresponding private

key to sign other certificates. Should the private key of the CA be compromised, the whole CA, including every certificate it has signed, is also compromised.

Validity Time

A certificate is not valid forever. Each certificate contains the dates between which the certificate is valid. When this validity period expires, the certificate can no longer be used, and a new certificate has to be issued.



Important

Make sure the CorePlus date and time are set correctly when using certificates.

Certificate Revocation Lists

A *Certificate Revocation List* (CRL) contains a list of all certificates that have been cancelled before their expiration date. They are normally held on an external server which is accessed to determine if the certificate is still valid. The ability to validate a user certificate in this way is a key reason why certificate security simplifies the administration of large user communities.

CRLs are published on servers that all certificate users can access, using either the LDAP or HTTP protocols. Revocation can happen for several reasons. One reason could be that the keys of the certificate have been compromised in some way, or perhaps that the owner of the certificate has lost the rights to authenticate using that certificate, perhaps because they have left the company. Whatever the reason, server CRLs can be updated to change the validity of one or many certificates.

Certificates often contain a CRL Distribution Point (CDP) field, which specifies the location from where the CRL can be downloaded. In some cases, certificates do not contain this field. In those cases the location of the CRL has to be configured manually.

A CA usually updates its CRL at a given interval. The length of this interval depends on how the CA is configured. Typically, this is somewhere between an hour to several days.

Trusting Certificates

When using certificates, CorePlus trusts anyone whose certificate is signed by a given CA. Before a certificate is accepted, the following steps are taken to verify the validity of the certificate:

- Construct a certification path up to the trusted root CA.
- Verify the signatures of all certificates in the certification path.
- Fetch the CRL for each certificate to verify that none of the certificates have been revoked.

Identification Lists

In addition to verifying the signatures of certificates, CorePlus also employs identification lists. An identification list is a list naming all the remote identities that are allowed access through a specific VPN tunnel, provided the certificate validation procedure described above succeeded.

Reusing Root Certificates

In CorePlus, root certificates should be seen as global entities that can be reused between VPN tunnels. Even though a root certificate is associated with one VPN tunnel in CorePlus, it can still be reused with any number of other, different VPN tunnels.

3.7.2. Certificates in CorePlus

Certificates can be uploaded to CorePlus for use in IKE/IPsec authentication, Webauth, etc. There are two types of certificates that can be uploaded: self-signed certificates and remote certificates belonging to a remote peer or CA server. Self-signed certificates can be generated by using one of a number of freely available utilities for doing this.

Example 3.19. Uploading a Certificate

The certificate may either be self-signed or belonging to a remote peer or CA server.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Authentication Objects > Add > Certificate**
2. Specify a suitable name for the certificate
3. Now select one of the following:
 - **Upload self-signed X.509 Certificate**
 - **Upload a remote certificate**
4. Click **OK** and follow the instructions

Example 3.20. Associating Certificates with IPsec Tunnels

To associate an imported certificate with an IPsec tunnel.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec**
2. Display the properties of the IPsec tunnel
3. Select the **Authentication** tab
4. Select the **X509 Certificate** option
5. Select the correct **Gateway** and **Root** certificates
6. Click **OK**

3.7.3. CA Certificate Requests

To request certificates from a CA server or CA company, the best method is to send a *CA Certificate Request* which is a file that contains a request for a certificate in a well known, predefined format.

Manually Creating Windows CA Server Requests

The CorePlus Web Interface (WebUI) does not currently include the ability to generate certificate requests that can be sent to a CA server for generation of the *.cer* and *.key* files required by CorePlus.

It is possible, however, to manually create the required files for a Windows CA server using the following stages.

- Create a *gateway certificate* on the Windows CA server and export it as a file in the *.pfx* format.
- Convert the *.pfx* file into the *.pem* format.
- Take out the relevant parts of the *.pem* file to form the required *.cer* and *.key* files.

The detailed steps for the above stages are as follows:

1. Create the *gateway certificate* on the Windows CA server and export it to a *.pfx* file on the local CorePlus management workstation disk.
2. Now convert the local *.pfx* file to a *.pem* file. This can be done with the *OpenSSL* utility using the console command line:

```
> openssl pkcs12 -in gateway.pfx -out gateway.pem -nodes
```

In this command line example, the file exported from the CA server is assumed to be called *gateway.pfx* and it is assumed to be in the same local directory as the *OpenSSL* executable.

The original *gateway.pfx* file contained 3 certificates: CA root certificate, a personal certificate and a private key certificate. The *gateway.pem* file now contains these in format which can be cut and pasted with a text editor.



Note

OpenSSL is being used here as a conversion utility and not in its normal role as a communication utility.

3. Create two blank text files with a text editor, such as Windows Notepad. Give the files the same filename but use the extension *.cer* for one and *.key* for the other. For example, *gateway.cer* and *gateway.key* might be the names.
4. Start a text editor and open the downloaded *.pem* file and locate the line that begins:

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

5. Mark and copy into the system clipboard that line and everything under it, up to and including the line:

```
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

6. Now paste the copied text into the *.key* file and save it.
7. Back in the *.pem* file, locate the line that begins:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
```

and copy into the system clipboard that line and everything under it, up to and including:

```
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

8. Now paste this copied text into the *.cer* file and save it.

The saved *.key* and *.cer* files are now ready for upload into CorePlus.

3.8. Date and Time

3.8.1. Overview

Correctly setting the date and time is important for CorePlus to operate properly. Time scheduled policies, auto-update of the IDP and Anti-Virus databases, and other product features such as digital certificates require that the system clock is accurately set.

In addition, log messages are tagged with time-stamps in order to indicate when a specific event occurred. Not only does this assume a working clock, but also that the clock is correctly synchronized with other equipment in the network.

The Local System Clock

To maintain current date and time, CorePlus makes use of the local hardware real-time hardware clock. On Clavister hardware models, this clock is also equipped with a battery backup to guard against a temporary loss of power.

Time Synchronization Protocols

CorePlus supports the optional use of *Time Synchronization Protocols* in order to automatically adjust the local system clock from the response to queries sent over the public Internet to special external servers which are known as *Time Servers*.

3.8.2. Setting Date and Time

Current Date and Time

The administrator can set the date and time manually and this is recommended when a new CorePlus installation is started for the first time.

Example 3.21. Setting the Current Date and Time

To adjust the current date and time, follow the steps outlined below:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> time -set YYYY-mm-DD HH:MM:SS
```

Where YYYY-mm-DD HH:MM:SS is the new date and time. Note that the date order is year, then month and then day. For example, to set the date and time to 9:25 in the morning on April 27th, 2008 the command would be:

```
Device:/> time -set 2008-04-27 09:25:00
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Date and Time**
2. Click **Set Date and Time**
3. Set year, month, day and time via the dropdown controls
4. Click **OK**

**Note: A reconfigure is not required**

A new date and time will be applied by CorePlus as soon as it is set. There is no need to reconfigure or restart the system.

Time Zones

The world is divided up into a number of time zones with Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) in London at zero longitude being taken as the base time zone. All other time zones going east and west from zero longitude are taken as being GMT plus or minus a given integer number of hours. All locations counted as being inside a given time zone will then have the same local time and this will be one of the integer offsets from GMT.

The CorePlus time zone setting reflects the time zone where the Clavister Security Gateway is physically located.

Example 3.22. Setting the Time Zone

To modify the CorePlus time zone to be GMT plus 1 hour, follow the steps outlined below:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> set DateTime Timezone=GMTplus1
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Date and Time**
2. Select **(GMT+01:00)** in the **Timezone** drop-down list
3. Click **OK**

Daylight Saving Time

Many regions follow *Daylight Saving Time* (DST) (or "Summer-time" as it is called in some countries) and this means clocks are advanced for the summer period. Unfortunately, the

principles regulating DST vary from country to country, and in some cases there can be variations within the same country. For this reason, CorePlus does not automatically know when to adjust for DST. Instead, this information has to be manually provided if daylight saving time is to be used.

There are two parameters governing daylight saving time; the DST period and the DST offset. The DST period specifies on what dates daylight saving time starts and ends. The DST offset indicates the number of minutes to advance the clock during the daylight saving time period.

Example 3.23. Enabling DST

To enable DST, follow the steps outlined below:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> set DateTime DSTEnabled=Yes
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System/Date and Time**
2. Check **Enable daylight saving time**
3. Click **OK**

3.8.3. Time Servers

The hardware clock which CorePlus uses can sometimes become fast or slow after a period of operation. This is normal behavior in most network and computer equipment and is solved by utilizing *Time Servers*.

CorePlus is able to adjust the clock automatically based on information received from one or more Time Servers which provide a highly accurate time, usually using atomic clocks. Using Time Servers is highly recommended as it ensures CorePlus will have its date and time aligned with other network devices.

Time Synchronization Protocols

Time Synchronization Protocols are standardized methods for retrieving time information from external Time Servers. CorePlus supports the following time synchronization protocols:

- **SNTP**

Defined by RFC 2030, The Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) is a lightweight implementation of NTP (RFC 1305). This is used by CorePlus to query NTP servers.

- **UDP/TIME**

The Time Protocol (UDP/TIME) is an older method of providing time synchronization service over the Internet. The protocol provides a site-independent, machine-readable date and

time. The server sends back the time in seconds since midnight on January first, 1900.

Most public Time Servers run the NTP protocol and are accessible using SNTP.

Configuring Time Servers

Up to three Time Servers can be configured to query for time information. By using more than a single server, situations where an unreachable server causes the time synchronization process to fail can be prevented. CorePlus always queries all configured Time Servers and then computes an average time based on all responses. Internet search engines can be used to list publicly available Time Servers.



Important: DNS servers need to be configured in CorePlus

Make sure at least one external DNS server is correctly configured in CorePlus so that Time Server URLs can be resolved (see Section 3.9, "DNS"). This is not needed if using IP addresses for the servers.

Example 3.24. Enabling Time Synchronization using SNTP

In this example, time synchronization is set up to use the SNTP protocol to communicate with the NTP servers at the Swedish National Laboratory for Time and Frequency. The NTP server URLs are *ntp1.sp.se* and *ntp2.sp.se*.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> set DateTime TimeSynchronization=custom
                    TimeSyncServer1=dns:ntp1.sp.se
                    TimeSyncServer2=dns:ntp2.sp.se
                    TimeSyncInterval=86400
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Date and Time**
2. Check the **Enable time synchronization**
3. Now enter:
 - **Time Server Type:** SNTP
 - **Primary Time Server:** dns:ntp1.sp.se
 - **Secondary Time Server:** dns:ntp2.sp.se
4. Click **OK**

The time server URLs must have the prefix *dns:* to specify that they should be resolved with a DNS server. CorePlus must therefore also have a DNS server defined so this resolution can be

performed.

Example 3.25. Manually Triggering a Time Synchronization

Time synchronization can be triggered from the CLI. The output below shows a typical response.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> time -sync
Attempting to synchronize system time...

Server time: 2008-02-27 12:21:52 (UTC+00:00)
Local time:  2008-02-27 12:24:30 (UTC+00:00) (diff: 158)

Local time successfully changed to server time.
```

Maximum Time Adjustment

To avoid situations where a faulty Time Server causes the clock to be updated with an extremely inaccurate time, a *Maximum Adjustment* value (in seconds) can be set. If the difference between the current CorePlus time and the time received from a Time Server is greater than this Maximum Adjustment value, then the Time Server response will be discarded. For example, assume that the maximum adjustment value is set to 60 seconds and the current CorePlus time is 16:42:35. If a Time Server responds with a time of 16:43:38 then the difference is 63 seconds. This is greater than the Maximum Adjustment value so no update occurs for this response.

Example 3.26. Modifying the Maximum Adjustment Value

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> set DateTime TimeSyncMaxAdjust=40000
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > Date and Time**
2. For the setting **Maximum time drift that a server is allowed to adjust**, enter the maximum time difference in seconds that an external server is allowed to adjust for. There may be a valid reason why there is a significant difference such as an incorrect CorePlus configuration.
3. Click **OK**

Sometimes it might be necessary to override the maximum adjustment. For example, if time synchronization has just been enabled and the initial time difference is greater than the maximum adjust value. It is then possible to manually force a synchronization and disregard the maximum adjustment parameter.

Example 3.27. Forcing Time Synchronization

This example demonstrates how to force time synchronization, overriding the maximum adjustment setting.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> time -sync -force
```

Synchronization Intervals

The interval between each synchronization attempt can be adjusted if needed. By default, this value is 86,400 seconds (1 day), meaning that the time synchronization process is executed once in a 24 hour period.

3.8.4. Settings Summary for Date and Time

Below is a summary of the various settings for date and time:

Time Zone

Time zone offset in minutes.

Default: *0*

DST Offset

Daylight saving time offset in minutes.

Default: *0*

DST Start Date

What month and day DST starts, in the format MM-DD.

Default: *none*

DST End Date

What month and day DST ends, in the format MM-DD.

Default: *none*

Time Sync Server Type

Type of server for time synchronization, UDPTIME or SNTP (Simple Network Time Protocol).

Default: *SNTP*

Primary Time Server

DNS hostname or IP Address of Timeserver 1.

Default: *None*

Secondary Time Server

DNS hostname or IP Address of Timeserver 2.

Default: *None*

tertiary Time Server

DNS hostname or IP Address of Timeserver 3.

Default: *None*

Interval between synchronization

Seconds between each resynchronization.

Default: *86400*

Max time drift

Maximum time drift in seconds that a server is allowed to adjust.

Default: *600*

Group interval

Interval according to which server responses will be grouped.

Default: *10*

3.9. DNS

Overview

A DNS server can resolve a *Fully Qualified Domain Name* (FQDN) into the corresponding numeric IP address. FQDNs are unambiguous textual domain names which specify a node's unique position in the Internet's DNS tree hierarchy. FQDN resolution allows the actual physical IP address to change while the FQDN can stay the same.

A *Uniform Resource Locator* (URL) differs from an FQDN in that the URL includes the access protocol along with the FQDN. For example the protocol might be specified *http//*: for world wide web pages.

FQDNs are used in many aspects of a CorePlus configuration where IP addresses are unknown or where it makes more sense to make use of DNS resolution instead of using static IP addresses.

DNS with CorePlus

To accomplish DNS resolution, CorePlus has a built-in DNS client that can be configured to make use of up to three DNS servers. They are called the *Primary Server*, the *Secondary Server* and the *Tertiary Server*. For DNS to function, at least the primary server must be configured. It is recommended to have both a primary and secondary defined so that there is a backup should the primary be unavailable.

Features Requiring DNS Resolution

Having at least one DNS server defined is vital for functioning of the following modules in CorePlus:

- Automatic time synchronization.
- Access to an external certificate authority server for CA signed certificates.
- UTM features that require access to external servers such as anti-virus and IDP.

Example 3.28. Configuring DNS Servers

In this example, the DNS client is configured to use one primary and one secondary DNS server, having IP addresses 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2 respectively.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> set DNS DNSServer1=10.0.0.1 DNSServer2=10.0.0.2
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > DNS**

2. Enter the following:
 - **Primary Server:** 10.0.0.1
 - **Secondary Server:** 10.0.0.2
3. Click **OK**

Dynamic DNS

A DNS feature offered by CorePlus is the ability to explicitly inform DNS servers when the external IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway has changed. This is sometimes referred to as *Dynamic DNS* and is useful where the Clavister Security Gateway has an external IP address that can change.

Dynamic DNS can also be useful in VPN scenarios where both ends of the tunnel have dynamic IP addresses. If only one side of the tunnel has a dynamic address then the CorePlus VPN *keep alive* feature solves this problem.

Under **System > Misc. Clients** in the WebUI, several dynamic DNS services are defined. The *HTTP Poster* client is a generic dynamic DNS client with which it is possible to define 3 different DNS URLs plus an explicit value for *Delay in seconds until all URLs are refetched* (with a default of 604800 seconds, equivalent to 7 days).

At the end of each time interval *HTTP Poster* will send an HTTP *GET* request to the defined URLs.

When CorePlus is reconfigured a request is NOT automatically sent. However, there is one exception to this and that is after a reconfigure which is the result of getting a new local IP address on the interface that connects to the DNS server.

The difference between *HTTP Poster* and the named DNS servers in the WebUI is that *HTTP Poster* can be used to send any URL. The named services are a convenience that make it easy to correctly format the URL needed for that service. For example, the `http://` URL for the *dyndns.org* service might be:

```
myuid:mypwd@members.dyndns.org/nic/update?hostname=mydns.dyndns.org
```

This could be sent as shown above by using *HTTP Poster*, or the URL could be automatically formatted for the administrator by CorePlus through choosing the *DynDNS* menu option and entering the information required for *dyndns.org*.

The CLI console command *httpposter* can be used to troubleshoot problems by seeing what CorePlus is sending and what the servers are returning.



Note: A high rate of server queries can cause problems

Dynamic DNS services are often sensitive to repeated logon attempt over short periods of time and may blacklist IP addresses that are sending excessive requests. It is therefore not advisable to query these services too often otherwise they may cease to respond.

HTTP Poster may be used for other purposes than dynamic DNS. Any need for CorePlus to generate an HTTP *GET* request can be met by the feature.

3.10. Internet Access Setup

Overview

One of the first things an administrator often wants to do after starting CorePlus for the first time is to set up access to the public Internet. This section is a quick start guide to doing this and refers to many other sections in *Chapter 3, Fundamentals* as well as *Chapter 4, Routing* which follows.

Getting Started Guides

This section is designed to be a broad overview of setting up Internet access for all CorePlus platforms. Clavister provides specific *Getting Started* guides for different Clavister hardware models as well as a generic guide for third-party hardware (the *CorePlus Software Series*) and another guide for setup under VMware (the *Virtual Security Gateway Series*).

These getting started guides contain a comprehensive section on Internet setup which is specific to each environment and the administrator is advised to refer to them for more detailed information. The guides also explain how to set up Internet PPOE and PPTP access.

The Setup Wizard

When CorePlus is accessed for the first time through the Web Interface using a web browser, the administrator is not taken directly to the interface. Instead, a *Setup Wizard* runs which takes the administrator through a number of dialogs to set up the basic CorePlus configuration. A portion of the wizard deals with the set up of Internet access.

By dismissing the wizard, the administrator can go straight to the Web Interface and perform setup manually, step by step. The sections below assume that setup is being done manually but they are also useful in understanding the setups that the wizard automates.

IP Address Options

Initially, access to the Internet will not be possible via a Clavister Security Gateway. To achieve this, access must first be arranged with an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The ISP will probably offer two options for access:

- **Using Static IP Addresses**

Access can be setup using static IP addresses. The ISP provides the required addresses (for example, in an email) and these are manually input into the CorePlus configuration.

- **Using DHCP**

CorePlus can act as a DHCP client and use the DHCP protocol to automatically retrieve all the IP addresses required across the connection with the ISP. No addresses need to be entered manually.

3.10.1. Static Address Setup

For the static IP address option, the ISP should provide:

- A public IP address for the Clavister Security Gateway. This is assigned to the interface that connects to the ISP.

- The IP address of the ISP's "gateway" router.
- A network address for the network between the ISP and the Clavister Security Gateway. This can be used for addressing any hosts that lie on this network aside from the ISP's gateway.



Note: CorePlus ignores the broadcast address

The broadcast IP address need not be specified. It is automatically calculated by CorePlus but is not responded to.

Creating IP Objects

Once the ISP has provided the necessary information, several *IP objects* in the CorePlus *Address Book* need to be defined. The address book provides a way to associate a text name with an IP address, IP range or IP network. Instead of re-typing IP addresses, these names can then be used as a choice throughout the Web Interface and InControl as well as being used with CLI commands.

Before defining any new addresses, the address book already contains a number of useful addresses by default. One of the most useful is the *all-nets* address, which corresponds to the IP address *0.0.0.0/0* (all hosts and networks).

To create the IP objects necessary for Internet access, go to **Objects > Address Book** in the Web Interface or InControl navigation tree and then select **Add > IP address**.

The following IP objects should be added or modified:

- Create a new IP object called *gw-world* with the IP address of the ISP gateway.
- One interface on the hardware must be dedicated as a connection to the ISP. We will assume here that the interface is *wan*. This interface will have the IP address object *ip_wan* as its IP address and belong to the network *wannet*. Modify the object *ip_wan* so it is assigned the public IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway.
- The object *wannet* should be allocated the network address provided by the ISP. This is the network between the Clavister Security Gateway and the ISP and both the *wan* and the ISP's gateway will belong to it.

Interface Naming

The physical interface *wan* is assumed in this manual to be the default name of the interface to which the ISP is connected. Different hardware models can have different default names and these names may be changed by the administrator. The above should therefore be adapted for the particular hardware in use.

CorePlus uses certain naming conventions for particular objects, such as *gw-world* for the ISP gateway. These need not be followed by the administrator but if they are followed, it makes examination of a configuration by support personnel easier.

3.10.2. DHCP Setup

The IP addresses defined in the previous section can alternatively be retrieved automatically from the ISP using the DHCP protocol. The steps to enable this are:

- In the Web Interface or InControl navigation tree, go to **Interfaces > Ethernet** and select the name of the interface that will be used for ISP access. The properties for that interface will be displayed.
- Check the option to *Enable DHCP on this interface*. This will automatically populate the address book with all relevant IP addresses when they are received from the ISP via DHCP.

See *Chapter 5, DHCP Services* for more information about this topic.

3.10.3. The Minimum Requirements for Traffic Flow

An important CorePlus principle that is repeated throughout this manual and which will be stated again here, is that there are a minimum of two CorePlus configuration components required for data traffic to flow through a Clavister Security Gateway:

- **A Route**

When traffic arrives at one CorePlus interface, it has a destination IP address. A CorePlus *routing table* contain *routes* which specify which destination IP address or network can be found on which interface. CorePlus uses this information to then forward the data out through the right interface.

- **An IP Rule**

Before any traffic can flow out through the interface decided by a route, there must be an *IP rule* in a CorePlus *IP ruleset* that allows this traffic to flow.

IP rules make up the *security policies* of the security gateway and can block or allow traffic based on its protocol type as well as on the combination of source/destination and interface/network. No IP rules exist by default and all traffic is therefore dropped until an IP rule exists which allows it.

The creation of the appropriate route and IP rules for Internet access is discussed in the sections that follow.

3.10.4. Creating a Route

Initially, no route will exist in the *main* routing table that allows traffic to reach the Internet so this must be defined. The routes parameters will be as follows:

Interface	Network	Gateway
wan	all-nets	gw-world

Notice that the destination network for this route is *all-nets*. When CorePlus needs to determine which interface the received traffic should be forwarded out from, it looks in a routing table for the "narrowest" destination network match. This *all-nets* route is therefore a catch-all route that will be used when no other, more specific, matching route exists. There should therefore only be one *all-nets* route.

The *all-nets* route is in fact created automatically by CorePlus when the *gateway* IP is specified for an interface.

To create the route manually in the Web Interface or InControl go to **Routes > New Route** in the navigation tree.

The route to access *wannet* via the *wan* interface will be automatically created when the *wannet* object is edited.

See *Chapter 4, Routing* for more information about this topic.

3.10.5. Creating IP Rules

Before traffic can flow to the ISP, appropriate *IP Rules* must be created in the IP rule set to allow the traffic to pass.

At minimum, DNS and HTTP traffic should be allowed to flow so that web surfing can take place. It is also recommended to use NAT to share the single external IP address assigned to the Clavister Security Gateway so that the internal network topology is hidden. If, for example, web surfing is going to be done from several hosts on the internal network attached to the *lan* interface then the IP rules for DNS and HTTP would be:

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	dns-all
NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	http-all

The service *http-all* includes both the HTTP and HTTPS services. The single service *all* could have been used in a single rule but this is not recommended as this means connections could be opened on any port number which can compromise security. The best approach is to define the filter for traffic as narrowly as possible which is what has been done here.

See *Section 3.5, "IP Rule Sets"* for more information about this topic.

3.10.6. Defining DNS Servers

Web surfing cannot function properly without the ability to resolve HTTP URLs by looking them up on DNS servers.

In the Web Interface or InControl go to **System > DNS** of the navigation tree. Up to three DNS servers can be manually specified here and at least one should be configured for the DNS lookup to function.

Automatic Configuration through DHCP

If connection to an ISP is done with DHCP then the ISP's DHCP server should automatically configure at least one DNS server in CorePlus at the same time all other IP addresses are configured during initial connection to the ISP.

When DHCP configures the DHCP servers in CorePlus, names are automatically assigned to these servers so they can be referenced later in user interfaces. The names used are of the form *<if-name>_dns1*, *<if-name>_dns2* and so on, where *<if-name>* is the interface name on which the DHCP addresses are received.

When CorePlus itself acts as a DHCP server, the DNS addresses it hands out are, by default, the same as those received through DHCP unless different DNS servers are explicitly specified.

Default DNS Server Address Names with DHCP

When CorePlus receives DNS servers through DHCP, these are automatically added to the address book with a default name that follows the pattern *<interface-name>_DNS<num>*. For example, the second DNS server address allocated through the *wan* interface would appear in the address book as *wan_DNS2*.

When viewed in the Web Interface or InControl these DNS addresses always have the value *0.0.0.0*. To see the actual value after it has been assigned with DHCP, use the CLI command *dhcp*

-show. For example, to see the status of the DNS servers on the *wan* interface, use the command:

```
Device: /> dhcp -show wan
```

See *Section 3.9, "DNS"* for more information about this topic.

Chapter 4: Routing

This chapter describes how to configure IP routing in CorePlus.

- Overview, page 187
- Static Routing, page 188
- Policy-based Routing, page 206
- Route Load Balancing, page 212
- Virtual Routing, page 220
- OSPF, page 228
- Multicast Routing, page 253
- Transparent Mode, page 267

4.1. Overview

IP routing is one of the most fundamental functions of CorePlus. Any IP packet flowing through a Clavister Security Gateway will be subjected to at least one routing decision at some point in time, and properly setting up routing is crucial for the system to function as expected.

CorePlus offers support for the following types of routing mechanisms:

- Static routing
- Dynamic routing
- Virtual routing

CorePlus additionally supports *route monitoring* to achieve route and link redundancy with fail-over capability.

4.2. Static Routing

The most basic form of routing is known as *Static Routing*. The word "static" refers to the fact that entries in the routing table are manually added and are therefore permanent (or static) by nature.

Due to this manual approach, static routing is most appropriate to use in smaller network deployments where addresses are fairly fixed and where the amount of connected networks are limited to a few. However, for larger networks, or whenever the network topology is complex, the work of manually maintaining static routing tables can be time-consuming and also problematic. Dynamic routing should therefore be used in such cases.

For more information about the dynamic routing capabilities of CorePlus, please see *Section 4.6, "OSPF"*. Note however, that even if you choose to implement dynamic routing for your network, you will still need to understand the principles of static routing and how it is implemented in CorePlus.

4.2.1. The Principles of Routing

IP routing is the mechanism used in TCP/IP based networks for delivering IP packets from their source to their ultimate destination through a number of intermediary network devices. These devices are most often referred to as *routers* since they are performing the task of routing packets to their destination.

In each router, one or more *routing tables* contain a list of *routes* and these are consulted to find out where to send a packet so it can reach its destination. The components of a single route are discussed next.

The Components of a Route

When a route is defined it consists of the following parameters:

- **Interface**

The interface to forward the packet on in order to reach the destination network. In other words, the interface to which the destination IP range is connected, either directly or through a router.

The interface might be a physical interface of the security gateway or it might be VPN tunnel (tunnels are treated like physical interfaces by CorePlus).

- **Network**

This is the destination network IP address range which this route will reach. The route chosen from a routing table is the one that has a destination IP range which includes the IP address being sought. If there is more than one such matching route, the route chosen is the one which has the smallest IP address range.

The destination network *all-nets* is usually always used in the route for public Internet access via an ISP.

- **Gateway**

The IP address of the *gateway* which is the next router in the path to the destination network. This is optional. If the destination network is connected directly to the interface, this is not needed.

When a router lies between the Clavister Security Gateway and the destination network, a gateway IP must be specified. For example, if the route is for public Internet access via an ISP

then the public IP address of the ISP's gateway router would be specified.

- **Local IP address**

This parameter usually doesn't need to be specified. If it is specified, CorePlus responds to ARP queries sent to this address. A special section below explains this parameter in more depth.

Local IP Address and *Gateway* are mutually exclusive and either one or the other should be specified.

- **Metric**

This is a metric value assigned to the route and is used as a weight when performing comparisons between alternate routes. If two routes are equivalent but have different metric values then the route with the lowest metric value is taken.

The metric value is also used by *Route Failover* and *Route Load Balancing*.

For more information, see *Section 4.4, "Route Load Balancing"* and *Section 4.2.3, "Route Failover"*.

A Typical Routing Scenario

The diagram below illustrates a typical Clavister Security Gateway usage scenario.




Figure 4.1. A Typical Routing Scenario

In the above diagram, the **LAN** interface is connected to the network *192.168.0.0/24* and the **DMZ** interface is connected to the network *10.4.0.0/16*. The **WAN** interface is connected to the network *195.66.77.0/24* and the address of the ISP gateway to the public Internet is *195.66.77.4*.

The associated routing table for this would be as follows:

Route #	Interface	Destination	Gateway
1	lan	192.168.0.0/24	
2	dmz	10.4.0.0/16	
3	wan	195.66.77.0/24	
4	wan	all-nets	195.66.77.4

The above routing table provides the following information:

- **Route #1**

All packets going to hosts on the 192.168.0.0/24 network should be sent out on the lan interface. As no gateway is specified for the route entry, the host is assumed to be located on the network segment directly reachable from the lan interface.

- **Route #2**

All packets going to hosts on the 10.4.0.0/16 network are to be sent out on the dmz interface. Also for this route, no gateway is specified.

- **Route #3**

All packets going to hosts on the 195.66.77.0/24 network will be sent out on the wan interface. No gateway is required to reach the hosts.

- **Route #4**

All packets going to any host (the *all-nets* network will match all hosts) will be sent out on the wan interface and to the gateway with IP address 195.66.77.4. That gateway will then consult its routing table to find out where to send the packets next.

A route with the destination *all-nets* is often referred to as the *Default Route* as it will match all packets for which no specific route has been configured. This route usually specifies the interface which is connected to the public internet.

When a routing table is evaluated, the ordering of the routes is important. In general, a routing table is evaluated with the most *specific* routes first. In other words, if two routes have destination networks that overlap, the narrower network definition will be evaluated prior to the wider one (in other words, the network that is contained within the other has priority).

In the above example, a packet with a destination IP address of 192.168.0.4 will theoretically match both the first route and the last one. However, the first route entry is a narrower, more specific match so the evaluation will end there and the packet will be routed according to that entry.

The Local IP Address Parameter

The correct usage of the *Local IP Address* parameter can be difficult to understand so additional explanation can be helpful.

Normally, a physical interface such as *lan* is connected to a single network and the interface and network are on the same network. We can say that the network *is bound* to a physical interface and clients on the connected network can automatically find the Clavister Security Gateway through ARP queries. ARP works because the clients and the CorePlus interface are part of the same network.

A second network might then be added to the same physical interface via a switch, but with a new network range that doesn't include the physical interface's IP address. We would say that this network is *not bound* to the physical interface. Clients on this second network won't then be

able to communicate with the Clavister Security Gateway because ARP won't function between the clients and the interface.

To solve this problem we would add a new route to CorePlus which would have the following parameters:

- **Interface:** The interface on which the second network is found.
- **Network:** The IP address range of the second network.
- **Local IP Address:** An address within the second network's IP range.

When the *Default Gateway* of the second network's clients is now set to the same value as the *Local IP Address* of the above route, the clients will be able to communicate successfully with the interface. The IP address chosen in the second network isn't significant, as long as it is the same value for the *Default Gateway* of the clients and the *Local IP Address*.

The effect of adding the route with the *Local IP Address* is that the CorePlus will act as a gateway with the *Local IP Address* and respond to, as well as send out, ARP queries as though the interface had that IP address.

The diagram below illustrates a scenario where this feature could be used. The network $10.1.1.0/24$ is bound to a physical interface that has an IP address within the network of $10.1.1.1$. If we now attach a second network $10.2.2.0/24$ to the interface via the switch, it is unbound since the interface's IP address doesn't belong to it.




Figure 4.2. Using Local IP Address with an Unbound Network

By adding a CorePlus route for this second network with the *Local IP Address* specified as $10.2.2.1$, the interface will then respond to ARP requests from the $10.2.2.0/24$ network. The clients in this second network must also have their *Default Gateway* set to $10.2.2.1$ in order to reach the Clavister Security Gateway.

This feature is normally used when an additional network is to be added to an interface but it is not desirable to change the existing IP addresses of the network. From a security standpoint,

doing this can present significant risks since different networks will typically be joined together through a switch which imposes no controls on traffic passing between those networks. Caution should therefore be exercised before using this feature.

All Traffic Must have Two Associated Routes

Something that is not intuitive when trying to understand routing in CorePlus is the fact that all traffic must have two routes associated with it. Not only must a route be defined for the destination network of a connection but also for the source network.

The route that defines the source network simply says that the source network is found on a particular interface. When a new connection is opened, CorePlus performs a check known as a *reverse route lookup* which looks for this route. The source network route is not used to perform routing but instead as a check that the source network should be found on the interface where it arrived. If this check fails, CorePlus generates a *Default Access Rule* error log message.

Even traffic destined for *Core* (CorePlus itself), such as ICMP ping requests must follow this rule of having two routes associated with it. In this case, the interface of one of the routes is specified as *Core*.

4.2.2. Static Routing

This section describes how routing is implemented in CorePlus, and how to configure static routing.

CorePlus supports multiple routing tables. A default table called **main** is predefined and is always present in CorePlus. However, additional and completely separate routing tables can be defined by the administrator to provide alternate routing.

Extra user-defined routing tables can be used in two ways:

- **Virtual Routing** associates interfaces with a particular routing table. This enables a single CorePlus installation to act as multiple virtual systems. Communication between these systems is achieved with *Loopback Interfaces* (see *Section 4.5, "Virtual Routing"* and also *Section 3.3.6, "Loopback Interfaces"*).
- **Policy Based Routing Rules** can be defined which decide which of the routing tables will deal with certain types of traffic (see *Section 4.3, "Policy-based Routing"*).

The Route Lookup Mechanism

The CorePlus route lookup mechanism has some slight differences to how some other router products work. In many routers, where the IP packets are forwarded without context (in other words, the forwarding is stateless), the routing table is scanned for each and every IP packet received by the router. In CorePlus, packets are forwarded with state-awareness, so the route lookup process is tightly integrated into the CorePlus stateful inspection mechanism.

When an IP packet is received on any of the interfaces, the connection table is consulted to see if there is an already open connection for which the received packet belongs. If an existing connection is found, the connection table entry includes information on where to route the packet so there is no need for lookups in the routing table. This is far more efficient than traditional routing table lookups, and is one reason for the high forwarding performance of CorePlus.

If an established connection cannot be found, then the routing table is consulted. It is important to understand that the route lookup is performed **before** any of the various policy rules get evaluated (for example, IP rules). Consequently, the destination interface is known at the time

CorePlus decides if the connection should be allowed or dropped. This design allows for a more fine-grained control in security policies.

CorePlus Route Notation

CorePlus uses a slightly different way of describing routes compared to most other systems but this way is easier to understand, making errors less likely.

Many other products do not use the specific interface in the routing table, but specify the IP address of the interface instead. The routing table below is from a Microsoft Windows XP workstation:

```

=====
Interface List
0x1 ..... MS TCP Loopback interface
0x10003 ...00 13 d4 51 8d dd ..... Intel(R) PRO/1000 CT Network
0x20004 ...00 53 45 00 00 00 ..... WAN (PPP/SLIP) Interface
=====
Active Routes:
Network Destination          Netmask          Gateway          Interface        Metric
0.0.0.0                    0.0.0.0          192.168.0.1      192.168.0.10     20
10.0.0.0                    255.0.0.0        10.4.2.143       10.4.2.143       1
10.4.2.143                  255.255.255.255  127.0.0.1        127.0.0.1        50
10.255.255.255              255.255.255.255  10.4.2.143       10.4.2.143       50
85.11.194.33                255.255.255.255  192.168.0.1      192.168.0.10     20
127.0.0.0                    255.0.0.0        127.0.0.1        127.0.0.1        1
192.168.0.0                  255.255.255.0    192.168.0.10     192.168.0.10     20
192.168.0.10                 255.255.255.255  127.0.0.1        127.0.0.1        20
192.168.0.255                255.255.255.255  192.168.0.10     192.168.0.10     20
224.0.0.0                    240.0.0.0        10.4.2.143       10.4.2.143       50
224.0.0.0                    240.0.0.0        192.168.0.10     192.168.0.10     20
255.255.255.255              255.255.255.255  10.4.2.143       10.4.2.143       1
255.255.255.255              255.255.255.255  192.168.0.10     192.168.0.10     1
Default Gateway:            192.168.0.1
=====
Persistent Routes:
None

```

The corresponding routing table in CorePlus will be similar to the following:

Flags	Network	Iface	Gateway	Local IP	Metric
	192.168.0.0/24	lan			20
	10.0.0.0/8	wan			1
	0.0.0.0/0	wan	192.168.0.1		20

CorePlus Route Definition Advantages

The CorePlus method of defining routes makes the reading and understanding of routing information easier.

A further advantage with the CorePlus approach is that the administrator can directly specify a gateway for a particular route and the following is true:

- A separate route doesn't need to be defined that includes the gateway IP address.
- It doesn't matter even if there is a separate route which includes the gateway IP address and that routes traffic to a different interface.

Composite Subnets can be Specified

Another advantage with the CorePlus approach to route definition is that it allows the administrator to specify routes for destinations that are not aligned with traditional subnet masks.

For example, it is perfectly legal to define one route for the destination IP address range 192.168.0.5 to 192.168.0.17 and another route for IP addresses 192.168.0.18 to 192.168.0.254. This is a feature that makes CorePlus highly suitable for routing in highly complex network topologies.

Displaying Routing Tables

It is important to note that routing tables that are initially configured by the administrator can have routes added, deleted and changed automatically during live operation and these changes will appear when the routing table contents are displayed.

These routing table changes can take place for different reasons. For example, if dynamic routing with OSPF has been enabled then routing tables will become populated with new routes learned from communicating with other OSPF routers in an OSPF network. Other events such as route fail-over can also cause routing table contents to change over time.

Example 4.1. Displaying the *main* Routing Table

This example illustrates how to display the contents of the default *main* routing table.

Command-Line Interface

To see the configured routing table:

```
Device:/> cc RoutingTable main
Device:/main> show
Route
#   Interface  Network  Gateway  Local IP
-   -
1   wan         all-nets 213.124.165.1 (none)
2   lan         lannet   (none)    (none)
3   wan         wannet   (none)    (none)
```

To see the active routing table enter:

```
Device:/> routes
Flags Network          Iface      Gateway      Local IP  Metric
-----
192.168.0.0/24        lan        (none)       (none)     0
213.124.165.0/24     wan        (none)       (none)     0
0.0.0.0/0             wan        213.124.165.1 (none)     0
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

To see the configured routing table:

1. Go to **Routing > Routing Tables**
2. Select the *main* routing table

The main window will list the configured routes

To see the active routing table in the Web Interface, select the **Routes** item in the **Status** dropdown menu in the menu bar - the main window will list the active routing table



Tip: The CLI *cc* command may be needed first

*In the CLI example above, it was necessary to first select the name of a specific routing table with the *cc* command (meaning **change category** or **change context**) before manipulating individual routes. This is necessary for any category that could contain more than one named group of objects.*

Default Static Routes are Added Automatically for Each Interface

When the Clavister Security Gateway is started for the first time, CorePlus will automatically add a route in the *main* routing table for each physical interface. These routes are assigned a default IP address object in the address book and these IP objects must have their addresses changed to the appropriate range for traffic to flow.



Note: The metric for default routes is 100

The metric assigned to the default routes automatically created for the physical interfaces is always 100.

These automatically added routes **cannot be removed manually** by deleting them one at a time from a routing table. Instead, the properties of the interface must be selected and the advanced option **Automatically add a route for this interface using the given network** must be disabled. This will remove any route that was added automatically at startup. This option has no other purpose but to delete the automatically added routes.

The *all-nets* Route

The most important route that should be defined is the route to *all-nets* which usually corresponds to your ISP for public Internet access. If using the CorePlus setup wizard, this route is also added automatically.

However, the option also exists for any physical interface to indicate that it should be used for connection to the Internet. In the Web Interface or InControl this is an advanced setting in the Ethernet interface properties called:

Automatically add a default route for this interface using the given default gateway.

When this option is selected, the appropriate *all-nets* route is automatically added to the *main* routing table for the interface.

Core Routes

CorePlus automatically populates the active routing table with *Core Routes*. These routes are

present for the system to understand where to route traffic that is destined for the system itself. There is one route added for each interface in the system. In other words, two interfaces named lan and wan, and with IP addresses 192.168.0.10 and 193.55.66.77, respectively, will result in the following routes:

Route #	Interface	Destination	Gateway
1	core	192.168.0.10	
2	core	193.55.66.77	

When the system receives an IP packet whose destination address is one of the interface IPs, the packet will be routed to the core interface. In other words, it is processed by CorePlus itself.

There is also a core route added for all multicast addresses:

Route #	Interface	Destination	Gateway
1	core	224.0.0.0/4	

To include the core routes when you display the active routing table, you have to specify an option to the routing command.

Example 4.2. Displaying the Core Routes

This example illustrates how to display the core routes in the active routing table.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> routes -all
```

Flags	Network	Iface	Gateway	Local IP	Metric
	127.0.0.1	core	(Shared IP)		0
	192.168.0.1	core	(Iface IP)		0
	213.124.165.181	core	(Iface IP)		0
	127.0.3.1	core	(Iface IP)		0
	127.0.4.1	core	(Iface IP)		0
	192.168.0.0/24	lan			0
	213.124.165.0/24	wan			0
	224.0.0.0/4	core	(Iface IP)		0
	0.0.0.0/0	wan	213.124.165.1		0

InControl

This operation cannot be performed with InControl.

Web Interface

1. Select the **Routes** item in the **Status** dropdown menu in the menu bar
2. Check the **Show all routes** checkbox and click the **Apply** button
3. The main window will list the active routing table, including the core routes



Tip: Understanding output from the routes command

For detailed information about the output of the CLI **routes** command. Please see the *CLI Reference Guide*.

4.2.3. Route Failover

Overview

Clavister Security Gateways are often deployed in mission-critical locations where availability and connectivity is crucial. For example, an enterprise relying heavily on access to the Internet could have operations severely disrupted if a single connection to the external Internet via a single Internet Service Provider (ISP) fails.

It is therefore not unusual to have backup Internet connectivity using a secondary ISP. The connections to the two service providers often use different routes to avoid a single point of failure.

To allow for a situation with multiple ISPs, CorePlus provides a *Route Failover* capability so that should one route fail, traffic can automatically failover to another, alternate route. CorePlus implements route failover through the use of *Route Monitoring* in which CorePlus monitors the availability of routes and then switches traffic to an alternate route should the primary, preferred route fail.




Figure 4.3. A Route Failover Scenario for ISP Access

Setting Up Route Failover

To set up route failover, *Route Monitoring* must be enabled and this is an option that is enabled on a route by route basis. To enable route failover in a scenario with a preferred and a backup route, the preferred route will have route monitoring enabled, however the backup route does not require this since it will usually have no route to failover to. When route monitoring is enabled for a route, one of the following monitoring methods must be chosen:

Interface Link Status

CorePlus will monitor the link status of the interface specified in the route. As long as the interface is up, the route is diagnosed as healthy. This method is appropriate for monitoring that the interface is physically attached and that the cabling is working

as expected. As any changes to the link status are instantly noticed, this method provides the fastest response to failure.

Gateway Monitoring

If a specific gateway has been specified as the next hop for a route, accessibility to that gateway can be monitored by sending periodic ARP requests. As long as the gateway responds to these requests, the route is considered to be functioning correctly.

Host Monitoring

The first two options check the accessibility of components local to the Clavister Security Gateway. An alternative is to monitor the accessibility of one or more nominated remote hosts. These hosts might have known high availability and polling them can indicate if traffic from the local Clavister Security Gateway is reaching them. Host monitoring also provides a way to measure the network delays in reaching remote hosts and to initiate failover to an alternate route if delays exceed administrator-specified thresholds.

Automatically Added Routes Need Redefining

It is important to note that the route monitoring cannot be enabled on automatically added routes. For example, the routes that CorePlus creates at initial startup for physical interfaces are automatically added routes. The reason why monitoring cannot be enabled for these routes is because automatically created routes have a special status in an CorePlus configuration and are treated differently.

If route monitoring is required on an automatically created route, the route should first be deleted and then recreated manually as a new route. Monitoring can then be enabled on the new route.

Setting the Route Metric

When specifying routes, the administrator should manually set a route's *Metric*. The metric is a positive integer that indicates how preferred the route is as a means to reach its destination. When two routes offer a means to reach the same destination, CorePlus will select the one with the lowest metric value for sending data (if two routes have the same metric, the route found first in the routing table will be chosen).

A primary, preferred route should have a lower metric (for example "10"), and a secondary, failover route should have a higher metric value (for example "20").

Multiple Failover Routes

It is possible to specify more than one failover route. For instance, the primary route could have two other routes as failover routes instead of just one. In this case the metric should be different for each of the three routes: "10" for the primary route, "20" for the first failover route and "30" for the second failover route. The first two routes would have route monitoring enabled in the routing table but the last one (with the highest metric) would not since it has no route to failover to.

Failover Processing

Whenever monitoring determines that a route is not available, CorePlus will mark the route as disabled and instigate route failover for existing and new connections. For already established connections, a route lookup will be performed to find the next best matching route and the

connections will then switch to using the new route. For new connections, route lookup will ignore disabled routes and the next best matching route will be used instead.

The table below defines two default routes, both having *all-nets* as the destination, but using two different gateways. The first, primary route has the lowest metric and also has route monitoring enabled. Route monitoring for the second, alternate route is not meaningful since it has no failover route.

Route #	Interface	Destination	Gateway	Metric	Monitoring
1	wan	all-nets	195.66.77.1	10	On
2	wan	all-nets	193.54.68.1	20	Off

When a new connection is about to be established to a host on the Internet, a route lookup will result in the route that has the lowest metric being chosen. If the primary WAN router should then fail, this will be detected by CorePlus, and the first route will be disabled. As a consequence, a new route lookup will be performed and the second route will be selected with the first one being marked as disabled.

Re-enabling Routes

Even if a route has been disabled, CorePlus will continue to check the status of that route. Should the route become available again, it will be re-enabled and existing connections will automatically be transferred back to it.

Route Interface Grouping

When using route monitoring, it is important to check if a failover to another route will cause the routing interface to be changed. If this could happen, it is necessary to take some precautionary steps to ensure that policies and existing connections will be maintained.

To illustrate the problem, consider the following configuration:

Firstly, there is one IP rule that will NAT all HTTP traffic destined for the Internet through the **wan** interface:

Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
NAT	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	http

The routing table consequently contains the following default route:

Interface	Destination	Gateway	Metric	Monitoring
wan	all-nets	195.66.77.1	10	Off

Now a secondary route is added over a backup DSL connection and Route Monitoring is enabled for this. The updated routing table will look like this:

Route #	Interface	Destination	Gateway	Metric	Monitoring
1	wan	all-nets	195.66.77.1	10	On
2	dsl	all-nets	193.54.68.1	20	Off

Notice that Route Monitoring is enabled for the first route but not the backup, failover route.

As long as the preferred **wan** route is healthy, everything will work as expected. Route Monitoring will also be functioning, so the secondary route will be enabled if the **wan** route should fail.

There are, however, some problems with this setup: if a route failover occurs, the default route will then use the **dsl** interface. When a new HTTP connection is then established from the **intnet** network, a route lookup will be made resulting in a destination interface of **dsl**. The IP rules will then be evaluated, but the original *NAT* rule assumes the destination interface to be **wan** so the new connection will be dropped by the rule set.

In addition, any existing connections matching the *NAT* rule will also be dropped as a result of the change in the destination interface. Clearly, this is undesirable.

To overcome this issue, potential destination interfaces should be grouped together into an *Interface Group* and the **Security/Transport Equivalent** flag should be enabled for the Group. The Interface Group is then used as the Destination Interface when setting policies. For more information on groups, see *Section 3.3.7, "Interface Groups"*.

Gratuitous ARP Generation

By default CorePlus generates a gratuitous ARP request when a route failover occurs. The reason for this is to notify surrounding systems that there has been a route change. This behavior can be controlled by the advanced setting **Gratuitous ARP on Fail**.

4.2.4. Host Monitoring for Route Failover

Overview

To provide a more flexible and configurable way to monitor the integrity of routes, CorePlus provides the additional capability to perform *Host Monitoring*. This feature means that one or more external host systems can be routinely polled to check that a particular route is available. It is similar in concept to the monitoring used for the *Server Load Balancing* feature in CorePlus (see *Section 10.4.5, "SLB Server Monitoring"*) but there are important differences.

The advantages of Host Monitoring are twofold:

- In a complex network topology it is more reliable to check accessibility to external hosts. Just monitoring a link to a local switch may not indicate a problem in another part of the internal network.
- Host monitoring can be used to help in setting the acceptable *Quality of Service* level of Internet response times. Internet access may be functioning but it may be desirable to instigate route failover if response latency times become unacceptable using the existing route.

Enabling Host Monitoring

As part of *Route Properties* Host Monitoring can be enabled and a single route can have multiple hosts associated with it for monitoring. Multiple hosts can provide a higher certainty that any network problem resides in the local network rather than because one remote host itself is down.

In association with Host Monitoring there are two numerical parameters for a route:

Grace Period

This is the period of time after startup or after reconfiguration of the Clavister Security Gateway which CorePlus will wait before starting Route Monitoring. This waiting period allows time for all network links to initialize once the security gateway comes online.

Minimum Number of Hosts Available

This is the minimum number of hosts that must be considered to be accessible before the route is deemed to have failed. The criteria for host accessibility are described below.

Specifying Hosts

For each host specified for host monitoring there are a number of property parameters that should be set:

- **Method**

The method by which the host is to be polled. This can be one of:

- *ICMP* - ICMP "Ping" polling. An IP address must be specified for this.
- *TCP* - A TCP connection is established to and then disconnected from the host. An IP address must be specified for this.
- *HTTP* - A normal HTTP server request using a URL. A URL must be specified for this as well as a text string which is the beginning (or complete) text of a valid response. If no text is specified, any response from the server will be valid.

- **IP Address**

The IP address of the host when using the **ICMP** or **TCP** option.

- **Port Number**

The port number for polling when using the **TCP** option.

- **Interval**

The interval in milliseconds between polling attempts. The default setting is 10,000 and the minimum value allowed is 100 ms.

- **Sample**

The number of polling attempts used as a sample size for calculating the *Percentage Loss* and the *Average Latency*. This value cannot be less than 1.

- **Maximum Failed Poll Attempts**

The maximum permissible number of polling attempts that fail. If this number is exceeded then the host is considered unreachable.

- **Max Average Latency**

The maximum number of milliseconds allowable between a poll request and the response. If this threshold is exceeded then the host is considered unreachable. Average Latency is calculated by averaging the response times from the host. If a polling attempt receives no response then it is not included in the averaging calculation.

The *Reachability Required* option

An important option that can be enabled for a host is the **Reachability Required** option. When this is selected, the host must be determined as accessible in order for that route to be considered to be functioning. Even if other hosts are accessible, this option says that the

accessibility of a host with this option set is mandatory.

Where multiple hosts are specified for host monitoring, more than one of them could have **Reachability Required** enabled. If CorePlus determines that any host with this option enabled is not reachable, Route Failover is initiated.

HTTP Parameters

If the **HTTP** polling method is selected then two further parameters can be entered:

- **Request URL**

The URL which is to be requested.

- **Expected Response**

The text that is expected back from querying the URL.

Testing for a specific response text provides the possibility of testing if an application is offline. If, for example, a web page response from a server can indicate if a specific database is operational with text such as "*Database OK*", then the absence of that response can indicate that the server is operational but the application is offline.

A Known Issue When No External Route is Specified

With connections to an Internet ISP, an external network route should always be specified. This external route specifies on which interface the network which exists between the Clavister Security Gateway and the ISP can be found. If only an *all-nets* route is specified to the ISP's gateway, route failover may, depending on the connected equipment, not function as expected.

This issue rarely occurs but the reason why it occurs is that ARP queries arriving on a disabled route will be ignored.

4.2.5. Advanced Settings for Route Failover

The following CorePlus advanced settings are available for route failover:

Iface poll interval

The time in milliseconds between polling for interface failure.

Default: *500*

ARP poll interval

The time in milliseconds between ARP-lookup of hosts. This may be overridden in individual routes.

Default: *1000*

Ping poll interval

The time in milliseconds between sending a Ping to hosts.

Default: *1000*

Grace time

The length of time in seconds between startup or reconfigure and monitoring start.

Default: 30

Consecutive fails

The number of consecutive failures that occurs before a route is marked as being unavailable.

Default: 5

Consecutive success

The number of consecutive successes that must occur before a route is marked as being available.

Default: 5

Gratuitous ARP on fail

Send a gratuitous ARP on HA failover to alert hosts of the changes in interface Ethernet and IP addresses.

Default: *Enabled*

4.2.6. Proxy ARP

Overview

As discussed previously in *Section 3.4, "ARP"*, the ARP protocol facilitates a mapping between an IP address and the MAC address of a host on an Ethernet network.

However, situations may exist where a network running Ethernet is separated into two parts with a routing device such as a Clavister Security Gateway in between. In such a case, CorePlus itself can respond to ARP requests directed to the network on the other side of the Clavister Security Gateway using the feature known as *Proxy ARP*.

The splitting of an Ethernet network into distinct parts so that traffic between them can be controlled is a common usage of the proxy ARP feature. CorePlus rule sets can then be used to impose security policies on the traffic passing between the different network parts.

A Typical Scenario

As an example of a typical proxy ARP scenario, consider a network split into two sub-networks with a Clavister Security Gateway between the two.

Host **A** on one sub-network might send an ARP request to find out the MAC address for the IP address of host **B** on the other sub-network. With the proxy ARP feature configured, CorePlus responds to this ARP request instead of host **B**. CorePlus sends its own MAC address in reply, pretending to be the target host. After receiving the reply, Host **A** then sends data directly to CorePlus which forwards the data to host **B**. In the process CorePlus checks the traffic against the configured rule sets.

Setting Up Proxy ARP

Setting up proxy ARP is done by specifying the option for a route in a routing table. Let us suppose we have a network and it is divided into two parts which are called *net_1* and *net_2*.

The network *net_1* is connected to the interface *if1* and the network *net_2* is connected to the interface *if2*. In CorePlus there will be a route configured that says *net_1* can be found on *if1*. This might be called *route_1*.

For *route_1* it is possible to specify the option that this network should be proxy ARP'ed on interface *if2*. Now any ARP request issued by a *net_2* host connected to *if2* looking for an IP address in *net_1* will get a positive response from CorePlus. In other words, CorePlus will pretend that the *net_1* address is found on *if2* and will forward data traffic to *net_1*.

In the same way, *net_2* could be published on the interface *if1* so that there is a mirroring of routes and ARP proxy publishing.

Route #	Network	Interface	Proxy ARP Published
1	net_1	if1	if2
2	net_2	if2	if1

In this way there is complete separation of the sub-networks but the hosts are unaware of this. The routes are a pair which are a mirror image of each other but there is no requirement that proxy ARP is used in a pairing like this.

Keep in mind that if the host has an ARP request for an IP address outside of the local network then this will be sent to the gateway configured for that host. The entire example is illustrated below.



Figure 4.4. A Proxy ARP Example

Transparent Mode as an Alternative

Transparent Mode is an alternative and preferred way of splitting Ethernet networks. Setup is simpler than using proxy ARP since only the appropriate *switch routes* need to be defined. Using switch routes is fully explained in *Section 4.8, "Transparent Mode"*.

Proxy ARP depends on static routing where the location of networks on interfaces are known and usually fixed. Transparent mode is more suited to networks whose interface location can change.

Proxy ARP and High Availability Clusters

In HA clusters, switch routes cannot be used and transparent mode is therefore not an option. However, proxy ARP does function with HA and is consequently the only way to implement transparent mode functionality with a cluster.



Not all interfaces can make use of Proxy ARP

It is only possible to have Proxy ARP functioning for Ethernet and VLAN interfaces. Proxy ARP is not relevant for other types of CorePlus interfaces since ARP is not involved.

Automatically Added Routes

Proxy ARP cannot be enabled for automatically added routes. For example, the routes that CorePlus creates at initial startup for physical interfaces are automatically added routes. The reason why Proxy ARP cannot be enabled for these routes is because automatically created routes have a special status in the CorePlus configuration and are treated differently.

If Proxy ARP is required on an automatically created route, the route should first be deleted and then manually recreated as a new route. Proxy ARP can then be enabled on the new route.

4.3. Policy-based Routing

4.3.1. Overview

Policy-based Routing (PBR) is an extension to the standard routing described previously. It offers administrators significant flexibility in implementing routing decision policies by being able to define rules so alternative routing tables are used.

Normal routing forwards packets according to destination IP address information derived from static routes or from a dynamic routing protocol. For example, using OSPF, the route chosen for packets will be the least-cost (shortest) path derived from an SPF calculation. Policy-based Routing means that routes chosen for traffic can be based on specific traffic parameters.

Policy-based Routing can allow:

Source based routing	A different routing table may need to be chosen based on the source of traffic. When more than one ISP is used to provide Internet services, Policy-based Routing can route traffic originating from different sets of users through different routes. For example, traffic from one address range might be routed through one ISP, whilst traffic from another address range might be through a second ISP.
Service-based Routing	A different routing table might need to be chosen based on the service. Policy-based Routing can route a given protocol such as HTTP, through proxies such as Web caches. Specific services might also be routed to a specific ISP so that one ISP handles all HTTP traffic.
User based Routing	A different routing table might need to be chosen based on the user identity or the <i>group</i> to which the user belongs. This is particularly useful in <i>provider-independent metropolitan area networks</i> where all users share a common active backbone, but each can use different ISPs, subscribing to different providers.

Policy-based Routing implementation in CorePlus is based on two building blocks:

- One or more user-defined alternate *Policy-based Routing Tables* in addition to the standard default **main** routing table.
- One or more *Policy-based routing rules* which determines which routing table to use for which traffic.

4.3.2. Policy-based Routing Tables

CorePlus, as standard, has one default routing table called **main**. In addition to the **main** table, it is possible to define one or more, additional alternate routing tables (this section will sometimes refer to these Policy-based Routing Tables as *alternate* routing tables).

Alternate routing tables contain the same information for describing routes as *main*, except that there is an extra parameter *ordering* defined for each of them. This parameter decides how route lookup is done using alternate tables in conjunction with the **main** table. This is described further in *Section 4.3.6, "The Ordering parameter"*.

The total number of routing tables that can be created is limited only by the particular license that is used with a CorePlus installation. At minimum, there is a limit of 5 alternate tables in addition to the *main* table.

4.3.3. Policy-based Routing Rules

A rule in the policy-based routing rule set can decide which routing table is selected. A Policy-based Routing rule can be triggered by the type of service (HTTP for example) in combination with the Source/Destination Interface and Source/Destination Network.

When looking up Policy-based Rules, it is the first matching rule found that is triggered.

4.3.4. Routing Table/Interface Association

If a particular routing table is to be always used for traffic from a given source interface, regardless of the service, then there is a way to achieve this.

It is possible to associate the source interface explicitly with a particular table using the **Group** membership parameter for that interface. This is sometimes referred to as *Routing Table Membership*.

The difference with this method of explicit association is that the administrator cannot specify the service, such as HTTP, for which the lookup will apply. Routing Rules allow a more fine-grained approach to routing table selection by being able to also select a service.

4.3.5. Routing Table Selection

When a packet corresponding to a new connection first arrives, the processing steps are as follows to determine which routing table is chosen:

1. The Routing Rules must first be looked up but to do this the packet's destination interface must be determined and this is always done by a lookup in the *main* routing table. It is therefore important a match for the destination network is found or at least a default **all-nets** route exists which can catch anything not explicitly matched.
2. A search is now made for a Policy-based Routing Rule that matches the packet's source/destination interface/network as well as service. If a matching rule is found then this determines the routing table to use.
3. If no matching Routing Rule is found, a check is made to see if the source interface has an alternate routing table explicitly associated with it through the **Group** option. In other words, to see if the interface has *Routing Table Membership* of a particular routing table. If there is no membership then the *main* table will be used.
4. Once the correct routing table has been located, a check is made to make sure that the source IP address in fact belongs on the receiving interface. The *Access Rules* are firstly examined to see if they can provide this check (see *Section 6.1, "Access Rules"* for more details of this feature). If there are no Access Rules or a match with the rules cannot be found, a reverse lookup in the previously selected routing table is done using the source IP address. If the check fails then a **Default access rule** log error message is generated.
5. At this point, using the routing table selected, the actual route lookup is done to find the packet's destination interface. At this point the *ordering* parameter is used to determine how the actual lookup is done and the options for this are described in the next section. To implement virtual systems, the *Only* ordering option should be used.
6. The connection is then subject to the normal IP rule set. If a *SAT* rule is encountered, address translation will be performed. The decision of which routing table to use is made before carrying out address translation but the actual route lookup is performed on the altered address. Note that the original route lookup to find the destination interface used for all rule look-ups was done with the original, untranslated address.

7. If allowed by the IP rule set, the new connection is opened in the CorePlus state table and the packet forwarded through this connection.

4.3.6. The *Ordering* parameter

Once the routing table for a new connection is chosen and that table is an alternate routing table, the *Ordering* parameter associated with the table is used to decide how the alternate table is combined with the **main** table to lookup the appropriate route. The three available options are:

1. **Default** - The default behavior is to first look up the route in the **main** table. If no matching route is found, or the default route is found (the route with the destination **all-nets** - 0.0.0.0/0), a lookup for a matching route in the alternate table is done. If no match is found in the alternate table then the default route in the main table will be used.
2. **First** - This behavior is to first look up the connection's route in the alternate table. If no matching route is found there then the **main** table is used for the lookup. The default **all-nets** route will be counted as a match in the alternate table if it exists there.
3. **Only** - This option ignores the existence of any other table except the alternate table so the alternate table is the only one used for the lookup. One application of this is to give the administrator a way to dedicate a single routing table to one set of interfaces. **Only** is the option to use when creating virtual systems since it can dedicate one routing table to a set of interfaces.

The first two options can be regarded as combining the alternate table with the **main** table and assigning one route if there is a match in both tables.



Important: Ensure all-nets appears in the main table

*A common mistake with policy-based routing is the absence of the default route with a destination interface of **all-nets** in the default **main** routing table.*

*If there is no route that is an exact match then the absence of a default **all-nets** route will mean that the connection will be dropped. The alternative of having interfaces associated explicitly with alternate routing tables through the **Group** option will also not function if the default route is missing.*

Example 4.3. Creating a Policy-based Routing Table

In this example we create a Policy-based Routing table called *TestPBRTTable*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Routing Tables > Add > RoutingTable**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** TestPBRTTable

- For **Ordering** select one of:
 - **First** - the named routing table is consulted first of all. If this lookup fails, the lookup will continue in the main routing table.
 - **Default** - the main routing table will be consulted first. If the only match is the default route (*all-nets*), the named routing table will be consulted. If the lookup in the named routing table fails, the lookup as a whole is considered to have failed.
 - **Only** - the named routing table is the only one consulted. If this lookup fails, the lookup will not continue in the main routing table.
- 3. If **Remove Interface IP Routes** is enabled, the default interface routes are removed, that is to say routes to the *core* interface (which are routes to CorePlus itself).
- 4. Click **OK**

Example 4.4. Creating the Route

After defining the routing table *TestPBRTTable*, we add routes into the table.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Routing Tables > TestPBRTTable > Add > Route**
2. Now enter:
 - **Interface:** The interface to be routed
 - **Network:** The network to route
 - **Gateway:** The gateway to send routed packets to
 - **Local IP Address:** The IP address specified here will be automatically published on the corresponding interface. This address will also be used as the sender address in ARP queries. If no address is specified, the gateway's interface IP address will be used.
 - **Metric:** Specifies the metric for this route. (Mostly used in route fail-over scenarios)
3. Click **OK**

Example 4.5. Policy-based Routing Configuration

This example illustrates a multiple ISP scenario which is a common use of Policy-based Routing. The following is assumed:

- Each ISP will give you an IP network from its network range. We will assume a 2-ISP scenario, with the network *10.10.10.0/24* belonging to ISP A and *20.20.20.0/24* belonging to ISP B. The

ISP gateways are *10.10.10.1* and *20.20.20.1* respectively.

- All addresses in this scenario are public addresses for the sake of simplicity.
- This is a "drop-in" design, where there are no explicit routing subnets between the ISP gateways and the Clavister Security Gateway.

In a provider-independent network, clients will likely have a single IP address, belonging to one of the ISPs. In a single-organization scenario, publicly accessible servers will be configured with two separate IP addresses: one from each ISP. However, this difference does not matter for the policy routing setup itself.

Note that, for a single organization, Internet connectivity through multiple ISPs is normally best done with the BGP protocol, where you do not need to worry about different IP spans or policy routing. Unfortunately, this is not always possible, and this is where Policy Based Routing becomes a necessity.

We will set up the main routing table to use ISP A and add a named routing table called *r2* that uses the default gateway of ISP B.

Interface	Network	Gateway	ProxyARP
lan1	10.10.10.0/24		wan1
lan1	20.20.20.0/24		wan2
wan1	10.10.10.1/32		lan1
wan2	20.20.20.1/32		lan1
wan1	all-nets	10.10.10.1	

Contents of the named Policy-based Routing table *r2*:

Interface	Network	Gateway
wan2	all-nets	20.20.20.1

The table *r2* has its *Ordering* parameter set to *Default*, which means that it will only be consulted if the main routing table lookup matches the default route (*all-nets*).

Contents of the Policy-based Routing Policy:

Source Interface	Source Range	Destination Interface	Destination Range	Selected/Service	Forward VR table	Return VR table
lan1	10.10.10.0/24	wan2	all-nets	ALL	r2	r2
wan2	all-nets	lan1	20.20.20.0/24	ALL	r2	r2

To configure this example scenario:

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Add the routes found in the list of routes in the main routing table, as shown earlier.
2. Create a routing table called "r2" and make sure the ordering is set to "Default".
3. Add the route found in the list of routes in the routing table "r2", as shown earlier.

4. Add two VR policies according to the list of policies shown earlier.
 - Go to **Routing > Routing Rules > Add > Routing Rule**
 - Enter the information found in the list of policies displayed earlier
 - Repeat the above to add the second rule

**Note**

Rules in the above example are added for both inbound and outbound connections.

4.4. Route Load Balancing

Overview

CorePlus provides the option to perform *Route Load Balancing* (RLB). This is the ability to distribute traffic over multiple alternate routes using one of a number of distribution algorithms.

The purpose of this feature is to provide the following:

- Balancing of traffic between interfaces in a policy driven fashion.
- To balance simultaneous utilization of multiple Internet links so networks are not dependent on a single ISP.
- To allow balancing of traffic across multiple VPN tunnels which might be setup over different physical interfaces.

Enabling RLB

RLB is enabled on a routing table basis and this is done by creating an RLB *Instance* object. This object specifies two parameters: a routing table and an RLB algorithm. A table may have only one Instance object associated with it.

One of the algorithms from the following list can be specified in an RLB Instance object:

- **Round Robin**

Matching routes are used equally often by successively going to the next matching route.

- **Destination**

This is an algorithm that is similar to *Round Robin* but provides destination IP "stickiness" so that the same destination IP address gets the same route.

- **Spillover**

This uses the next route when specified interface traffic limits are exceeded continuously for a given time.

Disabling RLB

Deleting a routing table's Instance object has the effect of switching off RLB for that table.

RLB Operation

When RLB is enabled for a routing table through an RLB *Instance* object, the sequence of processing steps is as follows:

1. Route lookup is done in the routing table and a list of all matching routes is assembled. The routes in the list must cover the exact same IP address range (further explanation of this requirement can be found below).
2. If the route lookup finds only one matching route then that route is used and balancing does not take place.

3. If more than one matching route is found then RLB is used to choose which one to use. This is done according to which algorithm is selected in the table's RLB Instance object:

- **Round Robin**

Successive routes are chosen from the matching routes in a "round robin" fashion provided that the metric of the routes is the same. This results in route lookups being spread evenly across matching routes with same metric. If the matching routes have unequal metrics then routes with lower metrics are selected more often and in proportion to the relative values of all metrics (this is explained further below).




Figure 4.5. The RLB Round Robin Algorithm

- **Destination**

This is similar to Round Robin but provides "stickiness" so that unique destination IP addresses always get the same route from a lookup. The importance of this is that it means that a particular destination application can see all traffic coming from the same source IP address.

- **Spillover**

Spillover is not similar to the previous algorithms. With spillover, the first matching route's interface is repeatedly used until the *Spillover Limits* of that route's interface are continuously exceeded for the *Hold Timer* number of seconds.

Once this happens, the next matching route is then chosen. The *Spillover Limits* for an interface are set in the *RLB Algorithm Settings* along with the *Hold Timer* number of seconds (the default is 30 seconds) for the interface.

When the traffic passing through the original route's interface falls below the *Spillover Limits* continuously for the *Hold Timer* number of seconds, route lookups will then revert back to the original route and its associated interface.




Figure 4.6. The RLB Spillover Algorithm

Spillover Limits are set separately for ingoing and outgoing traffic with only one of these typically being specified. If both are specified then only one of them needs to be exceeded continuously for *Hold Timer* seconds for the next matching route to be chosen. The units of the limits, such as Mbps, can be selected to simplify specification of the values.

Using Route Metrics with Round Robin

An individual route has a *metric* associated with it, with the default metric value being zero.

With the *Round Robin* and the associated *Destination* algorithms, the *metric* value can be set differently on matching routes to create a bias towards the routes with lower metrics. Routes with lower metrics will be chosen more frequently than those with higher metrics and the proportion of usage will be based on the relative differences between the metrics of matching routes.

In a scenario with two ISPs, if the requirement is that the bulk of traffic passes through one of the ISPs then this can be achieved by enabling RLB and setting a low metric on the route to the favoured ISP. A relatively higher metric is then set on the route to the other ISP.

Using Route Metrics with Spillover

When using the *Spillover* algorithm, a number of points should be noted regarding metrics and the way alternative routes are chosen:

- **Route metrics should always be set.**

With spillover, CorePlus always chooses the route in the matching routes list that has the lowest metric. The algorithm is not intended to be used with routes having the same metric so the administrator should set different metrics for all the routes to which spillover applies.

Metrics determine a clear ordering for which route should be chosen next after the interface traffic limits for the chosen route have been exceeded.

- **There can be many alternative routes.**

Several alternative routes can be set up, each with their own interface limits and each with a

different metric. The route with the lowest metric is chosen first and when that route's interface limits are exceeded, the route with the next highest metric is then chosen.

When that new route's interface limits are also exceeded then the route with the next highest metric is taken and so on. As soon as any route with a lower metric falls below its interface limit for its *Hold Timer* number of seconds, then it reverts to being the chosen route.

- **If there is no alternative route, the route does not change.**

If the spillover limit is reached but all alternative routes have also reached their limit then the route will not change.

The Requirement for Matching IP Ranges

As explained above, when RLB is assembling a list of matching routes from a routing table, the routes it selects must have the same range. Balancing between routes will not take place if their ranges are not exactly the same.

For instance, if one matching route has an IP address range of *10.4.16.0/24* and there is a second matching route with an address range *10.4.16.0/16* (which is a range that includes *10.4.16.0/24*) then RLB will not take place between these routes. The ranges are not exactly the same so RLB will treat the routes as being different.

It should also be remembered that route lookup will select the route that has the narrowest range that matches the destination IP address used in the lookup. In the above example, *10.4.16.0/24* may be chosen over *10.4.16.0/16* because the range is narrower with *10.4.16.0/24* for an IP address they both contain.

RLB Resets

There are two occasions when all RLB algorithms will reset to their initial state:

- After CorePlus reconfiguration.
- After a high availability failover.

In both these cases, the chosen route will revert to the one selected when the algorithms began operation.

RLB Limitations

It should be noted that the selection of different alternate routes occurs only when the route lookup is done and it is based on the algorithm being used with the routing table used for the lookup and the algorithm's state.

RLB cannot know how much data traffic will be related to each lookup. The purpose of RLB is to be able to spread route lookups across alternatives on the assumption that each lookup will relate to a connection carrying some assumed amount of traffic.

An RLB Scenario

Below is an illustration which shows a typical scenario where RLB might be used. Here, there is a group of clients on a network connected via the **LAN** interface of the Clavister Security Gateway and these will access the internet.

Internet access is available from either one of two ISPs, whose gateways *GW1* *GW2* are connected to the security gateway interfaces **WAN1** and **WAN2**. RLB will be used to balance the connections between the two ISPs.




Figure 4.7. A Route Load Balancing Scenario

We first need to define two routes to these two ISPs in the *main* routing table as shown below:

Route No.	Interface	Destination	Gateway	Metric
1	WAN1	all-nets	GW1	100
2	WAN2	all-nets	GW2	100

We will not use the spillover algorithm in this example so the routing metric for both routes should be the same, in this case a value of *100* is selected.

By using the *Destination* RLB algorithm we can ensure that clients communicate with a particular server using the same route and therefore the same source IP address. If NAT was being used for the client communication, the IP address seen by the server would be **WAN1** or **WAN2**.

In order to flow, any traffic requires both a route and an allowing IP rule. The following rules will allow traffic to flow to either ISP and will NAT the traffic using the external IP addresses of interfaces **WAN1** and **WAN2**.

Rule No.	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
1	NAT	lan	lannet	WAN1	all-nets	All
1	NAT	lan	lannet	WAN2	all-nets	All

The service *All* is used in the above IP rules but this should be further refined to a service or service group that covers all the traffic that will be allowed to flow.

Example 4.6. Setting Up RLB

In this example, the details of the RLB scenario described above will be implemented. The assumption is made that the various IP address book objects needed have already been defined.

The IP objects **WAN1** and **WAN2** represent the interfaces that connect to the two ISPs and the IP objects **GW1** and **GW2** represent the IP addresses of the gateway routers at the two ISPs.

Step 1. Set up the routes in the *main* routing table**CLI**

First, change the category context to be the *main* routing table:

```
Device:/> cc RoutingTable main
```

Add the route to the first ISP:

```
Device:/main> add Route Interface=WAN1 Network=all-nets
                  Gateway=GW1 Metric=100
```

Add the route to the second ISP:

```
Device:/main> add Route Interface=WAN2 Network=all-nets
                  Gateway=GW2 Metric=100
```

Return to the original context:

```
Device:/main> cc
Device:/>
```

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Routing Tables**
2. Select the *main* routing table
3. Select **Add > Route**
4. The dialog for a new route will appear. For the first route, enter:
 - **Interface:** WAN1
 - **Network:** all-nets
 - **Gateway:** GW1
 - **Local IP address:** Leave as *None*
 - **Metric:** 100
 - Click **OK**
5. Select **Add > Route** again to add the second route
6. The dialog for a new route will appear. For the second route, enter:

- **Interface:** WAN2
- **Network:** all-nets
- **Gateway:** GW2
- **Local IP address:** Leave as *None*
- **Metric:** 100
- Click **OK**

Step 2. Create an RLB Instance object

A Route Load Balancing Instance object is now created which uses the *Destination* algorithm will be selected to achieve stickiness so the server always sees the same source IP address (*WAN1* or *WAN2*) from a single client.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add RouteBalancingInstance main Algorithm=Destination
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Route Load Balancing > Instances > Add > Route Balancing Instance**
2. The route balancing instance dialog will appear. Now select:
 - **Routing Table:** main
 - **Algorithm:** Destination
 - Click **OK**

Step 3. Create IP rules to allow traffic to flow

Finally, IP rules needed to be added to an IP rule set to allow traffic to flow. The detailed steps for this are not included here but the created rules would follow the pattern described above.

RLB with VPN

When using RLB with VPN, a number of issues need to be overcome.

If we were to try and use RLB to balance traffic between two IPsec tunnels, the problem that arises is that the *Remote Endpoint* for any two IPsec tunnels in CorePlus must be different. The solutions to this issue are as follows:

- Use two ISPs, with one tunnel connecting through one ISP and the other tunnel connecting through the other ISP. RLB can then be applied as normal with the two tunnels.

In order to get the second tunnel to function in this case, you need to add a single host route in the *main* routing table that points to the secondary ISPs interface and with the secondary

ISPs gateway.

This solution has the advantage of providing redundancy should one ISP link fail.

- Use VPN with one tunnel that is IPsec based and another tunnel that is uses a different protocol.

If both tunnels must be, for example, IPsec connects, it is possible to wrap IPsec in a GRE tunnel (in other words, the IPsec tunnel is carried by a GRE tunnel). GRE is a simple tunneling protocol without encryption and therefore involves a minimum of extra overhead. See *Section 3.3.5, "GRE Tunnels"* for more about this topic.

4.5. Virtual Routing

4.5.1. Overview

Virtual Routing is a CorePlus feature that allows the creation of multiple, logically separated *virtual systems* within CorePlus, each with its own routing table. These systems can behave as physically separated Clavister Security Gateways and almost everything that can be done with separate gateways can be done with them, including dynamic routing with OSPF. Virtual systems are sometimes also referred to as *Virtual Routers*.

The CorePlus components involved in creating virtual routing are:

- Separate routing tables for each virtual system.
- Per-interface policy-based routing table membership to make interface IP addresses reachable only via a particular routing table. This association can be made explicitly by linking an interface with a specific routing table.
- Pairs of loopback interfaces can be used for communication between virtual systems if required.

There are two ways of associating a specific routing table with a specific interface:

- **Using Routing Rules**

Routing Rules can be defined so that all traffic on a particular interface are subject to a particular routing table.

- **Specifying a Routing Table for an Interface**


It is possible to associate an interface directly with a specific routing table. This is known as the interface's *routing table membership*. This option is part an interface's *virtual routing* options.

This is the preferred way of implementing a virtual router. The interface might be physical or it could be a virtual LAN (VLAN).

To ensure that a routing table does not use any other tables in the route lookup process, the **Ordering** parameter of the table should be set to *Only*.

4.5.2. A Simple Scenario

Consider a single Clavister Security Gateway connected to two external ISPs, *ISP1* and *ISP2*.



ISP1 provides Internet connection to *Department A* and connects to the Clavister Security Gateway via the physical interface *if1*.

ISP2 provides Internet connection to *Department B* and connects via the physical interface *if2*. For administration purposes it is decided that the Clavister Security Gateway is to be divided into 2 virtual systems, one for each ISP.

This is done by creating two dedicated routing tables, *PBR1* to deal with *ISP1* and *Department A* traffic and another, *PBR2*, to deal with *ISP2* and *Department B* traffic.

Interface *if1* is a member of the first routing table but not the second (in other words that routing table has been explicitly associated with the interface). Interface *if2* is a member of the second table but not the first. It is this interface membership which determines which routing table is used and which keeps the two sets of traffic totally separated.



Tip: The main routing table could be used

*In this example, the **main** routing table could have been used. However, it is often better to create new, dedicated routing tables for this purpose.*

Reusing Internal IP Addresses

An advantage of using separate routing tables on different interfaces is that internal IP address ranges can be re-used on different virtual systems. For example, *Department A* and *Department B* could both use the internal network *192.168.0.0/24*.

Since route lookup is done in completely separate routing tables, there are no conflicts.

VPN Tunnels are Interfaces

VPN tunnels are also considered to be interfaces in CorePlus and can therefore also be associated

with their own routing tables just as physical interfaces can.

This means that tunnels can be logically totally separate from each other within CorePlus.

Using Loopback Interfaces


In this simple example, *loopback interfaces* were not used since there is no requirement for communication between the virtual systems. For example, *Department A* does not need to communicate with *Department B*. If communication between them is needed then an appropriate loopback interface pair would have to be defined to allow this.

After we define a loopback interface, all traffic sent to that interface automatically appears as being received on another interface.

4.5.3. Advantages Over Routing Rules

Using Routing Rules can solve many of the problems that virtual routing can but complex configurations can become unwieldy for such rules. Consider a single Clavister Security Gateway being used as a firewall for two organizations, both using the same IP span.

In this case, two separate routing tables could be used, one for each organization as shown below.



We first would define two routing tables for this scenario, *pbrtable1* and *pbrtable2*.

Routing Table *pbrtable1*

Route #	Interface	Network	Gateway
1	ext	all-nets	defaultgw
2	int1	192.168.0.0/24	

Routing Table *pbrtable2*

Route #	Interface	Network	Gateway
1	ext	all-nets	defaultgw
2	int2	192.168.0.0/24	

Getting traffic from each network to and from the Internet is straightforward. Assuming only outbound traffic, it takes two Routing Rules. Assuming that each organization has a public IP address which maps to servers on the respective networks, outbound as well as inbound traffic is handled with four rules:


Route #	Name	Source If	Source Net	Dest Net	Fwd Table	Ret Table
1	org1-in	ext	all-nets	pubip-org1	pbtable1	pbtable1
2	org1-out	int1	all-nets	all-nets	pbtable1	pbtable1
3	org2-in	ext	all-nets	pubip-org2	pbtable2	pbtable2
4	org2-out	int2	all-nets	all-nets	pbtable2	pbtable2

This works if the two organizations do not attempt to communicate with each other. If this happens the following two routing rules are also needed, before the other four.

Route #	Name	Source if	Source Net	Dest Net	Fwd Table	Ret Table
1	org1-org2	int1	all-nets	pubip-org2	pbtable1	pbtable2
2	org2-org1	int2	all-nets	pubip-org1	pbtable2	pbtable1

With two organizations, two routing rules are enough for them to communicate. However, with three organizations, six are needed; with four, twelve are needed; with five, twenty are needed. The numbers continue: 30, 42, 56... and the administration task becomes unmanageable.

Virtual Routing can eliminate the all-to-all mappings described in the previous section. Using interface routing table membership instead of routing rules reduces the complexity by creating 3 virtual systems as shown above.



Each organization gets a virtual system of its own and both of these connect to "main", using pairs of loopback interfaces. First, we examine the routing tables:

Routing Table *main*

Route #	Interface	Network	Gateway
1	main-ext	all-nets	defaultgw
2	main-vs1	pubip-vs1	
3	main-vs2	pubip-vs2	

Routing Table *vs1*

Route #	Interface	Network	Gateway
1	vs1-main	all-nets	
2	vs1-int	192.168.0.0/24	

Routing Table *vs2*

Route #	Interface	Network	Gateway
1	vs2-main	all-nets	
2	vs2-int	192.168.0.0/24	

Ethernet Interfaces

Interface #	Name	IP Address	Routing Table
1	main-ext	ip_main-ext	main
2	vs1-int	192.168.0.1	vs1
3	vs2-int	192.168.0.254	vs2

Loopback Interfaces

#	Name	IP Address	Loop to	Routing Table
1	main-vs1	ip_main-ext	vs1-main	main
2	vs1-main	pubip-vs1	main-vs1	vs1
3	main-vs2	ip_main-ext	vs2-main	main
4	vs2-main	pubip-vs2	main-vs2	vs2

For each connection between a pair of virtual systems, a pair of loopback interfaces is required, one for each system. In this example, when traffic is sent through *main-vs1*, it arrives on *vs1-main*. When traffic is sent through *vs1-main*, it is received on *main-vs1*. This is exactly the same as with two Clavister Security Gateways and two interfaces, one on each, with a connection between them.

The Routing Table membership settings mean that if a connection arrives on an interface, it will be routed according to the routing table that the interface is a member of.

Also note how the IP addresses of the internal interfaces of the virtual systems differ. If

per-interface routing table membership were not used, "core" routes for both IP addresses would be added in both routing tables, leading to *192.168.0.1* being unusable in *vs2* (even though it should not be) and *192.168.0.254* being unusable in *vs1*. With per-interface routing table membership, interface IP addresses belonging to one virtual system will not interfere with other virtual systems and loopback interfaces are not needed.

The IP addresses of the *main-vs1* and *main-vs2* interfaces are the same as the IP address of the external interface. They could also have been set to something nonsensical, such as *127.0.0.1*. Regular routing would still have worked since loopback interfaces are raw IP interfaces (the ARP protocol is not used over them). However, their IP addresses will be visible to users doing a traceroute from the inside, and also the issue exists of traffic originating from the Clavister Security Gateway itself to the internal networks, such as pings or logging. Such traffic is most often routed according to the main routing table, and will be sourced from the IP address of the nearest interface in the main routing table.

4.5.4. IP Rules with Virtual Routing

The IP rule sets for different virtual systems can be split into separate rule sets using the CorePlus feature of creating multiple IP rule sets (see *Section 3.5.4, "Multiple IP Rule Sets"* for more detail on this feature).

IP Rules for different virtual systems need not be split up. The rules can reside together in a single IP rule set. The benefit of doing this is being able to define "shared" or "global" rules that span over several virtual systems. For example, for aggressive "worm" attacks, it may be desirable to drop all communication on ports known to be used by the worm until counter-measures can be put into place. One single *Drop* rule placed at the top of the rule set can take care of this for all the virtual systems. Using the example of the previous section, this is how the IP rule set might look:

Interface Groups

#	Name	Interfaces
1	main-vsifs	main-vs1, main-vs2
2	main-ifs	main-ext, main-vsifs
3	vs1-ifs	vs1-main, vs1-int
4	vs2-ifs	vs2-main, vs2-int

IP Rules

#	Name	Action	Source If	Source Net	Dest If	Dest Net	Service
IP Rules for the "main" virtual system							
1	main-allowall	Allow	main-ifs	all-nets	Any	all-nets	All
IP Rules for the "vs1" virtual system							
2	vs1-http-in	SAT	vs1-ifs	all-nets	pubip-vs1	all-nets	http SetDest 192.168.0.5
3	vs1-http-in	Allow	vs1-main	all-nets	Any	pubip-vs1	http
4	vs1-out	NAT	vs1-int	all-nets	Any	all-nets	All
IP Rules for the "vs2" virtual system							
5	vs2-smtp-in	SAT	vs2-main	all-nets	Any	pubip-vs2	All
6	vs2-smtp-in	Allow	vs2-main	all-nets	Any	pubip-vs2	smtp
7	vs2-http-out	NAT	vs2-int	192.168.0.4	vs2-main	all-nets	http

Note that *SAT* rules do not need to take into account that there are more organizations connected to the same physical unit. There is no direct connection between them; everything arrives through the same interface, connected to the *main* routing table. If this was done without virtual routing, the *Allow* rules would have to be preceded by *NAT* rules for traffic from other organizations. Care would also have to be taken that such rules were in accordance with the security policy of each organization. Such problems are eliminated with virtual routing.

The source interface filters are very specific. *Any* is not used as the source interface anywhere, since such a rule would trigger regardless. Consider for instance what would happen if the *vs1-http-in* rules were to use *Any* as source interface. They would trigger as soon as packets destined to *pubip-vs1* were received on *main-ext*. The destination address would be rewritten to *192.168.0.5*, and passed on using the main routing table. The main routing table would not know what to do with *192.168.0.5* and pass it back out to the default gateway outside the Clavister Security Gateway.

If the same naming scheme as shown in this example is used, making sure the source interfaces are correct can be done quickly. All the rules concerning the *main* system have source interfaces beginning with "*main-*". All those concerning *vs1* have source interfaces beginning with "*vs1-*", and so on.

The destination interface filters, however, do not need to be as specific as the source interface filters. The possible destinations are limited by the routing tables used. If the *vs1* table only includes routes through *vs1-* interfaces, *Any* filters can only mean "through other interfaces in the same virtual system". It may however be sound practice to write tighter destination interface filters in case an error occurs elsewhere in the configuration. In this example, rule 1 might use *main-ifs*, rule 4 might use *vs1-main*. The *SAT* and corresponding *Allow* rules however are already fairly tight in that they only concern one single destination IP address.

4.5.5. Multiple IP rule sets

An alternative approach to having all the IP rules for different virtual systems in one rule set is to make use of *Multiple IP rule sets*.

Although all scanning of IP rules begins in the *main* rule set, it is possible to define a rule in *main* whose action is **Goto** so that scanning continues in a separate, named rule set. These extra rule sets can be defined as needed and one rule set can be created for each virtual system and its corresponding routing table.

More details on this subject can be found in *Section 3.5.4, "Multiple IP Rule Sets"*.

4.5.6. Trouble Shooting

- Make sure that the source interface filters are correct
- Double check interface PBR table membership. For all types of interfaces and tunnels
- Use "ping -p <pbrtable>" to source pings from different virtual systems
- Use "ping -r <rcvif> -s <srcip>" to test the rule set, simulating that the ping was received on a given interface from a given IP address
- Use "arpnsnoop -v <ifacenames>" to get verbose information about ARP resolution
- Use "route <pbrtable> -all" to view all route entries in a given table, including "core" routes
- Use "route -lookup <ipaddr> <pbrtable>" to make sure that a given IP address is routed the way you think in a given virtual system. (Hint: "-lookup" may be shortened to "-l".)
- Use "conn -v" to view verbose information about open connections. Both ends of a

connection will be shown; before and after address translation. Also, the routing tables used in the forward and return direction will be shown.

- Enable logging and read the logs. In each virtual system, a separate rule decision is made, and a separate connection is established

4.6. OSPF

The feature called *Dynamic Routing* is implemented with CorePlus using the OSPF architecture.

This section begins by looking generally at what dynamic routing is and how it can be implemented. It then goes on to look at how OSPF can provide dynamic routing followed by a description of how a simple OSPF network can be set up.

4.6.1. Dynamic Routing

Before looking at OSPF in detail this section will discuss generally the concept of *Dynamic routing* and what type of dynamic routing OSPF provides. It introduces important concepts in dynamic routing and in OSPF.

Differences to Static Routing

Dynamic routing is different to static routing in that a routing network device, such as a Clavister Security Gateway, can adapt to changes of network topology automatically.

Dynamic routing involves first learning about all the directly connected networks and then getting further routing information from other connected routers specifying which networks they are connected to. All this routing information is then processed and the most suitable routes for both locally connected and remotely connected destinations are added into local routing tables.

Dynamic routing responds to routing updates dynamically but has some disadvantages in that it can be more susceptible to certain problems such as routing loops. One of two types of algorithms are generally used to implement the dynamic routing mechanism:

- A *Distance Vector (DV)* algorithm.
- A *Link State (LS)* algorithm.

How a router decides the optimal or "best" route and shares updated information with other routers depends on the type of algorithm used. The two algorithm types will be discussed next.

Distance Vector Algorithms

A *Distance vector* algorithm is a decentralized routing algorithm that computes the best path in a distributed way.

Each router in a network computes the "costs" of its own attached links, and shares routing information only with its neighboring routers. Each router determines the least-cost path to a destination by iterative computation and also using information exchanged with its neighbors.

Routing Information Protocol (RIP) is a well-known DV algorithm for router information exchange and operates by sending regular update messages and reflecting routing changes in routing tables. Path determination is based on the "length" of the path which is the number of intermediate routers (also known as "hops") to the destination.

After updating its own routing table, the router immediately begins transmitting its entire routing table to neighboring routers to inform them of changes.

Link State Algorithms

In contrast to DV algorithms, *Link State (LS)* algorithms enable routers to keep routing tables that

reflect the topology of the entire network.

Each router broadcasts its attached links and link costs to all other routers in the network. When a router receives these broadcasts it runs the LS algorithm and calculates its own set of least-cost paths. Any change of the link state will be sent everywhere in the network, so that all routers keep the same routing table information and have a consistent view of the network.

Advantages of Link State Algorithms

Due to the fact that the global link state information is maintained everywhere in a network, LS algorithms, like that used in OSPF, offer a high degree of configuration control and scalability. Changes result in broadcasts of just the updated information to other routers which means faster convergence and less possibility of routing loops. OSPF can also function within a hierarchy, whereas RIP has no knowledge of sub-network addressing.

The OSPF Solution

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) is a widely used protocol based on an LS algorithm. Dynamic routing is implemented in CorePlus using OSPF.

An OSPF enabled router first identifies the routers and sub-networks that are directly connected to it and then broadcasts the information to all the other routers. Each router uses the information it receives to add the OSPF learned routes to its routing table.

With this larger picture, each OSPF router can identify the networks and routers that lead to a given destination IP and therefore the best route. Routers using OSPF then only broadcast updates to inform others of any route changes instead of broadcasting the entire routing table.

OSPF depends on various metrics for path determination, including hops, bandwidth, load and delay. OSPF can also provide a high level of control over the routing process since its parameters can be finely tuned.

A Simple OSPF Scenario

The simple network topology illustrated below provides an excellent example of what OSPF can achieve. Here we have two Clavister Security Gateways **A** and **B** connected together and configured to be in the same OSPF area (the concept of *area* will be explained later).




Figure 4.8. A Simple OSPF Scenario

OSPF allows security gateway **A** to know that to reach network **Y**, traffic needs to be sent to security gateway **B**. Instead of having to manually insert this routing information into the routing tables of **A**, OSPF allows **B**'s routing table information to be automatically shared with **A**.

In the same way, OSPF allows security gateway **B** to automatically become aware that network **X** is attached to security gateway **A**.

Under OSPF, this exchange of routing information is completely automatic.

OSPF Provides Route Redundancy

If we now take the above scenario and add a third Clavister Security Gateway called **C** then we have a situation where all three security gateways are aware, through OSPF, of what networks are attached to the other gateways. This is illustrated below.




Figure 4.9. OSPF Providing Route Redundancy

In addition, we now have route redundancy between any two of the security gateways. For example, if the direct link between **A** and **C** fails then OSPF allows both security gateways to know immediately that there is an alternate route between them via gateway **B**.

For instance, traffic from network **X** which is destined for network **Z** will be routed automatically through security gateway **B**.

From the administrators point of view, only the routes for directly connected networks need to be configured on each security gateway. OSPF automatically provides the required routing information to find networks connected to other security gateways, even if traffic needs to transit several other gateways to reach its destination.



Tip: Ring topologies always provide alternate routes

When designing the topology of a network that implements OSPF, arranging Clavister Security Gateways in a circular ring means that any security gateway always has two possible routes to any other. Should any one inter-gateway connection fail, an alternative path always exists.

A Look at Routing Metrics

In discussing dynamic routing and OSPF further, an understanding of *Routing Metrics* can be useful and a brief explanation is given here.

Routing metrics are the criteria that a routing algorithm will use to compute the "best" route to a destination. A routing protocol relies on one or several metrics to evaluate links across a network and to determine the optimal path. The principal metrics used include:

Path length	The sum of the costs associated with each link. A commonly used value for this metric is called "hop count" which is the number of routing devices a packet must pass through when it travels from source to destination.
Item Bandwidth	The traffic capacity of a path, rated by "Mbps".
Load	The usage of a router. The usage can be evaluated by CPU utilization and throughput.
Delay	The time it takes to move a packet from the source to the destination. The time depends on various factors, including bandwidth, load, and the length of the path.

4.6.2. OSPF Concepts

Overview

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) is a routing protocol developed for IP networks by the *Internet Engineering Task Force* (IETF). The CorePlus OSPF implementation is based upon RFC 2328, with compatibility to RFC 1583.

OSPF functions by routing IP packets based only on the destination IP address found in the IP packet header. IP packets are routed "as is", in other words they are not encapsulated in any further protocol headers as they transit the *Autonomous System* (AS).

The Autonomous System

The term *Autonomous System* refers to a single network or group of networks with a single, clearly defined routing policy controlled by a common administrator. It forms the top level of a tree structure which describes the various OSPF components.

In CorePlus, an AS corresponds to a *OSPF Router* object. This must be defined first when setting up OSPF. In most scenarios only one OSPF router is required to be defined and it must be defined separately on each Clavister Security Gateway involved in the OSPF network. This CorePlus object is described further in *Section 4.6.3.1, "OSPF Router Process"*.

OSPF is a dynamic routing protocol as it quickly detects topological changes in the AS (such as router interface failures) and calculates new loop-free routes to destinations.

Link-state Routing

OSPF is a form of *link-state routing* (LS) that sends *Link-state Advertisements* (LSAs) to all other routers within the same area. Each router maintains a database, known as a *Link-state Database*, which maps the topology of the autonomous system (AS). Using this database, each router constructs a tree of shortest paths to other routers with itself as the root. This shortest-path tree yields the best route to each destination in the AS.

Authentication.

All OSPF protocol exchanges can, if required, be authenticated. This means that only routers with the correct authentication can join an AS. Different authentication schemes can be used and with CorePlus the scheme can be either a passphrase or an MD5 digest.

It is possible to configure separate authentication methods for each AS.

OSPF Areas

An OSPF *Area* consists of networks and hosts within an AS that have been grouped together. Routers that are only within an area are called *internal routers*. All interfaces on internal routers are directly connected to networks within the area.

The topology of an area is hidden from the rest of the AS. This information hiding reduces the amount of routing traffic exchanged. Also, routing within the area is determined only by the area's own topology, lending the area protection from bad routing data. An area is a generalization of an IP sub netted network.

In CorePlus, areas are defined by *OSPF Area* objects and are added to the AS which is itself defined by an *OSPF Router* object. There can be more than one area within an AS so multiple *OSPF Area* objects could be added to a single *OSPF Router*. In most cases, one is enough and it should be defined separately on each Clavister Security Gateway which will be part of the OSPF network.

This CorePlus object is described further in *Section 4.6.3.2, "OSPF Area"*.

OSPF Area Components

A summary of OSPF components related to an area is given below:

ABRs	<i>Area Border Routers</i> are routers that have interfaces connected to more than one area. These maintain a separate topological database for each area to which they have an interface.
ASBRs	Routers that exchange routing information with routers in other Autonomous Systems are called <i>Autonomous System Boundary Routers</i> . They advertise externally learned routes throughout the Autonomous System.
Backbone Areas	All OSPF networks need to have at least the <i>Backbone Area</i> which is the OSPF area with an ID of 0. This is the area that other related areas should be connected to. The backbone ensures routing information is distributed between connected areas. When an area is not directly connected to the backbone it needs a virtual link to it. OSPF networks should be designed by beginning with the backbone.
Stub Areas	Stub areas are areas through which or into which AS external advertisements are not flooded. When an area is configured as a stub area, the router will automatically advertise a default route so that routers in the stub area can reach destinations outside the area.
Transit Areas	Transit areas are used to pass traffic from an area that is not directly connected to the backbone area.

The Designated Router

Each OSPF broadcast network has a single *Designated Router* (DR) and a single *Backup Designated Router*. The routers use OSPF *Hello* messages to elect the DR and BDR for the network based on the priorities advertised by all the routers. If there is already a DR on the network, the router will accept that one, regardless of its own router priority.

With CorePlus, the DR and the BDR are automatically assigned.

Neighbors

Routers that are in the same area become neighbors in that area. Neighbors are elected by the use of *Hello* messages. These are sent out periodically on each interface using IP multicast. Routers become neighbors as soon as they see themselves listed in a neighbor's *Hello* message. In this way, a two way communication is guaranteed.

The following *Neighbor States* are defined:

Down	This is the initial state of the neighbor relationship.
Init	When a <i>Hello</i> message is received from a neighbor, but does NOT include the Router ID of the security gateway in it, the neighbor will be placed in the <i>Init</i> state. As soon as the neighbor in question receives a <i>Hello</i> message it will know the sending router's <i>Router ID</i> and will send a <i>Hello</i> message with that included. The state of the neighbors will change to the <i>2-way</i> state.
2-Way	In this state the communication between the router and the neighbor is bi-directional. On <i>Point-to-Point</i> and <i>Point-to-Multipoint</i> OSPF interfaces, the state will be changed to <i>Full</i> . On <i>Broadcast</i> interfaces, only the DR/BDR will advance to the <i>Full</i> state with their neighbors, all the remaining neighbors will remain in the <i>2-Way</i> state.
ExStart	Preparing to build adjacency.
Exchange	Routers are exchanging Data Descriptors.
Loading	Routers are exchanging LSAs.
Full	This is the normal state of an adjacency between a router and the DR/BDR.

Aggregates

OSPF Aggregation is used to combine groups of routes with common addresses into a single entry in the routing table. This is commonly used to minimize the routing table.

To set this feature up in CorePlus, see *Section 4.6.3.5, "OSPF Aggregates"*.

Virtual Links

Virtual links are used for the following scenarios:

- A. Linking an area that does not have a direct connection to the backbone area.**
- B. Linking backbone areas when the backbone is partitioned.**

The two uses are discussed next.

A. Linking areas without direct connection to the backbone

The backbone area always needs to be the center of all other areas. In some rare cases where it is impossible to have an area physically connected to the backbone, a *Virtual Link* is used. Virtual links can provide an area with a logical path to the backbone area.

This virtual link is established between two *Area Border Routers* (ABRs) that are on one common

area, with one of the ABRs connected to the backbone area. In the example below two routers are connected to the same area (Area 1) but just one of them, *fw1*, is connected physically to the backbone area.



Figure 4.10. Virtual Links Connecting Areas

In the above example, a *Virtual Link* is configured between *fw1* and *fw2* on *Area 1* as it is used as the transit area. In this configuration only the *Router ID* has to be configured. The diagram shows that *fw2* needs to have a *Virtual Link* to *fw1* with *Router ID 192.168.1.1* and vice versa. These virtual links need to be configured in *Area 1*.

B. Linking a Partitioned Backbone

OSPF allows for linking a partitioned backbone using a virtual link. The virtual link should be configured between two separate ABRs that touch the backbone from each side and have a common area in between.



Figure 4.11. Virtual Links with Partitioned Backbone

The virtual link is configured between *fw1* and *fw2* on *Area 1* as it is used as the transit area. In the configuration, only the *Router ID* has to be configured, as in the example above show *fw2* need to have a virtual link to *fw1* with the Router ID *192.168.1.1* and vice versa. These virtual links need to be configured in *Area 1*.

To set this feature up in CorePlus, see *Section 4.6.3.6, "OSPF VLinks"*.

OSPF High Availability Support

There are some limitations in High Availability support for OSPF that should be noted:

Both the active and the inactive part of an HA cluster will run separate OSPF processes, although the inactive part will make sure that it is not the preferred choice for routing. The HA master and slave will not form adjacency with each other and are not allowed to become DR/BDR on broadcast networks. This is done by forcing the router priority to 0.

For OSPF HA support to work correctly, the Clavister Security Gateway needs to have a broadcast interface with at least ONE neighbor for ALL areas that the security gateway is attached to. In essence, the inactive part of the cluster needs a neighbor to get the link state database from.

It should also be noted that it is not possible to put an HA cluster on the same broadcast network without any other neighbors (they will not form adjacency with each other because of the router priority 0). However, it may be possible, depending on the scenario, to setup a point to point link between them instead. Special care must also be taken when setting up a virtual link to an security gateway in an HA cluster. The endpoint setting up a link to the HA security gateway must setup 3 separate links: one to the shared, one to the master and one to the slave router id of the security gateway.

Using OSPF with CorePlus

When using OSPF with CorePlus, the scenario will be that we have two or more Clavister Security Gateways connected together in some way. OSPF allows any of these security gateway to be able to correctly route traffic to a destination network connected to another security gateway without

having a route in its routing tables for the destination.

The key aspect of an OSPF setup is that connected Clavister Security Gateways share the information in their routing tables so that traffic entering an interface on one of the security gateways can be automatically routed so that it exits the interface on another gateway which is attached to the correct destination network.

Another important aspect is that the security gateways monitor the connections between each other and route traffic by an alternate connection if one is available. A network topology can therefore be designed to be fault tolerant. If a connection between two security gateways fails then any alternate route that also reaches the destination will be used.

4.6.3. OSPF Components

This section looks at the CorePlus objects that need to be configured for OSPF routing. Defining these objects creates the OSPF network. The objects should be defined on each Clavister Security Gateway that is part of the OSPF network and should describe the same network.

An illustration of the relationship between CorePlus OSPF objects is shown below.




Figure 4.12. CorePlus OSPF Objects

4.6.3.1. OSPF Router Process

This object defines the *autonomous system* (AS) which is the top level of the OSPF network. A similar *Router Process* object should be defined on each Clavister Security Gateway which is part of the OSPF network.

General Parameters

Name	Specifies a symbolic name for the OSPF AS.
Router ID	Specifies the IP address that is used to identify the router in a AS. If no Router ID is configured, the security gateway computes the Router ID based on the highest IP address of any

interface participating in the OSPF AS.

Private Router ID

This is used in an HA cluster and is the ID for this security gateway and not the cluster.



Note

When running OSPF on a HA Cluster there is a need for a private master and private slave Router ID as well as the shared Router ID.

Reference Bandwidth

Set the reference bandwidth that is used when calculating the default interface cost for routes.

If bandwidth is used instead of specifying a metric on an OSPF Interface, the cost is calculated using the following formula:

$$\text{cost} = \text{reference bandwidth} / \text{bandwidth}$$

RFC 1583 Compatibility

Enable this if the Clavister Security Gateway will be used in an environment that consists of routers that only support RFC 1583.

Debug

Protocol debug provides a troubleshooting tool by logging OSPF protocol specific information to the log.

- **Off** - Nothing is logged.
- **Low** - Logs all actions.
- **Medium** - Logs all actions that **Low** logs but with more detail.
- **High** - Logs everything with most detail.



Note

*When using the **High** setting, the security gateway will log a lot of information, even when just connected to a small AS. Changing the advanced setting **Log Send Per Sec Limit** may be required.*

Authentication

OSPF supports the following authentication options:

No (null) authentication

No authentication is used for OSPF protocol exchanges.

Passphrase

A simple password is used to authenticate all the OSPF protocol exchanges.

MD5 Digest

MD5 authentication consists of a key ID and 128-bit key. When MD5 digest is used the specified key is used to

produce the 128-bit MD5 digest.

This does **NOT** mean that the OSPF packets are encrypted. If the OSPF traffic needs to be encrypted then they must be sent using a VPN. For example, using IPsec. Sending OSPF packets through an IPsec tunnel is discussed further in *Section 4.6.5, "Setting Up OSPF"*.



Note: Authentication must be the same on all routers

If a passphrase or MD5 authentication is configured for OSPF, the passphrase or authentication key must be the same on all OSPF Routers in that Autonomous System.

In other words, the OSPF authentication method must be replicated on all Clavister Security Gateways.

Advanced

Time Settings

SPF Hold Time Specifies the minimum time, in seconds, between two SPF calculations. The default time is 10 seconds. A value of 0 means that there is no delay. Note however that SPF can potentially be a CPU demanding process, so in a big network it might not be a good idea to run it to often.

SPF Delay Time Specifies the delay time, in seconds, between when OSPF receives a topology change and when it starts a SPF calculation. The default time is 5 seconds. A value of 0 means that there is no delay. Note however that SPF can potentially be a CPU demanding process, so in a big network it might not be a good idea to run it to often.

LSA Group Pacing This specifies the time in seconds at which interval the OSPF LSAs are collected into a group and refreshed. It's more optimal to group many LSAs and process them at the same time, instead of running them one and one.

Routes Hold Time This specifies the time in seconds that the routing table will be kept unchanged after a reconfiguration of OSPF entries or a HA failover.

Memory Settings

Memory Max Usage Maximum amount in Kilobytes of RAM that the OSPF AS process are allowed to use, if no value is specified the default is 1% of installed RAM. Specifying 0 indicates that the OSPF AS process is allowed to use all available ram in the security gateway.

4.6.3.2. OSPF Area

The Autonomous System (AS) is divided into smaller parts called an *Area*, this section explains how to configure areas. An area collects together OSPF interfaces, neighbors, aggregates and virtual links.

An OSPF area is a child of the OSPF router process and there can be many area objects defined

under a single router process. In most simple networking scenarios, a single area is sufficient. Like the router process object, a similar area object should be defined on all the Clavister Security Gateways which will be part of the OSPF network.

General Parameters

Name	Specifies the name of the OSPF Area.
ID	Specifies the area id. If <i>0.0.0.0</i> is specified then this is the backbone area. There can only be one backbone area and it forms the central portion of an AS. Routing information that is exchanged between different area always transits the backbone area.
Is stub area	Enable this option if the area is a stub area.
Become Default Router	It is possible to configure if the security gateway should become the default router for the stub area, and with what metric.

Import Filter

The import filter is used to filter what can be imported in the OSPF AS from either external sources (like the main routing table or a policy based routing table) or inside the OSPF area.

External	Specifies the network addresses allowed to be imported into this OSPF area from external routing sources.
Interarea	Specifies the network addresses allowed to be imported from other routers inside the OSPF area.

4.6.3.3. OSPF Interface

This section describes how to configure an *OSPF Interface* object. OSPF interface objects are children of OSPF areas. Unlike areas, they are not similar on each Clavister Security Gateway in the OSPF network. The purpose of an OSPF interface object is to describe a specific interface which will be part of an OSPF network.



Note: Different interface types can be used with OSPF interfaces

Note that an OSPF Interface does not always correspond to a physical interface although this is the most common usage. Other types of interfaces, such as a VLAN, could instead be associated with an OSPF Interface.

General Parameters

Interface	Specifies which interface on the security gateway will be used for this OSPF interface.
Network	Specifies the network address for this OSPF interface.
Interface Type	This can be one of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Auto - Tries to automatically detect interface type. This can be used for

physical interfaces.

- **Broadcast** - The Broadcast interface type is an interface that has native Layer 2 broadcast/multicast capabilities. The typical example of a broadcast/multicast network is an ordinary physical Ethernet interface.

When broadcast is used, OSPF will send OSPF *Hello* packets to the IP multicast address *224.0.0.5*. Those packets will be heard by all other the OSPF routers on the network. For this reason, no configuration of *OSPF Neighbor* objects is required for the discovery of neighboring routers.

- **Point-to-Point** - Point-to-Point is used for direct links which involve only two routers (in other words, two security gateways). A typical example of this is a VPN tunnel which is used to transfer OSPF traffic between two security gateways. The neighbor address of such a link is configured by defining an *OSPF Neighbour* object.

Using VPN tunnels is discussed further in *Section 4.6.5, "Setting Up OSPF"*.

- **Point-to-Multipoint** - The Point-to-Multipoint interface type is a collection of Point-to-Point networks, where there is more than one router in a link that does not have OSI Layer 2 broadcast/multicast capabilities.

Metric Specifies the metric for this OSPF interface. This represents the "cost" of sending packets over this interface. This cost is inversely proportional to the bandwidth of the interface.

Bandwidth If the metric is not specified, the bandwidth is specified instead. If the bandwidth is known then this can be specified directly instead of the metric.

Authentication

All OSPF protocol exchanges can be authenticated using a simple password or MD5 cryptographic hashes.

If **Use Default for Router Process** is enabled then the values configured in the router process properties are used. If this is not enabled then the following options are available:

- **No authentication.**
- **Passphrase.**
- **MD5 Digest.**

Advanced

Hello Interval Specifies the number of seconds between *Hello* packets sent on the interface.

Router Dead Interval If not *Hello* packets are received from a neighbor within this interval then that neighbor router will be considered to be out of operation.

RXMT Interval Specifies the number of seconds between retransmissions of LSAs to neighbors on this interface.

InfTrans Delay	Specifies the estimated transmit delay for the interface. This value represents the maximum time it takes to forward a LSA packet through the router.
Wait Interval	Specifies the number of seconds between the interface brought up and the election of the DR and BDR. This value should be higher than the hello interval.
Router Priority	Specifies the router priority, a higher number increases this routers chance of becoming a DR or a BDR. If 0 is specified then this router will not be eligible in the DR/BDR election.



Note

An HA cluster will always have 0 as router priority, and can never be used as a DR or BDR.

Sometimes there is a need to include networks into the OSPF routing process, without running OSPF on the interface connected to that network. This is done by enabling the option:

No OSPF routers connected to this interface ("Passive").

This is an alternative to using a Dynamic Routing Policy to import static routes into the OSPF routing process.

If the **Ignore received OSPF MTU restrictions** is enabled, OSPF MTU mismatches will be allowed.

4.6.3.4. OSPF Neighbors

In some scenarios the neighboring OSPF router to a security gateway needs to be explicitly defined. For example, when the connection is not between physical interfaces.

The most common situation for using this is when a VPN tunnel is used to connect two neighbors and we need to tell CorePlus that the OSPF connection needs to be made through the tunnel. This type of VPN usage with IPsec tunnels is described further in *Section 4.6.5, "Setting Up OSPF"*.

CorePlus *OSPF Neighbor* objects are created within an *OSPF Area* and each object has the following property parameters:

Interface	Specifies which OSPF interface the neighbor is located on.
IP Address	The IP Address of the neighbor. This is the IP Address of the neighbors OSPF interface connecting to this router. For VPN tunnels this will be the IP address of the tunnel's remote end.
Metric	Specifies the metric to this neighbor.

4.6.3.5. OSPF Aggregates

OSPF Aggregation is used to combine groups of routes with common addresses into a single entry in the routing table. If advertised this will decrease the size of the routing table in the security gateway, if not advertised this will hide the networks.

CorePlus *OSPF Aggregate* objects are created within an *OSPF Area* and each object has the following parameters:

Network	The network consisting of the smaller routers.
Advertise	If the aggregation should be advertised or not.

In most, simple OSPF scenarios, *OSPF Aggregate* objects will not be needed.

4.6.3.6. OSPF VLinks

All areas in an OSPF AS must be physically connected to the backbone area (the area with ID 0). In some cases this is not possible and in that case a *Virtual Link* (VLink) can be used to connect to the backbone through a non-backbone area.

CorePlus *OSPF VLink* objects are created within an *OSPF Area* and each object has the following parameters:

General Parameters

Name	Symbolic name of the virtual link.
Neighbor Router ID	The Router ID of the router on the other side of the virtual link.

Authentication

Use Default For AS	Use the values configured in the AS properties page.
---------------------------	--



Note: Linking partitioned backbones

If the backbone area is partitioned, a virtual link is used to connect the different parts.

In most, simple OSPF scenarios, *OSPF VLink* objects will not be needed.

4.6.4. Dynamic Routing Rules

This section looks at *Dynamic Routing Rules* which dictate which routes can be exported to an OSPF AS from the local routing tables and which can be imported into the local routing tables from the AS.

4.6.4.1. Overview

The Final OSPF Setup Step is Creating Dynamic Routing Rules

After the OSPF structure is created, the final step is always to create a *Dynamic Routing Rule* on each Clavister Security Gateway which allows the routing information that the OSPF AS delivers from remote security gateways to be added to the local routing tables.

Dynamic routing rules are discussed here in the context of OSPF, but can also be used in other contexts.

The Reasons for Dynamic Routing Rules

In a dynamic routing environment, it is important for routers to be able to regulate to what extent they will participate in the routing exchange. It is not feasible to accept or trust all

received routing information, and it might be crucial to avoid parts of the routing database getting published to other routers.

For this reason, *Dynamic Routing Rules* are used to regulate the flow of routing information.

These rules filter either statically configured or OSPF learned routes according to parameters like the origin of the routes, destination, metric and so on. The matched routes can be controlled by actions to be either exported to OSPF processes or to be added to one or more routing tables.

Usage with OSPF

Dynamic Routing Rules are used with OSPF to achieve the following:

- Allowing the import of routes from the OSPF AS into local routing tables.
- Allowing the export of routes from a local routing tables to the OSPF AS.
- Allowing the export of routes from one OSPF AS to another OSPF AS.



Note

The last usage of joining asynchronous systems together is rarely encountered except in very large networks.

OSPF Requires at Least an Import Rule

By default, CorePlus will not import or export any routes. For OSPF to function, it is therefore mandatory to define at least one dynamic routing rule which will be an *Import* rule.

This *Import* rule specifies the local *OSPF Router Process* object. This enables the external routes made available in the OSPF AS to be imported into the local routing tables.

Specifying a Filter

Dynamic routing rules allow a filter to be specified which narrows the routes that are imported based on the network reached. In most cases, the **Or is within** option should be specified as *all-nets* so that no filter is applied.

When to Use Export Rules

Although an *Import* rule is needed to import routes from the OSPF AS, the opposite is not true. The export of routes to networks that are part of *OSPF Interface* objects are automatic.

The one exception is for routes on interfaces that have a gateway defined for them. In other words, where the destination is not directly connected to the physical interface and instead there is a hop to another router on the way to the destination network. The *all-nets* route defined for Internet access via an ISP is an example of such a route.

In this case, a dynamic routing *export* rule must be created to explicitly export the route to the OSPF AS.

Dynamic Routing Rule Objects

The diagram below shows the relationship between the CorePlus dynamic routing rule objects.




Figure 4.13. Dynamic Routing Rule Objects

4.6.4.2. Dynamic Routing Rule

This object defines a dynamic routing rule.

General Parameters

Name	Specifies a symbolic name for the rule.
From OSPF AS	Specifies the from which OSPF AS (in other words, an OSPF Router Process) the route should be imported from into either a routing table or another AS.
From Routing Table	Specifies from which routing table a route should be imported into the OSPF AS or copied into another routing table.
Destination Interface	Specifies if the rule has to have a match to a certain destination interface.

Destination Network

Exactly Matches	Specifies if the network needs to exactly match a specific network.
Or is within	Specifies if the network needs to be within a specific network.

More Parameters

Next Hop	Specifies what the next hop (in other words, router) needs to be for this rule to be triggered.
Metric	Specifies an interval that the metric of the routers needs to be in between.
Router ID	Specifies if the rule should filter on <i>Router ID</i> .
OSPF Route Type	Specifies if the rule should filter on the <i>OSPF Router Type</i> .

OSPF Tag	Specifies an interval that the tag of the routers needs to be in between.
-----------------	---

4.6.4.3. OSPF Action

This object defines an OSPF action.

General Parameters

Export to Process	Specifies into which OSPF AS the route change should be imported.
Forward	If needed, specifies the IP to route via.
Tag	Specifies a tag for this route. This tag can be used in other routers for filtering.
Route Type	Specifies what the kind of external route type. Specify <i>1</i> if OSPF should regard external routes as <i>type 1 OSPF routes</i> . <i>Type 2</i> is the most significant cost of a route.
OffsetMetric	Increases the metric of an imported route by this value.
Limit Metric To	Limits the metrics for these routes to a minimum and maximum value. If a route has a higher or lower value than specified then it will be set to the specified value.

4.6.4.4. Routing Action

A *Routing Action* is used to manipulate and export routing changes to one or more local routing tables.

Destination	Specifies into which routing table the route changes to the OSPF AS should be imported.
Offset Metric	Increases the metric by this value.
Offset Metric Type 2	Increases the <i>Type 2</i> router's metric by this value.
Limit Metric To	Limits the metrics for these routes to a minimum and maximum value. If a route has a higher value than specified then it will be set to the specified value.
Static Route Override	Allows the override of the static routes.
Default Route Override	Allows the override of the default route.

4.6.5. Setting Up OSPF

Setting up OSPF can seem complicated because of the large number of configuration possibilities that OSPF offers. However, in many cases a simple OSPF solution using a minimum of CorePlus objects is needed and setup can be straightforward.

Let us examine again the simple scenario described earlier with just two Clavister Security Gateways.




Figure 4.14. Setting Up OSPF

In this example we connect together the two Clavister Security Gateways with OSPF so they can share the routes in their routing tables. Both will be inside a single OSPF area which will be part of a single OSPF autonomous system (AS). If you are unfamiliar with these OSPF concepts, refer to earlier sections for an explanation.

Beginning with just one of these security gateways, the CorePlus setup steps are as follows:

1. Create an OSPF Router object

Create a CorePlus *OSPF Router Process* object. This will represent an *OSPF Autonomous Area (AS)* which is the highest level in the OSPF hierarchy. Give the object an appropriate name. The **Router ID** can be left blank since this will be assigned automatically by CorePlus.

2. Add an OSPF Area to the OSPF Router

Within the *OSPF Router Process* created in the previous step, add a new *OSPF Area* object. Assign an appropriate name and use the value *0.0.0.0* for the *Area ID*.

An AS can have multiple areas but in many cases only one is needed. The ID *0.0.0.0* identifies this area as the *backbone area* which forms the central portion of the AS.

3. Add OSPF Interfaces to the OSPF Area

Within the *OSPF Area* created in the previous step, add a new *OSPF Interface* for each physical interface that will be part of the area.

The *OSPF Interface* object needs the following parameters specified in its properties:

- **Interface** - the physical interface which will be part of the OSPF area.
- **Network** - the network on the interface that will be part of the area.
This does not need to be specified and if it is not, the network assigned to the physical interface is used. For example if *lan* is the interface then *lannet* will be the default network.
- **Interface Type** - this would normally be *Auto* so that the correct type is automatically selected.
- The advanced option **No OSPF routers connected to this interface** must be enabled if the physical interface doesn't connect directly to another *OSPF Router* (in other words, with another Clavister Security Gateway that acts as an OSPF router). For example, the interface may only be connected to a network of clients, in which case the option would be enabled.

The option must be disabled if the physical interface is connected to another security gateway which is set up as an *OSPF Router*. In this example, the physical interface connected to the other security gateway would have this option disabled.

4. Add a Dynamic Routing Rule

Finally, a *Dynamic Routing Rule* needs to be defined to deploy the OSPF network. This involves two steps:

- i. A *Dynamic Routing Policy Rule* object is added. This rule should be an *Import* rule that enables the option **From OSPF Process** so that the previously defined *OSPF Router Process* object is selected. What we are doing is saying that we want to import all routes from the OSPF AS.

In addition, the optional **Or is within** filter parameter for the destination network must be set to be *all-nets*. We could use a narrower filter for the destination network but in this case we want all networks.

- ii. Within the *Dynamic Routing Policy Rule* just added, we now add a *Routing Action* object. Here we add the routing table into the *Selected* list which will receive the routing information from OSPF.

In the typical case this will be the routing table called *main*.

There is no need to have a *Dynamic Routing Policy Rule* which exports the local routing table into the AS since this is done automatically for *OSPF Interface* objects.

The exception to this is if a route involves a gateway (in other words, a router hop). In this case the route **MUST** be explicitly exported. The most frequent case when this is necessary is for the **all-nets** route to the external public Internet where the gateway is the ISP's router. Doing this is discussed in the next step.

5. Add a Dynamic Routing Rule for all-nets

Optionally, a *Dynamic Routing Rule* needs to be defined if there is an *all-nets* route. For example, if the security gateway is connected to an ISP. This involves the following steps

- i. A *Dynamic Routing Policy Rule* object is added. This rule should be an *Export* rule that enables the option **From Routing Table** with the *main* routing table moved to the **Selected** list.

In addition, the optional **Or is within** filter parameter for the destination network must be set to be *all-nets*.

- ii. Within the *Dynamic Routing Policy Rule* just added, we now add an *OSPF Action* object. Here set the **Export to process** option to be the *OSPF Router Process* which represents the OSPF AS.

6. Repeat these steps on the other security gateway

Now repeat steps **1** to **5** for the other Clavister Security Gateway that will be part of the OSPF AS and area. The *OSPF Router* and *OSPF Area* objects will be identical on each. The *OSPF Interface* objects will be different depending on which interfaces and networks will be included in the OSPF system.

If more than two security gateways will be part of the same OSPF area then all of them should be configured similarly.

OSPF Routing Information Exchange Begins Automatically

As the new configurations are created in the above steps and then deployed, OSPF will automatically start and begin exchanging routing information. Since OSPF is a dynamic and distributed system, it does not matter in which order the configurations of the individual security gateways are deployed.

When the physical link is plugged in between two interfaces on two different security gateways

and those interfaces are configured with *OSPF Router Process* objects, OSPF will begin exchanging routing information.

Confirming OSPF Deployment

It is now possible to check that OSPF is operating and that routing information is exchanged.

We can do by listing the routing tables either with the CLI or using the Web Interface or InControl. In both cases, routes that have been imported into the routing tables though OSPF are indicated with the letter "O" to the left of the route description. For example, if we use the *routes* command, we might see the following output:

```
Device: /> routes
```

Flags	Network	Iface	Gateway	Local IP	Metric
	192.168.1.0/24	lan			0
	172.16.0.0/16	wan			0
O	192.168.2.0/24	wan	172.16.2.1		1

Here, the route for *192.168.2.0/24* has been imported via OSPF and that network can be found on the *WAN* interface with the gateway of *172.16.2.1*. The *gateway* in this case is of course the Clavister Security Gateway to which the traffic should be sent. That security gateway may or may not be attached to the destination network but OSPF has determined that that is the optimum route to reach it.

The CLI command *ospf* can also be used to indicate OSPF status. The options for this command are fully described in the CLI Reference Guide.

Sending OSPF Traffic Through a VPN Tunnel

In some cases, the link between two Clavister Security Gateways which are configured with *OSPF Router Process* objects may be insecure. For example, over the public Internet.

In this case, we can secure the link by setting up a VPN tunnel between the two security gateways and telling OSPF to use this tunnel for exchange of OSPF information. Next, we will look at how to set this up and assume that IPsec will be the chosen method for implementing the tunnel.




Figure 4.15. OSPF Over IPsec

To create this setup we need to perform the normal OSPF steps described above but with the following additional steps:

1. Set up an IPsec tunnel

First set up an IPsec tunnel in the normal way between the two security gateways **A** and **B**. The IPsec setup options are explained in *Section 9.2, "VPN Quick Start"*.

This IPsec tunnel is now treated like any other interface when configuring OSPF in CorePlus.

2. Choose a random internal IP network

For each security gateway we need to choose a random IP network using internal IP addresses. For example, for security gateway **A** we could use the network *192.168.55.0/24*.

This network is used just as a convenience with OSPF setup and will never be associated with a real physical network.

3. Define an OSPF Interface for the tunnel

Define an CorePlus *OSPF Interface* object which has the IPsec tunnel for the **Interface** parameter. Specify the **Type** parameter to be *point-to-point* and the *Network* parameter to be the network chosen in the previous step, *192.168.55.0/24*.

This *OSPF Interface* tells CorePlus that any OSPF related connections to addresses within the network *192.168.55.0/24* should be routed into the IPsec tunnel.

4. Define an OSPF Neighbor

Next, we must explicitly tell OSPF how to find the neighbouring OSPF router. Do this by defining a CorePlus *OSPF Neighbor* object. This consists of a pairing of the IPsec tunnel (which is treated like an interface) and the IP address of the router at the other end of the tunnel.

For the IP address of the router, we simply use any single IP address from the network *192.168.55.0/24*. For example, *192.168.55.1*.

When CorePlus sets up OSPF, it will look at this *OSPF Neighbor* object and will try to send OSPF messages to the IP address *192.168.55.1*. The *OSPF Interface* object defined in the previous step tells CorePlus that OSPF related traffic to this IP address should be routed into the IPsec tunnel.

5. Set the Local IP of the tunnel endpoint

To finish the setup for security gateway **A** there needs to be two changes made to the IPsec tunnel setup on security gateway **B**. These are:

- i. In the IPsec tunnel properties, the **Local Network** for the tunnel needs to be set to *all-nets*. This setting acts as a filter for what traffic is allowed into the tunnel and *all-nets* will allow all traffic into the tunnel.
- ii. In the routing section of the IPsec properties, the **Specify address manually** option needs to be enabled and the IP address in this example of *192.168.55.1* needs to be entered. This sets the tunnel endpoint IP to be *192.168.55.1* so that all OSPF traffic will be sent to security gateway **A** with this source IP.

The result of doing this is to "core route" OSPF traffic coming from security gateway **A**. In other words the traffic is destined for CorePlus.

6. Repeat the steps for the other security gateway

What we have done so far is allow OSPF traffic to flow from **A** to **B**. The steps above need to be repeated as a mirror image for security gateway **B** using the same IPsec tunnel but using a different random internal IP network for OSPF setup.



Tip: Non-OSPF traffic can also use the tunnel

A VPN tunnel can carry both OSPF traffic as well as other types of traffic. There is no requirement to dedicate a tunnel to OSPF traffic.

4.6.6. An OSPF Example

This section shows the actual interface commands to implement the simple scenario described above in *Section 4.6.5, "Setting Up OSPF"*. The VPN IPsec scenario is not included.

Example 4.7. Creating an OSPF Router Process

On the first security gateway involved in the OSPF AS, create an *OSPF Router Process*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > OSPF > Add > OSPF Routing Process**
2. Specify a suitable name for the process, for example *as_0*
3. Click **OK**

This should be repeated for all the Clavister Security Gateways that will be part of the OSPF AS.

Example 4.8. Add an OSPF Area

Now add an *OSPF Area* object to the *OSPF Router Process* object *as_0*. The area will be the *backbone area* and will have the ID *0.0.0.0*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > OSPF**
2. Select the routing process *as_0*
3. Select **Add > OSPF Area**
4. For the area properties:
 - Enter a suitable name. For example, *area_0*
 - Specify the **Area ID** as *0.0.0.0*
5. Click **OK**

This should be repeated for all the Clavister Security Gateways that will be part of the OSPF area.

Example 4.9. Add OSPF Interface Objects

Now add *OSPF Interface* objects for each physical interface that is to be part of the OSPF area *area_0*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > OSPF > as_0 > area_0 > OSPF Interfaces**
2. Select **Add > OSPF Interface**
3. Select the **Interface**. For example, *lan*
4. Click **OK**

Just selecting the **Interface** means that the **Network** defaults to the network bound to that interface. In this case *lanet*.

This should be repeated for all the interfaces on this Clavister Security Gateway that will be part of the OSPF area and then repeated for all the other security gateways.

Example 4.10. Import Routes from an OSPF AS into the Main Routing Table

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Dynamic Routing Rules > Add > Dynamic Routing Policy Rule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the rule. For example, *ImportOSPFRoutes*.
3. Select the option **From OSPF Process**
4. Move *as0* from **Available** to **Selected**
5. Choose **all-nets** in the **...Or is within** filter option
6. Click **OK**

Now, create a Dynamic Routing Action that will do the actual importing of the routes into a routing table. Specify the destination routing table that the routes should be added to, in this case *main*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Dynamic Routing Rules**

2. Click on the newly created **ImportOSPFRoutes**
3. Go to **OSPF Routing Action > Add > DynamicRoutingRuleAddRoute**
4. Move the routing table *main* from **Available** to **Selected**
5. Click **OK**

Example 4.11. Exporting the Default Route into an OSPF AS

In this example, the default *all-nets* route from the *main* routing table will be exported into an OSPF AS named *as_0*. This must be done explicitly because *all-nets* routes are not exported automatically.

First, add a new *Dynamic Routing Policy Rule*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Dynamic Routing Rules > Add > Dynamic routing policy rule**
2. Specify a name for the rule. For example, *ExportAllNets*
3. Select the option **From Routing Table**
4. Move the routing table *main* to the **Selected** list
5. Choose **all-nets** in the **...Or is within** filter
6. Click **OK**

Next, create an OSPF Action that will export the filtered route to the specified OSPF AS:

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Routing > Dynamic Routing Rules**
2. Click on the newly created **ExportAllNets**
3. Go to **OSPF Actions > Add > DynamicRoutingRuleExportOSPF**
4. For **Export to process** choose **as0**
5. Click **OK**

4.7. Multicast Routing

4.7.1. Overview

The Multicast Problem

Certain types of Internet interactions, such as conferencing and video broadcasts, require a single client or host to send the same packet to multiple receivers. This could be achieved through the sender duplicating the packet with different receiving IP addresses or by a broadcast of the packet across the Internet. These solutions waste large amounts of sender resources or network bandwidth and are therefore not satisfactory. An appropriate solution should also be able to scale to large numbers of receivers.

The Multicast Routing Solution

Multicast Routing solves the problem by the network routers themselves, replicating and forwarding packets via the optimum route to all members of a group.

The IETF standards that allow multicast routing are the following:

- Class D of the IP address space which is reserved for multicast traffic. Each multicast IP address represent an arbitrary group of recipients.
- The *Internet Group Membership Protocol (IGMP)* allows a receiver to tell the network that it is a member of a particular multicast group.
- Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) is a group of routing protocols for deciding the optimal path for multicast packets.

Underlying Principles

Multicast routing functions on the principle that an interested receiver joins a group for a multicast by using the IGMP protocol. PIM routers can then duplicate and forward packets to all members of such a multicast group, thus creating a *distribution tree* for packet flow. Rather than acquiring new network information, PIM uses the routing information from existing protocols, such as OSPF, to decide the optimal path.

Reverse Path Forwarding

A key mechanism in the multicast routing process is *Reverse Path Forwarding*. For unicast traffic, a router is concerned only with a packet's destination. With multicast, the router is also concerned with a packets source since it forwards the packet on paths which are known to be downstream, away from the packet's source. This approach is adopted to avoid loops in the distribution tree.

Routing to the Correct Interface

By default, multicast packets are routed by CorePlus to the **core** interface (in other words, to CorePlus itself). *SAT Multiplex rules* are set up in the IP rule set in order to perform forwarding to the correct interfaces. This is demonstrated in the examples described later.



Note: Interface multicast handling must be On or Auto

*For multicast to function with an Ethernet interface on any Clavister Security Gateway, that interface must have multicast handling set to **On** or **Auto**. For further details on this see Section 3.3.2, "Ethernet Interfaces".*

4.7.2. Multicast Forwarding with SAT Multiplex Rules

The SAT Multiplex rule is used to achieve duplication and forwarding of packets through more than one interface. This feature implements multicast forwarding in CorePlus, where a multicast packet is sent through several interfaces.

Note that since this rule overrides the normal routing tables, packets that should be duplicated by the multiplex rule needs to be routed to the **core** interface.

By default, the multicast IP range `224.0.0.0/4` is always routed to **core** and does not have to be manually added to the routing tables. Each specified output interface can individually be configured with static address translation of the destination address. The **Interface** field in the **Interface/Net Tuple** dialog may be left empty if the **IPAddress** field is set. In this case, the output interface will be determined by a route lookup on the specified IP address.

The multiplex rule can operate in one of two modes:

- **Using IGMP**

The traffic flow specified by the multiplex rule must have been requested by hosts using IGMP before any multicast packets are forwarded through the specified interfaces. This is the default behavior of CorePlus.

- **Not using IGMP**

The traffic flow will be forwarded according to the specified interfaces directly without any inference from IGMP.



Note: An Allow or NAT rule is also needed

*Since the Multiplex rule is a **SAT** rule, an **Allow** or **NAT** rule also has to be specified as well as the **Multiplex** rule.*

4.7.2.1. Multicast Forwarding - No Address Translation

This scenario describes how to configure multicast forwarding together with IGMP. The multicast sender is `192.168.10.1` and generates the multicast streams `239.192.10.0/24:1234`. These multicast streams should be forwarded from interface wan through the interfaces `if1`, `if2` and `if3`. The streams should only be forwarded if some host has requested the streams using the IGMP protocol.

The example below only covers the multicast forwarding part of the configuration. The IGMP configuration can be found later in Section 4.7.3.1, "IGMP Rules Configuration - No Address Translation".




Figure 4.16. Multicast Forwarding - No Address Translation



Note: SAT Multiplex rules must have a matching Allow rule

Remember to add an **Allow** rule that matches the **SAT Multiplex** rule.

The matching rule could also be a **NAT** rule for source address translation (see below) but cannot be a **FwdFast** or **SAT** rule.

Example 4.12. Forwarding of Multicast Traffic using the SAT Multiplex Rule

In this example, we will create a multiplex rule in order to forward the multicast groups 239.192.10.0/24:1234 to the interfaces if1, if2 and if3. All groups have the same sender 192.168.10.1 which is located somewhere behind the wan interface.

The multicast groups should only be forwarded to the out interfaces if clients behind those interfaces have requested the groups using IGMP. The following steps need to be performed to configure the actual forwarding of the multicast traffic. IGMP has to be configured separately.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create a custom service for multicast called *multicast_service*:

1. Go to **Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** multicast_service
 - **Type:** UDP
 - **Destination:** 1234
- B. Create an IP rule:
 1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IP Rule**
 2. Under **General** enter.
 - **Name:** a name for the rule, for example *Multicast_Multiplex*
 - **Action:** Multiplex SAT
 - **Service:** multicast_service
 3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** 239.192.10.0/24
 4. Click the **Multiplex SAT** tab and add the output interfaces if1, if2 and if3 one at a time. For each interface, leave the **IPAddress** field blank since no destination address translation is wanted.
 5. Make sure the **forwarded using IGMP** checkbox is set
 6. Click **OK**

Creating Multiplex Rules with the CLI

Creating multiplex rules through the CLI requires some additional explanation.

First, the *IPRuleset*, in this example *main*, needs to be selected as the current category:

```
Device:/> cc IPRuleset main
```

The CLI command to create the multiplex rule is then:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule SourceNetwork=<srcnet> SourceInterface=<srcif>
DestinationInterface=<srcif> DestinationNetwork=<destnet>
Action=MultiplexSAT Service=<service>
MultiplexArgument={outif1;ip1},{outif2;ip2},{outif3;ip3}...
```

The two values *{outif;ip}* represent a combination of output interface and, if address translation of a group is needed, an IP address.

If, for example, multiplexing of the multicast group `239.192.100.50` is required to the output interfaces `if2` and `if3`, then the command to create the rule would be:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule SourceNetwork=<srcnet> SourceInterface=<if1>
DestinationInterface=core DestinationNetwork=239.192.100.50
Action=MultiplexSAT Service=<service>
MultiplexArgument={if2;},{if3;}
```

The destination interface is `core` since `239.192.100.50` is a multicast group. No address translation of `239.192.100.50` was added but if it is required for, say, `if2` then the final argument would be:

```
MultiplexArgument={if2;<new_ip_address>},{if3;}
```

4.7.2.2. Multicast Forwarding - Address Translation Scenario




Figure 4.17. Multicast Forwarding - Address Translation

This scenario is based on the previous scenario but this time the multicast group is translated. When the multicast streams `239.192.10.0/24` are forwarded through the `if2` interface, the multicast groups should be translated into `237.192.10.0/24`.

No address translation should be made when forwarding through interface `if1`. The configuration of the corresponding IGMP rules can be found below in [Section 4.7.3.2, "IGMP Rules Configuration - Address Translation"](#).



Tip

As previously noted, remember to add an Allow rule matching the SAT Multiplex rule.

Example 4.13. Multicast Forwarding - Address Translation

The following SAT Multiplex rule needs to be configured to match the scenario described above:

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create a custom service for multicast called *multicast_service*:

1. Go to **Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** multicast_service
 - **Type:** UDP
 - **Destination:** 1234

B. Create an IP rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IP Rule**
2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** a name for the rule, for example *Multicast_Multiplex*
 - **Action:** Multiplex SAT
 - **Service:** multicast_service
3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** 239.192.10.0/24
4. Click the **Multiplex SAT** tab
5. Add interface **if1** but leave the **IPAddress** empty
6. Add interface **if2** but this time, enter *237.192.10.0* as the **IPAddress**
7. Make sure the **Forwarded using IGMP** checkbox is enabled
8. Click **OK**

**Note: Replace Allow with NAT for source IP translation**

If address translation of the source address is required, the Allow rule following the SAT Multiplex rule should be replaced with a NAT rule.

4.7.3. IGMP Configuration

IGMP signalling between hosts and routers can be divided into two categories:

- **IGMP Reports**

Reports are sent from hosts towards the router when a host wants to subscribe to new multicast groups or change current multicast subscriptions.

- **IGMP Queries**

Queries are IGMP messages sent from the router towards the hosts in order to make sure that it will not close any stream that some host still wants to receive.

Normally, both types of rule have to be specified for IGMP to function but there are two exceptions:

1. If the multicast source is located on a network directly connected to the router, no query rule is needed.
2. If a neighboring router is statically configured to deliver a multicast stream to the Clavister Security Gateway, an IGMP query would also not have to be specified.

CorePlus supports two IGMP modes of operation:

- **Snoop Mode**
- **Proxy Mode**

The operation of these two modes are shown in the following illustrations:




Figure 4.18. Multicast Snoop Mode




Figure 4.19. Multicast Proxy Mode

In *Snoop Mode*, the Clavister Security Gateway will act transparently between the hosts and another IGMP router. It will not send any IGMP Queries. It will only forward queries and reports between the other router and the hosts.

In *Proxy Mode*, the security gateway will act as an IGMP router towards the clients and actively send queries. Towards the upstream router, the security gateway will be acting as a normal host, subscribing to multicast groups on behalf of its clients.

4.7.3.1. IGMP Rules Configuration - No Address Translation

This example describes the IGMP rules needed for configuring IGMP according to the No Address Translation scenario described above. The router is required to act as a host towards the upstream router and therefore IGMP must be configured to run in proxy mode.

Example 4.14. IGMP - No Address Translation

The following example requires a configured interface group *IfGrpClients* including interfaces *if1*, *if2* and *if3*. The ip address of the upstream IGMP router is known as *UpstreamRouterIP*.

Two rules are needed. The first one is a report rule that allows the clients behind interfaces *if1*, *if2* and *if3* to subscribe for the multicast groups *239.192.10.0/24*. The second rule, is a query rule that allows the upstream router to query us for the multicast groups that the clients have requested.

The following steps need to be executed to create the two rules.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create the first IGMP Rule:

1. Go to **Routing > IGMP > IGMP Rules > Add > IGMP Rule**
 2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** A suitable name for the rule, for example *Reports*
 - **Type:** Report
 - **Action:** Proxy
 - **Output:** wan (*this is the relay interface*)
 3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** IfGrpClients
 - **Source Network:** if1net, if2net, if3net
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** auto
 - **Multicast Source:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Multicast Destination:** 239.192.10.0/24
 4. Click **OK**
- B. Create the second IGMP Rule:
1. Again go to **Routing > IGMP > IGMP Rules > Add > IGMP Rule**
 2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** A suitable name for the rule, for example *Queries*
 - **Type:** Query
 - **Action:** Proxy
 - **Output:** IfGrpClients (*this is the relay interface*)
 3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** UpstreamRouterIp
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** auto
 - **Multicast Source:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Multicast Group:** 239.192.10.0/24
 4. Click **OK**

4.7.3.2. IGMP Rules Configuration - Address Translation

The following examples illustrate the IGMP rules needed to configure IGMP according to the Address Translation scenario described above in *Section 4.7.2.2, "Multicast Forwarding - Address Translation Scenario"*. We need two IGMP report rules, one for each client interface. The interface *if1* uses no address translation and *if2* translates the multicast group to *237.192.10.0/24*. We also need two query rules, one for the translated address and interface, and one for the original address towards *if1*.

Two examples are provided, one for each pair of report and query rule. The upstream multicast router uses IP *UpstreamRouterIP*.

Example 4.15. *if1* Configuration

The following steps need to be executed to create the report and query rule pair for *if1* which uses no address translation.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create the first IGMP Rule:

1. Go to **Routing > IGMP > IGMP Rules > Add > IGMP Rule**
2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** A suitable name for the rule, for example *Reports_if1*
 - **Type:** Report
 - **Action:** Proxy
 - **Output:** wan (*this is the relay interface*)
3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** if1
 - **Source Network:** if1net
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** auto
 - **Multicast Source:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Multicast Group:** 239.192.10.0/24
4. Click **OK**

B. Create the second IGMP Rule:

1. Again go to **Routing > IGMP > IGMP Rules > Add > IGMP Rule**

2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** A suitable name for the rule, for example *Queries_if1*
 - **Type:** Query
 - **Action:** Proxy
 - **Output:** if1 (*this is the relay interface*)
3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** UpstreamRouterIp
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** auto
 - **Multicast Source:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Multicast Group:** 239.192.10.0/24
4. Click **OK**

Example 4.16. if2 Configuration - Group Translation

The following steps need to be executed to create the report and query rule pair for if2 which translates the multicast group. Note that the group translated therefore the IGMP reports include the translated IP addresses and the queries will contain the original IP addresses

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create the first IGMP Rule:

1. Go to **Routing > IGMP > IGMP Rules > Add > IGMP Rule**
2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** A suitable name for the rule, for example *Reports_if2*
 - **Type:** Report
 - **Action:** Proxy
 - **Output:** wan (*this is the relay interface*)
3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** if2
 - **Source Network:** if2net

- **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** auto
 - **Multicast Source:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Multicast Group:** 239.192.10.0/24
4. Click **OK**
- B. Create the second IGMP Rule:
1. Again go to **Routing > IGMP > IGMP Rules > Add > IGMP Rule**
 2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** A suitable name for the rule, for example *Queries_if2*
 - **Type:** Query
 - **Action:** Proxy
 - **Output:** if2 (*this is the relay interface*)
 3. Under **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** UpstreamRouterIp
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** auto
 - **Multicast Source:** 192.168.10.1
 - **Multicast Group:** 239.192.10.0/24
 4. Click **OK**



Advanced IGMP Settings

There are a number of IGMP advanced settings which are global and apply to all interfaces which do not have IGMP settings explicitly specified for them.

4.7.4. Advanced IGMP Settings

Auto Add Multicast Core Route

This setting will automatically add core routes in all routing tables for the multicast IP address range 224.0.0.0/4. If the setting is disabled, multicast packets might be forwarded according to the default route.

Default: *Enabled*

IGMP Before Rules

For IGMP traffic, by-pass the normal IP rule set and consult the IGMP rule set.

Default: *Enabled*

IGMP React To Own Queries

The security gateway should always respond with IGMP Membership Reports, even to queries originating from itself. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: *Disabled*

IGMP Lowest Compatible Version

IGMP messages with a version lower than this will be logged and ignored. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: *IGMPv1*

IGMP Router Version

The IGMP protocol version that will be globally used on interfaces without a configured IGMP Setting. Multiple querying IGMP routers on the same network must use the same IGMP version. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: *IGMPv3*

IGMP Last Member Query Interval

The maximum time in milliseconds until a host has to send an answer to a group or group-and-source specific query. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: *5,000*

IGMP Max Total Requests

The maximum global number of IGMP messages to process each second.

Default: *1000*

IGMP Max Interface Requests

The maximum number of requests per interface and second. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: *100*

IGMP Query Interval

The interval in milliseconds between General Queries sent by the device to refresh its IGMP state. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: 125,000

IGMP Query Response Interval

The maximum time in milliseconds until a host has to send a reply to a query. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: 10,000

IGMP Robustness Variable

IGMP is robust to (IGMP Robustness Variable - 1) packet losses. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: 2

IGMP Startup Query Count

The security gateway will send IGMP Startup Query Count general queries with an interval of IGMPStartupQueryInterval at startup. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: 2

IGMP Startup Query Interval

The interval of General Queries in milliseconds used during the startup phase. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: 30,000

IGMP Unsolicited Report Interval

The time in milliseconds between repetitions of an initial membership report. Global setting on interfaces without an overriding IGMP Setting.

Default: 1,000

4.8. Transparent Mode

4.8.1. Overview

Transparent Mode Usage

The CorePlus *Transparent Mode* feature allows a Clavister Security Gateway to be placed at a point in a network without any reconfiguration of the network and without hosts being aware of its presence. All CorePlus features can then be used to monitor and manage traffic flowing through that point. CorePlus can allow or deny access to different types of services (for example HTTP) and in specified directions. As long as users are accessing the services permitted, they will not be aware of the Clavister Security Gateway's presence.

Network security and control can therefore be significantly enhanced with deployment of a Clavister Security Gateway operating in Transparent Mode but while disturbance to existing users and hosts is minimized.

Switch Routes

Transparent Mode is enabled by specifying a *Switch Route* instead of a standard *Route* in routing tables. The switch route usually specifies that the network *all-nets* is found on a specific interface. CorePlus then uses ARP message exchanges over the connected Ethernet network to identify and keep track of which host IP addresses are located on that interface (this is explained further below). There should not be a normal non-switch route for that same interface.

In certain, less usual circumstances, switch routes can have a network range specified instead of *all-nets*. This is usually when a network is split between two interfaces but the administrator does not know exactly which users are on which interface.

Usage Scenarios

Two examples of Transparent Mode usage are:

- **Implementing Security Between Users**

In a corporate environment, there may be a need to protect the computing resources of different departments from one another. The finance department might require access to only a restricted set of services (HTTP for example) on the sales department's servers whilst the sales department might require access to a similarly restricted set of applications on the finance department's hosts. By deploying a single Clavister Security Gateway between the two department's physical networks, transparent but controlled access can be achieved.

- **Controlling Internet Access**

An organization allows traffic between the external Internet and a range of public IP addresses on an internal network. Transparent Mode can control what kind of service is permitted to these IP addresses and in what direction. For instance the only services permitted in such a situation may be HTTP access out to the Internet. This usage is dealt with in greater depth below in *Section 4.8.2, "Enabling Internet Access"*.

Comparison with Routing Mode

The Clavister Security Gateway can operate in two modes: *Routing Mode* using non-switch routes or *Transparent Mode* using switch routes.

With non-switch routes, the Clavister Security Gateway acts as a router and routing operates at layer 3 of the OSI model. If the security gateway is placed into a network for the first time, or if network topology changes, the routing configuration must therefore be checked and adjusted to ensure that the routing table is consistent with the new layout. Reconfiguration of IP settings may be required for pre-existing routers and protected servers. This works well when comprehensive control over routing is desired.

With **switch routes**, the Clavister Security Gateway operates in Transparent Mode and resembles a *OSI Layer 2 Switch* in that it screens IP packets and forwards them transparently to the correct interface without modifying any of the source or destination information at the IP or Ethernet levels. This is achieved by CorePlus keeping track of the MAC addresses of the connected hosts and CorePlus allows physical Ethernet networks on either side of the Clavister Security Gateway to act as though they were a single logical IP network. (See *Appendix D, The OSI Framework* for an overview of the OSI layer model.)

Two benefits of Transparent Mode over conventional routing are:

- A user can move from one interface to another in a "plug-n-play" fashion, without changing their IP address (assuming their IP address is fixed). The user can still obtain the same services as before (for example HTTP, FTP) without any need to change routes.
- The same network address range can exist on several interfaces.



Note: Transparent and Routing Mode can be combined

Transparent Mode and Routing Mode can operate together on a single Clavister Security Gateway. Switch Routes can be defined alongside standard non-switch routes although the two types cannot be combined for the same interface. An interface operates in one mode or the other.

It is also possible to create a hybrid case by applying address translation on otherwise transparent traffic.

How Transparent Mode Works

In Transparent Mode, CorePlus allows ARP transactions to pass through the Clavister Security Gateway, and determines from this ARP traffic the relationship between IP addresses, physical addresses and interfaces. CorePlus remembers this address information in order to relay IP packets to the correct receiver. During the ARP transactions, neither of the endpoints will be aware of the Clavister Security Gateway.

When beginning communication, a host will locate the target host's physical address by broadcasting an ARP request. This request is intercepted by CorePlus and it sets up an internal ARP Transaction State entry and broadcasts the ARP request to all the other switch-route interfaces except the interface the ARP request was received on. If CorePlus receives an ARP reply from the destination within a configurable timeout period, it will relay the reply back to the sender of the request, using the information previously stored in the ARP Transaction State entry.

During the ARP transaction, CorePlus learns the source address information for both ends from the request and reply. CorePlus maintains two tables to store this information: the Content Addressable Memory (CAM) and Layer 3 Cache. The CAM table tracks the MAC addresses available on a given interface and the Layer 3 cache maps an IP address to MAC address and interface. As the Layer 3 Cache is only used for IP traffic, Layer 3 Cache entries are stored as single host entries in the routing table.

For each IP packet that passes through the Clavister Security Gateway, a route lookup for the destination is done. If the route of the packet matches a **Switch Route** or a Layer 3 Cache entry in

the routing table, CorePlus knows that it should handle this packet in a transparent manner. If a destination interface and MAC address is available in the route, CorePlus has the necessary information to forward the packet to the destination. If the route was a **Switch Route**, no specific information about the destination is available and the security gateway will have to discover where the destination is located in the network.

Discovery is done by CorePlus sending out ARP as well as ICMP (ping) requests, acting as the initiating sender of the original IP packet for the destination on the interfaces specified in the **Switch Route**. If an ARP reply is received, CorePlus will update the CAM table and Layer 3 Cache and forward the packet to the destination.

If the CAM table or the Layer 3 Cache is full, the tables are partially flushed automatically. Using the discovery mechanism of sending ARP and ICMP requests, CorePlus will rediscover destinations that may have been flushed.

Enabling Transparent Mode

The following steps are required to enable CorePlus Transparent Mode:

1. The interfaces that are to be transparent should be first collected together into a single *Interface Group* object. Interfaces in the group should be marked as **Security transport equivalent** if hosts are to move freely between them.
2. A **Switch Route** is now created in the appropriate routing table and the interface group associated with it. Any existing non-switch routes for interfaces in the group should be removed from the routing table.

For the **Network** parameter in the switch route, specify *all-nets* or alternatively, specify a network or range of IP addresses that will be transparent between the interfaces (this latter option is discussed further below).

3. Create the appropriate IP rules in the IP rule set to allow the desired traffic to flow between the interfaces operating in Transparent Mode.

If no restriction at all is to be initially placed on traffic flowing in transparent mode, the following single IP rule could be added but more restrictive IP rules are recommended.

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
Allow	any	all-nets	any	all-nets	all

Restricting the *Network* Parameter

As CorePlus listens to ARP traffic, it continuously adds *single host routes* to the routing table as it discovers on which interface IP addresses are located. As the name suggests, single hosts routes give a route for a single IP address. The number of these routes can therefore become large as connections are made to more and more hosts.

A key advantage of specifying a network or a range of IP addresses instead of *all-nets* for the *Network* parameter is that the number of routes automatically generated by CorePlus will be significantly smaller. A single host route will only be added if the IP address falls within the network or address specified. Reducing the number of routes added will reduce the processing overhead of route lookups.


Specifying a network or address range is, of course, only possible if the administrator has some knowledge of the network topology and often this may not be the case.

Multiple Switch Routes are Connected Together

The setup steps listed above describe placing all the interfaces into a single interface group object which is associated with a single switch route.

An alternative to one switch route is to not use an interface group but instead use an individual switch route for each interface. The end result is the same. All the switch routes defined in a single routing table will be connected together by CorePlus and no matter how interfaces are associated with the switch routes, transparency will exist between them.


For example, if the interfaces *if1* to *if6* appear in a switch routes in routing table *A*, the resulting interconnections will be as illustrated below.



Connecting together switch routes in this way only applies, however, if all interfaces are associated with the same routing table. The situation where they are not, is described next.

Creating Separate Transparent Mode Networks

If we now have two routing tables *A* and *B* so that interfaces *if1*, *if2* and *if3* appear in a switch route in table *A* and interfaces *if4*, *if5*, *if6* appear in a switch route in table *B*, the resulting interconnections will be as illustrated below.



The diagram above illustrates how switch route interconnections for one routing table are completely separate from the switch route interconnections for another routing table. By using different routing tables in this way we can create two separate transparent mode networks.

The routing table used for an interface is decided by the *Routing Table Membership* parameter for each interface. To implement separate Transparent Mode networks, interfaces must have their *Routing Table Membership* reset.

By default, all interfaces have *Routing Table Membership* set to be *all* routing tables. By default, one *main* routing table always exists and once an additional routing table has been defined, the *Membership* for any interface can then be set to be that new table.

Transparent Mode with VLANs

If transparent mode is being set up for all hosts and users on a VLAN then the technique described above of using multiple routing tables also applies. A dedicated routing table should be defined for each VLAN ID and switch routes should then be defined in that routing table

which refer to the VLAN interfaces. The reason for doing this is to restrict the ARP requests to the interfaces on which the VLAN is defined.

To better explain this, let us consider a VLAN *vlan5* which is defined on two physical interfaces called *if1* and *if2*. Both physical interfaces have switch routes defined so they operate in transparent mode. Two VLAN interfaces with the same VLAN ID are defined on the two physical interfaces and they are called *vlan5_if1* and *vlan5_if2*.

For the VLAN to operate in transparent mode we create a routing table with the ordering set to *only* and which contains the following 2 switch routes:

Network	Interface
all-nets	vlan5_if1
all-nets	vlan5_if2

Instead of creating individual entries, an interface group could be used in the above routing table.

No other non-switched routes should be in this routing table because traffic that follows such routes will be tagged incorrectly with the VLAN ID.

Finally, we must associate the created routing table with its VLAN interface by using the option to make each VLAN interface a member of a specific routing table.

Enabling Transparent Mode Directly on Interfaces

The recommended way to enable Transparent Mode is to add switch routes, as described above. An alternative method is to enable transparent mode directly on an interface (a check box for this is provided in the graphical user interfaces). When enabled in this way, default switch routes are automatically added to the routing table for the interface and any corresponding non-switch routes are automatically removed. This method is used in the detailed examples given later.

High Availability and Transparent Mode

Switch Routes cannot be used with High Availability and therefore true transparent mode cannot be implemented with a CorePlus High Availability Cluster.

Instead of Switch Routes the solution in a High Availability setup is to use Proxy ARP to separate two networks. This is described further in *Section 4.2.6, "Proxy ARP"*. The key disadvantage with this approach is that firstly, clients will not be able to roam between CorePlus interfaces, retaining the same IP address. Secondly, and more importantly, their network routes will need to be manually configured for proxy ARP.

Transparent Mode with DHCP

In most Transparent Mode scenarios, the IP address of users is predefined and fixed and is not dynamically fetched using DHCP. Indeed, the key advantage of Transparent Mode is that these users can plug in anywhere and CorePlus can route their traffic correctly after determining their whereabouts and IP address through ARP exchanges.

However, a DHCP server could be used to allocate user IP addresses in a Transparent Mode setup if desired. With Internet connections, it may be the ISP's own DHCP server which will hand out public IP addresses to users. In this case, CorePlus **MUST** be correctly configured as a *DHCP Relay* to forward DHCP traffic between users and the DHCP server.

4.8.2. Enabling Internet Access

A common misunderstanding when setting up Transparent Mode is how to correctly set up access to the public Internet. Below is a typical scenario where a number of users on an IP network called *lannet* access the Internet via an ISP's gateway with IP address *gw-ip*.




Figure 4.20. Non-transparent Mode Internet Access

The non-switch route usually needed to allow Internet access would be:

Route type	Interface	Destination	Gateway
Non-switch	if1	all-nets	gw-ip

Now lets suppose the Clavister Security Gateway is to operate in transparent mode between the users and the ISP. The illustration below shows how, using switch routes, the Clavister Security Gateway is set up to be transparent between the internal physical Ethernet network (*pn2*) and the Ethernet network to the ISP's gateway (*pn1*). The two Ethernet networks are treated as a single logical IP network in Transparent Mode with a common address range (in this example *192.168.10.0/24*).




Figure 4.21. Transparent Mode Internet Access

In this situation, any "normal" non-switch *all-nets* routes in the routing table should be removed and replaced with an *all-nets* switch route (not doing this is a common mistake during setup). This switch route will allow traffic from the local users on Ethernet network *pn2* to find the ISP gateway.

These same users should also configure the Internet gateway on their local computers to be the ISP's gateway address. In non-transparent mode the user's gateway IP would be the Clavister Security Gateway's IP address but in transparent mode the ISP's gateway is on the same logical IP network as the users and will therefore be *gw-ip*.

CorePlus May Also Need Internet Access

The Clavister Security Gateway also needs to find the public Internet if it is to perform CorePlus functions such as DNS lookup, Web Content Filtering or Anti-Virus and IDP updating. To allow this, individual "normal" non-switch routes need to be set up in the routing table for each IP address specifying the interface which leads to the ISP and the ISPs gateway IP address.

If the IP addresses that need to be reached by CorePlus are *85.12.184.39* and *194.142.215.15* then the complete routing table for the above example would be:

Route type	Interface	Destination	Gateway
Switch	if1	all-nets	
Switch	if2	all-nets	
Non-switch	if1	85.12.184.39	gw-ip
Non-switch	if1	194.142.215.15	gw-ip

The appropriate IP rules will also need to be added to the IP rule set to allow Internet access through the Clavister Security Gateway.

Grouping IP Addresses

It can be quicker when dealing with many IP addresses to group all the addresses into a single group IP object and then use that object in a single defined route. In the above example, *85.12.184.39* and *194.142.215.15* could be grouped into a single object in this way.

Using NAT

NAT should not be enabled for CorePlus in Transparent Mode since, as explained previously, the Clavister Security Gateway is acting like a level 2 switch and address translation is done at the higher IP OSI layer.

The other consequence of not using NAT is that IP addresses of users accessing the Internet usually need to be public IP addresses.

If NATing needs to be performed in the example above to hide individual addresses from the Internet, it would have to be done by a device (possibly another Clavister Security Gateway) between the *192.168.10.0/24* network and the public Internet. In this case, internal IP addresses could be used by the users on Ethernet network *pn2*.

4.8.3. Transparent Mode Scenarios

Scenario 1

The security gateway in Transparent Mode is placed between an Internet access router and the internal network. The router is used to share the Internet connection with a single public IP address. The internal NATed network behind the security gateway is in the *10.0.0.0/24* address space. Clients on the internal network are allowed to access the Internet via the HTTP protocol.




Figure 4.22. Transparent Mode Scenario 1

Example 4.17. Setting up Transparent Mode for Scenario 1

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Configure the interfaces:

1. Go to **Interfaces > Ethernet > Edit (wan)**
2. Now enter:
 - **IP Address:** 10.0.0.1
 - **Network:** 10.0.0.0/24
 - **Default Gateway:** 10.0.0.1
 - **Transparent Mode:** Enable
3. Click **OK**
4. Go to **Interfaces > Ethernet > Edit (lan)**
5. Now enter:
 - **IP Address:** 10.0.0.2
 - **Network:** 10.0.0.0/24
 - **Transparent Mode:** Enable
6. Click **OK**

Configure the rules:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** HTTPAllow
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** 10.0.0.0/24
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets (0.0.0.0/0)
3. Click **OK**

Scenario 2

Here the Clavister Security Gateway in Transparent Mode separates server resources from an internal network by connecting them to a separate interface without the need for different address ranges.

All hosts connected to LAN and DMZ (the lan and dmz interfaces) share the *10.0.0.0/24* address space. As this is configured using Transparent Mode any IP address can be used for the servers, and there is no need for the hosts on the internal network to know if a resource is on the same network or placed on the DMZ. The hosts on the internal network are allowed to communicate with an HTTP server on DMZ while the HTTP server on the DMZ can be reached from the Internet. The Clavister Security Gateway is transparent between the DMZ and LAN but traffic is still controlled by the IP rule set.




Figure 4.23. Transparent Mode Scenario 2

Example 4.18. Setting up Transparent Mode for Scenario 2

Configure a **Switch Route** over the LAN and DMZ interfaces for address range *10.0.0.0/24* (assume the WAN interface is already configured).

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Configure the interfaces:

1. Go to **Interfaces > Ethernet > Edit (lan)**
2. Now enter:
 - **IP Address:** 10.0.0.1
 - **Network:** 10.0.0.0/24
 - **Transparent Mode:** Disable
 - **Add route for interface network:** Disable
3. Click **OK**
4. Go to **Interfaces > Ethernet > Edit (dmz)**
5. Now enter:
 - **IP Address:** 10.0.0.2
 - **Network:** 10.0.0.0/24
 - **Transparent Mode:** Disable
 - **Add route for interface network:** Disable
6. Click **OK**

Configure the interface groups:

1. Go to **Interfaces > Interface Groups > Add > InterfaceGroup**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** TransparentGroup
 - **Security/Transport Equivalent:** Disable
 - **Interfaces:** Select lan and dmz
3. Click **OK**

Configure the routing:

1. Go to **Routing > Main Routing Table > Add > SwitchRoute**

2. Now enter:
 - **Switched Interfaces:** TransparentGroup
 - **Network:** 10.0.0.0/24
 - **Metric:** 0

3. Click **OK**

Configure the rules:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** HTTP-LAN-to-DMZ
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** 10.0.0.0/24
 - **Destination Network:** 10.1.4.10

3. Click **OK**

4. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

5. Now enter:
 - **Name:** HTTP-WAN-to-DMZ
 - **Action:** SAT
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan
 - **Translate:** Select Destination IP
 - **New IP Address:** 10.1.4.10

6. Click **OK**

7. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

8. Now enter:
 - **Name:** HTTP-WAN-to-DMZ

- **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan
9. Click **OK**

4.8.4. Spanning Tree BPDU Support

CorePlus includes support for relaying the *Bridge Protocol Data Units* (BPDUs) across the Clavister Security Gateway. BPDU frames carry Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) messages between layer 2 switches in a network. STP allows the switches to understand the network topology and avoid the occurrences of loops in the switching of packets.

The diagram below illustrates a situation where BPDU messages would occur if the administrator enables the switches to run the STP protocol. Two Clavister Security Gateways are deployed in transparent mode between the two sides of the network. The switches on either side of the security gateway need to communicate and require CorePlus to relay switch BPDU messages in order that packets do not loop between the gateways.




Figure 4.24. An Example BPDU Relaying Scenario

Implementing BPDU Relaying

The CorePlus BPDU relaying implementation only carries STP messages. These STP messages can be of three types:

- Normal Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)
- Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP)
- Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol (MSTP)
- Cisco proprietary PVST+ Protocol (Per VLAN Spanning Tree Plus)

CorePlus checks the contents of BPDU messages to make sure the content type is supported. If it is not, the frame is dropped.

Enabling/Disabling BPDU Relaying

BPDU relaying is disabled by default and can be controlled through the advanced setting **Relay Spanning-tree BPDUs**. Logging of BPDU messages can also be controlled through this setting. When enabled, all incoming STP, RSTP and MSTP BPDU messages are relayed to all transparent interfaces in the same routing table, except the incoming interface.

4.8.5. MPLS Pass Through

Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS) is a standard that allows the attaching of *labels* to IP packets to provide information about the packet's eventual destination. The router that initially attached the MPLS label is known as the *ingress router*.

Network nodes that support MPLS can then use this attached information to route packets without needing to perform route lookups and therefore increase processing speed. In addition to overall faster traffic movement, MPLS also makes it easier to manage *Quality of Service* (QoS).

MPLS is considered to be "multi-protocol" because it works with the Internet Protocol, *Asynchronous Transport Mode* (ATM) and frame relay network. When considered in reference to the OSI network model, MPLS allows packets to be forwarded at the layer two level rather than at the layer three level and for this reason it is said to operate at the two and a half level.

CorePlus MPLS Support

CorePlus supports *MPLS Pass Through*. This is relevant in transparent mode scenarios where the MPLS labelled packets are allowed to traverse the Clavister Security Gateway. CorePlus can optionally validate the integrity of these MPLS packets and the administrator can change the advanced setting **Relay MPLS** to specify the specific action to be taken. The possible values for this setting are:

- **Ignore** - Verify packets and allow all verified MPLS labelled packets to pass silently. Packets that fail verification are logged.
- **Log** - Verify packets and allow all verified MPLS packets to pass as well as being logged. Packets that fail verification are also logged.
- **Drop** - Silently drop all MPLS packets without verification or logging.
- **Drop/Log** - Drop all MPLS packets without verification and log these drops.

4.8.6. Advanced Settings for Transparent Mode

CAM To L3 Cache Dest Learning

Enable this if the security gateway should be able to learn the destination for hosts by combining destination address information and information found in the CAM table.

Default: *Enabled*

Decrement TTL

Enable this if the TTL should be decremented each time a packet traverses the security gateway in Transparent Mode.

Default: *Disabled*

Dynamic CAM Size

This setting can be used to manually configure the size of the CAM table. Normally *Dynamic* is the preferred value to use.

Default: *Dynamic*

CAM Size

If the Dynamic CAM Size setting is not enabled then this is the maximum number of entries in each CAM table.

Default: *8192*

Dynamic L3C Size

Allocate the L3 Cache Size value dynamically.

Default: *Enabled*

L3 Cache Size

This setting is used to manually configure the size of the Layer 3 Cache. Enabling *Dynamic L3C Size* is normally preferred.

Default: *Dynamic*

Transparency ATS Expire

Defines the lifetime of an unanswered ARP Transaction State (ATS) entry in seconds. Valid values are 1-60 seconds.

Default: *3 seconds*

Transparency ATS Size

Defines the maximum total number of ARP Transaction State (ATS) entries. Valid values are 128-65536 entries.

Default: 4096



Note: Optimal ATS handling

Both **Transparency ATS Expire** and **Transparency ATS Size** can be used to adjust the ATS handling to be optimal in different environments.

Null Enet Sender

Defines what to do when receiving a packet that has the sender hardware (MAC) address in Ethernet header set to null (0000:0000:0000). Options:

- *Drop* - Drop packets
- *DropLog* - Drop and log packets

Default: *DropLog*

Broadcast Enet Sender

Defines what to do when receiving a packet that has the sender hardware (MAC) address in Ethernet header set to the broadcast Ethernet address (FFFF:FFFF:FFFF). Options:

- *Accept* - Accept packet
- *AcceptLog* - Accept packet and log
- *Rewrite* - Rewrite to the MAC of the forwarding interface
- *RewriteLog* - Rewrite to the MAC of the forwarding interface and log
- *Drop* - Drop packets
- *DropLog* - Drop and log packets

Default: *DropLog*

Multicast Enet Sender

Defines what to do when receiving a packet that has the sender hardware (MAC) address in Ethernet header set to a multicast Ethernet address. Options:

- *Accept* - Accept packet
- *AcceptLog* - Accept packet and log
- *Rewrite* - Rewrite to the MAC of the forwarding interface
- *RewriteLog* - Rewrite to the MAC of the forwarding interface and log
- *Drop* - Drop packets
- *DropLog* - Drop and log packets

Default: *DropLog*

Relay Spanning-tree BPDUs

When set to **ignore** all incoming STP, RSTP and MSTP BPDUs are relayed to all transparent interfaces in the same routing table, except the incoming interface. Options:

- *Ignore* - Let the packets pass but do not log
- *Log* - Let the packets pass and log the event
- *Drop* - Drop the packets
- *DropLog* - Drop packets log the event

Default: *Drop*

Relay MPLS

When set to **ignore** all incoming MPLS packets are relayed in transparent mode. Options:

- *Ignore* - Let the packets pass but do not log
- *Log* - Let the packets pass and log the event
- *Drop* - Drop the packets
- *DropLog* - Drop packets log the event

Default: *Drop*

Chapter 5: DHCP Services

This chapter describes DHCP services in CorePlus.

- Overview, page 284
- DHCP Servers, page 285
- DHCP Relaying, page 291
- IP Pools, page 294

5.1. Overview

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a protocol that allows network administrators to automatically assign IP numbers to computers on a network.

IP Address Assignment

A *DHCP Server* implements the task of assigning IP addresses to DHCP clients. These addresses come from a predefined IP address pool which DHCP manages. When a DHCP server receives a request from a DHCP client, it returns the configuration parameters (such as an IP address, a MAC address, a domain name, and a lease for the IP address) to the client in a unicast message.

DHCP Leases

Compared to static assignment, where the client owns the address, dynamic addressing by a DHCP server leases the address to each client for a predefined period of time. During the lifetime of a lease, the client has permission to keep the assigned address and is guaranteed to have no address collision with other clients.

Lease Expiration

Before the expiration of the lease, the client needs to renew the lease from the server so it can keep using the assigned IP address. The client may also decide at any time that it no longer wishes to use the IP address it was assigned, and may terminate the lease and release the IP address.

The lease time can be configured in a DHCP server by the administrator.

5.2. DHCP Servers

DHCP servers assign and manage the IP addresses taken from a specified address pool. In CorePlus, DHCP servers are not limited to serving a single range of IP addresses but can use any IP address range that can be specified by a CorePlus IP address object.

Multiple DHCP Servers

The administrator has the ability to set up one or more logical DHCP servers in CorePlus. Filtering of DHCP client requests to different DHCP servers is based on a combination of:

- **Interface**

Each CorePlus interface can have, at most, one single logical DHCP server associated with it. In other words, CorePlus can provision DHCP clients using different address ranges depending on what interface they are located on.

- **Relayer IP**

The relayer IP address in the IP packet is also used to determine the server. The default value of *all-nets* means that this all addresses are accepted and only the interface is considered in making a DHCP server selection. The other options for this parameter are described further below.

Searching the Server List

Multiple DHCP servers form a list as they are defined, the last defined being at the top of the list. When CorePlus searches for a DHCP server to service a request, it goes through the list from top to bottom and chooses the first server with a matching combination of interface and relayer IP filter value. If there is no match in the list then the request is ignored.

The DHCP server ordering in the list can, of course, be changed through one of the user interfaces.

Using Relayer IP Address Filtering

As explained above a DHCP server is selected based on a match of both interface and relayer IP filter. Each DNS server must have a relayer IP filter value specified and the possible values are as follows:

- **all-nets**

The default value is *all-nets* (*0.0.0.0/0*). This means all DHCP requests will match this filter value regardless if the DHCP requests comes from a client on the local network or has arrived via a DHCP relay.

- **A value of 0.0.0.0**

The value *0.0.0.0* will match DHCP requests that come from a local client only. DHCP requests that have been relayed by a DHCP relay will be ignored.

- **A specific IP address.**

This is the IP address of the DHCP relay through which the DHCP request has come. Requests from local clients or other DHCP relays will be ignored.

DHCP Options

The following options can be configured for a DHCP server:

General Parameters

Name	A symbolic name for the server. Used as an interface reference but also used as a reference in log messages.
Interface Filter	The source interface on which CorePlus will listen for DHCP requests. This can be a single interface or a group of interfaces.
IP Address Pool	An IP range, group or network that the DHCP server will use as an IP address pool for handing out DHCP leases.
Netmask	The netmask which will be sent to DHCP clients.

Optional Parameters

Default GW	This specifies what IP should be sent to the client for use as the default gateway (the router to which the client connects).
Domain	The domain name used for DNS resolution. For example, <i>domain.com</i> .
Lease Time	The time, in seconds, that a DHCP lease is provided. After this time the DHCP client must renew the lease.
Primary/Secondary DNS	The IP of the primary and secondary DNS servers.
Primary/Secondary NBNS/WINS	IP of the <i>Windows Internet Name Service</i> (WINS) servers that are used in Microsoft environments which uses the <i>NetBIOS Name Servers</i> (NBNS) to assign IP addresses to NetBIOS names.
Next Server	Specifies the IP address of the next server in the boot process. This is usually a TFTP server.

DHCP Server Advanced Settings

There are two advanced settings which apply to all DHCP servers:

- **Auto Save Policy**

The policy for saving the lease database to disk. The options are:

1. **Never** - Never save the database.
2. **ReconfShut** - Save the database on a reconfigure or a shutdown.
3. **ReconfShutTimer** - Save the database on a reconfigure or a shutdown and periodically. The amount of time between periodic saves is specified by the next parameter, *Lease Store Interval*.

- **Lease Store Interval**

The number of seconds between auto saving the lease database to disk. The default value is

86400 seconds.

Example 5.1. Setting up a DHCP server

This example shows how to set up a DHCP server called *DHCPserver1* which assigns and manages IP addresses from an IP address pool called *DHCPRange1*.

This example assumes that an IP range for the DHCP Server has already been created.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add DHCPserver DHCPserver1 Interface=lan  
          IPAddressPool=DHCPRange1 Netmask=255.255.255.0
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > DHCP > DHCP Servers > Add > DHCPserver**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** DHCPserver1
 - **Interface Filter:** lan
 - **IP Address Pool:** DHCPRange1
 - **Netmask:** 255.255.255.0
3. Click **OK**

Example 5.2. Checking DHCP Server Status

Command-Line Interface

To see the status of all servers:

```
Device:/> dhcpserver
```

To list all current leases:

```
Device:/> dhcpserver -show
```

Displaying IP to MAC Address Mappings

To display the mappings of IP addresses to MAC addresses that result from allocated DHCP leases, the following command can be used. It is shown with some typical output:

```
Device:/> dhcpserver -show -mappings
```

```
DHCP server mappings:
Client IP          Client MAC          Mode
-----
10.4.13.240       00-1e-0b-a0-c6-5f  ACTIVE (STATIC)
10.4.13.241       00-0c-29-04-f8-3c  ACTIVE (STATIC)
10.4.13.242       00-1e-0b-aa-ae-11  ACTIVE (STATIC)
10.4.13.243       00-1c-c4-36-6c-c4  INACTIVE (STATIC)
10.4.13.244       00-00-00-00-02-14  INACTIVE (STATIC)
10.4.13.254       00-00-00-00-02-54  INACTIVE (STATIC)
10.4.13.1         00-12-79-3b-dd-45  ACTIVE
10.4.13.2         00-12-79-c4-06-e7  ACTIVE
10.4.13.3         *00-a0-f8-23-45-a3  ACTIVE
10.4.13.4         *00-0e-7f-4b-e2-29  ACTIVE
```

The asterisk "*" before a MAC address means that the DHCP server does not track the client using the MAC address but instead tracks the client through a *client identifier* which the client has given to the server.



Tip: Lease database saving

DHCP leases are, by default, remembered by CorePlus between system restarts. The DHCP advanced settings can be adjusted to control how often the lease database is saved.

Additional Server Settings

A CorePlus DHCP server can have two other sets of objects associated with it:

- Static Hosts.
- Custom Options.

The illustration below shows the relationship between these objects.




Figure 5.1. DHCP Server Objects

The following sections discuss these two DHCP server options.

5.2.1. Static DHCP Hosts

Where the administrator requires a fixed relationship between a client and the assigned IP

address, CorePlus allows the assignment of a given IP to a specific MAC address. In other words, the creation of a *static host*.

Static Host Parameters

Many such assignments can be created for a single DHCP server and each object has the following parameters:

Host	This is the IP address that will be handed out to the client.
MAC Address	This is the MAC address of the client. Either the MAC address can be used or the alternative <i>Client Identified</i> parameter can be used.
Client Identified	If the MAC address is not used for identifying the client then the client can send an identifier in its DHCP request. The value of this identifier can be specified as this parameter. The option exists to also specify if the identifier will be sent as an ASCII or Hexadecimal value.

Example 5.3. Static DHCP Host Assignment

This example shows how to assign the IP address *192.168.1.1* to the MAC address *00-90-12-13-14-15*. The examples assumes that the DHCP server *DHCPServer1* has already been defined.

Command-Line Interface

1. First, change the category to the *DHCPServer1* context:

```
Device:/> cc DHCPServer DHCPServer1
```

2. Add the static DHCP assignment:

```
Device:/> add DHCPServerPoolStaticHost Host=192.168.1.1
MACAddress=00-90-12-13-14-15
```

3. All static assignments can then be listed and each is listed with an index number:

```
Device:/> show
# Comments
- - - - -
+ 1 (none)
```

4. An individual static assignment can be shown using its index number:

```
Device:/> show DHCPServerPoolStaticHost 1
Property Value
-----
Index: 1
Host: 192.168.1.1
MACAddress: 00-90-12-13-14-15
Comments: (none)
```

5. The assignment could be changed later to IP address *192.168.1.12* with the following command:

```
Device:/> set DHCPServerPoolStaticHost 1 Host=192.168.1.12
          MACAddress=00-90-12-13-14-15
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **System > DHCP > DHCP Servers > DHCPServer1 > Static Hosts > Add > Static Host Entry**
2. Now enter:
 - **Host:** 19.168.1.1
 - **MAC:** 00-90-12-13-14-15
3. Click **OK**

5.2.2. Custom Options

Adding a *Custom Option* to the DHCP server definition allows the administrator to send specific pieces of information to DHCP clients in the DHCP leases that are sent out.

An example of this is certain switches that require the IP address of a TFTP server from which they can get certain extra information.

Custom Option Parameters

The following parameters can be set for a custom option:

- Code** This is the code that describes the type of information being sent to the client. A large list of possible codes exists.
- Type** This describes the type of data which will be sent. For example, if the type is *String* then the data is a character string.
- Data** This is the actual information that will be sent in the lease. The meaning of the data is determined by the *Code*. For example, if the code is *66* (TFTP server name) then the *Type* might be *String* and the *Data* could then be *tftp.mycompany.com*.

Several custom options may be associated with a single DHCP server.

5.3. DHCP Relaying

The DHCP Problem

With DHCP, clients send requests to locate the DHCP server(s) using broadcast messages. However, broadcasts are normally only propagated across the local network. This means that the DHCP server and client always need to be on the same physical network. In a large Internet-like network topology, this means there would have to be a different DHCP server on every network. This problem is solved by the use of a *DHCP relay*.

The DHCP Relay Solution

A DHCP relay takes the place of the DHCP server in the local network and acts as the link between the client and a remote DHCP server. It intercepts requests coming from clients and relays them to the DHCP server. The DHCP server then responds to the relay, which forwards the response back to the client. DHCP relays use the *TCP/IP Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP)* to implement this relay functionality. For this reason DHCP relays are sometimes referred to as *BOOTP relay agents*.

The Source IP of Relayed DHCP Traffic

For relayed DHCP traffic, the option exists in CorePlus to use the interface on which it listens as the source interface for forwarded traffic or alternatively the interface on which it sends out the forwarded request.

Although all CorePlus interfaces are *core routed* (that is to say, a route exists by default that routes interface IP addresses to *Core*) for relayed DHCP requests this core routing does not apply. Instead, the interface is the source interface and not *core*.

Example 5.4. Setting up a DHCP Relay

This example allows clients on CorePlus VLAN interfaces to obtain IP addresses from a DHCP server. It is assumed the Clavister Security Gateway is configured with VLAN interfaces *vlan1* and *vlan2* that use DHCP relaying, and the DHCP server IP address is defined in the CorePlus address book as *ip-dhcp*. CorePlus will add a route for the client when it has finalized the DHCP process and obtained an IP.

Command-Line Interface

1. Add the VLAN interfaces *vlan1* and *vlan2* that should relay to an interface group called *ipgrp-dhcp*:

```
Device: /> add Interface InterfaceGroup ipgrp-dhcp
           Members=vlan1,vlan2
```

2. Add a DHCP relay called *vlan-to-dhcpserver*:

```
Device: /> add DHCPRelay vlan-to-dhcpserver Action=Relay
           TargetDHCPserver=ip-dhcp
           SourceInterface=ipgrp-dhcp
           AddRoute=Yes
           ProxyARPInterfaces=ipgrp-dhcp
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Adding VLAN interfaces *vlan1* and *vlan2* that should relay to an interface group named as *ipgrp-dhcp*:

1. Go to **Interface > Interface Groups > Add > InterfaceGroup**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** ipgrp-dhcp
 - **Interfaces:** select *vlan1* and *vlan2* from the **Available** list and put them into the **Selected** list.
3. Click **OK**

Adding a DHCP relay called as *vlan-to-dhcpserver*:

1. Go to **System > DHCP > Add > DHCP Relay**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** vlan-to-dhcpserver
 - **Action:** Relay
 - **Source Interface:** ipgrp-dhcp
 - **DHCP Server to relay to:** ip-dhcp
 - **Allowed IP offers from server:** all-nets
3. Under the **Add Route** tab, check **Add dynamic routes for this relayed DHCP lease**
4. Click **OK**

5.3.1. DHCP Relay Advanced Settings

The following advanced settings are available with DHCP relaying.

Max Transactions

Maximum number of transactions at the same time.

Default: 32

Transaction Timeout

For how long a dhcp transaction can take place.

Default: 10 seconds

Max PPM

How many dhcp-packets a client can send to through CorePlus to the dhcp-server during one minute.

Default: *500 packets*

Max Hops

How many hops the dhcp-request can take between the client and the dhcp-server.

Default: *5*

Max lease Time

The maximum lease time allowed by CorePlus. If the DHCP server has a higher lease time, it will be reduced down to this value.

Default: *10000 seconds*

Max Auto Routes

How many relays that can be active at the same time.

Default: *256*

Auto Save Policy

What policy should be used to save the relay list to the disk, possible settings are *Disabled*, *ReconfShut*, or *ReconfShutTimer*.

Default: *ReconfShut*

Auto Save Interval

How often, in seconds, should the relay list be saved to disk if *DHCPServer_SaveRelayPolicy* is set to *ReconfShutTimer*.

Default: *86400*

5.4. IP Pools

Overview

An *IP pool* is used to offer other subsystems access to a cache of DHCP IP addresses. These addresses are gathered into a pool by internally maintaining a series of DHCP clients (one DHCP client per IP address). More than one DHCP server can be used by a pool and can either be external or be local DHCP servers defined in CorePlus itself. Multiple IP Pools can be set up with different identifying names.

External DHCP servers can be specified in one of two ways:

- As the single DHCP server on a specific interface
- One or more can be specified by a list of unique IP address.

IP Pools with Config Mode

A primary usage of IP Pools is with *IKE Config Mode* which is a feature used for allocating IP addresses to remote clients connecting through IPsec tunnels. For more information on this see *Section 9.4.3, "Roaming Clients"*.

Basic IP Pool Options

The basic options available for an IP Pool are:

DHCP Server behind interface	Indicates that the IP pool should use the DHCP server(s) residing on the specified interface.
Specify DHCP Server Address	Specify DHCP server IP(s) in preferred ascending order to be used. This option is used instead of the behind interface option. Using the IP loopback address <i>127.0.0.1</i> indicates that the DHCP server is CorePlus itself.
Server filter	Optional setting used to specify which servers to use. If unspecified any DHCP server on the interface will be used. The order of the provided address or ranges (if multiple) will be used to indicate the preferred servers.
Client IP filter	This is an optional setting used to specify which offered IPs are acceptable. In most cases this will be set to the default of all-nets so all addresses will be acceptable. Alternatively, a set of acceptable IP ranges can be specified. This filter option is used in the situation where there may be a DHCP server response with an unacceptable IP address.

Advanced IP Pool Options

Advanced options available for IP Pool configuration are:

Routing Table	The routing table to be used for lookups when resolving the destination interfaces for the configured DHCP servers.
----------------------	---

Receive Interface	<p>A "simulated" virtual DHCP server receiving interface. This setting is used to simulate a receiving interface when an IP pool is obtaining IP addresses from internal DHCP servers. This is needed since the filtering criteria of a DHCP server includes a Receive Interface.</p> <p>An internal DHCP server cannot receive requests from the IP pool subsystem on an interface since both the server and the pool are internal to CorePlus. This setting allows such requests from a pool to appear as though they come from a particular interface so that the relevant DHCP server will respond.</p>
MAC Range	<p>A range of MAC addresses that will be use to create "fake" DHCP clients. Used when the DHCP server(s) map clients by the MAC address. An indication of the need for MAC ranges is when the DHCP server keeps giving out the same IP for each client.</p>
Prefetch leases	<p>Specifies the number of leases to keep prefetched. Prefetching will improve performance since there will not be any wait time when a system requests an IP (while there exists prefetched IPs).</p>
Maximum free	<p>The maximum number of "free" IPs to be kept. Must be equal to or greater than the prefetch parameter. The pool will start releasing (giving back IPs to the DHCP server) when the number of free clients exceeds this value.</p>
Maximum clients	<p>Optional setting used to specify the maximum number of clients (IPs) allowed in the pool.</p>
Sender IP	<p>This is the source IP to use when communicating with the DHCP server.</p>

Memory Allocation for Prefetched Leases

As mentioned in the previous section, the *Prefetched Leases* option specifies the size of the cache of leases which is maintained by CorePlus. This cache provides fast lease allocation and can improve overall system performance. It should be noted however that the entire prefetched number of leases is requested at system startup and if this number is too large then this can degrade initial performance.

As leases in the prefetch cache are allocated, requests are made to DHCP servers so that the cache is always full. The administrator therefore has to make a judgement as to the optimal initial size of the prefetch cache.

Listing IP Pool Status

The CLI command *ippools* can be used to look at the current status of an IP pool. The simplest form of the command is:

```
Device:/> ippool -show
```

This displays all the configured IP pools along with their status. The status information is divided into four parts:

- **Zombies** - The number of allocated but inactive addresses.
- **In progress** - The number of addresses that in the process of being allocated.
- **Free maintained in pool** - The number of addresses that are available for allocation.

- **Used by subsystems** - The number of addresses that are allocated and active.

Other options in the *ippool* command allow the administrator to change the pool size and to free up IP addresses. The complete list of command options can be found in the CLI Reference Guide.

Example 5.5. Creating an IP Pool

This example shows the creation of an IP Pool object that will use the DHCP server on IP address 28.10.14.1 with 10 prefetched leases. It is assumed that this IP address is already defined in the address book as an IP object called *ippool_dhcp*

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add IPPool ip_pool_1 DHCPSType=ServerIP
           ServerIP=ippool_dhcp PrefetchLeases=10
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > IP Pools > Add > IP Pool**
2. Now enter **Name:** ip_pool_1
3. Select **Specify DHCP Server Address**
4. Add *ippool_dhcp* to the **Selected** list
5. Select the **Advanced** tab
6. Set **Prefetched Leases** to 10
7. Click **OK**

Chapter 6: Security Mechanisms

This chapter describes CorePlus security features.

- Access Rules, page 298
- ALGs, page 302
- Web Content Filtering, page 360
- Anti-Virus Scanning, page 379
- Intrusion Detection and Prevention, page 385
- Denial-of-Service Attack Prevention, page 395
- Blacklisting Hosts and Networks, page 400

6.1. Access Rules

6.1.1. Overview

One of the principal functions of CorePlus is to allow only authorized connections access to protected data resources. Access control is primarily addressed by the CorePlus IP rule set in which a range of protected LAN addresses are treated as trusted hosts, and traffic flow from untrusted sources is restricted from entering trusted areas.

Before a new connection is checked against the IP rule set, CorePlus checks the connection source against a set of *Access Rules*. Access Rules can be used specify what traffic source is expected on a given interface and also to automatically drop traffic originating from specific sources. AccessRules provide an efficient and targeted initial filter of new connection attempts.

The Default Access Rule

Even if the administrator does not explicitly specify any custom Access Rules, an access rule is always in place which is known as the *Default Access Rule*.

This default rule is not really a true rule but operates by checking the validity of incoming traffic by performing a *reverse lookup* in the CorePlus routing tables. This lookup validates that the incoming traffic is coming from a source that the routing tables indicate is accessible via the interface on which the traffic arrived. If this reverse lookup fails then the connection is dropped

and a *Default Access Rule* log message will be generated.

When troubleshooting dropped connections, the administrator should look out for *Default Access Rule* messages in the logs. The solution to the problem is to create a route for the interface where the connection arrives so that the route's destination network is the same as or contains the incoming connection's source IP.

Custom Access Rules are Optional

For most configurations the Default Access Rule is sufficient and the administrator does not need to explicitly specify other rules. The default rule can, for instance, protect against IP spoofing, which is described in the next section. If Access Rules are explicitly specified, then the Default Access Rule is still applied if a new connection does not match any of the custom Access Rules.

The recommendation is to initially configure CorePlus without any custom Access Rules and add them if there is a requirement for stricter checking on new connections.

6.1.2. IP Spoofing

Traffic that pretends it comes from a trusted host can be sent by an attacker to try and get past a gateway's security mechanisms. Such an attack is commonly known as *Spoofing*.

IP spoofing is one of the most common spoofing attacks. Trusted IP addresses are used to bypass filtering. The header of an IP packet indicating the source address of the packet is modified by the attacker to be a local host address. The gateway will believe the packet came from a trusted source. Although the packet source cannot be responded to correctly, there is the potential for unnecessary network congestion to be created and potentially a *Denial of Service* (DoS) condition could occur. Even if the gateway is able to detect a DoS condition, it is hard to trace or stop because of its nature.

VPNs provide one means of avoiding spoofing but where a VPN is not an appropriate solution then Access Rules can provide an anti-spoofing capability by providing an extra filter for source address verification. An Access Rule can verify that packets arriving at a given interface do not have a source address which is associated with a network of another interface. In other words:

- Any incoming traffic with a source IP address belonging to a local trusted host is NOT allowed.
- Any outgoing traffic with a source IP address belonging to an outside untrusted network is NOT allowed.

The first point prevents an outsider from using a local host's address as its source address. The second point prevents any local host from launching the spoof.

6.1.3. Access Rule Settings

The configuration of an access rule is similar to other types of rules. It contains **Filtering Fields** as well as the **Action** to take. If there is a match, the rule is triggered, and CorePlus will carry out the specified Action.

Access Rule Filtering Fields

The Access Rule filtering fields used to trigger a rule are:

- **Interface:** The interface that the packet arrives on.
- **Network:** The IP span that the sender address should belong to.

Access Rule Actions

The Access Rule actions that can be specified are:

- **Drop:** Discard the packets that match the defined fields.
- **Accept:** Accept the packets that match the defined fields for further inspection in the rule set.
- **Expect:** If the sender address of the packet matches the **Network** specified by this rule, the receiving interface is compared to the specified interface. If the interface matches, the packet is accepted in the same way as an **Accept** action. If the interfaces do not match, the packet is dropped in the same way as a **Drop** action.



Note: Enabling logging

Logging can be enabled as required for these actions.

Turning Off Default Access Rule Messages

If, for some reason, the *Default Access Rule* log message is continuously being generated by some source and needs to be turned off, then the way to do this is to specify an Access Rule for that source with an action of **Drop**.

Troubleshooting Access Rule Related Problems

It should be noted that Access Rules are a first filter of traffic before any other CorePlus modules can see it. Sometimes problems can appear, such as setting up VPN tunnels, precisely because of this. It is always advisable to check Access Rules when troubleshooting puzzling problems in case a rule is preventing some other function, such as VPN tunnel establishment, from working properly.

Example 6.1. Setting up an Access Rule

A rule is to be defined that ensures no traffic with a source address not within the lannet network is received on the lan interface.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Access Name=lan_Access Interface=lan
                Network=lannet Action=Expect
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > Access**
2. Select **Access Rule** in the **Add menu**

3. Now enter:
 - **Name:** lan_Access
 - **Action:** Expect
 - **Interface:** lan
 - **Network:** lannet
4. Click **OK**

6.2. ALGs

6.2.1. Overview

To complement low-level packet filtering, which only inspects packet headers in protocols such as IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP, Clavister Security Gateways provide *Application Layer Gateways (ALGs)* which provide filtering at the higher *application* OSI level.

An ALG object acts as a mediator in accessing commonly used Internet applications outside the protected network, for example web access, file transfer and multimedia transfer. ALGs provide higher security than packet filtering since they are capable of scrutinizing all traffic for a specific protocol and perform checks at the higher levels of the TCP/IP stack.

ALGs exist for the following protocols in CorePlus:

- HTTP
- FTP
- TFTP
- SMTP
- POP3
- SIP
- H.323
- TLS

Deploying an ALG

Once a new ALG object is defined by the administrator, it is brought into use by first associating it with a *Service* object and then associating that service with an IP rule in the CorePlus IP rule set.



Figure 6.1. Deploying an ALG

Maximum Connection Sessions

The service associated with an ALG has a configurable parameter associated with it called *Max Sessions* and the default value varies according to the type of ALG. For instance, the default value for the HTTP ALG is *1000*. This means that a 1000 connections are allowed in total for the HTTP service across all interfaces. The full list of default maximum session values are:

- HTTP ALG - *1000* sessions.
- FTP ALG - *200* sessions.
- TFTP ALG - *200* sessions.
- SMTP ALG - *200* sessions.
- POP3 ALG - *200* sessions.
- H.323 ALG - *100* sessions.
- SIP ALG - *200* sessions.



Tip: Maximum sessions for HTTP can sometimes be too low

This default value of the maximum sessions can often be too low for HTTP if there are large number of clients connecting through the Clavister Security Gateway and it is therefore recommended to consider using a higher value in such circumstances.

6.2.2. The HTTP ALG

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the primary protocol used to access the *World Wide Web* (WWW). It is a connectionless, stateless, application layer protocol based on a request/response architecture. A client, such as a Web browser, sends a request by establishing a TCP/IP connection to a known port (usually port 80) on a remote server. The server answers with a response string, followed by a message of its own. That message might be, for example, an HTML file to be shown in the Web browser or an ActiveX component to be executed on the client, or perhaps an error message.

The HTTP protocol has particular issues associated with it because of the wide variety of web sites that exist and because of the range of file types that can be downloaded using the protocol.

HTTP ALG Features

The HTTP ALG is an extensive CorePlus subsystem consisting of the options described below:

- **Static Content Filtering** - This deals with *Blacklisting* and *Whitelisting* of specific URLs.
 1. **URL Blacklisting**
Specific URLs can be blacklisted so that they are not accessible. Wildcarding can be used when specifying URLs, as described below.
 2. **URL Whitelisting**
The opposite to blacklisting, this makes sure certain URLs are always allowed. Wildcarding can also be used for these URLs, as described below.

It is important to note that whitelisting a URL means that it cannot be blacklisted and it also cannot be dropped by web content filtering (if that is enabled, although it will be logged). Anti-Virus scanning, if it is enabled, is always applied to the HTTP traffic even if it is whitelisted.

These features are described in depth in *Section 6.3.3, "Static Content Filtering"*.

- **Dynamic Content Filtering** - Access to specific URLs can be allowed or blocked according to policies for certain types of web content. Access to news sites might be allowed whereas access to gaming sites might be blocked.

This feature is described in depth in *Section 6.3.4, "Dynamic Web Content Filtering"*.

- **Anti-Virus Scanning** - The contents of HTTP file downloads can be scanned for viruses. Suspect files can be dropped or just logged.

This feature is common to a number of ALGs and is described fully in *Section 6.4, "Anti-Virus Scanning"*.

- **Verify File Integrity** - This part of the ALG deals with checking the filetype of downloaded files. There are two separate optional features with filetype verification: **Verify MIME type** and **Allow/Block Selected Types**, and these are described below:

1. **Verify MIME type**

This option enables checking that the filetype of a file download agrees with the contents of the file (the term *filetype* here is also known as the *filename extension*).

All filetypes that are checked in this way by CorePlus are listed in *Appendix C, Verified MIME filetypes*. When enabled, any file download that fails MIME verification, in other words its filetype does not match its contents, is dropped by CorePlus on the assumption that it can be a security threat.

2. **Allow/Block Selected Types**

This option operates independently of the MIME verification option described above but is based on the predefined filetypes listed in *Appendix C, Verified MIME filetypes*. When enabled, the feature operates in either a *Block Selected* or an *Allow Selected* mode. These two modes function as follows:

- i. *Block Selected*

The filetypes marked in the list will be dropped as downloads. To make sure that this is not circumvented by renaming a file, CorePlus looks at the file's contents (in a way similar to MIME checking) to confirm the file is what it claims to be.

If, for example, *.exe* files are blocked and a file with a filetype of *.jpg* (which is not blocked) is found to contain *.exe* data then it will be blocked. If blocking is selected but nothing in the list is marked, no blocking is done.

- ii. *Allow Selected*

Only those filetypes marked will be allowed in downloads and other will be dropped. As with blocking, file contents are also examined to verify the file's contents. If, for example, *.jpg* files are allowed and a file with a filetype of *.jpg* is found to contain *.exe* data then the download will be dropped. If nothing is marked in this mode then no files can be downloaded.

Additional filetypes not included by default can be added to the Allow/Block list however these cannot be subject to content checking meaning that the file extension

will be trusted as being correct for the contents of the file.



Note: Similarities with other CorePlus features

The **Verify MIME type** and **Allow/Block Selected Types** options work in the same way for the FTP, POP3 and SMTP ALGs.

- **Download File Size Limit** - A file size limit can additionally be specified for any single download (this option is available only for HTTP and SMTP ALG downloads).

The Ordering for HTTP Filtering

HTTP filtering obeys the following processing order and is similar to the order followed by the SMTP ALG:

1. Whitelist.
2. Blacklist.
3. Web content filtering (if enabled).
4. Anti-virus scanning (if enabled).

As described above, if a URL is found on the whitelist then it will not be blocked if it also found on the blacklist. If it is enabled, Anti-virus scanning is always applied, even though a URL is whitelisted.

If it is enabled, Web content filtering is still applied to whitelisted URLs but if instead of blocking, flagged URLs are only logged. If it is enabled, Anti-virus scanning is always applied, even though a URL is whitelisted.




Figure 6.2. HTTP ALG Processing Order

Using Wildcards in White and Blacklists

Entries made in the white and blacklists can make use of *wildcarding* to have a single entry be equivalent to a large number of possible URLs. The wildcard character "*" can be used to represent any sequence of characters.

For example, the entry **.some_domain.com* will block all pages whose URLs end with *some_domain.com*.

If we want to now explicitly allow one particular page then this can be done with an entry in the whitelist of the form *my_page.my_company.com* and the blacklist will not prevent this page from being reachable since the whitelist has precedence.

Deploying an HTTP ALG

As mentioned in the introduction, the HTTP ALG object is brought into use by first associating it with a service object and then associating that service object with an IP rule in the IP rule set. A number of predefined HTTP services could be used with the ALG. For example, the **http** service might be selected for this purpose. As long as the associated service is associated with an IP rule then the ALG will be applied to traffic targeted by that IP rule.

The **https** service (which is also included in the **http-all** service) cannot be used with an HTTP ALG since HTTPS traffic is encrypted.

6.2.3. The FTP ALG

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is a TCP/IP-based protocol for exchanging files between a client and a server. The client initiates the connection by connecting to the FTP server. Normally the client needs to authenticate itself by providing a predefined login and password. After granting access, the server will provide the client with a file/directory listing from which it can download/upload files (depending on access rights). The FTP ALG is used to manage FTP connections through the Clavister Security Gateway.

FTP Connections

FTP uses two communication channels, one for control commands and one for the actual files being transferred. When an FTP session is opened, the FTP client establishes a TCP connection (the control channel) to port 21 (by default) on the FTP server. What happens after this point depends on the FTP mode being used.

FTP Connection Modes

FTP operates in two modes: *active* and *passive*. These determine the role of the server when opening data channels between client and server.

- **Active Mode**

In active mode, the FTP client sends a command to the FTP server indicating what IP address and port the server should connect to. The FTP server establishes the data channel back to the FTP client using the received address information.

- **Passive Mode**

In passive mode, the data channel is opened by the FTP client to the FTP server, just like the command channel. This is the often recommended default mode for FTP clients though

some advice may recommend the opposite.

A Discussion of FTP Security Issues

Both *active* and *passive* modes of FTP operation present problems for Clavister Security Gateways. Consider a scenario where an FTP client on the internal network connects through the security gateway to an FTP server on the Internet. The IP rule is then configured to allow network traffic from the FTP client to port 21 on the FTP server.

When active mode is used, CorePlus doesn't know that the FTP server will establish a new connection back to the FTP client. Therefore, the incoming connection for the data channel will be dropped. As the port number used for the data channel is dynamic, the only way to solve this is to allow traffic from all ports on the FTP server to all ports on the FTP client. Obviously, this is not a good solution.

When passive mode is used, the security gateway does not need to allow connections from the FTP server. On the other hand, CorePlus still does not know what port the FTP client will try to use for the data channel. This means that it has to allow traffic from all ports on the FTP client to all ports on the FTP server. Although this is not as insecure as in the active mode case, it still presents a potential security threat. Furthermore, not all FTP clients are capable of using passive mode.

The CorePlus ALG Solution

The CorePlus FTP ALG deals with these issues by fully reassembling the TCP stream of the FTP command channel and examining its contents. By doing this, the CorePlus knows what port to open for the data channel. Furthermore, the FTP ALG also provides functionality to filter out certain control commands and provide buffer overrun protection.

Hybrid Mode

An important feature of the CorePlus FTP ALG is its automatic ability to perform on-the-fly conversion between active and passive mode so that FTP connection modes can be combined. Passive mode can be used on one side of the security gateway while active mode can be used on the other. This type of FTP ALG usage is sometimes referred to as *hybrid mode*.

The advantage of hybrid mode can be summarized as follows:

- The FTP client can be configured to use passive mode, which is the recommended mode for clients.
- The FTP server can be configured to use active mode, which is the safer mode for servers.
- When an FTP session is established, the Clavister Security Gateway will automatically and transparently receive the passive data channel from the FTP client and the active data channel from the server, and correctly tie them together.

This implementation results in both the FTP client and the FTP server working in their most secure mode. The conversion also works the other way around, that is, with the FTP client using active mode and the FTP server using passive mode. The illustration below shows the typical hybrid mode scenario.




Figure 6.3. FTP ALG Hybrid Mode



Note: Hybrid conversion is automatic

Hybrid mode does not need to be enabled. The conversion between modes occurs automatically within the FTP ALG.

Connection Restriction Options

The FTP ALG has two options to restrict which type of mode the FTP client and the FTP server can use:

- **Allow the client to use active mode.**

If this is enabled, FTP clients are allowed to use both passive and active transfer modes. With this option disabled, the client is limited to using passive mode. If the FTP server requires active mode, the CorePlus FTP ALG will handle the conversion automatically to active mode.

A range of client data ports is specified with this option. The server will be allowed to connect to any of these if the client is using active mode. The default range is *1024-65535*.

- **Allow the server to use passive mode.**

If this option is enabled, the FTP server is allowed to use both passive and active transfer modes. With the option disabled, the server will never receive passive mode data channels. CorePlus will handle the conversion automatically if clients use passive mode.

A range of server data ports is specified with this option. The client will be allowed to connect to any of these if the server is using passive mode. The default range is *1024-65535*.

These options can determine if hybrid mode is required to complete the connection. For example, if the client connects with passive mode but this is not allowed to the server then hybrid mode is automatically used and the FTP ALG performs the conversion between the two modes.

Predefined FTP ALGs

CorePlus provides four predefined FTP ALG definitions, each with a different combination of the client/server mode restrictions described above.

- ***ftp-inbound*** - Clients can use any mode but servers cannot use passive mode.

- **ftp-outbound** - Clients cannot use active mode but servers can use any mode.
- **ftp-passthrough** - Both the client and the server can use any mode.
- **ftp-internal** - The client cannot use active mode and the server cannot use passive mode.

FTP ALG Command Restrictions

The FTP protocol consists of a set of standard commands that are sent between server and client. If the CorePlus FTP ALG sees a command it does not recognize then the command is blocked. This blocking must be explicitly lifted and the options for lifting blocking are:

- Allow unknown FTP commands. These are commands the ALG does not consider part of the standard set.
- Allow the *SITE EXEC* command to be sent to an FTP server by a client.
- Allow the *RESUME* command even if content scanning terminated the connection.



Note: Some commands are never allowed

Some commands, such as encryption instructions, are never allowed. Encryption would mean that the FTP command channel could not be examined by the ALG and the dynamic data channels could not be opened.

Control Channel Restrictions

The FTP ALG also allows restrictions to be placed on the FTP control channel which can improve the security of FTP connections. These are:

- **Maximum line length in control channel**

Creating very large control channel commands can be used as a form of attack against a server by causing buffer overruns. This restriction combats this threat. The default value is 256.

If very long file or directory names on the server are used then this limit may need to be raised. The shorter the limit, the better the security.

- **Maximum number of commands per second**

To prevent automated attacks against FTP server, restricting the frequency of commands can be useful. The default limit is 20 commands per second.

- **Allow 8-bit strings in control channel**

The option determines if 8-bit characters are allowed in the control channel. Allowing 8-bit characters enables support for filenames containing international characters. For example, accented or umlauted characters.

Filetype Checking

The FTP ALG offers the same filetype verification for downloaded files that is found in the HTTP ALG. This consists of two separate options:

- **MIME Type Verification**

When enabled, CorePlus checks that a download's stated filetype matches the file's contents. Mismatches result in the download being dropped.

- **Allow/Block Selected Types**

If selected in blocking mode, specified filetypes are dropped when downloaded. If selected in allow mode, only the specified filetypes are allowed as downloads.

CorePlus also performs a check to make sure the filetype matches the contents of the file. New filetypes can be added to the predefined list of types.

The above two options for filetype checking are the same as those available in the HTTP ALG and are more fully described in *Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG"*.


Anti-Virus Scanning

The CorePlus Anti-Virus subsystem can be enabled to scan all FTP downloads searching for malicious code. Suspect files can be de dropped or just logged.

This feature is common to a number of ALGs and is described fully in *Section 6.4, "Anti-Virus Scanning"*.

Example 6.2. Protecting an FTP Server with an ALG

As shown, an FTP Server is connected to the Clavister Security Gateway on a DMZ with private IP addresses, shown below:



In this case, we will set the FTP ALG restrictions as follows.

- Enable the **Allow client to use active mode** FTP ALG option so clients can use both active and passive modes.
- Disable the **Allow server to use passive mode** FTP ALG option. This is more secure for the server as it will never receive passive mode data. The FTP ALG will handle all conversion if a client connects using passive mode.

The configuration is performed as follows:

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Define the ALG:

(The ALG *ftp-inbound* is already predefined by CorePlus but in this example we will show how it can be created from scratch.)

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > FTP ALG**
2. Enter **Name:** ftp-inbound
3. Check **Allow client to use active mode**
4. Uncheck **Allow server to use passive mode**
5. Click **OK**

B. Define the Service:

1. Go to **Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP Service**
2. Enter the following:
 - **Name:** ftp-inbound-service
 - **Type:** select TCP from the list
 - **Destination:** 21 (the port the FTP server resides on)
 - **ALG:** select *ftp-inbound* created above
3. Click **OK**

C. Define a rule to allow connections to the public IP on port 21 and forward that to the internal FTP server:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** SAT-ftp-inbound
 - **Action:** SAT
 - **Service:** ftp-inbound-service
3. For **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan (assuming the external interface has been defined as this)
4. For **SAT** check **Translate the Destination IP Address**
5. Enter **To: New IP Address:** ftp-internal (assume this internal IP address for FTP server has been defined in the address book object)
6. **New Port:** 21
7. Click **OK**


D. Traffic from the internal interface needs to be NATed through a single public IP address:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** NAT-ftp
 - **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** ftp-inbound-service

3. For **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** dmz
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Source Network:** dmznet
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan
 4. For **NAT** check **Use Interface Address**
 5. Click **OK**
- E. Allow incoming connections (SAT requires an associated *Allow* rule):
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
 2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** Allow-ftp
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** ftp-inbound-service
 3. For **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan
 4. Click **OK**

Example 6.3. Protecting FTP Clients

In this scenario shown below the Clavister Security Gateway is protecting a workstation that will connect to FTP servers on the Internet.



In this case, we will set the FTP ALG restrictions as follows.

- Disable the **Allow client to use active mode** FTP ALG option so clients can only use passive mode. This is much safer for the client.
- Enable the **Allow server to use passive mode** FTP ALG option. This allows clients on the inside to connect to FTP servers that support active and passive mode across the Internet.

The configuration is performed as follows:

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create the FTP ALG

(The ALG *ftp-outbound* is already predefined by CorePlus but in this example we will show how it can be created from scratch.)

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > FTP ALG**
2. Enter **Name:** ftp-outbound
3. Uncheck **Allow client to use active mode**
4. Check **Allow server to use passive mode**
5. Click **OK**

B. Create the Service

1. Go to **Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP Service**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** ftp-outbound-service
 - **Type:** select TCP from the dropdown list
 - **Destination:** 21 (the port the ftp server resides on)
 - **ALG:** ftp-outbound
3. Click **OK**

C. Create IP Rules

IP rules need to be created to allow the FTP traffic to pass and these are different depending on if private or public IP addresses are being used.

i. Using Public IPs

If using public IPs, make sure there are no rules disallowing or allowing the same kind of ports/traffic before these rules. The service used here is the *ftp-outbound-service* which should be using the predefined ALG definition *ftp-outbound* which is described earlier.

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** Allow-ftp-outbound
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** ftp-outbound-service
3. For **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets
4. Click **OK**

ii. Using Public IPs

If the security gateway is using private IPs with a single external public IP, the following *NAT* rule need to be added instead:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** NAT-ftp-outbound

- **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** ftp-outbound-service
3. For **Address Filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets
 4. Check **Use Interface Address**
 5. Click **OK**

Setting Up FTP Servers with Passive Mode

An important point about FTP server setup needs to be made if the FTP ALG is being used along with passive mode.

Usually, the FTP server will be protected behind the Clavister Security Gateway and CorePlus will *SAT-Allow* connections to it from external clients that are connecting across the public Internet. If FTP *Passive* mode is allowed and a client connects with this mode then the FTP server must return an IP address and port to the client on which it can set up the data transfer connection.

This IP address is normally manually specified by the administrator in the FTP server software and the natural choice is to specify the external IP address of the interface on the security gateway that connects to the Internet. This is, however, wrong if the FTP ALG is being used.

Instead, the local, internal IP address of the FTP server should be specified when setting up the FTP server.

6.2.4. The TFTP ALG

Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is a much simpler version of FTP with more limited capabilities. Its purpose is to allow a client to upload files to or download files from a host system. TFTP data transport is based on the UDP protocol and therefore it supplies its own transport and session control protocols which are layered onto UDP.

TFTP is widely used in enterprise environments for updating software and backing up configurations on network devices. TFTP is recognized as being an inherently insecure protocol and its usage is often confined to internal networks. The CorePlus ALG provides an extra layer of security to TFTP in being able to put restrictions on its use.

General TFTP Options

Allow/Disallow Read

The TFTP **GET** function can be disabled so that files cannot be retrieved by a TFTP client. The default value is *Allow*.

Allow/Disallow Write

The TFTP **PUT** function can be disabled so that files cannot

be written by a TFTP client. The default value is *Allow*.

Remove Request Option

Specifies if options should be removed from request. The default is *False* which means "do not remove".

Allow Unknown Options

If this option is not enabled then any option in a request other than the blocksize, the timeout period and the file transfer size is blocked. The setting is disabled by default.

TFTP Request Options

As long as the **Remove Request Option** described above is set to *false* (options are not removed) then the following request option settings can be applied:

Maximum Blocksize

The maximum blocksize allowed can be specified. The allowed range is 0 to 65,464 bytes. The default value is 65,464 bytes.

Maximum File Size

The maximum size of a file transfer can be restricted. By default this is the absolute maximum allowed which 999,999 Kbytes.

Block Directory Traversal

This option can disallow directory traversal through the use of filenames containing consecutive periods ("..").

Allowing Request Timeouts

The CorePlus TFTP ALG blocks the repetition of an TFTP request coming from the same source IP address and port within a fixed period of time. The reason for this is that some TFTP clients might issue requests from the same source port without allowing an appropriate timeout period.

6.2.5. The SMTP ALG

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is a text based protocol used for transferring email between mail servers over the Internet. Typically the local SMTP server will be located on a DMZ so that mail sent by remote SMTP servers will traverse the Clavister Security Gateway to reach the local server (this setup is illustrated later in *Section 6.2.5.1, "Anti-Spam Filtering"*). Local users will then use email client software to retrieve their email from the local SMTP server.

SMTP is also used when clients are sending email and the SMTP ALG can be used to monitor SMTP traffic originating from both clients and servers.

SMTP ALG Options

Key features of the SMTP ALG are:

Email rate limiting

A maximum allowable rate of email messages can be specified. This rate is calculated on a *per source IP address* basis, in other words it is not the total rate that is of interest but the rate from a certain email source.

This is a very useful feature to have since it is possible to put in a block against either an infected client or an infected server sending large amounts of malware generated emails.

Email size limiting	<p>A maximum allowable size of email messages can be specified. This feature counts the total amount of bytes sent for a single email which is the header size plus body size plus the size of any email attachments after they are encoded. It should be kept in mind that an email with, for example, an attachment of 100 Kbytes, will be larger than 100 Kbytes. The transferred size might be 120 Kbytes or more since the encoding which takes place automatically for attachments may substantially increase the transferred attachment size.</p> <p>The administrator should therefore add a reasonable margin above the anticipated email size when setting this limit.</p>
Email address blacklisting	<p>A blacklist of sender or recipient email addresses can be specified so that mail from/to those addresses is blocked. The blacklist is applied after the whitelist so that if an address matches a whitelist entry it is not then checked against the blacklist.</p>
Email address whitelisting	<p>A whitelist of email addresses can be specified so that any mail from/to those addresses is allowed to pass through the ALG regardless if the address is on the blacklist or that the mail has been flagged as Spam.</p>
Verify MIME type	<p>The content of an attached file can be checked to see if it agrees with its stated filetype. A list of all filetypes that are verified in this way can be found in <i>Appendix C, Verified MIME filetypes</i>. This same option is also available in the HTTP ALG and a fuller description of how it works can be found in <i>Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG"</i>.</p>
Block/Allow filetype	<p>Filetypes from a predefined list can optionally be blocked or allowed as mail attachments and new filetypes can be added to the list. This same option is also available in the HTTP ALG and a fuller description of how it works can be found in <i>Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG"</i>. This same option is also available in the HTTP ALG and a fuller description of how it works can be found in <i>Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG"</i>.</p>
Anti-Virus scanning	<p>The CorePlus Anti-Virus subsystem can scan email attachments searching for malicious code. Suspect files can be dropped or just logged. This feature is common to a number of ALGs and is described fully in <i>Section 6.4, "Anti-Virus Scanning"</i>.</p>

The Ordering for SMTP Filtering

SMTP filtering obeys the following processing order and is similar to the order followed by the HTTP ALG except for the addition of Spam filtering:

1. Whitelist.
2. Blacklist.
3. Spam filtering (if enabled).
4. Anti-virus scanning (if enabled).

As described above, if an address is found on the whitelist then it will not be blocked if it also found on the blacklist. Spam filtering, if it is enabled, is still applied to whitelisted addresses but emails flagged as Spam will not be tagged nor dropped, only logged. Anti-virus scanning, if it is enabled, is always applied, even though an email's address is whitelisted.

Notice that either an email's sender or receiver address can be the basis for blocking by one of the first two filtering stages.



Figure 6.4. SMTP ALG Processing Order

Using Wildcards in White and Blacklists

Entries made in the white and blacklists can make use of *wildcarding* to have a single entry cover a large number of potential email addresses. The wildcard character "*" can be used to represent any sequence of characters.

For instance, the address entry `*@some_domain.com` can be used to specify all possible email addresses for `some_domain.com`.

If, for example, wildcarding is used in the blacklist to block all addresses for a certain company called `my_company` then the blacklist address entry required could be `*@my_company.com`.

If we want to now explicitly allow mails for just one department called `my_department` in `my_company` then this could be done with an entry in the whitelist of the form `my_department@my_company.com`.

Enhanced SMTP and Extensions

Enhanced SMTP (ESMTP) is defined in RFC 1869 and allows a number *extensions* to the standard SMTP protocol.

When an SMTP client opens a session with an SMTP server using ESMTP, the client first sends an *EHLO* command. If the server supports ESMTP it will respond with a list of the extensions that it supports. These extensions are defined by various separate RFCs. For example, RFC 2920 defines the SMTP *Pipelining* extension. Another common extension is *Chunking* which is defined in RFC 3030.

The CorePlus SMTP ALG does not support all ESMTP extensions including *Pipelining* and *Chunking*. The ALG therefore removes any unsupported extensions from the supported

extension list that is returned to the client by an SMTP server behind the Clavister Security Gateway. When an extension is removed, a log message is generated with the text:

```
unsupported_extension
capability_removed
```

The parameter "*capa=*" in the log message indicates which extension the ALG removed from the server response. For example, this parameter may appear in the log message as:

```
capa=PIPELINING
```

To indicate that the *pipelining* extension was removed from the SMTP server reply to an *EHLO* client command.

Although ESMTP extensions may be removed by the ALG and related log messages generated, **this does not mean that any emails are dropped**. Email transfers will take place as usual but without making use of unsupported extensions removed by the ALG.

6.2.5.1. Anti-Spam Filtering

Unsolicited email, often referred to as *Spam*, has become both a major annoyance as well as a security issue on the public Internet. Unsolicited email, sent out in massive quantities by groups known as *spammers*, can waste resources, transport malware as well as try to direct the reader to webpages which might exploit browser vulnerabilities.

Integral to the CorePlus SMTP ALG is a spam module that provides the ability to apply *spam filtering* to incoming email as it passes through the Clavister Security Gateway on its way to a local SMTP email server. Filtering is done based on the email's origin. This approach can significantly reduce the burden of such email in the mailboxes of users behind the Clavister Security Gateway.

CorePlus offers two approaches to handling spam:

- Dropping email which has a very high probability of being spam.
- Letting through but flagging email that has a moderate probability of being spam.

The CorePlus Anti-Spam Implementation

SMTP functions as a protocol for sending emails between servers. CorePlus applies Spam filtering to emails as they pass through the Clavister Security Gateway from an external remote SMTP server to a local SMTP server (from which local clients will later download their emails). Typically, the local, protected SMTP server will be set up on a DMZ network and there will usually be only one "hop" between the sending server and the local, receiving server.

DNSBL Databases

A number of trusted organizations maintain publicly available databases of the origin IP address of known spamming SMTP servers and these can be queried over the public Internet. These lists are known as *DNS Black List* (DNSBL) databases and the information is accessible using a standardized query method supported by CorePlus. The image below illustrates all the components involved:

DNSBL Server Queries

When the CorePlus Anti-Spam filtering function is configured, the IP address of the email's sending server is sent to one or more DNSBL servers to find out if any DNSBL servers think the

email is from a spammer or not. CorePlus examines the IP packet headers to do this.

The reply sent back by a server is either a *not listed* response or a *listed* response. In the latter case of being listed, the DNSBL server is indicating the email might be spam and it will usually also provide information known as a *TXT* record which is a textual explanation for the listing.




Figure 6.5. Anti-Spam Filtering

Creating a DNSBL Consensus

The administrator can configure the CorePlus SMTP ALG to consult multiple DNSBL servers in order to form a consensus opinion on an email's origin address. For each new email, configured servers are queried to assess the likelihood that the email is Spam, based on its origin address. The CorePlus administrator assigns a weight greater than zero to each configured server so that a weighted sum can then be calculated based on all responses. The administrator can configure one of the following actions based on the weighted sum calculated:

1. **Dropped**

If the sum is greater than or equal to a predefined *Drop threshold* then the email is considered to be definitely Spam and is discarded or alternatively sent to a single, special mailbox.

If it is discarded then the administrator has the option that an error message is sent back to the sending SMTP server (this error message is similar to the one used with blacklisting).

2. **Flagged as Spam**

If the sum is greater than or equal to a predefined *Spam threshold* then the email is considered as probably being Spam but forwarded to the recipient with notifying text inserted into it.

A Threshold Calculation Example

As an example, let's suppose that three DNSBL servers are configured: *dnsbl1*, *dnsbl2* and *dnsbl3*. Weights of **3**, **2** and **2** are assigned to these respectively. The Spam threshold is then set to be **5**.

If *dnsbl1* and *dnsbl2* say an email is Spam but *dnsbl3* does not, then the total calculated will be $3+2+0=5$. Since the total of **5** is equal to (or greater than) the threshold then the email will be treated as Spam.

If the *Drop threshold* in this example is set at **7** then all three DNSBL servers would have to respond in order for the calculated sum to cause the email to be dropped ($3+2+2=7$).

Alternative Actions for Dropped Spam

If the calculated sum is greater than or equal to the *Drop threshold* value then the email is not forwarded to the intended recipient. Instead the administrator can choose one of two alternatives for dropped email:

- A special email address can be configured to receive all dropped email. If this is done then any *TXT* messages sent by the DNSBL servers (described next) that identified the email as Spam can be optionally inserted by CorePlus into the header of the forwarded email.
- If no receiver email address is configured for dropped emails then they are discarded by CorePlus. The administrator can specify that an error message is sent back to the sender address along with the *TXT* messages from the DNSBL servers that failed the email.

Tagging Spam

If an email is considered to be probably Spam because the calculated sum is above the Spam threshold but it is below the Drop threshold, then the *Subject* field of the email is changed and pre-fixed with a message and the email is forwarded on to the intended recipient. The tag message text is specified by the administrator but can be left blank (although that is not recommended).

An example of tagging might be if the original *Subject* field is:

```
Buy this stock today!
```

And if the tag text is defined to be "*** SPAM ***", then the modified email's *Subject* field will become:

```
*** SPAM *** Buy this stock today!
```

And this is what the email's recipient will see in the summary of their inbox contents. The individual user could then decide to set up their own filters in the local client to deal with such tagged emails, possibly sending it to a separate folder.

Adding X-Spam Information

If an email is determined to be Spam and a forwarding address is configured for dropped emails, then the administrator has the option to *Add TXT Records* to the email. A *TXT Record* is the information sent back from the DNSBL server when the server thinks the sender is a source of Spam. This information can be inserted into the header of the email using the *X-Spam* tagging convention before it is sent on. The X-Spam fields added are:

- **X-Spam-Flag** - This value will always be *Yes*.
- **X-Spam-Checker-Version** - The CorePlus version that tagged the email.
- **X-Spam-Status** - This will always be *DNSBL*.
- **X-Spam-Report** - A list of DNSBL servers that flagged the email as Spam.

- **X-Spam-TXT-Records** - A list of TXT records sent by the DNSBL servers that identified the email as Spam.
- **X-Spam_Sender-IP** - IP address used by the email sender.

These fields can be referred to in filtering rules set up by the administrator in mail server software.

Allowing for Failed DNSBL Servers

If a query to a DNSBL server times out then CorePlus will consider that the query has failed and the weight given to that server will be automatically subtracted from both the Spam and Drop thresholds for the scoring calculation done for that email.

If enough DNSBL servers do not respond then this subtraction could mean that the threshold values become negative. Since the scoring calculation will always produce a value of zero or greater (servers cannot have negative weights) then all email will be allowed through if both the Spam and Drop thresholds become negative.

A log message is generated whenever a configured DNSBL server does not respond within the required time. This is done only once at the beginning of a consecutive sequence of response failures from a single server to avoid unnecessarily repeating the message.

Verifying the Sender Email

As part of the Anti-Spam module, the option exists to check for a mismatch of the "From" address in the SMTP protocol command with the actual email header "From" address. Spammers can deliberately make these different to get email past filters so this feature provides an extra check on email integrity.

If a mismatch is detected, one of two actions can be configured:

- The email is dropped.
- Allow the email to pass but tag it using the configured spam tag.

When sender address verification is enabled, there is an additional option to only compare the domain names in the "From" addresses.

Logging

There are three types of logging done by the Spam filtering module:

- Logging of dropped or Spam tagged emails - These log messages include the source email address and IP as well as its weighted points score and which DNSBLs caused the event.
- DNSBLs not responding - DNSBL query timeouts are logged.
- All defined DNBSLs stop responding - This is a high severity event since all email will be allowed through if this happens.

Setup Summary

To set up DNSBL Spam filtering in the SMTP ALG, the following list summarizes the steps:

- Specify the DNSBL servers that are to be used. There can be one or multiple. Multiple servers can act both as backups to each other as well as confirmation of a sender's status.
- Specify a *weight* for each server which will determine how important it is in deciding if email is Spam or not in the calculation of a weighted sum.
- Specify the thresholds for designating any email as Spam. If the weighted sum is equal or greater than these then an email will be considered to be Spam. Two thresholds are specified:
 - i. *Spam Threshold* - The threshold for tagging mail as spam.
 - ii. *Drop Threshold* - The threshold for dropping mail.
The *Spam Threshold* should be less than the *Drop Threshold*. If the two are equal then only the *Drop Threshold* applies.
- Specify a textual tag to prefix to the **Subject** field of email designated as Spam.
- Optionally specify an email address to which dropped email will be sent (as an alternative to simply discarding it). Optionally specify that the *TXT* messages sent by the DNSBL servers that failed are inserted into the header of these emails.

Caching Addresses for Performance

To speed processing CorePlus maintains a cache of the most recently looked-up sender "From" addresses in local memory. If the cache becomes full then the oldest entry is written over first. There are two parameters which can be configured for the address cache:

- **Cache Size**

This is the number of entries that the cache can contain. If set to zero, the cache is not used. Increasing the cache size increases the amount of CorePlus memory required for Anti-Spam.

- **Cache Timeout**

The timeout determines how long any address will be valid for once it is saved in the cache. After this period of time has expired, a new query for a cached sender address must be sent to the DNSBL servers.

The default value is 600 seconds.

The Anti-Spam address cache is emptied at startup or reconfiguration.

Real-time Monitoring

The following values for Spam filtering can be monitored in real time using the real-time monitoring functionality of InControl.

For the DNSBL subsystem overall:

- Number of emails checked.
- Number of emails Spam tagged.
- Number of dropped emails.

For each DNSBL server accessed:

- Number of positive (is Spam) responses from each configured DNSBL server.
- Number of queries sent to each configured DNSBL server.
- Number of failed queries (without replies) for each configured DNSBL server.

The *dnsbl* CLI Command

The **dnsbl** CLI command provides a means to control and monitor the operation of the Spam filtering module. The **dnsbl** command on its own without options shows the overall status of all ALGs. If the name of the SMTP ALG object on which DNSBL Spam filtering is enabled is *my_smtp_alg* then the output would be:

```
Device:/> dnsbl

DNSBL Contexts:

Name                Status      Spam      Drop      Accept
-----
my_smtp_alg         active      156       65       34299
alt_smtp_alg        inactive    0         0         0
```

The *-show* option provides a summary of the Spam filtering operation of a specific ALG. It is used below to examine activity for *my_smtp_alg* although in this case, the ALG object has not yet processed any emails.

```
Device:/> dnsbl my_smtp_alg -show

Drop Threshold      : 20
Spam Threshold      : 10
Use TXT records     : yes
IP Cache disabled
Configured BlackLists : 4
Disabled BlackLists  : 0
Current Sessions    : 0
Statistics:
Total number of mails checked : 0
Number of mails dropped       : 0
Number of mails spam tagged   : 0
Number of mails accepted     : 0
BlackList                  Status      Value Total      Matches Failed
-----
zen.spamhaus.org          active      25      0           0         0
cbl.abuseat.org           active      20      0           0         0
dnsbl.sorbs.net           active       5      0           0         0
asdf.egrhb.net            active       5      0           0         0
```

To examine the statistics for a particular DNSBL server, the following command can be used.

```
Device:/> dnsbl smtp_test zen.spamhaus.org -show

BlackList: zen.spamhaus.org
Status      : active
Weight value : 25
Number of mails checked           : 56
Number of matches in list         : 3
Number of failed checks (times disabled) : 0
```

To clean out the **dnsbl** cache for *my_smtp_alg* and to reset all its statistical counters, the following command option can be used:

```
Device:/> dnsbl my_smtp_alg -clean
```



Tip: DNSBL servers

A list of DNSBL servers can be found at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_DNS_blacklists.

6.2.6. The POP3 ALG

POP3 is a mail transfer protocol that differs from SMTP in that the transfer of mail is directly from a server to a user's client software.

POP3 ALG Options

Key features of the POP3 ALG are:

Block clients from sending USER and PASS command	Block connections between client and server that send the username/password combination as clear text which can be easily read (some servers may not support other methods than this).
Hide User	This option prevents the POP3 server from revealing that a username does not exist. This prevents users from trying different usernames until they find a valid one.
Allow Unknown Commands	Non-standard POP3 commands not recognized by the ALG can be allowed or disallowed.
Fail Mode	When content scanning find bad file integrity then the file can be allowed or disallowed.
Verify MIME type	The content of an attached file can be checked to see if it agrees with its stated filetype. A list of all filetypes that are verified in this way can be found in <i>Appendix C, Verified MIME filetypes</i> . This same option is also available in the HTTP ALG and a fuller description of how it works can be found in <i>Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG"</i> .
Block/Allow filetype	Filetypes from a predefined list can optionally be blocked or allowed as mail attachments and new filetypes can be added to the list. This same option is also available in the HTTP ALG and a fuller description of how it works can be found in <i>Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG"</i> .
Anti-Virus Scanning	The CorePlus Anti-Virus subsystem can optionally scan email attachments searching for malicious code. Suspect files can be dropped or just logged. This feature is common to a number of ALGs and is described fully in <i>Section 6.4, "Anti-Virus Scanning"</i> .

6.2.7. The PPTP ALG

Why the PPTP ALG is Needed

The PPTP ALG is provided to deal with a specific issue when PPTP tunnels are used with NAT.

Let us suppose we have two clients **A** and **B** on a protected inner network behind a Clavister Security Gateway. The security gateway is connected to the external Internet and a NAT rule is defined to allow traffic from the clients to flow to the Internet. Both clients will therefore appear to have from the same IP address as they make connections to servers across the Internet.

One client **A** now establishes a PPTP tunnel to an external host **C** across the Internet. The tunnel endpoints are the client and the external server. Because of the NAT IP rule, the tunnel connection will appear to be coming from the external IP address on the security gateway.

This first connection will be successful but when the second client **B** also tries to connect to the same server **C** at the same endpoint IP address, the first connection for **A** will be lost. The reason is that both clients are trying to establish a PPTP tunnel from the same external IP address to the same endpoint.




Figure 6.6. PPTP ALG Usage

The PPTP ALG solves this problem. By using the ALG, the traffic from all the clients can be multiplexed through a single PPTP tunnel between the security gateway and the server.

PPTP ALG Setup

Setting up the PPTP ALG is similar to the set up of other ALG types. The ALG object must be associated with the relevant service and the service is then associated with an IP rule. The full sequence of steps for setup is as follows:

- Define a new PPTP ALG object with an appropriate name, for example *pptp_alg*. The full list of options for the ALG are listed towards the end of this section.
- Associate the new ALG object with an appropriate *Service* object. The predefined service called *pptp-ctl* can be used for this purpose.

Alternatively, a new custom service object can be defined, for example called *pptp_service*. The service must have the following characteristics:

- Select the **Type** (the protocol) as *TCP*.
- The **Source** port range can be the default of *0-65535*.
- Set the **Destination** port to be *1723*.

- iv. Select the **ALG** to be the PPTP ALG object that was defined in the first step. In this case, it was called *pptp_alg*.
- Associate this service object with the NAT IP rule that permits the traffic to flow from clients to the remote endpoint of the PPTP tunnel. This may be the rule that NATs the traffic out to the Internet with a destination network of *all-nets*.

The single IP rule below shows how the custom service object called *pptp_service* is associated with a typical NAT rule. The clients, which are the local end point of the PPTP tunnels, are located behind the security gateway on the network *lannet* which is connected to the *lan* interface. The Internet is found on the *wan* interface which is the destination interface, with *all-nets* as the destination network.

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
NAT	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	pptp_service

PPTP ALG Settings

The following settings are available for the PPTP ALG:

Name	A descriptive name for the ALG.
Echo timeout	Idle timeout for Echo messages in the PPTP tunnel.
Idle timeout	Idle timeout for user traffic messages in the PPTP tunnel.

In most cases only the name needs to be defined and the other settings can be left at their defaults.

6.2.8. The SIP ALG

Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an ASCII (UTF-8) text based signalling protocol used to establish sessions between clients in an IP network. It is a request-response protocol that resembles HTTP and SMTP. The session which SIP sets up might consist of a Voice-Over-IP (VoIP) telephone call or it could be a collaborative multi-media conference. Using SIP with VoIP means that telephony can become another IP application which can integrate into other services.

SIP does not know about the details of a session's content and is only responsible for initiating, terminating and modifying sessions. Sessions set up by SIP are typically used for the streaming of audio and video over the Internet using the RTP/RTCP protocol (which is based on UDP) but they might also involve traffic based on the TCP protocol. A RTP/RTCP based sessions might also involve TCP or TLS based traffic in the same session.

SIP is defined by IETF RFC 3261 and is considered an important standard for VoIP communication. It is comparable to H.323 but a design goal with SIP was to make it more scalable than H.323. (For VoIP see also *Section 6.2.9, "The H.323 ALG"*.)



Note: Traffic shaping will not work with the SIP ALG

Any traffic connections that trigger an IP rule with a service object that uses the SIP ALG cannot be also subject to traffic shaping.

SIP Components

The following components are the logical building blocks for SIP communication:

User Agents These are the end points or *clients* that are involved in the client-to-client communication. These would typically be the workstation or device used in an IP telephony conversation. The term *client* will be used throughout this section to describe a *user agent*.

Proxy Servers These act as routers in the SIP protocol, performing both as client and server when receiving client requests. They forward requests to a client's current location as well as authenticating and authorizing access to services. They also implement provider call-routing policies.

The proxy is often located on the external, unprotected side of the Clavister Security Gateway but can have other locations. All of these scenarios are supported by CorePlus.

Registrars A server that handles SIP *REGISTER* requests is given the special name of Registrar. The Registrar server has the task of locating the host where the other client is reachable.

The Registrar and Proxy Server are logical entities and may, in fact, reside on the same physical server.

SIP Media-related Protocols

A SIP session makes use of a number of protocols. These are:

SDP *Session Description Protocol* (RFC4566) is used for media session initialization.

RTP *Real-time Transport Protocol* (RFC3550) is used as the underlying packet format for delivering audio and video streaming via IP using the UDP protocol.

RTCP *Real-time Control Protocol* (RFC3550) is used in conjunction with RTP to provide out-of-band control flow management.

CorePlus SIP Setup

When configuring CorePlus to handle SIP sessions the following steps are needed:

- Define a single *Service* object for SIP communication.
- Define a *SIP ALG* object which is associated with the *Service* object.
- Define the appropriate *IP rules* for SIP communications which use the defined *Service* object.

SIP ALG Options

The following options can be configured for a SIP ALG object:

Maximum Sessions per ID The number of simultaneous sessions that a single client can be involved with is restricted by this value. The default number is 5.

Maximum Registration Time	The maximum time for registration with a SIP Registrar. The default value is <i>3600 seconds</i> .
SIP Signal Timeout	The maximum time allowed for SIP sessions. The default value is <i>43200 seconds</i> .
Data Channel Timeout	The maximum time allowed for periods with no traffic in a SIP session. A timeout condition occurs if this value is exceeded. The default value is <i>120 seconds</i> .
Allow Media Bypass	If this option is enabled then data, such as RTP/RTCP communication, may take place directly between two clients without involving the Clavister Security Gateway. This would only happen if the two clients were behind the same interface and belong to the same network. The default value is <i>Disabled</i> .

The SIP Proxy *Record-Route* Option

To understand how to set up SIP scenarios with CorePlus, it is important to first understand the SIP proxy *Record-Route* option. SIP proxies have the *Record-Route* option either enabled or disabled. When it is switched on, a proxy is known as a *Stateful proxy*. When *Record-Route* is enabled, a proxy is saying it will be the intermediary for all SIP signalling that takes place between two clients.

When a SIP session is being set up, the calling client sends an *INVITE* message to its outbound SIP proxy server. The SIP proxy relays this message to the remote proxy server responsible for the called, remote client's contact information. The remote proxy then relays the *INVITE* message to the called client. Once the two clients have learnt of each other's IP addresses, they can communicate directly with each other and remaining SIP messages can bypass the proxies. This facilitates scaling since proxies are used only for the initial SIP message exchange.

The disadvantage of removing proxies from the session is that CorePlus IP rules must be set up to allow all SIP messages through the Clavister Security Gateway, and if the source network of the messages is not known then a large number of potentially dangerous connections must be allowed by the IP rule set. This problem does not occur if the local proxy is set up with the *Record-Route* option enabled. In this mode, all SIP messages will only come from the proxy.

The different rules required when the *Record-Route* option is enabled and disabled can be seen in the two different sets of IP rules listed below in the detailed description of *Scenario 1 Protecting local clients - Proxy located on the Internet*.

IP Rules for Media Data

When discussing SIP data flows there are two distinct types of exchanges involved:

- The SIP session which sets up communication between two clients prior to the exchange of *media data*.
- The exchange of the *media data* itself, for example the coded voice data which constitute a VoIP phone call.

In the SIP setups described below, IP rules need only be explicitly defined to deal with the first of the above, the SIP exchanges needed for establishing client-to-client communications. No IP rules or other objects need to be defined to handle the second of the above, the exchange of media data. The SIP ALG automatically and invisibly takes care of creating the connections required (sometimes described as SIP *pinholes*) for allowing the media data traffic to flow

through the Clavister Security Gateway.



Tip

Make sure there are no preceding rules already in the IP rule set disallowing or allowing the same kind of traffic.

SIP and Virtual Routing

SIP is a complex protocol that requires that CorePlus maintains state information regarding active calls and registered users. The scope of a SIP state is uniquely defined by the SIP-service and its connected SIP ALG. If multiple SIP domains are running concurrently but using different Policy-based Routing Tables then one SIP ALG and one SIP service object should be created for each table. Policy-based Routing Tables are described in detail in *Section 4.5, "Virtual Routing"*.

SIP Usage Scenarios

CorePlus supports a variety of SIP usage scenarios. The following three scenarios cover nearly all possible types of usage:

- **Scenario 1**
Protecting local clients - Proxy located on the Internet

The SIP session is between a client on the local, protected side of the Clavister Security Gateway and a client which is on the external, unprotected side. The SIP proxy is located on the external, unprotected side of the Clavister Security Gateway. Communication typically takes place across the public Internet with clients on the internal, protected side registering with a proxy on the public, unprotected side.

- **Scenario 2**
Protecting proxy and local clients - Proxy on the same network as clients

The SIP session is between a client on the local, protected side of the Clavister Security Gateway and a client which is on the external, unprotected side. The SIP proxy is located on the local, protected side of the Clavister Security Gateway and can handle registrations from both clients located on the same local network as well as clients on the external, unprotected side. Communication can take place across the public Internet or between clients on the local network.

- **Scenario 3**
Protecting proxy and local clients - Proxy on a DMZ interface

The SIP session is between a client on the local, protected side of the Clavister Security Gateway and a client which is on the external, unprotected side. The SIP proxy is located on the DMZ interface and is physically separated from the local client network as well as the remote client network and proxy network.


All the above scenarios will also deal with the situation where two clients in a session reside on the same network.

These scenarios will now be examined in detail.

Scenario 1 **Protecting local clients - Proxy located on the Internet**

The scenario assumed is an office with VoIP users on a private internal network where the

network's topology will be hidden using NAT. This is illustrated below.



The SIP proxy in the above diagram could alternatively be located remotely across the Internet. The proxy should be configured with the **Record-Route** feature enabled to insure all SIP traffic to and from the office clients will be sent through the SIP Proxy. This is recommended since the attack surface is minimized by allowing only SIP signalling from the SIP Proxy to enter the local network.

This scenario can be implemented in two ways:

- Using NAT to hide the network topology.
- Without NAT so the network topology is exposed.



Note: NAT traversal should not be configured

*SIP User Agents and SIP Proxies should not be configured to employ NAT Traversal in any setup. For instance the **Simple Traversal of UDP through NATs (STUN)** technique should not be used. The CorePlus SIP ALG will take care of all NAT traversal issues in a SIP scenario.*

The setup steps for this scenario are as follows:

1. Define a *SIP ALG* object using the options described above.
2. Define a *Service* object which is associated with the SIP ALG object. The service should have:
 - **Destination Port** set to *5060* (the default SIP signalling port).
 - **Type** set to *TCP/UDP*.
3. Define two rules in the IP rule set:
 - A *NAT* rule for outbound traffic from clients on the internal network to the SIP Proxy Server located externally. The SIP ALG will take care of all address translation needed by the *NAT* rule. This translation will occur both on the IP level and the application level. Neither the clients or the proxies need to be aware that the local users are being NATed.
 - An *Allow* rule for inbound SIP traffic from the SIP proxy to the IP of the Clavister Security Gateway. This rule will use **core** (in other words, CorePlus itself) as the destination interface. The reason for this is due to the *NAT* rule above. When an incoming call is received, CorePlus will automatically locate the local receiver, perform address

translation and forward SIP messages to the receiver. This will be executed based on the ALGs internal state.

A *SAT* rule for translating incoming SIP messages is not needed since the ALG will automatically redirect incoming SIP requests to the correct internal user. When a SIP client behind a NATing Clavister Security Gateway registers with an external SIP proxy, CorePlus sends its own IP address as contact information to the SIP proxy. CorePlus registers the client's local contact information and uses this to redirect incoming requests to the user. The ALG takes care of the address translations needed.

4. Ensure the clients are correctly configured. The SIP Proxy Server plays a key role in locating the current location of the other client for the session. The proxy's IP address is not specified directly in the ALG. Instead its location is either entered directly into the client software used by the client or in some cases the client will have a way of retrieving the proxy's IP address automatically such as through DHCP.



Note: NAT traversal should not be configured

*SIP User Agents and SIP Proxies should not be configured to employ **NAT Traversal** in any setup. For instance, the **Simple Traversal of UDP through NATs (STUN)** technique should not be used. The CorePlus SIP ALG will take care of all traversal issues with NAT in a SIP setup.*

The IP rules with the Record-Route option enabled would be as shown below, the changes that apply when NAT is used are shown in parentheses "(..)".

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
Allow (or NAT)	lan	lanet	wan	ip_proxy
Allow	wan	ip_proxy	lan (or core)	lanet (or ip_wan)

Without the Record-Route option enabled the IP rules would be as shown below, the changes that apply when NAT is used are again shown in parentheses "(..)".

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
Allow (or NAT)	lan	lanet	wan	<All possible IPs>
Allow	wan	<All possible IPs>	lan (or core)	lanet (or ipwan)

The advantage of using *Record-Route* is clear since now the destination network for outgoing traffic and the source network for incoming traffic have to include all IP addresses that are possible.



The Service object for IP rules

*In this section, tables which list IP rules like those above, will omit the **Service** object associated with the rule. The same, custom **Service** object is used for all SIP scenarios.*

Example 6.4. SIP with Local Clients, Proxy on Internet

This example shows the exact steps to implement **Scenario 1** which is described above. The local network topology is hidden using NAT. The proxy server lies on the external, unprotected side of the Clavister Security Gateway.

The client is assumed to be on the network *if1_net* connected to the interface *if1*. The SIP proxy is assumed to be on the IP address *proxy_ip* on the interface *ext*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Define the following IP objects:

- **if1_net:** 192.168.1.0/24
(the internal network)
- **proxy_ip:** 81.100.55.2
(the SIP proxy)
- **ip_wan:** 81.100.55.1
(the Clavister Security Gateway's public IP address)

B. Define an SIP ALG object

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > SIP ALG**
2. The **SIP ALG** properties will be displayed
3. Specify a name for the ALG, for example *sip_alg*
4. Click **OK**

C. Define a custom *Service* object for SIP:

1. Go to **Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP**
2. The **Service** properties will be displayed
3. Specify a name for the service, for example *sip_serv*
4. Choose *UDP* as the **Type**
5. Choose *sip-alg* as the **ALG**
6. Under **Destination** and enter port number *5060*
7. Click **OK**

D. Define the outgoing SIP traffic IP rule:


1. Go to **Rules > IP Rule Set > main > Add > IP Rule**
2. The **Rule Properties** dialog will be displayed
3. Now enter:

- **Name:** sip_nat
 - **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** sip_serv
 - **Source Interface:** if1
 - **Source Network:** if1_net
 - **Destination Interface:** ext
 - **Destination Network:** proxy_ip
 - **Comment:** Allow outgoing SIP calls
4. Click **OK**
- E. Define the incoming SIP traffic IP rule:
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rule Set > main > Add > IP Rule**
 2. The **Rule Properties** dialog will be displayed
 3. Now enter:
 - **Name:** sip_allow
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** sip_serv
 - **Source Interface:** ext
 - **Source Network:** proxy_ip
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan
 - **Comment:** Allow incoming SIP traffic
 4. Click **OK**

Scenario 2

Protecting proxy and local clients - Proxy on the same network as clients

In this scenario the goal is to protect the local clients as well as the SIP proxy. The proxy is located on the same, local network as the clients, with SIP signalling and media data flowing across two interfaces. This scenario is illustrated below.



This scenario can be implemented in two ways:

- Using NAT to hide the network topology.
- Without NAT so the network topology is exposed.

Solution A - Using NAT

Here, the proxy and the local clients are hidden behind the IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway. The setup steps are as follows:

1. Define a single SIP ALG object using the options described above.
2. Define a *Service* object which is associated with the SIP ALG object. The service should have:
 - **Destination Port** set to *5060* (the default SIP signalling port)
 - **Type** set to *TCP/UDP*
3. Define three rules in the IP rule set:
 - A *NAT* rule for outbound traffic from the local proxy and the clients on the internal network to the remote clients on, for example, the Internet. The SIP ALG will take care of all address translation needed by the *NAT* rule. This translation will occur both on the IP level and the application level. Neither the clients or the proxies need to be aware that the local clients are being NATed.

If *Record-Route* is enabled on the SIP proxy, the *source* network of the *NAT* rule can include only the SIP proxy, and not the local clients.

 - A *SAT* rule for redirecting inbound SIP traffic to the private IP address of the NATed local proxy. This rule will have **core** as the destination interface (in other words CorePlus itself) since inbound traffic will be sent to the private IP address of the SIP proxy.
 - An *Allow* rule which matches the same type of traffic as the *SAT* rule defined in the previous step.

	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
OutboundFrom ProxyUsers	NAT	lan	lannet (ip_proxy)	wan	all-nets
InboundTo ProxyAndClients	SAT SETDEST ip_proxy	wan	all-nets	core	ip_wan

	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
InboundTo ProxyAndClients	Allow	wan	all-nets	core	ip_wan

If *Record-Route* is enabled then the *Source Network* for outbound traffic from proxy users can be further restricted in the above rules by using "ip_proxy" as indicated.

When an incoming call is received, the SIP ALG will follow the *SAT* rule and forward the SIP request to the proxy server. The proxy will in turn, forward the request to its final destination which is the client.

If *Record-Route* is disabled at the proxy server, and depending on the state of the SIP session, the SIP ALG may forward inbound SIP messages directly to the client, bypassing the SIP proxy. This will happen automatically without further configuration.

Solution B - Without NAT

Without NAT, the outbound *NAT* rule is replaced by an *Allow* rule. The inbound *SAT* and *Allow* rules are replaced by a single *Allow* rule.


	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
OutboundFrom Proxy&Clients	Allow	lan	lannet (ip_proxy)	wan	all-nets
InboundTo Proxy&Clients	Allow	wan	all-nets	lan	lannet (ip_proxy)

If *Record-Route* is enabled then the networks in the above rules can be further restricted by using "(ip_proxy)" as indicated.


Scenario 3

Protecting proxy and local clients - Proxy on the DMZ interface

This scenario is similar to the previous but the major difference is the location of the local SIP proxy server. The server is placed on a separate interface and network to the local clients. This setup adds an extra layer of security since the initial SIP traffic is never exchanged directly between a remote endpoint and the local, protected clients.



The complexity is increased in this scenario since SIP messages flow across three interfaces: the receiving interface from the call initiator, the DMZ interface towards the proxy and the destination interface towards the call terminator. This the initial messages exchanges that take place when a call is setup in this scenario are illustrated below:



The exchanges illustrated are as follows:

- **1,2** - An initial *INVITE* is sent to the outbound local proxy server on the DMZ.
- **3,4** - The proxy server sends the SIP messages towards the destination on the Internet.
- **5,6** - A remote client or proxy server replies to the local proxy server.
- **7,8** - The local proxy forwards the reply to the local client.

This scenario can be implemented in a topology hiding setup with DMZ (**Solution A** below) as well as a setup without NAT (**Solution B** below).

Solution A - Using NAT

The following should be noted about this setup:

- The IP address of the SIP proxy must be a globally routable IP address. The Clavister Security Gateway does not support hiding of the proxy on the DMZ.
- The IP address of the DMZ interface must be a globally routable IP address. This address can be the same address as the one used on the external interface.

The setup steps are as follows:

1. Define a single SIP ALG object using the options described above.
2. Define a *Service* object which is associated with the SIP ALG object. The service should have:
 - **Destination Port** set to *5060* (the default SIP signalling port)
 - **Type** set to *TCP/UDP*
3. Define four rules in the IP rule set:
 - A *NAT* rule for outbound traffic from the clients on the internal network to the proxy

located on the DMZ interface. The SIP ALG will take care of all address translation needed by the NAT rule. This translation will occur both at the IP level and at the application level.



Note

Clients registering with the proxy on the DMZ will have the IP address of the DMZ interface as the contact address.

- An *Allow* rule for outbound traffic from the proxy behind the DMZ interface to the remote clients on the Internet.
- An *Allow* rule for inbound SIP traffic from the SIP proxy behind the DMZ interface to the IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway. This rule will have **core** (in other words, CorePlus itself) as the destination interface.

The reason for this is because of the NAT rule above. When an incoming call is received, CorePlus automatically locates the local receiver, performs address translation and forwards SIP messages to the receiver. This is done based on the SIP ALG's internal state.

- An *Allow* rule for inbound traffic from, for example the Internet, to the proxy behind the DMZ.
4. If *Record-Route* is **not** enabled at the proxy, direct exchange of SIP messages must also be allowed between clients, bypassing the proxy. The following additional rules are therefore needed when *Record-Route* is disabled:
- A NAT rule for outbound traffic from the clients on the internal network to the external clients and proxies on, for example, the Internet. The SIP ALG will take care of all address translation needed by the NAT rule. The translation will occur both at the IP level and the application level.
 - An *Allow* rule for inbound SIP traffic from, for example the Internet, to the IP address of the DMZ interface. The reason for this is because local clients will be NATed using the IP address of the DMZ interface when they register with the proxy located on the DMZ.

This rule has **core** as the destination interface (in other words, CorePlus itself). When an incoming call is received, CorePlus uses the registration information of the local receiver to automatically locate this receiver, perform address translation and forward SIP messages to the receiver. This will be done based on the internal state of the SIP ALG.

The IP rules needed with *Record-Route* enabled are:

	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
OutboundToProxy	NAT	lan	lannet	dmz	ip_proxy
OutboundFromProxy	Allow	dmz	ip_proxy	wan	all-nets
InboundFromProxy	Allow	dmz	ip_proxy	core	ip_dmz
InboundToProxy	Allow	wan	all-nets	dmz	ip_proxy

With *Record-Route* disabled, the following IP rules must be added to those above:

	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
OutboundBypassProxy	NAT	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets
InboundBypassProxy	Allow	wan	all-nets	core	ipdmz

Solution B - Without NAT

The setup steps are as follows:

1. Define a single SIP ALG object using the options described above.
2. Define a *Service* object which is associated with the SIP ALG object. The service should have:
 - **Destination Port** set to *5060* (the default SIP signalling port)
 - **Type** set to *TCP/UDP*
3. Define four rules in the IP rule set:
 - An *Allow* rule for outbound traffic from the clients on the internal network to the proxy located on the DMZ interface.
 - An *Allow* rule for outbound traffic from the proxy behind the DMZ interface to the remote clients on the Internet.
 - An *Allow* rule for inbound SIP traffic from the SIP proxy behind the DMZ interface to the clients located on the local, protected network.
 - An *Allow* rule for inbound SIP traffic from clients and proxies on the Internet to the proxy behind the DMZ interface.
4. If *Record-Route* is **not** enabled at the proxy, direct exchange of SIP messages must also be allowed between clients, bypassing the proxy. The following two additional rules are therefore needed when *Record-Route* is disabled:
 - An *Allow* rule for outbound traffic from the clients on the local network to the external clients and proxies on the Internet.
 - An *Allow* rule for inbound SIP traffic from the Internet to clients on the local network.

The IP rules with *Record-Route* enabled are:

	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
OutboundToProxy	Allow	lan	lannet	dmz	ip_proxy
OutboundFromProxy	Allow	dmz	ip_proxy	lan	lannet
InboundFromProxy	Allow	dmz	ip_proxy	core	ip_dmz
InboundToProxy	Allow	wan	all-nets	dmz	ip_proxy

With *Record-Route* disabled, the following IP rules must be added to those above:

	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
OutboundBypassProxy	Allow	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets
InboundBypassProxy	Allow	wan	all-nets	lan	lannet

6.2.9. The H.323 ALG

H.323 is a standard approved by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to allow compatibility in video conference transmissions over IP networks. It is used for real-time audio, video and data communication over packet-based networks such as the Internet. It specifies the components, protocols and procedures for providing such multimedia communication, including Internet phone and voice-over-IP (VoIP). (For VoIP see also *Section 6.2.8, "The SIP ALG"*.)

H.323 Components

H.323 consists of four main components:

Terminals	Devices used for audio and optionally video or data communication, such as phones, conferencing units, or "software phones" such as the product "NetMeeting".
Gateways	An H.323 gateway connects two dissimilar networks and translates traffic between them. It provides connectivity between H.323 networks and non-H.323 networks such as public switched telephone networks (PSTN), translating protocols and converting media streams. A gateway is not required for communication between two H.323 terminals.
Gatekeepers	The Gatekeeper is a component in the H.323 system which is used for addressing, authorization and authentication of terminals and gateways. It can also take care of bandwidth management, accounting, billing and charging. The gatekeeper may allow calls to be placed directly between endpoints, or it may route the call signalling through itself to perform functions such as follow-me/find-me, forward on busy, etc. It is needed when there is more than one H.323 terminal behind a NATing device with only one public IP.
Multipoint Control Units	MCUs provide support for conferences of three or more H.323 terminals. All H.323 terminals participating in the conference call have to establish a connection with the MCU. The MCU then manages the calls, resources, video and audio codecs used in the call.

H.323 Protocols

The different protocols used in implementing H.323 are:

H.225 RAS signalling and Call Control (Setup) signalling	Used for call signalling. It is used to establish a connection between two H.323 endpoints. This call signal channel is opened between two H.323 endpoints or between a H.323 endpoint and a gatekeeper. For communication between two H.323 endpoints, TCP 1720 is used. When connecting to a gatekeeper, UDP port 1719 (H.225 RAS messages) are used.
H.245 Media Control and Transport	Provides control of multimedia sessions established between two H.323 endpoints. Its most important task is to negotiate opening and closing of logical channels. A logical channel could be, for example, an audio channel used for voice communication. Video and T.120 channels are also called logical channels during negotiation.
T.120	A suite of communication and application protocols. Depending on the type of H.323 product, T.120 protocol can be used for application sharing, file transfer as well as for conferencing features such as whiteboards.

H.323 ALG features

The H.323 ALG is a flexible application layer gateway that allows H.323 devices such as H.323 phones and applications to make and receive calls between each other when connected via private networks secured by Clavister Security Gateways.

The H.323 specification was not designed to handle NAT, as IP addresses and ports are sent in the payload of H.323 messages. The H.323 ALG modifies and translates H.323 messages to make sure that H.323 messages will be routed to the correct destination and allowed through the Clavister Security Gateway.

The H.323 ALG has the following features:

- The H.323 ALG supports version 5 of the H.323 specification. This specification is built upon H.225.0 v5 and H.245 v10.
- In addition to support voice and video calls, the H.323 ALG supports application sharing over the T.120 protocol. T.120 uses TCP to transport data while voice and video is transported over UDP.
- To support gatekeepers, the ALG monitors RAS traffic between H.323 endpoints and the gatekeeper, in order to correctly configure the Clavister Security Gateway to let calls through.
- NAT and SAT rules are supported, allowing clients and gatekeepers to use private IP addresses on a network behind the Clavister Security Gateway.

H.323 ALG Configuration

The configuration of the standard H.323 ALG can be changed to suit different usage scenarios. The configurable options are:

- **Allow TCP Data Channels** - This option allows TCP based data channels to be negotiated. Data channels are used, for example, by the T.120 protocol.
- **Number of TCP Data Channels** - The number of TCP data channels allowed can be specified.
- **Address Translation** - For NATed traffic the **Network** can be specified, which is what is allowed to be translated. The **External IP** for the **Network** is specified which is the IP address to NAT with. If the **External IP** is set as *Auto* then the external IP is found automatically through route lookup.
- **Translate Logical Channel Addresses** - This would normally always be set. If not enabled then no address translation will be done on logical channel addresses and the administrator needs to be sure about IP addresses and routes used in a particular scenario.
- **Gatekeeper Registration Lifetime** - The gatekeeper registration lifetime can be controlled in order to force re-registration by clients within a certain time. A shorter time forces more frequent registration by clients with the gatekeeper and less probability of a problem if the network becomes unavailable and the client thinks it is still registered.


Presented below are some network scenarios where H.323 ALG use is applicable. For each scenario a configuration example of both the ALG and the rules are presented. The three service definitions used in these scenarios are:

- Gatekeeper (UDP ALL > 1719)
- H323 (H.323 ALG, TCP ALL > 1720)

- H323-Gatekeeper (H.323 ALG, UDP > 1719)

Example 6.5. Protecting Phones Behind Clavister Security Gateways

In the first scenario a H.323 phone is connected to the Clavister Security Gateway on a network (lannet) with public IP addresses. To make it possible to place a call from this phone to another H.323 phone on the Internet, and to allow H.323 phones on the Internet to call this phone, we need to configure rules. The following rules need to be added to the rule set, make sure there are no rules disallowing or allowing the same kind of ports/traffic before these rules.



InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Outgoing Rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323AllowOut
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
 - **Comment:** Allow outgoing calls

3. Click **OK**

Incoming Rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

2. Now enter:

- **Name:** H323AllowIn
- **Action:** Allow
- **Service:** H323
- **Source Interface:** any
- **Destination Interface:** lan
- **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
- **Destination Network:** lannet
- **Comment:** Allow incoming calls

3. Click **OK**

Example 6.6. H.323 with private IP addresses

In this scenario a H.323 phone is connected to the Clavister Security Gateway on a network with private IP addresses. To make it possible to place a call from this phone to another H.323 phone on the Internet, and to allow H.323 phones on the Internet to call this phone, we need to configure rules. The following rules need to be added to the rule set, make sure there are no rules disallowing or allowing the same kind of ports/traffic before these rules. As we are using private IPs on the phone incoming traffic need to be SATed as in the example below. The object ip-phone below should be the internal IP of the H.323 phone.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Outgoing Rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

2. Now enter:

- **Name:** H323Out
- **Action:** NAT
- **Service:** H323
- **Source Interface:** lan

- **Destination Interface:** any
- **Source Network:** lannet
- **Destination Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
- **Comment:** Allow outgoing calls

3. Click **OK**

Incoming Rules:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

2. Now enter:

- **Name:** H323In
- **Action:** SAT
- **Service:** H323
- **Source Interface:** any
- **Destination Interface:** core
- **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
- **Destination Network:** ip_wan (external IP of the security gateway)
- **Comment:** Allow incoming calls to H.323 phone at ip-phone

3. For **SAT** enter **Translate Destination IP Address:** To New IP Address: ip-phone (IP address of phone)

4. Click **OK**

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

2. Now enter:


- **Name:** H323In
- **Action:** Allow
- **Service:** H323
- **Source Interface:** any
- **Destination Interface:** core
- **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
- **Destination Network:** ip_wan (external IP of the security gateway)
- **Comment:** Allow incoming calls to H.323 phone at ip-phone

3. Click **OK**

To place a call to the phone behind the Clavister Security Gateway, place a call to the external IP address on the security gateway. If multiple H.323 phones are placed behind the security gateway, one *SAT* rule has to be configured for each phone. This means that multiple external addresses have to be used. However, it is preferred to use a H.323 gatekeeper as in the "H.323 with Gatekeeper" scenario, as this only requires one external address.

Example 6.7. Two Phones Behind Different Clavister Security Gateways

This scenario consists of two H.323 phones, each one connected behind the Clavister Security Gateway on a network with public IP addresses. In order to place calls on these phones over the Internet, the following rules need to be added to the rule listings in both security gateways. Make sure there are no rules disallowing or allowing the same kind of ports/traffic before these rules.



InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Outgoing Rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323AllowOut
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
 - **Comment:** Allow outgoing calls
3. Click **OK**

Incoming Rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323AllowIn
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Destination Interface:** lan
 - **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
 - **Destination Network:** lannet
 - **Comment:** Allow incoming calls
3. Click **OK**

Example 6.8. Using Private IP Addresses

This scenario consists of two H.323 phones, each one connected behind the Clavister Security Gateway on a network with private IP addresses. In order to place calls on these phones over the Internet, the following rules need to be added to the rule set in the security gateway. Make sure there are no rules disallowing or allowing the same kind of ports/traffic before these rules. As we are using private IPs on the phones, incoming traffic need to be SATed as in the example below. The object ip-phone below should be the internal IP of the H.323 phone behind each security gateway.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Outgoing Rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323Out
 - **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** H323
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** lannet

- **Destination Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
- **Comment:** Allow outgoing calls

3. Click **OK**

Incoming Rules:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

2. Now enter:

- **Name:** H323In
- **Action:** SAT
- **Service:** H323
- **Source Interface:** any
- **Destination Interface:** core
- **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
- **Destination Network:** ip_wan (external IP of the security gateway)
- **Comment:** Allow incoming calls to H.323 phone at ip-phone

3. For **SAT** enter **Translate Destination IP Address:** To New IP Address: ip-phone (IP address of phone)

4. Click **OK**

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**

2. Now enter:

- **Name:** H323In
- **Action:** Allow
- **Service:** H323
- **Source Interface:** any
- **Destination Interface:** core
- **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
- **Destination Network:** ip_wan (external IP of the security gateway)
- **Comment:** Allow incoming calls to H.323 phone at ip-phone


3. Click **OK**

To place a call to the phone behind the Clavister Security Gateway, place a call to the external IP address on the security gateway. If multiple H.323 phones are placed behind the security gateway, one *SAT* rule has to be configured for each phone. This means that multiple external

addresses have to be used. However, it is preferable to use an H.323 gatekeeper as this only requires one external address.

Example 6.9. H.323 with Gatekeeper

In this scenario, a H.323 gatekeeper is placed in the DMZ of the Clavister Security Gateway. A rule is configured in the security gateway to allow traffic between the private network where the H.323 phones are connected on the internal network and to the Gatekeeper on the DMZ. The Gatekeeper on the DMZ is configured with a private address. The following rules need to be added to the rule listings in both security gateways, make sure there are no rules disallowing or allowing the same kind of ports/traffic before these rules.



InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Incoming Gatekeeper Rules:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323In
 - **Action:** SAT
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan (external IP of the security gateway)
 - **Comment:** SAT rule for incoming communication with the Gatekeeper located at ip-gatekeeper

3. For **SAT** enter **Translate Destination IP Address:** To New IP Address: ip-gatekeeper (IP address of gatekeeper).
 4. Click **OK**
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
 2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323In
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Source Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan (external IP of the security gateway)
 - **Comment:** Allow incoming communication with the Gatekeeper
 3. Click **OK**
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
 2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323In
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** ip-gatekeeper (IP address of the gatekeeper)
 - **Comment:** Allow incoming communication with the Gatekeeper
 3. Click **OK**




Note: Outgoing calls do not need a specific rule

There is no need to specify a specific rule for outgoing calls. CorePlus monitors the communication between "external" phones and the Gatekeeper to make sure that it is possible for internal phones to call the external phones that are registered with the gatekeeper.

Example 6.10. H.323 with Gatekeeper and two Clavister Security Gateways

This scenario is quite similar to scenario 3, with the difference that the Clavister Security Gateway is protecting the "external" phones. The Clavister Security Gateway with the Gatekeeper connected to the DMZ should be configured exactly as in scenario 3. The other Clavister Security Gateway should be configured as below. The rules need to be added to the rule listings, and it should be make sure there are no rules disallowing or allowing the same kind of ports/traffic before these rules.

***InControl***

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** H323Out
 - **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** 0.0.0.0/0 (all-nets)
 - **Comment:** Allow outgoing communication with a gatekeeper
3. Click **OK**




Note: Outgoing calls do not need a specific rule

There is no need to specify a specific rule for outgoing calls. CorePlus monitors the communication between "external" phones and the Gatekeeper to make sure that it is possible for internal phones to call the external phones that are registered with the gatekeeper.

Example 6.11. Using the H.323 ALG in a Corporate Environment

This scenario is an example of a more complex network that shows how the H.323 ALG can be deployed in a corporate environment. At the head office DMZ a H.323 Gatekeeper is placed that can handle all H.323 clients in the head-, branch- and remote offices. This will allow the whole corporation to use the network for both voice communication and application sharing. It is assumed that the VPN tunnels are correctly configured and that all offices use private IP-ranges on their local networks. All outside calls are done over the existing telephone network using the gateway (ip-gateway) connected to the ordinary telephone network.



The head office has placed a H.323 Gatekeeper in the DMZ of the corporate Clavister Security Gateway. This security gateway should be configured as follows:

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** LanToGK
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** ip-gatekeeper
 - **Comment:** Allow H.323 entities on lannet to connect to the Gatekeeper
3. Click **OK**

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** LanToGK
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** ip-gateway
 - **Comment:** Allow H.323 entities on lannet to call phones connected to the H.323 Gateway on the DMZ
3. Click **OK**

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** GWToLan
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** dmz
 - **Destination Interface:** lan
 - **Source Network:** ip-gateway

- **Destination Network:** lannet
 - **Comment:** Allow communication from the Gateway to H.323 phones on lannet
3. Click **OK**
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
 2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** BranchToGW
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** vpn-branch
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** branch-net
 - **Destination Network:** ip-gatekeeper, ip-gateway
 - **Comment:** Allow communication with the Gatekeeper on DMZ from the Branch network
 3. Click **OK**
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
 2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** BranchToGW
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** vpn-remote
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Source Network:** remote-net
 - **Destination Network:** ip-gatekeeper
 - **Comment:** Allow communication with the Gatekeeper on DMZ from the Remote network
 3. Click **OK**

Example 6.12. Configuring remote offices for H.323

If the branch and remote office H.323 phones and applications are to be configured to use the H.323 Gatekeeper at the head office, the Clavister Security Gateways in the remote and branch

offices should be configured as follows: (this rule should be in both the Branch and Remote Office security gateways).

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** ToGK
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Destination Interface:** vpn-hq
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Network:** hq-net
 - **Comment:** Allow communication with the Gatekeeper connected to the Head Office DMZ
3. Click **OK**

Example 6.13. Allowing the H.323 Gateway to register with the Gatekeeper

The branch office Clavister Security Gateway has a H.323 Gateway connected to its DMZ. In order to allow the Gateway to register with the H.323 Gatekeeper at the Head Office, the following rule has to be configured:

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** GWTtoGK
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** H323-Gatekeeper
 - **Source Interface:** dmz

- **Destination Interface:** vpn-hq
 - **Source Network:** ip-branchgw
 - **Destination Network:** hq-net
 - **Comment:** Allow the Gateway to communicate with the Gatekeeper connected to the Head Office
3. Click **OK**



Note: Outgoing calls do not need a specific rule

There is no need to specify a specific rule for outgoing calls. CorePlus monitors the communication between "external" phones and the Gatekeeper to make sure that it is possible for internal phones to call the external phones that are registered with the gatekeeper.

6.2.10. The TLS ALG

Overview

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a protocol that provides secure communications over the public Internet between two end points through the use of cryptography as well as providing endpoint authentication.

Typically in a TLS client/server scenario, only the identity of the server is authenticated before encrypted communication begins. TLS is very often encountered when a web browser connects with a server that uses TLS such as when a customer accesses online banking facilities. This is sometimes referred to as an *HTTPS* connection and is often indicated by a padlock icon appearing in the browser's navigation bar.

TLS can provide a convenient and simple solution for secure access by clients to servers and avoids many of the complexities of other types of VPN solutions such as using IPsec. Most web browsers support TLS and users can therefore easily have secure server access without requiring additional software.

The Relationship with SSL

TLS is a successor to the *Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)* but the differences are slight. Therefore, for most purposes, TLS and SSL can be regarded as equivalent. In the context of the TLS ALG, we can say that the Clavister Security Gateway is providing *SSL termination* since it is acting as an SSL end-point.

Regarding the SSL and TLS standards supported, CorePlus provides termination support for SSL 3.0 as well as TLS 1.0, with RFC 2246 defining the TLS 1.0 support (with CorePlus supporting the server side part of RFC 2246).

TLS is Certificate Based

TLS security is based on the use of digital certificates which are present on the server side and

sent to a client at the beginning of a TLS session in order to establish the server's identity and then be the basis for encryption. Certificates which are Certificate Authority (CA) signed can be used on the server in which case a client's web browser will automatically recognize the validity of the certificate.

Self-signed certificates can be used instead of CA signed certificates on the server. With self-signed certificates, the client's web browser will alert the user that the certificate's authenticity is not recognized and the user will have to explicitly tell the browser to accept the certificate and continue.




Figure 6.7. TLS Termination

Advantages of Using CorePlus for TLS Termination

TLS can be implemented directly in the server to which clients connect, however, if the servers are protected behind a Clavister Security Gateway, then CorePlus can take on the role of the TLS endpoint. CorePlus then performs TLS authentication, encryption and unencryption of data to/from clients and the transfer of unencrypted data to/from servers. The advantages of this approach are:

- TLS support can be centralized in the Clavister Security Gateway instead of being set up on individual servers.
- Certificates can be managed centrally in the Clavister Security Gateway instead of on individual servers. Unique certificates (or one wildcard certificate) does not needed to be present on each server.
- The encryption/decryption processing overhead required by TLS can be offloaded to the Clavister Security Gateway. This is be sometimes referred to as *SSL acceleration*. Any processing advantages that can be achieved can, however, vary and will depend on the comparative processing capabilities of the servers and the Clavister Security Gateway.
- Decrypted TLS traffic can be subject to other CorePlus features such as traffic shaping or looking for server threats with IDP scanning.
- TLS can be combined with CorePlus *server load balancing* to provide a means to spread traffic across servers.

Enabling TLS

The steps to take to enable TLS in CorePlus are as follows:

1. Upload the host and root certificates to be used with TLS to CorePlus if not done already.
2. Define a new TLS ALG object and associate the appropriate host and root certificates with the ALG. If the certificate is self-signed then the root and host certificate should both be set to the same certificate.
3. Create a new custom *Service* object based on the TCP protocol.
4. Associate the TLS ALG object with the newly created service object.
5. Create a *NAT* or *Allow* IP rule for the targeted traffic and associate the custom service object with it.
6. Optionally, a *SAT* rule can be created to change the destination port for the unencrypted traffic. Alternatively an *SLB_SAT* rule can be used to do load balancing (the destination port can also be changed through a custom service object).

URLs Delivered by Servers

It should be noted that using CorePlus for TLS termination will not change URLs in webpages delivered by servers which lie behind the Clavister Security Gateway.

What this means is that if a client connects to a webserver behind the Clavister Security Gateway using the *https://* protocol then any web pages delivered back containing absolute URLs with the *http://* protocol (perhaps to refer to other pages on the same site) will not have these URLs converted to *https://* by CorePlus. The solution to this issue is for the servers to use relative URLs instead of absolute ones.

Cipher Suites Supported by CorePlus TLS

CorePlus TLS supports the following cipher suites:

1. TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.
2. TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA.
3. TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5.
4. TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_56_SHA (certificate key size up to 1024 bits).
5. TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 (certificate key size up to 1024 bits).
6. TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 (certificate key size up to 1024 bits).
7. TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5.
8. TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA.

CorePlus TLS Limitations

As discussed above, CorePlus TLS provides support for server side termination only. The other limitations that should be noted.

- Client authentication is not supported (where Clavister Security Gateway authenticates the identity of the client).

- Renegotiation is not supported.
- Sending server key exchange messages is not supported which means the key in the certificate must be sufficiently weak in order to use export ciphers.
- The certificate chain used by CorePlus can contain at most 2 certificates.

6.3. Web Content Filtering

6.3.1. Overview

Web traffic is one of the biggest sources for security issues and misuse of the Internet. Inappropriate surfing habits can expose a network to many security threats as well as legal and regulatory liabilities. Productivity and Internet bandwidth can also be impaired.

Filtering Mechanisms

Through the HTTP ALG, CorePlus provides the following mechanisms for filtering out web content that is deemed inappropriate for an organization or group of users:

- *Active Content Handling* can be used to "scrub" web pages of content that the administrator considers a potential threat, such as ActiveX objects and Java Applets.
- *Static Content Filtering* provides a means for manually classifying web sites as "good" or "bad". This is also known as URL *blacklisting* and *whitelisting*.
- *Dynamic Content Filtering* is a powerful feature that enables the administrator to allow or block access to web sites depending on the category they have been classified into by an automatic classification service. Dynamic content filtering requires a minimum of administration effort and has very high accuracy.



Note: Enabling WCF

All Web Content Filtering is enabled via the HTTP ALG which is described in Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG".

6.3.2. Active Content Handling

Some web content can contain malicious code designed to harm the workstation or the network from where the user is surfing. Typically, such code is embedded into various types of objects or files which are embedded into web pages.

CorePlus includes support for removing the following types of objects from web page content:

- ActiveX objects (including Flash)
- Java applets
- Javascript/VBScript code
- Cookies
- Invalidly formatted UTF-8 Characters (invalid URL formatting can be used to attack webservers)

The object types to be removed can be selected individually by configuring the corresponding HTTP Application Layer Gateway accordingly.



Caution: Consider the consequences of removing objects

Careful consideration should be given before enabling removal any object types from

web content. Many web sites use Javascript and other types of client-side code and in most cases, the code is non-malicious. Common examples of this is the scripting used to implement drop-down menus as well as hiding and showing elements on web pages.

Removing such legitimate code could, at best, cause the web site to look distorted, at worst, cause it to not work in a browser at all. Active Content Handling should therefore only be used when the consequences are well understood.

Example 6.14. Stripping ActiveX and Java applets

This example shows how to configure a HTTP Application Layer Gateway to strip ActiveX and Java applets. The example will use the `content_filtering` ALG object and presumes you have done one of the previous examples.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> set ALG ALG_HTTP content_filtering
                RemoveActiveX=Yes RemoveApplets=Yes
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > ALG**
2. In the table, click on our HTTP ALG object, *content_filtering*
3. Check the **Strip ActiveX objects (including flash)** control
4. Check the **Strip Java applets** control
5. Click **OK**

6.3.3. Static Content Filtering

Through the HTTP ALG, CorePlus can block or permit certain web pages based on configured lists of URLs which are called *blacklists* and *whitelists*. This type of filtering is also known as *Static Content Filtering*. The main benefit with Static Content Filtering is that it is an excellent tool to target specific web sites, and make the decision as to whether they should be blocked or allowed.

Static and Dynamic Filter Ordering

Additionally, Static Content Filtering takes place *before* Dynamic Content Filtering (described below), which allows the possibility of manually making exceptions from the automatic dynamic classification process. In a scenario where goods have to be purchased from a particular on-line store, Dynamic Content Filtering might be set to prevent access to shopping sites by blocking the "Shopping" category. By entering the on-line store's URL into the HTTP Application Layer Gateway's whitelist, access to that URL is always allowed, taking precedence over Dynamic

Content Filtering.

Wildcarding

Both the URL blacklist and URL whitelist support wildcard matching of URLs in order to be more flexible. This wildcard matching is also applicable to the path following the URL hostname which means that filtering can be controlled to a file and directory level.

Below are some good and bad blacklist example URLs used for blocking:

.example.com/	Good. This will block all hosts in the <i>example.com</i> domain and all web pages served by those hosts.
www.example.com/*	Good. This will block the <i>www.example.com</i> website and all web pages served by that site.
/.gif	Good. This will block all files with <i>.gif</i> as the file name extension.
www.example.com	Bad. This will only block the first request to the web site. Surfing to <i>www.example.com/index.html</i> , for example, will not be blocked.
example.com/	Bad. This will also cause <i>www.myexample.com</i> to be blocked since it blocks all sites ending with <i>example.com</i> .



Note: The hosts and networks blacklist is separate

Web content filtering URL blacklisting is a separate concept from Section 6.7, "Blacklisting Hosts and Networks".

Example 6.15. Setting up a white and blacklist

This example shows the use of static content filtering where CorePlus can block or permit certain web pages based on blacklists and whitelists. As the usability of static content filtering will be illustrated, dynamic content filtering and active content handling will not be enabled in this example.

In this small scenario a general surfing policy prevents users from downloading *.exe*-files. However, the Clavister website provides secure and necessary program files which should be allowed to download.

Command-Line Interface

Start by adding an HTTP ALG in order to filter HTTP traffic:

```
Device:/> add ALG ALG_HTTP content_filtering
```

Then create a HTTP ALG URL to set up a blacklist:

```
Device:/> cc ALG ALG_HTTP content_filtering
```

```
Device:/content_filtering> add ALG_HTTP_URL
                        URL=*/*.exe
                        Action=Blacklist
```

Finally, make an exception from the blacklist by creating a specific whitelist:

```
Device:/content_filtering> add ALG_HTTP_URL
                        URL=www.Clavister.com/*.exe
                        Action=Whitelist
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Start by adding an HTTP ALG in order to filter HTTP traffic:

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > HTTP ALG**
2. Enter a suitable name for the ALG, for example *content_filtering*
3. Click **OK**

Then create a HTTP ALG URL to setup a blacklist:

1. Go to **Objects > ALG**
2. In the table, click on the recently created HTTP ALG to view its properties
3. Click the **HTTP URL** tab
4. Now click **Add** and select **HTTP ALG URL** from the menu
5. Select **Blacklist** as the **Action**
6. Enter **/*.exe* in the **URL** textbox
7. Click **OK**

Finally, make an exception from the blacklist by creating a whitelist:

1. Go to **Objects > ALG**
2. In the table, click on the recently created HTTP ALG to view its properties
3. Click the **HTTP URL** tab
4. Now click **Add** and select **HTTP ALG URL** from the menu
5. Select **Whitelist** as the **Action**
6. In the **URL** textbox, enter *www.Clavister.com/*.exe*
7. Click **OK**

Simply continue adding specific blacklists and whitelists until the filter satisfies the needs.

6.3.4. Dynamic Web Content Filtering

6.3.4.1. Overview

As part of the HTTP ALG, CorePlus supports *Dynamic Web Content Filtering (WCF)* of web traffic, which enables an administrator to permit or block access to web pages based on the content of those web pages.

Dynamic WCF Databases

CorePlus *Dynamic WCF* allows web page blocking to be automated so it is not necessary to manually specify beforehand which URLs to block or to allow. Instead, Clavister maintains a global infrastructure of databases containing huge numbers of current web site URL addresses which are already classified and grouped into a variety of categories such as shopping, news, sport, adult-oriented and so on.

The Dynamic WCF URL databases are updated almost hourly with new, categorized URLs while at the same time older, invalid URLs are dropped. The scope of the URLs in the databases is global, covering websites in many different languages and hosted on servers located in many different countries.

WCF Processing Flow

When a user of a web browser requests access to a web site, CorePlus queries the Dynamic WCF databases in order to retrieve the category of the requested site. Access to the URL can then be allowed or denied based on the filtering policy that the administrator has put in place for that category.

If access is denied, a web page will be presented to the user explaining that the requested site has been blocked. To make the lookup process as fast as possible CorePlus maintains a local cache in memory of recently accessed URLs. Caching can be highly efficient since a given user community, such as a group of university students, often surfs to a limited range of websites.




Figure 6.8. Dynamic Content Filtering Flow

If the requested web page URL is not present in the databases, then the webpage content at the URL will automatically be downloaded to Clavister's central data warehouse and automatically analyzed using a combination of software techniques. Once categorized, the URL is distributed to the global databases and CorePlus receives the category for the URL. Dynamic WCF therefore requires a minimum of administration effort.



Note: New URL submissions are done anonymously

New, uncategorized URLs sent to the Clavister network are treated as anonymous submissions and no record of the source of new submissions is kept.

Categorizing Pages and Not Sites

CorePlus dynamic filtering categorizes web pages and not sites. In other words, a web site may contain particular pages that should be blocked without blocking the entire site. CorePlus provides blocking down to the page level so that users may still access parts of websites that are not blocked by the filtering policy.

WCF and Whitelisting

If a particular URL is whitelisted then it will bypass the WCF subsystem. No classification will be done on the URL and it will always be allowed. This applies if the URL has an exact match with an entry on the whitelist or if it matches an entry that makes use of wildcarding.

6.3.4.2. Setting Up WCF

Activation

Dynamic Content Filtering is a feature that is enabled by taking out a separate subscription to the service. This is an addition to the normal CorePlus license. For complete details of subscription services, see *Appendix A, Update Subscriptions*.

Once a subscription is taken out, an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object should be defined with Dynamic Content Filtering enabled. This object is then associated with a service object and the service object is then associated with a rule in the IP rule set to determine which traffic should be subject to the filtering. This makes possible the setting up of a detailed filtering policy based on the filtering parameters that are used for rules in the IP rule set.



Tip: Using a schedule

If you would like your content filtering policy to vary depending on the time of the day, make use of a schedule object in the corresponding IP rule. For more information, please see Section 3.6, "Schedules".

Setting Fail Mode

The option exists to set the HTTP ALG *fail mode* in the same way that it can be set for some other ALGs and it applies to WCF just as it does to functions such as Anti-Virus scanning. The fail mode setting determines what happens when dynamic content filtering cannot function and, typically, this is because CorePlus is unable to reach the external databases to perform URL lookup. Fail mode can have one of two settings:

- **Deny** - If WCF is unable to function then URLs are denied if external database access to verify them is not possible. The user will see an "Access denied" web page.
- **Allow** - If the external WCF database is not accessible, URLs are allowed even though they might be disallowed if the WCF databases were accessible.

Example 6.16. Enabling Dynamic Web Content Filtering

This example shows how to setup a dynamic content filtering policy for HTTP traffic from **intnet** to **all-nets**. The policy will be configured to block all search sites, and this example assumes that the system is using a single NAT rule for HTTP traffic from **intnet** to **all-nets**.

Command-Line Interface

First, create an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object:

```
Device:/> add ALG ALG_HTTP content_filtering
           WebContentFilteringMode=Enabled
           FilteringCategories=SEARCH_SITES
```

Then, create a service object using the new HTTP ALG:

```
Device:/> add ServiceTCPUDP http_content_filtering Type=TCP
           DestinationPorts=80
           ALG=content_filtering
```

Finally, modify the NAT rule to use the new service. Assume rule is called **NATHttp**:

```
Device:/> set IPRule NATHttp Service=http_content_filtering
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

First, create an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object:

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > HTTP ALG**
2. Specify a suitable name for the ALG, for example *content_filtering*
3. Click the **Web Content Filtering** tab
4. Select **Enabled** in the **Mode** list
5. In the **Blocked Categories** list, select **Search Sites** and click the >> button.
6. Click **OK**

Then, create a service object using the new HTTP ALG:

1. Go to **Local Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP service**
2. Specify a suitable name for the Service, for example *http_content_filtering*
3. Select the **TCP** in the **Type** dropdown list

4. Enter **80** in the **Destination Port** textbox
5. Select the HTTP ALG you just created in the **ALG** list
6. Click **OK**

Finally, modify the *NAT* rule to use the new service:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules**
2. Select the *NAT* rule handling your HTTP traffic
3. Select the **Service** tab
4. Select your new service, `http_content_filtering`, in the predefined **Service** list
5. Click **OK**

Dynamic content filtering is now activated for all web traffic from *lannet* to *all-nets*.

We can validate the functionality with the following steps:

1. On a workstation on the *lannet* network, launch a standard web browser.
2. Try to browse to a search site. For example, *www.google.com*.
3. If everything is configured correctly, the web browser will present a web page that informs the user about that the requested site is blocked.

Audit Mode

In *Audit Mode*, the system will classify and log all surfing according to the content filtering policy, but restricted web sites will still be accessible to the users. This means the content filtering feature of CorePlus can then be used as an analysis tool to analysis what categories of websites are being accessed by a user community and how often.

After running in Audit Mode for some period of time, it is easier to then have a better understanding of the surfing behavior of different user groups and also to better understand the potential impact of turning on the WCF feature.

Introducing Blocking Gradually

Blocking websites can be controversial if it's suddenly introduced. It is therefore recommended that the administrator gradually introduces the blocking of particular categories one at a time. This allows individual users time to get used to the notion that blocking exists and could avoid any adverse reaction that might occur if too much is blocked at once. Gradual introduction also makes it easier to evaluate if the goals of site blocking are being met.

Example 6.17. Enabling Audit Mode

This example is based on the same scenario as the previous example, but now with audit mode enabled.

Command-Line Interface

First, create an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object:

```
Device: /> add ALG ALG_HTTP content_filtering
           WebContentFilteringMode=Audit
           FilteringCategories=SEARCH_SITES
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

First, create an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object:

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > HTTP ALG**
2. Specify a suitable name for the ALG, for example *content_filtering*
3. Click the **Web Content Filtering** tab
4. Select **Audit** in the **Mode** list
5. In the **Blocked Categories** list, select **Search Sites** and click the >> button
6. Click **OK**

The steps to then create a service object using the new HTTP ALG and modifying the NAT rule to use the new service, are described in the previous example.

Allowing Override

On some occasions, Active Content Filtering may prevent users carrying out legitimate tasks. Consider a stock analyst who deals with on-line gaming companies. In his daily work, he might need to browse gambling web sites to conduct company assessments. If the corporate policy blocks gambling web-sites, he will not be able to do his job.

For this reason, CorePlus supports a feature called *Allow Override*. With this feature enabled, the content filtering component will present a warning to the user that he is about to enter a web site that is restricted according to the corporate policy, and that his visit to the web site will be logged. This page is known as the *restricted site notice*. The user is then free to continue to the URL, or abort the request to prevent being logged.

By enabling this functionality, only users that have a valid reason to visit inappropriate sites will normally do so. Other will avoid those sites due to the obvious risk of exposing their surfing habits.

**Caution: Overriding the restriction of a site**

If a user overrides the restricted site notice page, they are allowed to surf to all pages without any new restricted site message appearing again. The user is however still being logged. When the user has become inactive for 5 minutes, the restricted site page will reappear if they then try to access a restricted site.

Reclassification of Blocked Sites

As the process of classifying unknown web sites is automated, there is always a small risk that some sites are given an incorrect classification. CorePlus provides a mechanism for allowing users to manually propose a new classification of sites.

This mechanism can be enabled on a per-HTTP ALG level, which means that you can choose to enable this functionality for regular users or for a selected user group only.

If reclassification is enabled and a user requests a web site which is disallowed, the block web page will include a dropdown list containing all available categories. If the user believes the requested web site is wrongly classified, he can select a more appropriate category from the dropdown list and submit that as a proposal.

The URL to the requested web site as well as the proposed category will then be sent to Clavister's central data warehouse for manual inspection. That inspection may result in the web site being reclassified, either according to the category proposed or to a category which is felt to be correct.

Example 6.18. Reclassifying a blocked site

This example shows how a user may propose a reclassification of a web site if he believes it is wrongly classified. This mechanism is enabled on a per-HTTP ALG level basis.

Command-Line Interface

First, create an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object:

```
Device:/> add ALG ALG_HTTP content_filtering
                WebContentFilteringMode=Enable
                FilteringCategories=SEARCH_SITES
                AllowReclassification=Yes
```

Then, continue setting up the service object and modifying the NAT rule as we have done in the previous examples.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

First, create an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object:

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > HTTP ALG**
2. Specify a suitable name for the ALG, for example *content_filtering*
3. Click the **Web Content Filtering** tab
4. Select **Enabled** in the **Mode** list
5. In the **Blocked Categories** list, select **Search Sites** and click the >> button
6. Check the **Allow Reclassification** control
7. Click **OK**

Then, continue setting up the service object and modifying the *NAT* rule as we have done in the previous examples.

Dynamic content filtering is now activated for all web traffic from *lannet* to *all-nets* and the user is able to propose reclassification of blocked sites. Validate the functionality by following these steps:

1. On a workstation on the *lannet* network, launch a standard web browser.
2. Try to browse to a search site, for example *www.google.com*.
3. If everything is configured correctly, your web browser will present a block page where a dropdown list containing all available categories is included.
4. The user is now able to select a more proper category and propose a reclassification.

Event Messages

Dynamic WCF utilizes the *request_url* log event message to log its activities. The parameters of this event message will contain information on whether the request was allowed or blocked, and what categories the web site was classified as. Also, the message includes parameters specifying if audit mode or a restricted site notice were in effect.



Note: Enabling *request_url* message generation

*The **request_url** event message will only be generated if event message generation has been enabled in the "parent" IP Rule.*

6.3.4.3. Content Filtering Categories

This section lists all the categories used with Dynamic Content Filtering and describes the purpose of each category.

Category 1: Adult Content

A web site may be classified under the Adult Content category if its content includes the description or depiction of erotic or sexual acts or sexually oriented material such as pornography. Exceptions to this are web sites that contain information relating to sexuality and sexual health, which may be classified under the Health Sites Category (21). Examples might be:

- www.naughtychix.com
- www.fullonxxx.com

Category 2: News

A web site may be classified under the News category if its content includes information articles on recent events pertaining to topics surrounding a locality (for example, town, city or nation) or culture, including weather forecasting information. Typically this would include most real-time online news publications and technology or trade journals. This does not include financial

quotes, refer to the Investment Sites category (11), or sports, refer to the Sports category (16). Examples might be:

- www.newsunlimited.com
- www.dailyscoop.com

Category 3: Job Search

A web site may be classified under the Job Search category if its content includes facilities to search for or submit online employment applications. This also includes resume writing and posting and interviews, as well as staff recruitment and training services. Examples might be:

- www.allthejobs.com
- www.yourcareer.com

Category 4: Gambling

A web site may be classified under the Gambling category if its content includes advertisement or encouragement of, or facilities allowing for the partaking of any form of gambling; For money or otherwise. This includes online gaming, bookmaker odds and lottery web sites. This does not include traditional or computer based games; refer to the Games Sites category (10). Examples might be:

- www.blackjackspot.com
- www.pickapony.net

Category 5: Travel / Tourism

A web site may be classified under the Travel / Tourism category if its content includes information relating to travel activities including travelling for recreation and travel reservation facilities. Examples might be:

- www.flythere.nu
- www.reallycheaptix.com.au

Category 6: Shopping

A web site may be classified under the Shopping category if its content includes any form of advertisement of goods or services to be exchanged for money, and may also include the facilities to perform that transaction online. Included in this category are market promotions, catalogue selling and merchandising services. Examples might be:

- www.megamall.com
- www.buy-alcohol.se

Category 7: Entertainment

A web site may be classified under the Entertainment category if its content includes any general

form of entertainment that is not specifically covered by another category. Some examples of this are music sites, movies, hobbies, special interest, and fan clubs. This category also includes personal web pages such as those provided by ISPs. The following categories more specifically cover various entertainment content types, Pornography / Sex (1), Gambling (4), Chatrooms (8), Game Sites (10), Sports (16), Clubs and Societies (22) and Music Downloads (23). Examples might be:

- www.celebnews.com
- www.hollywoodlatest.com

Category 8: Chatrooms

A web site may be classified under the Chatrooms category if its content focuses on or includes real-time on-line interactive discussion groups. This also includes bulletin boards, message boards, online forums, discussion groups as well as URLs for downloading chat software. Examples might be:

- www.thetalkroom.org
- chat.yazoo.com

Category 9: Dating Sites

A web site may be classified under the Dating Sites category if its content includes facilities to submit and review personal advertisements, arrange romantic meetings with other people, mail order bride / foreign spouse introductions and escort services. Examples might be:

- adultmatefinder.com
- www.marriagenow.com

Category 10: Game Sites

A web site may be classified under the Game Sites category if its content focuses on or includes the review of games, traditional or computer based, or incorporates the facilities for downloading computer game related software, or playing or participating in online games. Examples might be:

- www.gamesunlimited.com
- www.gameplace.com

Category 11: Investment Sites

A web site may be classified under the Investment Sites category if its content includes information, services or facilities pertaining to personal investment. URLs in this category include contents such as brokerage services, online portfolio setup, money management forums or stock quotes. This category does not include electronic banking facilities; refer to the E-Banking category (12). Examples might be:

- www.loadsofmoney.com.au
- www.putsandcalls.com

Category 12: E-Banking

A web site may be classified under the E-Banking category if its content includes electronic banking information or services. This category does not include Investment related content; refer to the Investment Sites category (11). Examples might be:

- www.nateast.co.uk
- www.borganfanley.com

Category 13: Crime / Terrorism

A web site may be classified under the Crime / Terrorism category if its content includes the description, promotion or instruction in, criminal or terrorist activities, cultures or opinions. Examples might be:

- www.beatthecrook.com

Category 14: Personal Beliefs / Cults

A web site may be classified under the Personal Beliefs / Cults category if its content includes the description or depiction of, or instruction in, systems of religious beliefs and practice. Examples might be:

- www.paganfed.demon.co.uk
- www.cultdeadcrow.com

Category 15: Politics

A web site may be classified under the Politics category if its content includes information or opinions of a political nature, electoral information and including political discussion groups. Examples might be:

- www.democrats.org.au
- www.political.com

Category 16: Sports

A web site may be classified under the Sports category if its content includes information or instructions relating to recreational or professional sports, or reviews on sporting events and sports scores. Examples might be:

- www.sportstoday.com
- www.soccerball.com

Category 17: www-Email Sites

A web site may be classified under the www-Email Sites category if its content includes online,

web-based email facilities. Examples might be:

- www.coldmail.com
- mail.yazoo.com

Category 18: Violence / Undesirable

A web site may be classified under the Violence / Undesirable category if its contents are extremely violent or horrific in nature. This includes the promotion, description or depiction of violent acts, as well as web sites that have undesirable content and may not be classified elsewhere. Examples might be:

- www.itstinks.com
- www.ratemywaste.com

Category 19: Malicious

A web site may be classified under the Malicious category if its content is capable of causing damage to a computer or computer environment, including malicious consumption of network bandwidth. This category also includes "Phishing" URLs which designed to capture secret user authentication details by pretending to be a legitimate organization. Examples might be:

- hastalavista.baby.nu

Category 20: Search Sites

A web site may be classified under the Search Sites category if its main focus is providing online Internet search facilities. Refer to the section on unique categories at the start of this document. Examples might be:

- www.zoogle.com
- www.yazoo.com

Category 21: Health Sites

A web site may be classified under the Health Sites category if its content includes health related information or services, including sexuality and sexual health, as well as support groups, hospital and surgical information and medical journals. Examples might be:

- www.thehealthzone.com
- www.safedrugs.com

Category 22: Clubs and Societies

A web site may be classified under the Clubs and Societies category if its content includes information or services of relating to a club or society. This includes team or conference web sites. Examples might be:

- www.sierra.org

- www.walkingclub.org

Category 23: Music Downloads

A web site may be classified under the Music Downloads category if it provides online music downloading, uploading and sharing facilities as well as high bandwidth audio streaming. Examples might be:

- www.onlymp3s.com
- www.mp3space.com

Category 24: Business Oriented

A web site may be classified under the Business Oriented category if its content is relevant to general day-to-day business or proper functioning of the Internet, for example Web browser updates. Access to web sites in this category would in most cases not be considered unproductive or inappropriate.

Category 25: Government Blocking List

This category is populated by URLs specified by a government agency, and contains URLs that are deemed unsuitable for viewing by the general public by way of their very extreme nature. Examples might be:

- www.verynastystuff.com
- www.unpleasantvids.com

Category 26: Educational

A web site classified under the Educational category may belong to other categories but has content that relates to educational services or has been deemed of educational value, or to be an educational resource, by educational organizations. This category is populated by request or submission from various educational organizations. Examples might be:

- highschoolsays.org
- www.learn-at-home.com

Category 27: Advertising

A web site may be classified under the Advertising category if its main focus includes providing advertising related information or services. Examples might be:

- www.admessages.com
- www.tripleclick.com

Category 28: Drugs/Alcohol

A web site may be classified under the Drugs/Alcohol category if its content includes drug and alcohol related information or services. Some URLs categorized under this category may also be categorized under the Health category. Examples might be:

- www.the-cocktail-guide.com
- www.stiffdrinks.com

Category 29: Computing/IT

A web site may be classified under the Computing/IT category if its content includes computing related information or services. Examples might be:

- www.purplehat.com
- www.gnu.org

Category 30: Swimsuit/Lingerie/Models

A web site may be categorized under the Swimsuit/Lingerie/Models category if its content includes information pertaining to, or images of swimsuit, lingerie or general fashion models. Examples might be:

- www.vickys-secret.com
- sportspictured.cnn.com/features/2002/swimsuit

Category 31: Spam

A web site may be classified under the Spam category if it is found to be contained in bulk or spam emails. Examples might be:

- kaqsovdij.gjibhgk.info
- www.pleaseupdateyourdetails.com

Category 32: Non-Managed

Unclassified sites and sites that do not fit one of the other categories will be placed in this category. It is unusual to block this category since this could result in most harmless URLs being blocked.

6.3.4.4. Customizing HTML Pages

Dynamic Web Content filtering make use of a set of HTML files to present information to the user when certain conditions occur such as trying to access a blocked site. These web pages, sometimes referred to as *HTTP banner files*, are stored within CorePlus but can be customized to suit a particular installation's needs. The WebUI provides a simple way to download, edit and upload these files. The available files are:

RestrictedSiteNotice ReclassifyURL

To perform customization it is necessary to first create a new, named **ALG Banner Files** object. This new object automatically contains a copy of all the files in the *Default* ALG Banner Files object. These new files can then be edited and uploaded back to CorePlus. The original *Default* object cannot be edited. The following example goes through the necessary steps.

Example 6.19. Editing Content Filtering HTTP Banner Files

This example shows how to modify the contents of the *URL forbidden* HTML page.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > Banner files > Add > ALG Banner Files**
2. Enter a name such as *new_forbidden* and press **OK**
3. The dialog for the new set of ALG banner files will appear
4. Click the **Edit & Preview tab**
5. Select *URLForbidden* from the **Page** list
6. Now edit the HTML source that appears in the text box for the Forbidden URL page
7. Use **Preview** to check the layout if required
8. Press **Save** to save the changes
9. Click **OK** to exit editing
10. Go to **User Authentication > User Authentication Rules**
11. Select the relevant HTML ALG and click the **Agent Options** tab
12. Set the **HTTP Banners** option to be *new_forbidden*
13. Click **OK**
14. Go to **Configuration > Save & Activate** to activate the new file
15. Press **Save** and then click **OK**

The new file will be uploaded to CorePlus



Tip: Saving changes

*In the above example, more than one HTML file can be edited in a session but the **Save** button should be pressed to save any edits before beginning editing on another file.*

Uploading with SCP

It is possible to upload new HTTP Banner files using SCP. The steps to do this are:

1. Since SCP cannot be used to download the original default HTML, the source code must be first copied from the WebUI and pasted into a local text file which is then edited using an appropriate editor.
2. A new **ALG Banner Files** object must exist which the edited file(s) is uploaded to. If the object is called *mytxt*, the CLI command to create this object is:

```
Device:/> add HTTPALGBanners mytxt
```

This creates an object which contains a copy of all the *Default* content filtering banner files.

3. The modified file is then uploaded using SCP. It is uploaded to the object type *HTTPALGBanner* and the object *mytxt* with the property name *URLForbidden*. If the edited *URLForbidden* local file is called *my.html* then using the Open SSH SCP client, the upload command would be:

```
scp myhtml admin@10.5.62.11:HTTPAuthBanners/mytxt/URLForbidden
```

The usage of SCP clients is explained further in *Section 2.1.6, "Secure Copy"*.

4. Using the CLI, the relevant HTTP ALG should now be set to use the *mytxt* banner files. If the ALG is called *my_http_alg*, the command would be:

```
set ALG_HTTP my_http_alg HTTPBanners=mytxt
```

5. As usual, the *activate* followed by the *commit* CLI commands must be used to activate the changes on the Clavister Security Gateway.

HTML Page Parameters

The HTML pages contain a number of parameters that can be used as and where it is appropriate. The parameters available are:

- **%URL%** - The URL which was requested
- **%IPADDR%** - The IP address which is being browsed from
- **%REASON%** - The reason that access was denied

6.4. Anti-Virus Scanning

6.4.1. Overview

The CorePlus Anti-Virus module protects against malicious code carried in file downloads. Files may be downloaded as part of a web-page in an HTTP transfer, in an FTP download, or perhaps as an attachment to an email delivered through SMTP. Malicious code in such downloads can have different intents ranging from programs that merely cause annoyance to more sinister aims such as sending back passwords, credit card numbers and other sensitive information. The term "Virus" can be used as a generic description for all forms of malicious code carried in files.

Combining with Client Anti-Virus Scanning

Unlike IDP, which is primarily directed at attacks against servers, Anti-Virus scanning is focused on downloads by clients. CorePlus Anti-Virus is designed to be a complement to the standard antivirus scanning normally carried out locally by specialized software installed on client computers. IDP is not intended as a complete substitute for local scanning but rather as an extra shield to boost client protection. Most importantly, it can act as a backup for when local client antivirus scanning is not available.

Enabling Through ALGs

CorePlus Anti-Virus is enabled on a per ALG basis. It is available for file downloads associated with the following ALGs and is enabled in the ALGs themselves:

- The HTTP ALG
- The FTP ALG
- The POP3 ALG
- The SMTP ALG

Hardware Acceleration

Anti-Virus performance, like IDP scanning performance, can be increased with an optional hardware acceleration upgrade on the SG50, SG4200 and SG4400 Security Gateways. Multiple streams are accelerated asynchronously in this optional hardware to boost overall throughput. The console command

```
Device: /> hwaccel
```

can be used to check if acceleration is installed. Note that Anti-Virus is not available on the discontinued SG30 model.

6.4.2. Implementation

Streaming

As a file transfer is streamed through the Clavister Security Gateway, CorePlus will scan the data stream for the presence of viruses if the Anti-Virus module is enabled. Since files are being streamed and not being read completely into memory, a minimum amount of memory is required and there is minimal effect on overall throughput.

Pattern Matching

The inspection process is based on *pattern matching* against a database of known virus patterns and can determine, with a high degree of certainty, if a virus is in the process of being downloaded to a user behind the Clavister Security Gateway. Once a virus is recognized in the contents of a file, the download can be terminated before it completes.

Types of File Downloads Scanned

As described above, Anti-Virus scanning is enabled on a per ALG basis and can scan file downloads associated with the HTTP, FTP, SMTP and POP3 ALGs. More specifically:

- Any uncompressed file type transferred through these ALGs can be scanned.
- If the download has been compressed, ZIP and GZIP file downloads can be scanned.

The administrator has the option to always drop specific files as well as the option to specify a size limit on scanned files. If no size limit is specified then there is no default upper limit on file sizes.

Simultaneous Scans

There is no fixed limit on how many Anti-Virus scans can take place simultaneously in a single Clavister Security Gateway. However, the available free memory can place a limit on the number of concurrent scans that can be initiated.

Protocol Specific behavior

Since Anti-Virus scanning is implemented through an *Application Level Gateway* (ALG), specific protocol specific features are implemented in CorePlus. With FTP, for example, scanning is aware of the dual control and data transfer channels that are opened and can send a request via the control connection to stop a download if a virus in the download is detected.

Relationship with IDP

A question that is often posed is the "ordering" of Anti-virus scanning in relation to IDP scanning. In fact, the concept of ordering is not relevant since the two scanning processes can occur simultaneously and operate at different protocol levels.

If IDP is enabled, it scans all packets designated by a defined IDP rule and does not take notice of higher level protocols, such as HTTP, that generate the packet streams. However, Anti-virus is aware of the higher level protocol and only looks at the data involved in file transfers. Anti-virus scanning is a function that therefore logically belongs in an ALG, whereas IDP does not belong there.

6.4.3. Activating Anti-Virus Scanning

Association with an ALG

Activation of Anti-Virus scanning is achieved through an ALG associated with the targeted protocol. An ALG object must first exist with the Anti-Virus option enabled. As always, an ALG must then be associated with an appropriate service object for the protocol to be scanned. The service object is then associated with a rule in the IP rule set which defines the origin and destination of the traffic to which the ALG is to be applied.

Creating Anti-Virus Policies

Since IP rule set rules are the means by which the Anti-Virus feature is deployed, the deployment can be *policy based*. IP rules can specify that the ALG and its associated Anti-Virus scanning can apply to traffic going in a given direction and between specific source and destination IP addresses and/or networks. Scheduling can also be applied to virus scanning so that it takes place only at specific times.

6.4.4. The Signature Database

SafeStream

CorePlus Anti-Virus scanning is implemented by Clavister using the "SafeStream" virus signature database. The SafeStream database is created and maintained by Kaspersky, a company which is a world leader in the field of virus detection. The database provides protection against virtually all known virus threats including trojans, worms, backdoor exploits and others. The database is also thoroughly tested to provide near zero false positives.

Database Updates

The SafeStream database is updated on a daily basis with new virus signatures. Older signatures are seldom retired but instead are replaced with more generic signatures covering several viruses. The local CorePlus copy of the SafeStream database should therefore be updated regularly and this updating service is enabled as part of the subscription to the Clavister Anti-Virus subscription.

6.4.5. Subscribing to the Clavister Anti-Virus Service

The Clavister Anti-Virus feature is purchased as an additional component to the base Clavister license and is bought in the form of a renewable subscription. An Anti-Virus subscription includes regular updates of the Kaspersky SafeStream database during the subscription period with the signatures of the latest virus threats.

To subscribe to the Anti-Virus service please refer to the details described in *Appendix A, Update Subscriptions*.

6.4.6. Anti-Virus Options

When configuring Anti-Virus scanning in an ALG, the following parameters can be set:

1. General options

Mode	This must be one of: <ul style="list-style-type: none">i. Disabled - Anti-Virus is switched off.ii. Audit - Scanning is active but logging is the only action.iii. Protect - Anti-Virus is active. Suspect files are dropped and logged.
Fail mode behavior	If a virus scan fails for any reason then the transfer can be dropped or allowed, with the event being logged. If this option is set to <i>Allow</i>

then a condition such as the virus database not being available or the current license not being valid will not cause files to be dropped. Instead, they will be allowed through and a log message will be generated to indicate a failure has occurred.

2. Scan Exclude Option

Certain filetypes may be explicitly excluded from virus-scanning if that is desirable. This can increase overall throughput if an excluded filetype is a type which is commonly encountered in a particular scenario, such as image files in HTTP downloads.

CorePlus performs MIME content checking on all the filetypes listed in *Appendix C, Verified MIME filetypes* to establish the file's true filetype and then look for that filetype in the excluded list. If the file's type cannot be established from its contents (and this may happen with filetypes not specified in *Appendix C, Verified MIME filetypes*) then the filetype in the file's name is used when the excluded list is checked.

3. Compression Ratio Limit

When scanning compressed files, CorePlus must apply decompression to examine the file's contents. Some types of data can result in very high compression ratios where the compressed file is a small fraction of the original uncompressed file size. This can mean that a comparatively small compressed file attachment might need to be uncompressed into a much larger file which can place an excessive load on CorePlus resources and noticeably slowdown throughput.

To prevent this situation, the administrator should specify a *Compression Ratio* limit. If the limit of the ration is specified as **10** then this will mean that if the uncompressed file is 10 times larger than the compressed file, the specified Action should be taken. The Action can be one of:

- **Allow** - The file is allowed through without virus scanning
- **Scan** - Scan the file for viruses as normal
- **Drop** - Drop the file

In all three of the above cases the event is logged.

Verifying the MIME Type

The ALG **File Integrity** options can be utilized with Anti-Virus scanning to check that the file's contents matches the MIME type it claims to be.

The MIME type identifies a file's type. For instance a file might be identified as being of type *.gif* and therefore should contain image data of that type. Some viruses can try to hide inside files by using a misleading file type. A file might pretend to be a *.gif* file but the file's data will not match that type's data pattern because it is infected with a virus.

Enabling of this function is recommended to make sure this form of attack cannot allow a virus to get through. The possible MIME types that can be checked are listed in *Appendix C, Verified MIME filetypes*.

Selecting the Anti-Virus Engine

If hardware based Anti-Virus acceleration is not available then the CorePlus Anti-Virus module offers a choice of Anti-Virus software scanning engines. The advanced setting **AVSW_Engine** allows selection of the engine best suited to the environment in which it is running. The options

for this setting are:

- **Auto** - Select the engine automatically.
- **DFA** - Use the engine which maximizes scanning speed.
- **NFA** - Use the engine which minimizes memory usage.

These options have no meaning if Anti-Virus hardware acceleration is being used.

Setting the Correct System Time

It is important that a CorePlus has the correct system time set if the auto-update feature in the Anti-Virus module can function correctly. An incorrect time can mean the auto-updating is disabled.

The console command

```
Device:/> updatecenter -status
```

will show the current status of the auto-update feature.

Updating in High Availability Clusters

Updating the Anti-Virus databases for both the Clavister Security Gateways in an HA Cluster is performed automatically by CorePlus. In a cluster there is always an *active* unit and an *inactive* unit. Only the active unit in the cluster will perform regular checking for new database updates. If a new database update becomes available the sequence of events will be as follows:

1. The active unit determines there is a new update and downloads the required files for the update.
2. The active unit performs an automatic reconfiguration to update its database.
3. This reconfiguration causes a failover so the passive unit becomes the active unit.
4. When the update is completed, the newly active unit also downloads the files for the update and performs a reconfiguration.
5. This second reconfiguration causes another failover so the passive unit reverts back to being active again.

These steps result in both Clavister Security Gateways in a cluster having updated databases and with the original active/passive roles. For more information about HA clusters refer to *Chapter 11, High Availability*.

Example 6.20. Activating Anti-Virus Scanning

This example shows how to setup an Anti-Virus scanning policy for HTTP traffic from **lannet** to **all-nets**. We will assume there is already a NAT rule defined in the IP rule set to NAT this traffic.

Command-Line Interface

First, create an HTTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG) Object with Anti-Virus scanning enabled:

```
Device:/> set ALG ALG_HTTP anti_virus Antivirus=Protect
```

Next, create a Service object using the new HTTP ALG:

```
Device:/> add ServiceTCPUDP http_anti_virus Type=TCP
          DestinationPorts=80
          ALG=anti_virus
```

Finally, modify the NAT rule to use the new service:

```
Device:/> set IPRule NATHttp Service=http_anti_virus
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. First, create an HTTP ALG Object:

1. Go to **Objects > ALG > Add > HTTP ALG**
2. Specify a suitable name for the ALG, for instance *anti_virus*
3. Click the **Antivirus** tab
4. Select **Protect** in the **Mode** dropdown list
5. Click **OK**

B. Then, create a Service object using the new HTTP ALG:

1. Go to **Local Objects > Services > Add > TCP/UDP service**
2. Specify a suitable name for the Service, for instance *http_anti_virus*
3. Select the **TCP** in the **Type** dropdown list
4. Enter **80** in the **Destination Port** textbox
5. Select the HTTP ALG you just created in the **ALG** dropdown list
6. Click **OK**

C. Finally, modify the NAT rule (called **NATHttp** in this example) to use the new service:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules**
2. Select the NAT rule handling the traffic between **lannet** and **all-nets**
3. Click the **Service** tab
4. Select your new service, *http_anti_virus*, in the predefined **Service** dropdown list
5. Click **OK**

Anti-Virus scanning is now activated for all web traffic from **lannet** to **all-nets**.

6.5. Intrusion Detection and Prevention

6.5.1. Overview

Intrusion Definition

Computer servers can sometimes have vulnerabilities which leave them exposed to attacks carried by network traffic. Worms, trojans and backdoor exploits are examples of such attacks which, if successful, can potentially compromise or take control of a server. A generic term that can be used to describe these server orientated threats are *intrusions*.

Intrusion Detection

Intrusions differ from viruses in that a virus is normally contained in a single file download and this is normally downloaded to a client system. An intrusion manifests itself as a malicious pattern of Internet data aimed at bypassing server security mechanisms. Intrusions are not uncommon and they can constantly evolve as their creation can be automated by the attacker. CorePlus IDP provides an important line of defense against these threats.

Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) is a CorePlus subsystem that is designed to protect against these intrusion attempts. It operates by monitoring network traffic as it passes through the Clavister Security Gateway, searching for patterns that indicate an intrusion is being attempted. Once detected, CorePlus IDP allows steps to be taken to neutralize both the intrusion attempt as well as its source.



Note

*IDP performance, like Anti-Virus scanning performance, can be increased with an optional hardware acceleration upgrade on the SG50, SG4200 and SG4400 Security Gateways. Multiple streams are accelerated asynchronously in this optional hardware to boost overall throughput. The console command **hwaccel** can be used to check if acceleration is installed. Also note that IDP is not available on the discontinued SG30 model.*

IDP Issues

In order to have an effective and reliable IDP system, the following issues have to be addressed:

1. What kinds of traffic should be analyzed?
2. What should we search for in that traffic?
3. What action should be carried out when an intrusion is detected?

CorePlus IDP Components

CorePlus IDP addresses the above issues with the following mechanisms:

1. **IDP Rules** are defined up by the administrator to determine what traffic should be scanned.
2. **Pattern Matching** is applied by CorePlus IDP to the traffic that matches an IDP Rule as it streams through the gateway.

3. If CorePlus IDP detects an intrusion then the **Action** specified for the triggering IDP Rule is taken.

IDP Rules, Pattern Matching and IDP Rule Actions are described in the sections which follow.

6.5.2. Subscribing to Clavister IDP

Clavister IDP is purchased as an additional component to the base CorePlus license. It is a subscription service and the subscription means that the IDP signature database can be downloaded to a CorePlus installation and also that the database is regularly updated with the latest intrusion threats. For full details about obtaining the IDP service please refer to *Appendix A, Update Subscriptions*.




Figure 6.9. IDP Database Updating

Automatic Updating

New attacks can be discovered on a daily basis, so it is important to have an up to date signature database in order to protect the network from the latest threats. Auto-update is an option that can be enabled or disabled by the administrator.

With auto-update enabled, signature database updates are downloaded automatically by CorePlus at a configurable interval. This is done via an HTTP connection to the Clavister server network which delivers the latest signature database updates. If the server's signature database has new signatures then new updates will be automatically downloaded, replacing any older versions. No reconfiguration is needed by the administrator to activate new signatures.

If auto-update is disabled then updates must be explicitly forced and the administrator needs to be aware of when new updates are available. However, this approach does help with more quickly detecting any false positives that new signatures might produce.

Setting the Correct System Time

It is important that a CorePlus has the correct system time set if the auto-update feature in the IDP module can function correctly. An incorrect time can mean the auto-updating is disabled.

The console command

```
> updatecenter -status
```

will show the current status of the auto-update feature.

Updating in High Availability Clusters

Updating the IDP databases for both the Clavister Security Gateways in an HA Cluster is performed automatically by CorePlus. In a cluster there is always an *active* unit and an *inactive* unit. Only the active unit in the cluster will perform regular checking for new database updates. If a new database update becomes available the sequence of events will be as follows:

1. The active unit determines there is a new update and downloads the required files for the update.
2. The active unit performs an automatic reconfiguration to update its database.
3. This reconfiguration causes a failover so the passive unit becomes the active unit.
4. When the update is completed, the newly active unit also downloads the files for the update and performs a reconfiguration.
5. This second reconfiguration causes another failover so the passive unit reverts back to being active again.

These steps result in both Clavister Security Gateways in a cluster having updated databases and with the original active/passive roles. For more information about HA clusters refer to *Chapter 11, High Availability*.

6.5.3. IDP Rules

Rule Components

An **IDP Rule** defines what kind of traffic, or service, should be analyzed. An IDP Rule is similar in makeup to an IP Rule. IDP Rules are constructed like other security policies in CorePlus such as IP Rules. An IDP Rule specifies a given combination source/destination interfaces/addresses as well as being associated with a service object which defines which protocols to scan. A time schedule can also be associated with an IDP Rule. Most importantly, an IDP Rule specifies the **Action** to take on detecting an intrusion in the traffic targeted by the rule.

HTTP Normalization

Each IDP rule has a section of settings for *HTTP normalization*. This allows the administrator to choose the actions that should be taken when IDP finds inconsistencies in the URIs embedded in incoming HTTP requests. Some server attacks are based on creating URIs with sequences that can exploit weaknesses in some HTTP server products.

The URI conditions which IDP can detect are:

- **Invalid UTF8**

This looks for any invalid UTF8 characters in a URI.

- **Invalid hex encoding**

A valid hex sequence is where a percentage sign is followed by two hexadecimal values to represent a single byte of data. An invalid hex sequence would be percentage sign followed by something which is not a valid hexadecimal value.

- **Double encoding**

This looks for any hex sequence which itself is encoded using other hex escape sequences. An example would be the original sequence %2526 where %25 is then might be decoded by the HTTP server to '%' and results in the sequence '%26'. This is then finally decoded to '&'.

Initial Packet Processing

The initial order of packet processing with IDP is as follows:

1. A packet arrives at the gateway and CorePlus performs normal verification. If the packet is part of a new connection then it is checked against the IP rule set before being passed to the IDP module. If the packet is part of an existing connection it is passed straight to the IDP system. If the packet is not part of an existing connection or is rejected by the IP rule set then it is dropped.
2. The source and destination information of the packet is compared to the set of IDP Rules defined by the administrator. If a match is found, it is passed on to the next level of IDP processing which is pattern matching, described in step below. If there is no match against an IDP rule then the packet is accepted and the IDP system takes no further actions although further actions defined in the IP rule set are applied such as address translation and logging.

6.5.4. Insertion/Evasion Attack Prevention

Overview

When defining an IDP Rule, the administrator can enable or disable the option **Protect against Insertion/Evasion attack**. An *Insertion/Evasion Attack* is a form of attack which is specifically aimed at evading IDP mechanisms. It exploits the fact that in a TCP/IP data transfer, the data stream must often be reassembled from smaller pieces of data because the individual pieces either arrive in the wrong order or are fragmented in some way. *Insertions* or *Evasions* are designed to exploit this reassembly process.

Insertion Attacks

An Insertion attack consists of inserting data into a stream so that the resulting sequence of data packets is accepted by the IDP subsystem but will be rejected by the targeted application. This results in two different streams of data.

As an example, consider a data stream broken up into 4 packets: p1, p2, p3 and p4. The attacker might first send packets p1 and p4 to the targeted application. These will be held by both the IDP subsystem and the application until packets p2 and p3 arrive so that reassembly can be done. The attacker now deliberately sends two packets, p2' and p3', which will be rejected by the application but accepted by the IDP system. The IDP system is now able to complete reassembly

of the packets and believes it has the full data stream. The attacker now sends two further packets, p2 and p3, which will be accepted by the application which can now complete reassembly but resulting in a different data stream to that seen by the IDP subsystem.

Evasion Attacks

An evasion attack has a similar end-result to the Insertion Attack in that it also generates two different data streams, one that the IDP subsystem sees and one that the target application sees, but it is achieved in the reverse way. It consists of sending data packets that are rejected by the IDP subsystem but are acceptable to the target application.

Detection Action

If an Insertion/Evasion Attack is detected with the Insertion/Evasion Protect option enabled, CorePlus automatically corrects the data stream by removing the extraneous data associated with the attack.

Insertion/Evasion Log Events

The Insertion/Evasion Attack subsystem in CorePlus can generate two types of log message:

- An **Attack Detected** log message, indicating an attack has been identified and prevented.
- An **Unable to Detect** log message when CorePlus has been unable to identify potential attacks when reassembling a TCP/IP stream although such an attack may have been present. This condition is caused by infrequent and unusually complex patterns of data in the stream.

Recommended Configuration

By default, Insertion/Evasion protection is enabled for all IDP rules and this is the recommended setting for most configurations. There are two motivations for disabling the option:

- **Increasing throughput** - Where the highest throughput possible is desirable, then turning the option off, can provide a slight increase in processing speed.
- **Excessive False Positives** - If there is evidence of an unusually high level of Insertion/Evasion false positives then disabling the option may be prudent while the false positive causes are investigated.

6.5.5. IDP Pattern Matching

Signatures

In order for IDP to correctly identify an attack, it uses a profile of indicators, or *pattern*, associated with different types of attack. These predefined patterns, also known as *signatures*, are stored in a local CorePlus database and are used by the IDP module to analyze traffic for attack patterns. Each IDP signature is designated by a unique number.

Consider the following simple attack example involving an exchange with an FTP server. A rogue user might try to retrieve the password file "passwd" from an FTP server using the FTP command **RETR passwd**. A signature looking for the ASCII text strings *RETR* and *passwd* would find a match in this case, indicating a possible attack. In this example, the pattern is found in plaintext but pattern matching is done in the same way on pure binary data.

Recognizing Unknown Threats

Attackers who build new intrusions often re-use older code. This means their new attacks can appear "in the wild" quickly. To counter this, Clavister IDP uses an approach where the module scans for these reusable components, with pattern matching looking for building blocks rather than the entire complete code patterns. This means that "known" threats as well as new, recently released, "unknown" threats, built with re-used software components, can be protected against.

Signature Advisories

An *advisory* is an explanatory textual description of a signature. Reading a signature's advisory will explain to the administrator what the signature will search for. Due to the changing nature of the signature database, advisories are not included in Clavister documentation but instead, are available on the Clavister website at:

<http://www.clavister.com/securityportal/advisories/>

IDP Signature types

IDP offers three signature types which offer differing levels of certainty with regard to threats:

- **Intrusion Protection Signatures (IPS)** - These are highly accurate and a match is almost certainly an indicator of a threat. Using the **Protect** action is recommended. These signatures can detect administrative actions and security scanners.
- **Intrusion Detection Signatures (IDS)** - These can detect events that may be intrusions- They have lower accuracy than IPS and may give some false positives so that's recommended that the **Audit** action is initially used before deciding to use **Protect**.
- **Policy Signatures** - These detect different types of application traffic. They can be used to block certain applications such as file sharing applications and instant messaging.

6.5.6. IDP Signature Groups

Using Groups

Usually, several lines of attacks exist for a specific protocol, and it is best to search for all of them at the same time when analyzing network traffic. To do this, signatures related to a particular protocol are grouped together. For example, all signatures that refer to the FTP protocol form a group. It is best to specify a group that relates to the traffic being searched than be concerned about individual signatures. For performance purposes, the aim should be to have CorePlus search data using the least possible number of signatures.

Specifying Signature Groups

IDP Signature Groups fall into a three level hierarchical structure. The top level of this hierarchy is the signature *Type*, the second level the *Category* and the third level the *Sub-Category*. The signature group called **POLICY_DB_MSSQL** illustrates this principle where **Policy** is the *Type*, **DB** is the *Category* and **MSSQL** is the *Sub-Category*. These 3 signature components are explained below:

1. Signature Group Type

The group type is one of the values *IDS*, *IPS* or *Policy*. These types are explained above.

2. Signature Group Category

This second level of naming describes the type of application or protocol. Examples are:

- BACKUP
- DB
- DNS
- FTP
- HTTP

3. Signature Group Sub-Category

The third level of naming further specifies the target of the group and often specifies the application, for example *MSSQL*. The Sub-Category may not be necessary if the *Type* and *Category* are sufficient to specify the group, for example **APP_ITUNES**.

Listing of IDP Groups

A listing of IDP groupings can be found in *Appendix B, IDP Signature Groups*. The listing shows group names consisting of the *Category* followed by the *Sub-Category*, since the *Type* could be any of IDS, IPS or POLICY.

Processing Multiple Actions

For any IDP rule, it is possible to specify multiple actions and an action type such as **Protect** can be repeated. Each action will then have one or more signatures or groups associated with it. When signature matching occurs it is done in a top-down fashion, with matching for the signatures for the first action specified being done first.

IDP Signature Wildcarding

When selecting IDP signature groups, it is possible to use wildcarding to select more than one group. The "?" character can be used to wildcard for a single character in a group name. Alternatively, the "*" character can be used to wildcard for any set of characters of any length in a group name.



Caution: Use the minimum IDP signatures necessary

Do not use the entire signature database and avoid using signatures and signature groups unnecessarily. Instead, use only those signatures or groups applicable to the type of traffic you are trying to protect. For instance, using `IDS_WEB`, `IPS_WEB*`, `IDS_HTTP*` and `IPS_HTTP*` IDP groups would be appropriate for protecting an HTTP server.*

IDP traffic scanning creates an additional load on the hardware that in most cases should not noticeably degrade performance. Using too many signatures during scanning can make the load on the gateway hardware unnecessarily high, adversely affecting throughput.

6.5.7. IDP Actions

Action Options

After pattern matching recognizes an intrusion in traffic subject to an IDP Rule, the Action associated with that Rule is taken. The administrator can associate one of three Action options with an IDP Rule:

- **Ignore** - Do nothing if an intrusion is detected and allow the connection to stay open.
- **Audit** - Allow the connection to stay open but log the event.
- **Protect** - This option drops the connection and logs the event (with the additional option to blacklist the source of the connection as described below).

IDP Blacklisting

The **Protect** option includes the option that the particular host or network that triggers the IDP Rule can be added to a *Blacklist* of offending traffic sources. This means that all subsequent traffic coming from a blacklisted source will be automatically dropped by CorePlus. For more details of how blacklisting functions see Section 6.7, "Blacklisting Hosts and Networks".




Tip

Any IP address that exists in the CorePlus whitelist cannot be blacklisted. For this reason it is recommended that the IP address of the management workstation and the Clavister Security Gateway itself is added to the whitelist when using IDP.

Example 6.21. Setting up IDP for a Mail Server

The following example details the steps needed to set up IDP for a simple scenario where a mail server is exposed to the Internet on the **DMZ** network with a public IP address. The public Internet can be reached through the gateway on the **WAN** interface as illustrated below.



An IDP rule called *IDPMailSrvRule* will be created, and the *Service* to use is the SMTP service. *Source Interface* and *Source Network* defines where traffic is coming from, in this example the external network. The *Destination Interface* and *Destination Network* define where traffic is directed to, in this case the mail server. *Destination Network* should therefore be set to the object defining the mail server.

Command-Line Interface

Create an IDP Rule:

```
Device:/> add IDPRule Service=smtp SourceInterface=wan
          SourceNetwork=wannet
          DestinationInterface=dmz
          DestinationNetwork=ip_mailserver
          Name=IDPMailSrvRule
```

Specify the Rule Action:

```
Device:/> cc IDPRule IDPMailSrvRule

Device:/IDPMailSrvRule> add IDPRuleAction Action=Protect
                          IDPServity=All Signatures=IPS_MAIL_SMTP
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Create an IDP Rule:

This IDP rule is called *IDPMailSrvRule*, and applies to the SMTP service. Source Interface and Source Network define where traffic is coming from, in this example, the external network. The Destination Interface and Destination Network define where traffic is directed to, in this case the mail server. Destination Network should therefore be set to the object defining the mail server.

1. Go to **IDP > IDP Rules > Add > IDP Rule**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** IDPMailSrvRule
 - **Service:** smtp
 - Also inspect dropped packets: In case all traffic matching this rule should be scanned (this also means traffic that the main rule set would drop), the **Protect against insertion/evasion attacks** checkbox should be checked, which is the case in this example.
 - **Source Interface:** wan
 - **Source Network:** wannet
 - **Destination Interface:** dmz
 - **Destination Network:** ip_mailserver
 - Click **OK**

Specify the Action:

An action is now defined, specifying what signatures the IDP should use when scanning data matching the rule, and what CorePlus should do when a possible intrusion is detected. In this example, intrusion attempts will cause the connection to be dropped, so **Action** is set to *Protect*. The **Signatures** option is set to *IPS_MAIL_SMTP* in order to use signatures that describe attacks from the external network that are based on the SMTP protocol.

1. Select the **Rule Action** tab for the IDP rule

2. Now enter:

- **Action:** Protect
- **Signatures:** IPS_MAIL_SMTP
- Click **OK**

If logging of intrusion attempts is desired, this can be configured by clicking in the **Rule Actions** tab when creating an IDP rule and enabling logging. The **Severity** should be set to *All* in order to match all SMTP attacks.

In summary, the following will occur: If traffic from the external network to the mail server occurs, IDP will be activated. If traffic matches any of the signatures in the *IPS_MAIL_SMTP* signature group, the connection will be dropped, thus protecting the mail server.

6.6. Denial-of-Service Attack Prevention

6.6.1. Overview

By embracing the Internet, enterprises experience new business opportunities and growth. The enterprise network and the applications that run over it are business critical. Not only can a company reach a larger number of customers via the Internet, it can serve them faster and more efficiently. At the same time, using a public IP network enables companies to reduce infrastructure related costs.

Unfortunately, the same advantages that the Internet brings to business also benefit the hackers who use the same public infrastructure to mount attacks. Attack tools are readily available on the Internet and development work on these tools is often split across groups of novice hackers - sometimes referred to with names such as "script kiddies" - spread around the world, providing a 24/7 evolution of attack methods. Many newer attack techniques utilize the distributed topology of the Internet to launch *Denial of Service* (DoS) attacks against organizations resulting in paralysed web servers that can no longer respond to legitimate connection requests.

To be on the receiving end of a DoS attack is probably the last thing any network administrator wants to experience. Attacks can appear out of thin air and the consequences can be devastating with crashed servers, jammed Internet connections and business critical systems in overload.

This section deals with using Clavister Security Gateways to protect organizations against these attacks.

6.6.2. DoS Attack Mechanisms

A DoS attack can be perpetrated in a number of ways but there are three basic types of attack:

- Consumption of computational resources, such as bandwidth, disk space, or CPU time.
- Disruption of configuration information, such as routing information.
- Disruption of physical network components.

One of the most commonly used method is the consumption of computational resources which means that the DoS attack floods the network and ties up critical resources used to run business critical applications. In some cases, vulnerabilities in the Unix and Windows operating systems are exploited to intentionally crash the system, while in other cases large amounts of apparently valid traffic are directed at sites until they become overloaded and crash.

Some of the most commonly used DoS attacks have been:

- The Ping of Death / Jolt attacks
- Fragmentation overlap attacks: Teardrop / Bonk / Boink / Nestea
- The Land and LaTierra attacks
- The WinNuke attack
- Amplification attacks: Smurf, Papasmurf, Fraggle
- TCP SYN Flood attack
- The Jolt2 attack

6.6.3. Ping of Death and Jolt Attacks

The "ping of death" is one of the earliest layer 3/4 attacks. One of the simplest ways to execute it is to run "ping -l 65510 1.2.3.4" on a Windows 95 system where 1.2.3.4 is the IP address of the intended victim. "Jolt" is simply a purpose-written program for generating such packets on operating systems whose ping commands refuse to generate oversized packets.

The triggering factor is that the last fragment makes the total packet size exceed 65535 bytes, which is the highest number that a 16-bit integer can store. When the value overflows, it jumps back to a very small number. What happens then is a function of how well the victim's IP stack is implemented.

CorePlus will never allow fragments through that would result in the total size exceeding 65535 bytes. In addition to that, there are configurable limits for IP packet sizes in Advanced Settings.

Ping of death will show up in CorePlus logs as drops with the rule name set to "LogOversizedPackets". The sender IP address may be spoofed.

6.6.4. Fragmentation overlap attacks: *Teardrop, Bonk, Boink and Nestea*

Teardrop and its followers are fragment overlap attacks. Many IP stacks have shown erratic behavior (excessive resource exhaustion or crashes) when exposed to overlapping fragments.

CorePlus protects fully against fragmentation overlap attacks. Overlapping fragments are never allowed to pass through the system.

Teardrop and its followers will show up in CorePlus logs as drops with the rule name set to "IllegalFragments". The sender IP address may be spoofed.

6.6.5. The *Land* and *LaTierra* attacks

The Land and LaTierra attacks works by sending a packet to a victim and making the victim respond back to itself, which in turn generates yet another response to itself, etc. This will either bog the victim's machine down, or make it crash.

The attack is accomplished by using the victim's IP address in the source field of an IP packet as well as in the destination field.

CorePlus protects against this attack by applying IP spoofing protection to all packets. In its default configuration, it will simply compare arriving packets to the contents of the routing table; if a packet arrives on an interface that is different from the interface where the system expects the source to be, the packet will be dropped.

Land and LaTierra attacks will show up in CorePlus logs as drops with the rule name set to "AutoAccess" by default, or if the configuration contains custom Access Rules, the name of the Access rule that dropped the packet. The sender IP address is of no interest here since it is always the same as the destination IP address.

6.6.6. The *WinNuke* attack

The WinNuke attack works by connecting to a TCP service that does not have handlers for "out-of-band" data (TCP segments with the URG bit set), but still accepts such data. This will usually put the service in a tight loop that consumes all available CPU time.

One such service was the NetBIOS over TCP/IP service on Windows machines, which gave the attack its name.

CorePlus protects against this in two ways:

- With a careful inbound policy, the attack surface is greatly reduced. Only exposed services could possibly become victims to the attack, and public services tend to be more well-written than services expected to only serve the local network.
- By stripping the URG bit by default from all TCP segments traversing the system (configurable via **Advanced Settings > TCP > TCPUrg**).

WinNuke attacks will usually show up in CorePlus logs as normal drops with the name of the rule in your policy that disallowed the connection attempt. For connections allowed through the system, "TCP" or "DROP" category (depending on the TCPUrg setting) entries will appear, with a rule name of "TCPUrg". The sender IP address is not likely to be spoofed; a full three-way handshake must be completed before out-of-band segments can be sent.

6.6.7. Amplification attacks: *Smurf, Papasmurf, Fraggle*

This category of attacks all make use of "amplifiers": poorly configured networks who amplify a stream of packets and send it to the ultimate target. The goal is excessive bandwidth consumption - consuming all of the victim's Internet connection capacity. An attacker with sufficient bandwidth can forgo the entire amplification stage and simply stream enough bandwidth at the victim. However, these attacks allows attackers with less bandwidth than the victim to amplify their data stream to overwhelm the victim.

- "Smurf" and "Papasmurf" send ICMP echo packets to the broadcast address of open networks with many machines, faking the source IP address to be that of the victim. All machines on the open network then "respond" to the victim.
- "Fraggle" uses the same general idea, but instead using UDP echo (port 7) to accomplish the task. Fraggle generally gets lower amplification factors since there are fewer hosts on the Internet that have the UDP echo service enabled.

Smurf attacks will show up in CorePlus logs as masses of dropped ICMP Echo Reply packets. The source IP addresses will be those of the amplifier networks used. Fraggle attacks will show up in CorePlus logs as masses of dropped (or allowed, depending on policy) packets. The source IP addresses will be those of the amplifier networks used.

Avoiding Becoming an Amplifier

Even though the brunt of the bandwidth stream is at the ultimate victim's side, being selected as an amplifier network can also consume great resources. In its default configuration, CorePlus explicitly drops packets sent to broadcast address of directly connected networks (configurable via **Advanced Settings > IP > DirectedBroadcasts**). However, with a reasonable inbound policy, no protected network should ever have to worry about becoming a smurf amplifier.

Protection on the Victim's Side

Smurf, and its followers, are resource exhaustion attacks in that they use up Internet connection capacity. In the general case, the security gateway is situated at the "wrong" side of the Internet connection bottleneck to provide much protection against this class of attacks. The damage has already been done by the time the packets reach the gateway.

However, CorePlus can help in keeping the load off of internal servers, making them available for internal service, or perhaps service via a secondary Internet connection not targeted by the attack.

- *Smurf* and *Papasmurf* type floods will be seen as ICMP Echo Responses at the victim side. Unless *FwdFast* rules are in use, such packets are never allowed to initiate new connections, regardless of whether or not there are rules that allow the traffic.
- *Fraggle* packets may arrive at any UDP destination port targeted by the attacker. Tightening the inbound rule set may help.

The *Traffic Shaping* feature built into CorePlus also help absorb some of the flood before it reaches protected servers.

6.6.8. TCP SYN Flood Attacks

TCP SYN flood attacks work by sending large amounts of TCP SYN packets to a given port and then not responding to SYN ACKs sent in response. This will tie up local TCP stack resources on the victim's web server so that it is unable to respond to more SYN packets until the existing half-open connections have timed out.

CorePlus can protect against TCP SYN Flood attacks if the *Syn Flood Protection* option is enabled in a service object associated with the rule in the IP rule set that triggers on the traffic. This is also sometimes referred to as the *SYN Relay* option.

Flood protection is enabled automatically in the predefined services **http-in**, **https-in**, **smtp-in**, and **ssh-in**. If a new custom service object is defined by the administrator then the flood protection option can be enabled or disabled as desired.

The SYN Flood Defence Mechanism

Syn flood protection works by completing the 3-way handshake with the client before doing a second handshake of its own with the target service. Overload situations have difficulty occurring in CorePlus due to superior resource management and an absence of the restrictions normally placed on other operating systems. While other operating systems can exhibit problems with as few as 5 outstanding half-open connections, CorePlus can fill its entire state table before anything out of the ordinary happens. When the state table fills up, old outstanding SYN connections will be the first to be dropped to make room for new connections.

Spotting SYN Floods

TCP SYN flood attacks will show up in CorePlus logs as excessive amounts of new connections (or drops, if the attack is targeted at a closed port). The sender IP address is almost invariably spoofed.

ALGs Automatically Provide Flood Protection

It should be noted that SYN Flood Protection does not need to be explicitly enabled on a service object that has an ALG associated with it. ALGs provide automatic SYN flood protection.

6.6.9. The *Jolt2* Attack

The *Jolt2* attack works by sending a steady stream of identical fragments at the victim machine. A few hundred packets per second will freeze vulnerable machines completely until the stream is ended.

CorePlus will protect completely against this attack. The first fragment will be queued, waiting for earlier fragments to arrive so that they may be passed on in order, but this never happens, so not even the first fragment gets through. Subsequent fragments will be thrown away as they are identical to the first fragment.

If the attacker chooses a fragment offset higher than the limits imposed by the **Advanced Settings > LengthLim** in CorePlus, the packets will not even get that far; they will be dropped immediately. Jolt2 attacks may or may not show up in CorePlus logs. If the attacker chooses a too-high fragment offset for the attack, they will show up as drops from the rule set to "LogOversizedPackets". If the fragment offset is low enough, no logging will occur. The sender IP address may be spoofed.

6.6.10. Distributed DoS Attacks

A more sophisticated form of DoS is the *Distributed Denial of Service* (DDoS) attack. DDoS attacks involve breaking into hundreds or thousands of machines all over the Internet to install DDoS software on them, allowing the hacker to control all these burgled machines to launch coordinated attacks on victim sites. These attacks typically exhaust bandwidth, router processing capacity, or network stack resources, breaking network connectivity to the victims.

Although recent DDoS attacks have been launched from both private corporate and public institutional systems, hackers tend to often prefer university or institutional networks because of their open, distributed nature. Tools used to launch DDoS attacks include Trin00, TribeFlood Network (TFN), TFN2K and Stacheldraht.

6.7. Blacklisting Hosts and Networks

Overview

CorePlus implements a *Blacklist* of host or network IP addresses which can be utilized to protect against traffic coming from specific Internet sources.

Certain CorePlus subsystems have the ability to optionally blacklist a host or network when certain conditions are encountered. These subsystems are:

- Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP).
- Threshold Rules.

Blacklisting Options

The automatic blacklisting of a host or network can be enabled in IDP and in threshold rules by specifying the **Protect** action for when a rule is triggered. Once enabled there are three blacklisting options:

Time to Block Host/Network in seconds	The host or network which is the source of the traffic will stay on the blacklist for the specified time and then be removed. If the same source triggers another entry to the blacklist then the blocking time is renewed to its original, full value (in other words, it is not cumulative).
Block only this Service	By default Blacklisting blocks all services for the triggering host.
Exempt already established connections from Blacklisting	If there are established connections that have the same source as this new Blacklist entry then they will not be dropped if this option is set.

IP addresses or networks are added to the list then the traffic from these sources is then blocked for the period of time specified.



Note: Restarts do not effect the blacklist

The contents of the blacklist is not lost if the Clavister Security Gateway shuts down and restarts.

Whitelisting

To ensure that Internet traffic coming from trusted sources, such as the management workstation, are not blacklisted under any circumstances, a *Whitelist* is also maintained by CorePlus. Any IP address object can be added to this whitelist



Tip: Important IP addresses should be whitelisted

It is recommended to add the Clavister Security Gateway itself to the whitelist as well as the IP address or network of the management workstation since blacklisting of either could have serious consequences for network operations.

It is also important to understand that although whitelisting prevents a particular source from being blacklisted, it still does not prevent CorePlus mechanisms such as threshold rules from dropping or denying connections from that source. What whitelisting does is prevent a source being added to a blacklist if that is the action a rule has specified.

For further details on usage see *Section 6.5.7, "IDP Actions"*, *Section 10.3.7, "Threshold Rule Blacklisting"* and *Section 10.3, "Threshold Rules"*.



Note: The content filtering blacklist is separate

Content filtering blacklisting is a separate subject and uses a separate logical list (see *Section 6.3, "Web Content Filtering"*).

The CLI *blacklist* Command

The *blacklist* command can be used to look at as well as manipulate the current contents of the blacklist and the whitelist. The current blacklist can be viewed with the command:

```
Device:/> blacklist -show -black
```

This *blacklist* command can be used to remove a host from the blacklist using the *-unblock* option.

Example 6.22. Adding a Host to the Whitelist

In this example we will add an IP address object called *white_ip* to the whitelist. This will mean this IP address can never be blacklisted.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add BlacklistWhiteHost Addresses=white_ip Service=all_tcp
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Goto **System > Whitelist > Add > Whitelist host**
2. Now select the IP address object *white_ip* so it is added to the whitelist
3. Select the service *all_tcp* to be associated with this whitelist entry
4. Click **OK**

Chapter 7: Address Translation

This chapter describes CorePlus address translation capabilities.

- Overview, page 403
- NAT, page 405
- NAT Pools, page 411
- SAT, page 415

7.1. Overview

The ability of CorePlus to change the IP address of packets as they pass through the Clavister Security Gateway is known as *address translation*.

The ability to transform one IP address to another can have many benefits. Two of the most important are:

- Private IP addresses can be used on a protected network where protected hosts need to have access to the public Internet. There may also be servers with private IP addresses that need to be accessible from the public Internet.
- Security is increased by making it more difficult for intruders to understand the topology of the protected network. Address translation hides internal IP addresses which means that an attack coming from the "outside" is much more difficult.

Types of Translation

CorePlus supports two types of translation:

- *Dynamic Network Address Translation (NAT)*.
- *Static Address Translation (SAT)*.

Both types of translation are *policy-based* in CorePlus, which means that they can be applied to specific traffic based on the source/destination network/interface as well as based on the type of protocol. Two types of CorePlus IP rules, *NAT* rules and *SAT* rules are used to configure address translation.

This section describes and provides examples of configuring *NAT* and *SAT* rules.

7.2. NAT

Dynamic Network Address Translation (NAT) provides a mechanism for translating original source IP addresses to a different address. Outgoing packets then appear to come from a different IP address and incoming packets back to that address have their IP address translated back to the original IP address.

NAT can have two important benefits:

- The IP addresses of individual clients and hosts can be "hidden" behind the security gateway's IP address.
- Only the security gateway needs a public IP address for public Internet access. Hosts and networks behind the security gateway can be allocated private IP addresses but can still have access to the public Internet through the public IP address.

NAT Provides *many-to-one* IP Address Translation

NAT provides *many-to-one translation*. This means that each NAT rule in the IP rule set will translate between several source IP addresses and a single source IP address.

To maintain session state information, each connection from dynamically translated addresses uses a unique port number and IP address combination as its sender. CorePlus performs automatic translation of the source port number as well as the IP address. In other words, the source IP addresses for connections are all translated to the same IP address and the connections are distinguished from one another by the allocation of a unique port number to each connection.

The diagram below illustrates the concept of NAT.



Figure 7.1. NAT IP Address Translation

In the illustration above, three connections from IP addresses *A*, *B* and *C* are NATed through a single source IP address *N*. The original port numbers are also changed.

The next source port number allocated for a new NAT connection will be the first free port selected randomly by CorePlus. Ports are allocated randomly to increase security.

Limitations on the Number of Connections

There is a limitation of approximately 64,500 simultaneous NAT connections where each connection consists of a unique pair of IP addresses. The term *IP pair* means one IP address on a

CorePlus interface and the IP address of some external host to which a connection is being made. If two different IP addresses on an external host are being connected to from the same NAT address on the security gateway then this will constitute two, unique IP pairs. The 64,500 figure is therefore not a limitation for the entire Clavister Security Gateway.



Tip: Use NAT pools to get around the connection limit

*The connection maximum per unique IP pair is normally adequate for all but the most extreme scenarios. However, to increase the number of NAT connections that can exist between the Clavister Security Gateway and a particular external host IP, the CorePlus **NAT pools** feature can be used which can automatically make use of additional IP addresses on the security gateway.*

*See **Section 7.3, "NAT Pools"** for more information about this topic.*

The Source IP Address Used for Translation

There are three options for how CorePlus determines the source IP address that will be used for NAT:

- **Use the IP Address of the Interface**

When a new connection is established, the routing table is consulted to resolve the outbound interface for the connection. The IP address of that resolved interface is then used as the new source IP address when CorePlus performs the address translation. This is the default way that the IP address is determined.

- **Specify a Specific IP Address**

A specific IP address can be specified as the new source IP address. The specified IP address needs to have a matching ARP Publish entry configured for the outbound interface. Otherwise, the return traffic will not be received by the Clavister Security Gateway. This technique might be used when the source IP is to differ based on the source of the traffic. For example, an ISP that is using NAT, might use different IP addresses for different customers.

- **Use an IP Address from a NAT Pool**

A *NAT Pool*, which is a set of IP addresses defined by the administrator, can be used. The next available address from the pool can be used as the IP address used for NAT. There can be one or many NAT pools and a single pool can be used in more than one *NAT* rule. This topic is discussed further in *Section 7.3, "NAT Pools"*.

Applying NAT Translation

The following illustrates how NAT is applied in practice on a new connection:

1. The sender, for example 192.168.1.5, sends a packet from a dynamically assigned port, for instance, port 1038, to a server, for example 195.55.66.77 port 80.

```
192.168.1.5:1038 => 195.55.66.77:80
```

2. In this example, the Use Interface Address option is used, and we will use 195.11.22.33 as the interface address. In addition, the source port is changed to a random free port on the Clavister Security Gateway and which is above port 1024. In this example, we will assume port 32789 is chosen. The packet is then sent to its destination.

195.11.22.33:32789 => 195.55.66.77:80

- The recipient server then processes the packet and sends its response.

195.55.66.77:80 => 195.11.22.33:32789

- CorePlus receives the packet and compares it to its list of open connections. Once it finds the connection in question, it restores the original address and forwards the packet.

195.55.66.77:80 => 192.168.1.5:1038

- The original sender now receives the response.

The sequence of these events is illustrated further in the diagram below.




Figure 7.2. A NAT Example

Example 7.1. Adding a NAT Rule

To add a NAT rule that will perform address translation for all HTTP traffic originating from the internal network, follow the steps outlined below:

Command-Line Interface

First, change the current category to be the *main* IP rule set:

```
Device:/> cc IPRuleSet main
```

Now, create the IP rule:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule Action=NAT Service=http
SourceInterface=lan
SourceNetwork=lannet
DestinationInterface=any
DestinationNetwork=all-nets
```

```
Name=NAT_HTTP  
NATAction=UseInterfaceAddress
```

Return to the top level:

```
Device:/main> cc
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the rule, for example *NAT_HTTP*
3. Now enter:
 - **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets
4. Under the **NAT** tab, make sure that the **Use Interface Address** option is selected
5. Click **OK**

Protocols Handled by NAT

Dynamic address translation is able to deal with the TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols with a good level of functionality since the algorithm knows which values can be adjusted to become unique in the three protocols. For other IP level protocols, unique connections are identified by their sender addresses, destination addresses and protocol numbers.

This means that:

- An internal machine can communicate with several external servers using the same IP protocol.
- An internal machine can communicate with several external servers using different IP protocols.
- Several internal machines can communicate with different external servers using the same IP protocol.
- Several internal machines can communicate with the same server using different IP protocols.

- Several internal machines can *not* communicate with the same external server using the same IP protocol.



Note: Restrictions only apply to IP level protocols

These restrictions apply only to IP level protocols other than TCP, UDP and ICMP, such as OSPF and L2TP. They do not apply to the protocols transported by TCP, UDP and ICMP such as telnet, FTP, HTTP and SMTP.

CorePlus can alter port number information in the TCP and UDP headers to make each connection unique, even though such connections have had their sender addresses translated to the same IP.

Some protocols, regardless of the method of transportation used, can cause problems during address translation.

Anonymizing Internet Traffic with NAT

A useful application of the NAT feature in CorePlus is for anonymizing service providers to anonymize traffic between clients and servers across the public Internet so that the client's public IP address is not present in any server access requests or peer to peer traffic.

We shall examine the typical case where the Clavister Security Gateway acts as a PPTP server and terminates the PPTP tunnel for PPTP clients. Clients that wish to be anonymous, communicate with their local ISP using PPTP. The traffic is directed to the anonymizing service provider where a Clavister Security Gateway is installed to act as the PPTP server for the client, terminating the PPTP tunnel. This arrangement is illustrated in the diagram below.




Figure 7.3. Anonymizing with NAT

CorePlus is set up with *NAT* rules in the IP rule set so it takes communication traffic coming from the client and NATs it back out onto the Internet. Communication with the client is with the PPTP protocol but the PPTP tunnel from the client terminates at the security gateway. When this traffic

is relayed between the security gateway and the Internet, it is no longer encapsulated by PPTP.

When an application, such as a web server, now receives requests from the client it appears as though they are coming from the anonymizing service provider's external IP address and not the client's IP. The application therefore sends its responses back to the security gateway which relays the traffic back to the client through the PPTP tunnel. The original IP address of the client is not revealed in traffic as it is relayed beyond the termination of the PPTP tunnel at the CorePlus.

Typically, all traffic passes through the same physical interface and that interface has a single public IP address. Multiple interfaces could be used if multiple public IP addresses are available. There is clearly a small processing overhead involved with anonymizing traffic but this need not be an issue if sufficient hardware resources are employed to perform the anonymizing.

This same technique can also be used with L2TP instead of PPTP connections. Both protocols are discussed further in *Section 9.5.4, "PPTP/L2TP Clients"*.

7.3. NAT Pools

Overview

Network Address Translation (NAT) provides a way to have multiple internal clients and hosts with unique private internal IP addresses communicate to remote hosts through a single external public IP address (this is discussed in depth in *Section 7.2, "NAT"*). When multiple public external IP addresses are available then a *NAT Pool* object can be used to allocate new connections across these public IP addresses.

NAT Pools are usually employed when there is a requirement for huge numbers of unique port connections. The CorePlus Port Manager has a limit of approximately 65,000 connections for a unique combination of source and destination IP addresses. Where large number of internal clients are using applications such as file sharing software, very large numbers of ports can be required for each client. The situation can be similarly demanding if a large number of clients are accessing the Internet through a proxy-server. The port number limitation is overcome by allocating extra external IP addresses for Internet access and using NAT Pools to allocate new connections across them.

Types of NAT Pools

A NAT Pool can be one of the following three types with each allocating new connections in a different way:

- **Stateful**
- **Stateless**
- **Fixed**

The details of these three types are discussed next.

Stateful NAT Pools

When the *Stateful* option is selected, CorePlus allocates a new connection to the external IP address that currently has the least number of connections routed through it with the assumption that it is the least loaded. CorePlus keeps a record in memory of all such connections. Subsequent connections involving the same internal client/host will then use the same external IP address.

The advantage of the stateful approach is that it can balance connections across several external ISP links while ensuring that an external host will always communicate back to the same IP address which will be essential with protocols such as HTTP when cookies are involved. The disadvantage is the extra memory required by CorePlus to track the usage in its state table and the small processing overhead involved in processing a new connection.

To make sure that the state table does not contain dead entries for communications that are no longer active, a **State Keepalive** time can be specified. This time is the number of seconds of inactivity that must occur before a state in the state table is removed. After this period CorePlus assumes no more communication will originate from the associated internal host. Once the state is removed then subsequent communication from the host will result in a new state table entry and may be allocated to a different external IP address in the NAT Pool.

The state table itself takes up memory so it is possible to limit its size using the *Max States* value in a NAT Pool object. The state table is not allocated all at once but is incremented in size as needed. One entry in the state table tracks all the connections for a single host behind the Clavister Security Gateway no matter which external host the connection concerns. If *Max States*

is reached then an existing state with the longest idle time is replaced. If all states in the table is active then the new connection is dropped. As a rule of thumb, the *Max States* value should be at least the number of local hosts or clients that will connect to the Internet.

There is only one state table per NAT Pool so that if a single NAT Pool is re-used in multiple NAT IP rules they share the same state table.

Stateless NAT Pools

The *Stateless* option means that no state table is maintained and the external IP address chosen for each new connection is the one that has the least connections already allocated to it. This means two connections between one internal host to the same external host may use two different external IP addresses.

The advantage of a Stateless NAT Pool is that there is good spreading of new connections between external IP addresses with no requirement for memory allocated to a state table and there is less processing time involved in setting up each new connection. The disadvantage is that it is not suitable for communication that requires a constant external IP address.

Fixed NAT Pools

The *Fixed* option means that each internal client or host is allocated one of the external IP addresses through a hashing algorithm. Although the administrator has no control over which of the external connections will be used, this scheme ensures that a particular internal client or host will always communicate through the same external IP address.

The Fixed option has the advantage of not requiring memory for a state table and providing very fast processing for new connection establishment. Although explicit load balancing is not part of this option, there should be spreading of the load across the external connections due to the random nature of the allocating algorithm.

IP Pool Usage

When allocating external IP addresses to a NAT Pool it is not necessary to explicitly state these. Instead a CorePlus *IP Pool* object can be selected. IP Pools gather collections of IP addresses automatically through DHCP and can therefore supply external IP addresses automatically to a NAT Pool. See *Section 5.4, "IP Pools"* for more details about this topic.

Proxy ARP Usage

Where an external router sends ARP queries to the Clavister Security Gateway to resolve external IP addresses included in a NAT Pool, CorePlus will need to send the correct ARP replies for this resolution to take place through its Proxy ARP mechanism so the external router can correctly build its routing table.

By default, the administrator must specify in NAT Pool setup which interfaces will be used by NAT pools. The option exists however to enable Proxy ARP for a NAT Pool on all interfaces but this can cause problems sometimes by possibly creating routes to interfaces on which packets should not arrive. It is therefore recommended that the interface(s) to be used for the NAT Pool Proxy ARP mechanism are explicitly specified.

Using NAT Pools

NAT Pools are used in conjunction with a normal NAT IP rule. When defining a *NAT* rule, the dialog includes the option to select a NAT Pool to use with the rule. This association brings the NAT Pool into use.

Example 7.2. Using NAT Pools

This example creates a NAT pool with the external IP address range *10.6.13.10* to *10.16.13.15* which is then used in a NAT IP rule for HTTP traffic on the **wan** interface.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. First create an object in the address book for the address range:

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP address**
2. Specify a suitable name for the IP range *nat_pool_range*
3. Enter *10.6.13.10-10.16.13.15* in the **IP Address** textbox
(a network such as *10.6.13.0/24* could be used here - the 0 and 255 addresses will be automatically removed)
4. Click **OK**

B. Next create a stateful NAT Pool object called *stateful_natpool*:

1. Go to **Objects > NAT Pools > Add > NAT Pool**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** *stateful_natpool*
 - **Pool type:** *stateful*
 - **IP Range:** *nat_pool_range*
3. Select the **Proxy ARP** tab and add the **WAN** interface
4. Click **OK**

C. Now define the NAT rule in the IP rule set

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IP Rule**
2. Under **General** enter:
 - **Name:** Enter a suitable name such as *nat_pool_rule*
 - **Action:** NAT
3. Under **Address filter** enter:
 - **Source Interface:** *int*
 - **Source Network:** *int-net*
 - **Destination Interface:** *wan*
 - **Destination Network:** *all-nets*

- **Service:** HTTP
4. Select the **NAT** tab and enter:
 - Check the **Use NAT Pool** option
 - Select **stateful_natpool** from the drop-down list
 5. Click **OK**

7.4. SAT

CorePlus can translate entire ranges of IP addresses and/or ports. Such translations are transpositions, each address or port is mapped to a corresponding address or port in the new range, rather than translating them all to the same address or port. In CorePlus this functionality is known as *Static Address Translation (SAT)*.



Note: Port forwarding

Some network equipment vendors use the term "**port forwarding**" when referring to SAT. Both terms are referring to the same functionality.

SAT Requires Multiple IP Rules

Unlike NAT, SAT requires more than just a single IP rule to be defined. A SAT rule must first be added to specify the address translation but CorePlus does not terminate the rule set lookup upon finding a matching SAT rule. Instead, it continues to search for a matching *Allow*, *NAT* or *FwdFast* rule. Only when it has found such a matching rule does CorePlus execute the original SAT rule.

The SAT rule **only** defines the translation that is to take place. A second, associated rule, such as an *Allow* rule, must exist to actually allow the traffic to pass through the security gateway.

The Second Rule Must Trigger on the Untranslated Destination IP

An important principle to keep in mind when creating the IP rules for SAT is that the second rule, for example an *Allow* rule, **must** trigger on the **untranslated** destination IP address. A common mistake is to create a rule which triggers on the translated address given by the SAT rule.

For example, if a SAT rule translates the destination from *1.1.1.1* to *2.2.2.2* then the second associated rule should allow traffic to pass to the destination *1.1.1.1* and not *2.2.2.2*.

Only after the second rule triggers to allow the traffic, is the route lookup then done by CorePlus on the translated address to work out which interface the packets should be sent from.

7.4.1. Translation of a Single IP Address (1:1)

The simplest form of SAT usage is translation of a single IP address. A very common scenario for this is to enable external users to access a protected server in a DMZ that has a private address. This scenario is also sometimes referred to as a *Virtual IP* or *Virtual Server* in some other manufacturer's products.

The Role of the DMZ

At this point in the manual, it's relevant to discuss the concept and role of the network known as the *Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)*.

The DMZ's purpose is to have a network where the administrator can place those resources which will be accessed by external, untrusted clients and typically this access takes place across the public Internet. These servers will have the maximum exposure to external threats and therefore at most risk of being compromised.

By isolating these servers in the DMZ, we are creating a distinct separation from the more sensitive local, internal networks. This allows CorePlus to better control what traffic flows

between the DMZ and internal networks and to better isolate any security breaches that might occur in DMZ servers.

The illustration below shows a typical network arrangement with the Clavister Security Gateway mediating communications between the public Internet and servers in the DMZ, and between the DMZ and local clients on a network called LAN.




Figure 7.4. The Role of the DMZ



Note: The DMZ port could be any Ethernet port

On some models of Clavister hardware, there is a specific Ethernet port which is marked as being for the **DMZ** network. Although this is the port's intended use, it could be used for other purposes and any other Ethernet port could also be used for a DMZ.

On hardware models without a specific DMZ port, any port could be used for this purpose.

Example 7.3. Enabling Traffic to a Protected Web Server in a DMZ

In this example, we will create a SAT policy that will translate and allow connections from the Internet to a web server located in a DMZ. The Clavister Security Gateway is connected to the Internet using the wan interface with address object ip_wan (defined as 195.55.66.77) as IP address. The web server has the IP address 10.10.10.5 and is reachable through the dmz interface.

Command-Line Interface

First, change the current category to be the *main* IP rule set:

```
Device: /> cc IPRuleSet main
```


Next, create a SAT IP rule:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule Action=SAT Service=http
                SourceInterface=any
                SourceNetwork=all-nets
                DestinationInterface=core
                DestinationNetwork=ip_wan
                SATTranslate=DestinationIP
                SATTranslateToIP=10.10.10.5
                Name=SAT_HTTP_To_DMZ
```

Then create a corresponding *Allow* rule:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule action=Allow Service=http
                SourceInterface=any
                SourceNetwork=all-nets
                DestinationInterface=core
                DestinationNetwork=ip_wan
                Name=Allow_HTTP_To_DMZ
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

First create a SAT rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the rule, for example *SAT_HTTP_To_DMZ*
3. Now enter:
 - **Action:** SAT
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan
4. Under the **SAT** tab, make sure that the **Destination IP Address** option is selected
5. In the **New IP Address** textbox, enter *10.10.10.5*
6. Click **OK**

Then create a corresponding *Allow* rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the rule, for example *Allow_HTTP_To_DMZ*
3. Now enter:

- **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** ip_wan
4. Under the **Service** tab, select **http** in the **Predefined** list
 5. Click **OK**

The example results in the following two rules in the rule set:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST 10.10.10.5 80
2	Allow	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http

These two rules allow us to access the web server via the Clavister Security Gateway's external IP address. Rule 1 states that address translation can take place if the connection has been permitted, and rule 2 permits the connection.

Of course, we also need a rule that allows internal machines to be dynamically address translated to the Internet. In this example, we use a rule that permits everything from the internal network to access the Internet using a NAT rule:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
3	NAT	lan	lanet	any	all-nets	All

Now, what is wrong with this rule set?

If we assume that we want to implement address translation for reasons of security as well as functionality, we discover that this rule set makes our internal addresses visible to machines in the DMZ. When internal machines connect to ip_wan port 80, they will be allowed to proceed by rule 2 as it matches that communication. From an internal perspective, all machines in the DMZ should be regarded as any other Internet-connected servers; we do not trust them, which is the reason for locating them in a DMZ in the first place.

There are two possible solutions:

1. You can change rule 2 so that it only applies to external traffic.
2. You can swap rules 2 and 3 so that the *NAT* rule is carried out for internal traffic before the *Allow* rule matches.

Which of these two options is the best? For this configuration, it makes no difference. Both solutions work just as well.

However, suppose that we use another interface, ext2, in the Clavister Security Gateway and connect it to another network, perhaps to that of a neighboring company so that they can communicate much faster with our servers.

If option 1 was selected, the rule set must be adjusted like this:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST 10.10.10.5 80
2	Allow	wan	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http
3	Allow	ext2	ext2net	core	ip_wan	http
4	NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	All

This increases the number of rules for each interface allowed to communicate with the web server. However, the rule ordering is unimportant, which may help avoid errors.

If option 2 was selected, the rule set must be adjusted like this:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST 10.10.10.5 80
2	NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	All
3	Allow	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http

This means that the number of rules does not need to be increased. This is good as long as all interfaces can be trusted to communicate with the web server. If, however, at a later point we add an interface that cannot be trusted to communicate with the web server, separate *Drop* rules would have to be placed before the rule granting all machines access to the web server.

Determining the best course of action must be done on a case-by-case basis, taking all circumstances into account.

Example 7.4. Enabling Traffic to a Web Server on an Internal Network

The example we have decided to use is that of a web server with a private address located on an internal network. From a security standpoint, this approach is wrong, as web servers are very vulnerable to attack and should therefore be located in a DMZ. However, due to its simplicity, we have chosen to use this model in our example.

In order for external users to access the web server, they must be able to contact it using a public address. In this example, we have chosen to translate port 80 on the Clavister Security Gateway's external address to port 80 on the web server:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST wwwsrv 80
2	Allow	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http

These two rules allow us to access the web server via the Clavister Security Gateway's external IP address. Rule 1 states that address translation can take place if the connection has been permitted, and rule 2 permits the connection.

Of course, we also need a rule that allows internal machines to be dynamically address translated to the Internet. In this example, we use a rule that permits everything from the internal network to access the Internet via NAT hide:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
3	NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	All

The problem with this rule set is that it will not work at all for traffic from the internal network.

In order to illustrate exactly what happens, we use the following IP addresses:

- *ip_wan* (195.55.66.77): a public IP address
- *ip_lan* (10.0.0.1): the Clavister Security Gateway's private internal IP address
- *wwwsrv* (10.0.0.2): the web servers private IP address
- *PC1* (10.0.0.3): a machine with a private IP address

The order of events is as follows:

- *PC1* sends a packet to *ip_wan* to reach *www.ourcompany.com*:
10.0.0.3:1038 => 195.55.66.77:80
- CorePlus translates the address in accordance with rule 1 and forwards the packet in accordance with rule 2:
10.0.0.3:1038 => 10.0.0.2:80
- *wwwsrv* processes the packet and replies:
10.0.0.2:80 => 10.0.0.3:1038

This reply arrives directly to *PC1* without passing through the Clavister Security Gateway. This causes problems.

The reason this will not work is because *PC1* expects a reply from *195.55.66.77:80* and not *10.0.0.2:80*. The unexpected reply is discarded and *PC1* continues to wait for a response from *195.55.66.77:80* which will never arrive.

Making a minor change to the rule set in the same way as described above, will solve the problem. In this example, for no particular reason, we choose to use option 2:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST wwwsrv 80
2	NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	All
3	Allow	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http

- *PC1* sends a packet to *ip_wan* to reach "www.ourcompany.com":
10.0.0.3:1038 => 195.55.66.77:80
- CorePlus address translates this statically in accordance with rule 1 and dynamically in accordance with rule 2:
10.0.0.1:32789 => 10.0.0.2:80
- *wwwsrv* processes the packet and replies:
10.0.0.2:80 => 10.0.0.1:32789
- The reply arrives and both address translations are restored:
195.55.66.77:80 => 10.0.0.3:1038

In this way, the reply arrives at *PC1* from the expected address.

Another possible solution to this problem is to allow internal clients to speak directly to *10.0.0.2* and this would completely avoid all the problems associated with address translation. However,

this is not always practical.

7.4.2. Translation of Multiple IP Addresses (M:N)

A single SAT rule can be used to translate an entire range of IP addresses. In this case, the result is a transposition where the first original IP address will be translated to the first IP address in the translation list and so on.

For instance, a SAT policy specifying that connections to the *194.1.2.16/29* network should be translated to *192.168.0.50* will result in transpositions which are described in the table below:

Original Address	Translated Address
194.1.2.16	192.168.0.50
194.1.2.17	192.168.0.51
194.1.2.18	192.168.0.52
194.1.2.19	192.168.0.53
194.1.2.20	192.168.0.54
194.1.2.21	192.168.0.55
194.1.2.22	192.168.0.56
194.1.2.23	192.168.0.57

In other words:

- Attempts to communicate with *194.1.2.16* will result in a connection to *192.168.0.50*.
- Attempts to communicate with *194.1.2.22* will result in a connection to *192.168.0.56*.

An example of when this is useful is when having several protected servers in a DMZ, and where each server should be accessible using a unique public IP address.

Example 7.5. Translating Traffic to Multiple Protected Web Servers

In this example, we will create a SAT policy that will translate and allow connections from the Internet to five web servers located in a DMZ. The Clavister Security Gateway is connected to the Internet using the *wan* interface, and the public IP addresses to use are in the range of *195.55.66.77* to *195.55.66.81*. The web servers have IP addresses in the range *10.10.10.5* to *10.10.10.9*, and they are reachable through the *dmz* interface.

To accomplish the task, the following steps need to be performed:

- Define an address object containing the public IP addresses.
- Define another address object for the base of the web server IP addresses.
- Publish the public IP addresses on the *wan* interface using the ARP publish mechanism.
- Create a SAT rule that will perform the translation.
- Create an *Allow* rule that will permit the incoming HTTP connections.

Command-Line Interface

Create an address object for the public IP addresses:

```
Device:/> add Address IP4Address wwwsrv_pub
          Address=195.55.66.77-195.55.66.81
```

Now, create another object for the base of the web server IP addresses:

```
Device:/> add Address IP4Address wwwsrv_priv_base
          Address=10.10.10.5
```

Publish the public IP addresses on the wan interface using ARP publish. One ARP item is needed for every IP address:

```
Device:/> add ARP Interface=wan IP=195.55.66.77 mode=Publish
```

Repeat this for all the five public IP addresses.

Next, change the current category to be the *main* IP rule set:

```
Device:/> cc IPRuleSet main
```

Next, create a SAT rule for the translation:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule Action=SAT Service=http
                SourceInterface=any
                SourceNetwork=all-nets
                DestinationInterface=wan
                DestinationNetwork=wwwsrv_pub
                SATTranslateToIP=wwwsrv_priv_base
                SATTranslate=DestinationIP
```

Finally, create an associated *Allow* Rule:

```
Device:/main> add IPRule Action=Allow Service=http
                SourceInterface=any
                SourceNetwork=all-nets
                DestinationInterface=wan
                DestinationNetwork=wwwsrv_pub
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

Create an address object for the public IP address:

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP address**
2. Specify a suitable name for the object, for example *wwwsrv_pub*
3. Enter *195.55.66.77 - 195.55.66.77.81* as the **IP Address**
4. Click **OK**

Now, create another address object for the base of the web server IP addresses:

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP address**
2. Specify a suitable name for the object, for example *wwwsrv_priv_base*
3. Enter *10.10.10.5* as the **IP Address**

4. Click **OK**

Publish the public addresses on the *wan* interface using ARP publish. One ARP item is needed for every IP address:

1. Go to **Interfaces > ARP > Add > ARP**
2. Now enter:
 - **Mode:** Publish
 - **Interface:** wan
 - **IP Address:** 195.55.66.77
3. Click **OK** and repeat for all 5 public IP addresses

Create a SAT rule for the translation:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the rule, for example *SAT_HTTP_To_DMZ*
3. Now enter:
 - **Action:** SAT
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Interface:** wan
 - **Destination Network:** wwwsrv_pub
4. Switch to the **SAT** tab
5. Make sure that the **Destination IP Address** option is selected
6. In the **New IP Address** dropdown list, select *wwwsrv_priv*
7. Click **OK**

Finally, create a corresponding *Allow* rule:

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the rule, for example *Allow_HTTP_To_DMZ*
3. Now enter:
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** http
 - **Source Interface:** any

- **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Interface:** wan
 - **Destination Network:** wwwsrv_pub
4. Click **OK**

7.4.3. All-to-One Mappings (N:1)

CorePlus can be used to translate ranges and/or groups into just one IP address.

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	wan	194.1.2.16-194.1.2.20, 194.1.2.30	http SETDEST all-to-one 192.168.0.50 80

This rule produces a N:1 translation of all addresses in the group (the range 194.1.2.16 - 194.1.2.20 and 194.1.2.30) to the IP 192.168.0.50.

- Attempts to communicate with 194.1.2.16 - port 80, will result in a connection to 192.168.0.50.
- Attempts to communicate with 194.1.2.30 - port 80, will result in a connection to 192.168.0.50.



Note

When all-nets is the destination, All-to-One mapping is always done.

7.4.4. Port Translation

Port Translation (PAT) (also known as *Port Address Translation*) can be used to modify the source or destination port.

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	wan	wwwsrv_pub	TCP 80-85 SETDEST 192.168.0.50 1000

This rule produces a 1:1 translation of all ports in the range 80 - 85 to the range 1080 - 1085.

- Attempts to communicate with the web servers public address - port 80, will result in a connection to the web servers private address - port 1080.
- Attempts to communicate with the web servers public address - port 84, will result in a connection to the web servers private address - port 1084.



Note: A custom service is needed for port translation

In order to create a SAT rule that allows port translation, a Custom Service object must be used with the rule.

7.4.5. Protocols Handled by SAT

Generally, static address translation can handle all protocols that allow address translation to take place. However, there are protocols that can only be translated in special cases, and other protocols that simply cannot be translated at all.

Protocols that are impossible to translate using SAT are most likely also impossible to translate using NAT. Reasons for this include:

- The protocol cryptographically requires that the addresses are unaltered; this applies to many VPN protocols.
- The protocol embeds its IP addresses inside the TCP or UDP level data, and subsequently requires that, in some way or another, the addresses visible on IP level are the same as those embedded in the data. Examples of this include FTP and logons to NT domains via NetBIOS.
- Either party is attempting to open new dynamic connections to the addresses visible to that party. In some cases, this can be resolved by modifying the application or the security gateway configuration.

There is no definitive list of what protocols that can or cannot be address translated. A general rule is that VPN protocols cannot usually be translated. In addition, protocols that open secondary connections in addition to the initial connection can be difficult to translate.

Some protocols that are difficult to address translate may be handled by specially written algorithms designed to read and/or alter application data. These are commonly referred to as *Application Layer Gateways* or *Application Layer Filters*. CorePlus supports a number of such Application Layer Gateways and for more information please see *Section 6.2, "ALGs"*.

7.4.6. Multiple SAT Rule Matches

CorePlus does not terminate the rule set lookup upon finding a matching *SAT* rule. Instead, it continues to search for a matching *Allow*, *NAT* or *FwdFast* rule. Only when it has found such a matching rule does CorePlus execute the static address translation.

Despite this, the first matching *SAT* rule found for each address is the one that will be carried out.

The phrase "*each address*" above means that two *SAT* rules can be in effect at the same time on the same connection, provided that one is translating the sender address whilst the other is translating the destination address.

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	wwwsrv_pub	TCP 80-85 SETDEST 192.168.0.50 1080
2	SAT	lan	lannet	all-nets	Standard	SETSRC pubnet

The two above rules may both be carried out concurrently on the same connection. In this instance, internal sender addresses will be translated to addresses in *pubnet* in a 1:1 relationship. In addition, if anyone tries to connect to the public address of the web server, the destination address will be changed to its private address.

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	lan	lannet	wwwsrv_pub	TCP 80-85	SETDEST intrasrv 1080
2	SAT	any	all-nets	wwwsrv_pub	TCP 80-85	SETDEST wwwsrv-priv 1080

In this instance, both rules are set to translate the destination address, meaning that only one of them will be carried out. If an attempt is made internally to communicate with the web servers public address, it will instead be redirected to an intranet server. If any other attempt is made to communicate with the web servers public address, it will be redirected to the private address of

the publicly accessible web server.

Again, note that the above rules require a matching *Allow* rule at a later point in the rule set in order to work.

7.4.7. SAT and FwdFast Rules

It is possible to employ static address translation in conjunction with *FwdFast* rules, although return traffic must be explicitly granted and translated.

The following rules make up a working example of static address translation using *FwdFast* rules to a web server located on an internal network:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST wwwsrv 80
2	SAT	lan	wwwsrv	any	all-nets	80 -> All SETSRC ip_wan 80
3	FwdFast	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http
4	FwdFast	lan	wwwsrv	any	all-nets	80 -> All

We now add a *NAT* rule to allow connections from the internal network to the Internet:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
5	NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	All

What happens now is as follows:

- External traffic to *ip_wan:80* will match rules 1 and 3, and will be sent to *wwwsrv*. Correct.
- Return traffic from *wwwsrv:80* will match rules 2 and 4, and will appear to be sent from *ip_wan:80*. Correct.
- Internal traffic to *ip_wan:80* will match rules 1 and 3, and will be sent to *wwwsrv*. This is almost correct; the packets will arrive at *wwwsrv*, but:
- Return traffic from *wwwsrv:80* to internal machines will be sent directly to the machines themselves. This will not work, as the packets will be interpreted as coming from the wrong address.

We will now try moving the *NAT* rule between the *SAT* and *FwdFast* rules:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST wwwsrv 80
2	SAT	lan	wwwsrv	any	all-nets	80 -> All SETSRC ip_wan 80
3	NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	All
4	FwdFast	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http
5	FwdFast	lan	wwwsrv	any	all-nets	80 -> All

What happens now?

- External traffic to *ip_wan:80* will match rules 1 and 4, and will be sent to *wwwsrv*. Correct.
- Return traffic from *wwwsrv:80* will match rules 2 and 3. The replies will therefore be dynamically address translated. This changes the source port to a completely different port, which will not work.

The problem can be solved using the following rule set:

#	Action	Src Iface	Src Net	Dest Iface	Dest Net	Parameters
1	SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_wan	http SETDEST wwwsrv 80
2	SAT	lan	wwwsrv	any	all-nets	80 -> All SETSRC ip_wan 80
3	FwdFast	lan	wwwsrv	any	all-nets	80 -> All
4	NAT	lan	lannet	any	all-nets	All
5	FwdFast	lan	wwwsrv	any	all-nets	80 -> All

- External traffic to *ip_wan:80* will match rules 1 and 5 and will be sent to *wwwsrv*.
- Return traffic from *wwwsrv:80* will match rules 2 and 3.
- Internal traffic to *ip_wan:80* will match rules 1 and 4, and will be sent to *wwwsrv*. The sender address will be the Clavister Security Gateway's internal IP address, guaranteeing that return traffic passes through the Clavister Security Gateway.
- Return traffic will automatically be handled by the Clavister Security Gateway's stateful inspection mechanism.

Chapter 8: User Authentication

This chapter describes how CorePlus implements user authentication.

- Overview, page 429
- Authentication Setup, page 431
- Customizing HTML Pages, page 447

8.1. Overview

In situations where individual users connect to protected resources through the Clavister Security Gateway, the administrator will often require that each user goes through a process of *authentication* before access is allowed.

This chapter deals with setting up authentication for CorePlus but first the general issues involved in authentication will be examined.

Proving Identity

The aim of authentication is to have the user prove their identity so that the network administrator can allow or deny access to resources based on that identity. Possible types of proof could be:

- A.** Something the user is. Unique attributes that are different for every person, such as a fingerprint.
- B.** Something the user has, such a passcard, a X.507 Digital Certificate or Public and Private Keys.
- C.** Something the user knows such as a password.

Method **A** may require a special piece of equipment such as a biometric reader. Another problem with **A** is that the special attribute often cannot be replaced if it is lost.

Methods **B** and **C** are therefore the most common means of identification in network security. However, these have drawbacks: keys might be intercepted, passcards might be stolen, passwords might be guessable, or people may simply be bad at keeping a secret. Methods **B** and **C** are therefore sometimes combined, for example in a passcard that requires a password or pincode for use.

Making Use of Username/Password Combinations

This chapter deals specifically with user authentication performed with username/password combinations that are manually entered by a user attempting to gain access to resources. Access to the external public Internet through a Clavister Security Gateway by internal clients using the HTTP protocol is an example of this.

In using this approach, username/password pairs are often the subject of attacks using guesswork or systematic automated attempts. To counter this, any password should be carefully chosen. Ideally it should:

- Be more than 8 characters with no repeats.
- Use random character sequences not commonly found in phrases.
- Contain both lower and upper case alphabetic characters.
- Contain both digits and special characters.

To remain secure, passwords should also:

- Not be recorded anywhere in written form.
- Never be revealed to anyone else.
- Changed on a regular basis such as every three months.

8.2. Authentication Setup

8.2.1. Setup Summary

The following list summarizes the steps for User Authentication setup with CorePlus:

- Have an *authentication source* which consists of a database of users, each with a username/password combination. Any of the following can be an authentication source:
 - i. A *Local Database* internal to CorePlus that is set up by the administrator.
 - ii. A *RADIUS server* which is external to the Clavister Security Gateway.
 - iii. An *LDAP Server* which is also external to the Clavister Security Gateway.
- Define an *Authentication Rule* which describes which traffic passing through the security gateway is to be authenticated and which *authentication source* will be used to perform the authentication. These are described further in *Section 8.2.5, "Authentication Rules"*.
- If required, define an IP object for the IP addresses of the clients that will be authenticated. This can be associated directly with an authentication rule as the originator IP or can be associated with an *Authentication Group*.
- Set up IP rules to allow the authentication to take place and also to allow access to resources by the clients belonging to the IP object set up in the previous step.

The sections that follow describe the components of these steps in detail. These are:

- *Section 8.2.2, "Local User Databases"*
- *Section 8.2.3, "External RADIUS Servers"*
- *Section 8.2.4, "External LDAP Servers"*
- *Section 8.2.5, "Authentication Rules"*

8.2.2. Local User Databases

Local User Databases are administrator defined registries internal to CorePlus which contain the profiles of authorized users and user groups. Combinations of usernames/password can be entered into these with passwords stored using reversible cryptography for security.

Group Membership

Each user entered into the Local Database can optionally be specified to be a member of one or more *Authentication Groups*. These groups are not predefined (with the exception of the administrators and auditors group described below) but rather entered as text strings. These text strings are case sensitive and must always be entered in exactly the same way. Authentication Groups are not used with *Authentication Rules* but are instead associated with IP objects which are then used in the IP rule set.

Using Groups with IP Rules

When specifying the *Source Network* for an IP rule, a user defined IP object can be used and an

Authentication Group can be associated with that IP object. This will mean that the IP rule will then only apply to logged-in clients who also belong to the source network's associated group.

The purpose of this is to restrict access to certain networks to a particular group by having IP rules which will only apply to members of that group. To gain access to a resource there must be an IP rule that allows it and the client must belong to the same group as the rule's Source Network group.

Granting Administration Privileges

When a user is defined, it can also be added to two default *administration groups*:

- **The *administrators* group**

Members of this group can log into CorePlus through the Web Interface or InControl as well as through the remote CLI interface and are allowed to edit the CorePlus configuration.

- **The *auditors* group**

This is similar to the *administrators* group but members are only allowed to view the configuration and cannot change it.

PPTP/L2TP Configuration

If a client is connecting to the Clavister Security Gateway using PPTP/L2TP then the following three options called also be specified for the local CorePlus user database:

- **Static Client IP Address**

This is the IP address which the client must have if it is to be authenticated. If it is not specified then the user can have any IP. This option offers extra security for users with fixed IP addresses.

- **Network behind user**

If a network is specified for this user then when the user connects, a route is automatically added to the CorePlus *main* routing table. This existence of this added route means that any traffic destined for the specified network will be correctly routed through the user's PPTP/L2TP tunnel.

When the connection to the user ends, the route is automatically removed by CorePlus.



Caution: Use the network option with care

*The administrator should think carefully what the consequences of using this option will be. For example, setting this option to **all-nets** will possibly direct all Internet traffic through the tunnel to this user.*

- **Metric for Networks**

If the **Network behind user** option is specified then this is the metric that will be used with the route that is automatically added by CorePlus. If there are two routes which give a match for the same network then this metric decides which should be used.



Note: Other authentication sources do not have the PPTP/L2TP option

Specifying an SSH Public Key

With PPTP/L2TP clients, using a key is often an alternative to specifying a username and password. A private key can be specified for a local database user by selecting a previously uploaded CorePlus *SSH Client Key* object.

When the user connects, there is an automatic checking of the keys used by the client to verify their identity. Once verified, there is no need for the user to input their username and password.

To make use of this feature, the relevant *SSH Client Key* object or objects must first be defined separately in CorePlus. Client keys are found as an object type within *Authentication Objects* in the Web Interface or InControl. Definition requires the uploading of the public key file for the key pair used by the client.

8.2.3. External RADIUS Servers

Reasons for Using External Servers

In a larger network topology with a larger administration workload, it is often preferable to have a central authentication database on a dedicated server. When there is more than one Clavister Security Gateway in the network and thousands of users, maintaining separate authentication databases on each device becomes problematic. Instead, an external authentication server can validate username/password combinations by responding to requests from CorePlus. To provide this, CorePlus supports the *Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service* (RADIUS) protocol.

RADIUS Usage with CorePlus

CorePlus can act as a RADIUS client, sending user credentials and connection parameter information as a RADIUS message to a designated RADIUS server. The server processes the requests and sends back a RADIUS message to accept or deny them. One or more external servers can be defined in CorePlus.

RADIUS Security

To provide security, a common *shared secret* is configured on both the RADIUS client and the server. This secret enables encryption of the messages sent from the RADIUS client to the server and is commonly configured as a relatively long text string. The string can contain up to 100 characters and is case sensitive.

RADIUS uses PPP to transfer username/password requests between client and RADIUS server, as well as using PPP authentication schemes such as PAP and CHAP. RADIUS messages are sent as UDP messages via UDP port 1812.

Support for Groups

RADIUS authentication supports the specification of groups for a user. This means that a user can also be specified as being in the *administrators* or *auditors* group.

8.2.4. External LDAP Servers

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) servers can also be used with CorePlus as an authentication source. This is implemented by the Clavister Security Gateway acting as a client to one or more LDAP servers. Multiple servers can be configured to provide redundancy if any servers become unreachable.

Setting Up LDAP Authentication

There are two steps for setting up user authentication with LDAP servers:

- Define one or more user authentication LDAP server objects in CorePlus.
- Specify one or a list of these LDAP server objects in a user authentication rule.

One or more LDAP servers can be associated as a list within a user authentication rule. The ordering of the list determines the order in which server access is attempted.

The first server in the list has the highest precedence and will be used first. If authentication fails or the server is unreachable then the second in the list is used and so on.

LDAP Issues

Unfortunately, setting up LDAP authentication may not be as simple as, for example, RADIUS setup. Careful consideration of the parameters used in defining the LDAP server to CorePlus is required. There are a number of issues that can cause problems:

- LDAP servers differ in their implementation. CorePlus provides a flexible way of configuring an LDAP server and some configuration options may have to be changed depending on the LDAP server software.
- Authentication of PPTP or L2TP clients may require some administrative changes to the LDAP server and this is discussed later.

Microsoft Active Directory as the LDAP Server

A Microsoft Active Directory can be configured in CorePlus as an LDAP server. There is one option in the CorePlus LDAP server setup which has special consideration with Active Directory and that is the *Name Attribute*. This should be set to *SAMAccountName*.

Defining an LDAP Server

One or more named LDAP server objects can be defined in CorePlus. These objects tell CorePlus which LDAP servers are available and how to access them.

Defining an LDAP server to CorePlus is sometimes not straightforward because some LDAP server software may not follow the LDAP specifications exactly. It is also possible that an LDAP administrator has modified the server LDAP *schema* so that an LDAP *attribute* has been renamed.

LDAP Attributes

To fully understand LDAP setup, it is important to note some setup values are *attributes*. These are:

- The **Name** attribute.
- The **Membership** attribute.
- The **Password** attribute.

An LDAP **attribute** is a tuple (a pair of data values) consisting of an *attribute name* (in this manual

we will call this the attribute *ID* to avoid confusion) and an *attribute value*. An example might be a tuple for a username attribute that has an *ID* of **username** and a *value* of **Smith**.

These attributes can be used in different ways and their meaning to the LDAP server is usually defined by the server's database *schema*. The database schema can usually be changed by the server administrator to alter the attributes.

General Settings

The following general parameters are used for configuration of each server:

- **Name**

The name given to the server object for reference purposes in CorePlus. For example, CorePlus authentication rules may be defined which reference this name.

This value has nothing to do with the *Name Attribute* described below. It is only for use by CorePlus and not the LDAP server.

- **IP Address**

The IP address of the LDAP server.

- **Port**

The port number on the LDAP server which will receive the client request which is sent using TCP/IP.

This port is by default 389.

- **Timeout**

This is the timeout length for LDAP server user authentication attempts in seconds. If no response to a request is received from the server after this time then the server will be considered to be unreachable.

The default timeout setting is 5 seconds.

- **Name Attribute**

The *Name Attribute* is the ID of the data field on the LDAP server that contains the username. The CorePlus default value for this is *uid* which is correct for most UNIX based servers.

If using Microsoft Active Directory this should be set to *SAMAccountName* (which is NOT case sensitive). When looking at the details of a user in Active Directory, the value for the user logon name is defined in the *SAMAccountName* field under the *Account* tab.



Note: The LDAP server database determines the correct value

This is an attribute tuple and the LDAP server's database schema definitions determines the correct ID to use.

- **Retrieve Group Membership**

This option specifies if the groups that a user belongs to should be retrieved from the LDAP server. The group name is often used when granting user access to a service after a successful logon.

If the *Retrieve Group Membership* option is enabled then the *Membership Attribute* option, described next can also be set.

- **Membership Attribute**

The *Membership Attribute* defines which groups a user is a member of. This is similar to the way a user belongs to either the *admin* or *audit* database group in CorePlus. This is another tuple defined by the server's database schema and the default ID is *MemberOf*.

In Microsoft Active Directory, the groups a user belongs to can be found by looking at a users details under the *MemberOf* tab.

- **Use Domain Name**

Some servers require the *domain name* in combination with a username for performing successful authentication. The domain name is the host name of the LDAP server, for example *myldapserver*. The choices for this parameter are:

- i. *None* - This will not modify the username in any way. For example, *testuser*.
- ii. *Username Prefix* - When authenticating, this will put *<domain name>* in front of the username. For example, *myldapserver/testuser*.
- iii. *Username Postfix* - When authenticating, this will add *@<domain name>* after the username. For example, *testuser@myldapserver*.

If the choice is other than *None*, the *Domain Name* parameter option described below should be specified.

Different LDAP servers could handle the domain name differently and you should check your servers requirements. Most versions of Windows Active Directory require the *Postfix* option to be used.

- **Routing Table**

The CorePlus routing table where route lookup will be done to resolve the server's IP address into a route. The default is the *main* routing table.

Database Settings

The *Database Settings* are as follows:

- **Base Object**

Defines where in the LDAP server tree search for user accounts shall begin.

The users defined on an LDAP server database are organized into a tree structure. The *Base Object* specifies where in this tree the relevant users are located. Specifying the *Base Object* has the effect of speeding up the search of the LDAP tree since only users under the *Base Object* will be examined.



Important: The Base Object must be specified correctly

If the Base Object is specified incorrectly then this can mean that a user will not be found and authenticated if they are not in the part of the tree below the Base Object. The recommended option is therefore to initially specify the Base Object as the route of the tree.

The *Base Object* is specified as a common separated *domainComponent* (DC) set. If the full domain name is *myldapserver.local.eu.com* and this is the *Base Object* then this is specified as:

```
DC=myldapserver,DC=local,DC=eu,DC=com
```

The username search will now begin at the root of the *myldapserver* tree.

- **Administrator Account**

The LDAP server will require that the user establishing a connection to do a search has administrator privileges. The *Administration Account* specifies the administrator username. This username may be requested by the server in a special format in the same way as described previously with *Use Domain Name*.

- **Password/Confirm Password**

The password for the administrator account which was specified above.

- **Domain Name**

The *Domain Name* is used when formatting usernames. This is the first part of the full domain name. In our examples above, the *Domain Name* is *myldapserver*. The full domain name is a dot separated set of labels, for example, *myldapserver.local.eu.com*.

This option is only available if the *Server Type* is NOT set to *Other*.

This option can be left empty but is required if the LDAP server requires the domain name when performing a bind request.

Optional Settings

There is one optional setting:

- **Password Attribute**

The password attribute specifies the ID of the tuple on the LDAP server that contains the user's password. The default ID is *userPassword*.

This option should be left empty unless the LDAP server is being used to authenticate users connecting via PPP with CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2.

When it is used, it determines the ID of the data field in the LDAP server database which contains the user password in plain text. The LDAP server administrator must make sure that this field actually does contain the password. This is explained in greater detail later.

Bind Request Authentication

LDAP server authentication is automatically configured to work using LDAP *Bind Request Authentication*. This means that authentication succeeds if successful connection is made to the LDAP server. Individual clients are not distinguished from one another.

LDAP server referrals should not occur with bind request authentication but if they do, the server sending the referral will be regarded as not having responded.

LDAP Server Responses

When an LDAP server is queried by CorePlus with a user authentication request, the following are the possible outcomes:

- The server replies with a positive response and the user is authenticated.

Clients using PPP with CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2 is a special case and authentication

is actually done by CorePlus, as discussed later.

- The server replies with a negative response and the user is not authenticated.
- The server does not respond within the *Timeout* period specified for the server. If only one server is specified then authentication will be considered to have failed. If there are alternate servers defined for the user authentication rule then these are queried next.

Username may need the Domain

With certain LDAP servers, the domain name may need to be combined with the username when the user is prompted for a username/password combination.

If the domain is **mydomain.com** then the username for **myuser** might need to be specified as **myuser@mydomain.com**. With some LDAP servers this might be **myuser@domain mydomain.com/myuser** or even **mydomain\myuser**. The format depends entirely on the LDAP server and what it expects.

Real-time Monitoring Statistics

The following statistics are available for real-time monitoring of LDAP server access for user authentication:

- Number of authentications per second.
- Total number of authentication requests.
- Total number of successful authentication requests.
- Total number of failed authentication requests.
- Total number of invalid usernames.
- Total number of invalid password.

LDAP Authentication CLI Commands

The CLI objects that correspond to LDAP servers used for authentication are called *LDAPDatabase* objects (LDAP servers used for certificate lookup are known as *LDAPServer* objects in the CLI).

A specific LDAP server that is defined in CorePlus for authentication can be shown with the command:

```
Device:/> show LDAPDatabase <object_name>
```

The entire contents of the database can be displayed with the command:

```
Device:/> show LDAPDatabase
```

LDAP Authentication and PPP

When using a PPP based client for PPTP or L2TP access, special consideration has to be taken if LDAP authentication is to succeed with CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2 encryption. The two

cases of **(A)** normal PPP authentication and **(B)** PPP with encryption are examined next.

A. Normal LDAP Authentication

Normal LDAP authentication for Webauth, XAuth, or PPP with PAP security is illustrated in the diagram below. An authentication *bind request* with the username and password is sent to the LDAP server which then performs the authentication and sends back a *bind response* with the result.




Figure 8.1. Normal LDAP Authentication

The processing is different if a group membership is being retrieved since a request is sent to the LDAP server to search for memberships and any group memberships are then sent back in the response.

B. PPP Authentication with CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2 Encryption

If PPP with CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2 is used for authentication, a digest of the user's password will be sent to CorePlus by the client. CorePlus cannot just forward this digest to the LDAP server since this won't be understood. The solution is for CorePlus to obtain the password in plain-text from the LDAP server, create a digest itself, and then compare the created digest with the digest from the client. If the two are the same, authentication is successful but it is CorePlus that makes the authentication decision and not the LDAP server.

To retrieve the password from the LDAP server, two things are needed:

- The *Password Attribute* parameter needs to be specified when defining the server to CorePlus. This will be the ID of the field on the LDAP server that will contain the password when it's sent back.

This ID **must** be different from the default password attribute (which is usually *userPassword* for most LDAP servers). A suggestion is to use the *description* field in the LDAP database.

- In order for the server to return the password in the database field with the ID specified, the LDAP administrator must make sure that the plain text password is found there. LDAP servers store passwords in encrypted digest form and do not provide automatic mechanisms for doing this. It must therefore be done manually by the administrator as they add new users and change existing users passwords.

This clearly involves some effort from the administrator, as well as leaving passwords dangerously exposed in plain text form on the LDAP server. These are some of the reasons why LDAP may not be viewed as a viable authentication solution for CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2 encrypted PPP.

When CorePlus receives the password digest from the client, it initiates a *Search Request* to the LDAP server. The server replies with a *Search Response* which will contains the user's password and any group memberships. CorePlus is then able to compare digests. The diagram below illustrates this process.




Figure 8.2. LDAP for PPP with CHAP, MS-CHAPv1 or MS-CHAPv2



Important: The link to the LDAP server must be protected

Since the LDAP server is sending back passwords in plain text to CorePlus, the link between the Clavister Security Gateway and the server must be protected. A VPN link should be used if the link between the two is not local.

Access to the LDAP server itself must also be restricted as passwords will be stored in plain text.

8.2.5. Authentication Rules

An *Authentication Rule* should be defined when a client establishing a connection through a Clavister Security Gateway is to be prompted for a username/password login sequence.

Authentication Rules are set up in a way that is similar to other CorePlus security policies, by specifying which traffic is to be subject to the rule. They differ from other policies in that the connection's destination network/interface is not of interest but only the source network/interface.

Authentication Rule Parameters

An Authentication Rule has the following parameters:

- **Authentication Agent**

The type of traffic being authenticated. This can one of:

- i. **HTTP**

HTTP web connections to be authenticated via a predefined or custom web page (see

the detailed HTTP explanation below).

ii. **HTTPS**

HTTPS web connections to be authenticated via a predefined or custom web page (also see the detailed HTTP explanation below).

iii. **XAUTH**

This is the IKE authentication method which is used as part of VPN tunnel establishment with IPsec.

XAuth is an extension to the normal IKE exchange and provides an addition to normal IPsec security which means that clients accessing a VPN must provide a login username and password.

It should be noted that an *interface* value is not entered with an XAuth authentication rule since one single rule with XAuth as the agent will be used for all IPsec tunnels. However, this approach assumes that a single authentication source is used for all tunnels.

iv. **PPP**

This is used specifically for L2TP or PPTP authentication.

- **Authentication Source**

This specifies that authentication is to be performed using one of the following:

- i. **LDAP** - Users are looked up in an external LDAP server database.
- ii. **RADIUS** - An external RADIUS server is used for lookup.
- iii. **Disallow** - This option explicitly disallows all connections that trigger this rule. Such connections will never be authenticated.

Any *Disallow* rules are best located at the end of the authentication rule set.

- iv. **Local** - The local database defined within CorePlus is used for user lookup.
- v. **Allow** - This option allows all connections that trigger this rule. With this option, all connections that trigger this rule will be authenticated. No authentication database lookup occurs.

- **Interface**

The source interface on which the connections to be authenticated will arrive. This must be specified.

- **Originator IP**

The source IP or network from which new connections will arrive. For XAuth and PPP, this is the tunnel originator IP.

- **Terminator IP**

The terminating IP with which new connections arrive. This is only specified where the *Authentication Agent* is PPP.

Connection Timeouts

An Authentication Rule can specify the following timeouts related to a user session:

- **Idle Timeout**

How long a connection is idle before being automatically terminated (1800 seconds by default).

- **Session Timeout**

The maximum time that a connection can exist (no value is specified by default).

If an authentication server is being used then the option to **Use timeouts received from the authentication server** can be enabled to have these values set from the server.

Multiple Logins

An Authentication Rule can specify how *multiple logins* are handled where more than one user from different source IP addresses try to login with the same username. The possible options are:

- Allow multiple logins so that more than one client can use the same username/password combination.
- Allow only one login per username.
- Allow one login per username and logout an existing user with the same name if they have been idle for a specific length of time when the new login occurs.

8.2.6. Authentication Processing

The list below describes the processing flow through CorePlus for username/password authentication:

1. A user creates a new connection to the Clavister Security Gateway.
2. CorePlus sees the new user connection on an interface and checks the *Authentication rule set* to see if there is a matching rule for traffic on this interface, coming from this network and data which is one of the following types:
 - HTTP traffic
 - HTTPS traffic
 - IPsec tunnel traffic
 - L2TP tunnel traffic
 - PPTP tunnel traffic
3. If no rule matches, the connection is allowed, provided the IP rule set permits it, and nothing further happens in the authentication process.
4. Based on the settings of the first matching authentication rule, CorePlus prompts the user with an authentication request.
5. The user replies by entering their identification information which is usually a

username/password pair.

6. CorePlus validates the information against the *Authentication Source* specified in the authentication rule. This will be either a local CorePlus database, an external RADIUS database server or an external LDAP server.
7. CorePlus then allows further traffic through this connection as long as authentication was successful and the service requested is allowed by a rule in the IP rule set. That rule's Source Network object has either the **No Defined Credentials** option enabled or alternatively it is associated with a group and the user is also a member of that group.
8. If a timeout restriction is specified in the authentication rule then the authenticated user will be automatically logged out after that length of time without activity.

Any packets from an IP address that fails authentication are discarded.

8.2.7. A Group Usage Example

To illustrate Authentication Group usage, let's suppose that there are a set of users which will login from a network *192.168.1.0/24* connected to the *lan* interface. The requirement is to restrict access to a network called *important_net* on the *int* interface to one group of trusted users, while the other less-trusted users can only access another network called *regular_net* on the *dmz* interface.

Assuming we are using the internal database of users as the authentication source, we add the users to this database with appropriate username/password pairs and a specific **Group** string. One set of users would be assigned to the group with the name *trusted* and the other to the group with the name *untrusted*.

We now define two IP objects for the same network *192.168.1.0/24*. One IP object is called *untrusted_net* and has its **Group** parameter set to the string *untrusted*. The other IP object is called *trusted_net* and its **Group** parameter is set to the string *trusted*.

The final step is to set up the rules in the IP rule set as shown below:

#	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
1	Allow	lan	trusted_net	int	important_net	All
2	Allow	lan	untrusted_net	dmz	regular_net	All

If we wanted to allow the *trusted* group users to also be able to access the regular network we could add a third rule to permit this:

#	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
1	Allow	lan	trusted_net	int	important_net	All
2	Allow	lan	trusted_net	dmz	regular_net	All
3	Allow	int	untrusted_net	dmz	regular_net	All

8.2.8. HTTP Authentication

Where users are communicating through a web browser using the HTTP protocol then authentication can be done by presenting the user with HTML pages to retrieve required user information. This is sometimes referred to as *WebAuth* and the setup requires further considerations.

Changing the Management WebUI Port

HTTP authentication will collide with the WebUI's remote management service which also uses TCP port 80. To avoid this, the WebUI port number should be changed before configuring authentication. Do this by going to **Remote Management > advanced settings** in the WebUI and changing the setting **WebUI HTTP Port**. Port number 81 could instead, be used for this setting.

Agent Options

For HTTP and HTTPS authentication there is a set of options in Authentication Rules called **Agent Options**. These are:

- **Login Type** - This can be one of:
 - i. **FORM** - The user is presented with an HTML page for authentication which is filled in and the data sent back to CorePlus with a POST. A predefined HTML file in CorePlus will be used but this can be customized as described below in *Section 8.3, "Customizing HTML Pages"*.
 - ii. **BASICAUTH** - This sends a **401 - Authentication Required** message back to the browser which will cause it to use its own inbuilt dialog to ask the user for a username/password combination. A **Realm String** can optionally be specified which will appear in the browser's dialog.

FORM is recommended over **BASICAUTH** because in some cases the browser might hold the login data in its cache.

- If the **Agent** is set to *HTTPS* then the **Host Certificate** and **Root Certificate** have to be chosen from a list of certificates already loaded into CorePlus.

Setting Up IP Rules

HTTP authentication cannot operate unless a rule is added to the IP rule set to explicitly allow authentication to take place. If we consider the example of a number of clients on the local network *lannet* who would like access to the public Internet through the *wan* interface then the IP rule set would contain the following rules:

#	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
1	Allow	lan	lannet	core	ip_lan	http-all
2	NAT	lan	trusted_users	wan	all-nets	http-all
3	NAT	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	dns-all

The first rule allows the authentication process to take place and assumes the client is trying to access the *ip_lan* IP address, which is the IP address of the interface on the Clavister Security Gateway where the local network connects.

The second rule allows normal surfing activity but we cannot just use *lannet* as the source network since the rule would trigger for any unauthenticated client from that network. Instead, the source network is an administrator defined IP object called *trusted_users* which is the same network as *lannet* but has additionally either the Authentication option **No Defined Credentials** enabled *or* has an Authentication Group assigned to it (which is the same group as that assigned to the users).

The third rule allows DNS lookup of URLs.

Forcing Users to a Login Page

With this setup, when users that are not authenticated try to surf to any IP except *ip_lan* they will

fall through the rules and their packets will be dropped. To always have these users come to the authentication page we must add a *SAT* rule and its associated *Allow* rule. The rule set will now look like this:

#	Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
1	Allow	lan	lannet	core	ip_lan	http-all
2	NAT	lan	trusted_users	wan	all-nets	http-all
3	NAT	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	dns-all
4	SAT	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets all-to-one 127.0.0.1	http-all
5	Allow	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	http-all

The *SAT* rule catches all unauthenticated requests and must be set up with an all-to-one address mapping that directs them to the address *127.0.0.1* which corresponds to **core** (CorePlus itself).

Example 8.1. Creating an Authentication User Group

In the example of an authentication address object in the address book, a user group "users" is used to enable user authentication on "lannet". This example shows how to configure the user group in the CorePlus database.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface**Step A**

1. Go to **User Authentication > Local User Databases > Add > LocalUserDatabase**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** lannet_auth_users
 - **Comments:** folder for "lannet" authentication user group - "users"
3. Click **OK**

Step B

1. Go to **lannet_auth_users > Add > User**
2. Now enter:
 - **Username:** Enter the user's account name, for example *user1*
 - **Password:** Enter the user's password
 - **Confirm Password:** Repeat the password
 - **Groups:** One user can be specified into more than one group - enter the group names here separated by a comma - *users* for this example
3. Click **OK**
4. Repeat **Step B** to add all the *lannet* users having the membership of *users* group into the *lannet_auth_users* folder

Example 8.2. Configuring a RADIUS Server

The following steps illustrate how a RADIUS server is typically configured.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. **User Authentication > External User Databases> Add > External User Database**
2. Now enter:
 - a. **Name:** Enter a name for the server, for example *ex-users*
 - b. **Type:** Select RADIUS
 - c. **IP Address:** Enter the IP address of the server, or enter the symbolic name if the server has been defined in the **Address Book**
 - d. **Port:** 1812 (RADIUS service uses UDP port 1812 by default)
 - e. **Retry Timeout:** 2 (CorePlus will resend the authentication request to the sever if there is no response after the timeout, for example every 2 seconds. This will be retried a maximum of 3 times)
 - f. **Shared Secret:** Enter a text string here for basic encryption of the RADIUS messages
 - g. **Confirm Secret:** Retype the string to confirm the one typed above
3. Click **OK**

8.3. Customizing HTML Pages

User Authentication makes use of a set of HTML files to present information to the user during the authentication process. The options available for HTTP authentication processing are as follows:

- When a user attempts to use a browser to open a web page they are directed to a login page (the *FormLogin* page). After successful login, the user is taken to the originally requested page.
- After successful login, instead the user can be taken to a specified web page.
- After successful login, the user is taken to a particular web page (the *LoginSuccess* page) before being automatically redirected to the originally requested page.

HTTP Banner Files

The web page files, also referred to as *HTTP banner files*, are stored within CorePlus and exist by default at startup. They can be customized to suit a particular installation's needs either through by direct editing in Web Interface or InControl or by downloading and re-uploading through an SCP client.

The files available for editing have the following names:

FormLogin
LoginSuccess
LoginFailure
LoginAlreadyDone
LoginChallenge
LoginChallengeTimeout
LoginSuccess
LoginSuccessBasicAuth
LoginFailure

FileNotFound

Editing the Banner Files

The WebUI provides a simple way to download and edit the files and then upload the edited HTML back to CorePlus. The description of doing this that is given next and mirrors the procedure described in *Section 6.3.4.4, "Customizing HTML Pages"*.

To perform customization it is necessary to first create a new **Auth Banner Files** object with a new name. This new object automatically contains a copy of all the files in the *Default* Auth Banner Files object. These new files can then be edited and uploaded back to CorePlus. The original *Default* object cannot be edited. The example given below goes through the customization steps.

HTML Page Parameters

The HTML pages can contain a number of parameters that can be used where it is appropriate. The parameters available are:

- **%URL%** - The URL which was requested.
- **%IPADDR%** - The IP address which is being browsed from.
- **%REASON%** - The reason that access was denied.
- - The web page URL for redirects.

The **%REDIRURL%** Parameter

In certain banner web pages, the parameter **%REDIRURL%** appears. This is a placeholder for the original URL which was requested before the user login screen appeared for an unauthenticated user. Following successful authentication, the user becomes redirected to the URL held by this parameter.

Since **%REDIRURL%** only has this internal purpose, it should not be removed from web pages and should appear in the *FormLogin* page if that is used.

Example 8.3. Editing Content Filtering HTTP Banner Files

This example shows how to modify the contents of the *URL forbidden* HTML page.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > HTTP Banner files > Add > Auth Banner Files**
2. Enter a name such as *new_forbidden* and press **OK**
3. The dialog for the new set of ALG banner files will appear
4. Click the **Edit & Preview tab**

5. Select *FormLogin* from the **Page** list
6. Now edit the HTML source that appears in the text box for the Forbidden URL page
7. Use **Preview** to check the layout if required
8. Press **Save** to save the changes
9. Click **OK** to exit editing
10. Go to **Objects > ALG** and select the relevant HTML ALG
11. Select *new_forbidden* as the **HTML Banner**
12. Click **OK**
13. Go to **Configuration > Save & Activate** to activate the new file



Tip: HTML file changes need to be saved

*In the above example, more than one HTML file can be edited in a session but the **Save** button should be pressed to save any edits before beginning editing on another file.*

Uploading with SCP

It is possible to upload new HTTP Banner files using SCP. The steps to do this are:

1. Since SCP cannot be used to download the original default HTML, the source code must be first copied from the WebUI and pasted into a local text file which is then edited using an appropriate editor.
2. A new **Auth Banner Files** object must exist which the edited file(s) is uploaded to. If the object is called *ua_html*, the CLI command to create this object is:

```
Device: /> add HTTPAuthBanners ua_html
```

This creates an object which contains a copy of all the *Default* user auth banner files.

3. The modified file is then uploaded using SCP. It is uploaded to the object type *HTTPAuthBanner* and the object *ua_html* with property name *FormLogin*. If the edited *Formlogon* local file is called *my.html* then using the Open SSH SCP client, the upload command would be:

```
pscp my.html admin@10.5.62.11:HTTPAuthBanners/ua_html/FormLogin
```

The usage of SCP clients is explained further in *Section 2.1.6, "Secure Copy"*.

4. Using the CLI, the relevant user authentication rule should now be set to use the *ua_html*. If the rule is called *my_auth_rule*, the command would be:

```
set UserAuthRule my_auth_rule HTTPBanners=ua_html
```

5. As usual, use the *activate* followed by the *commit* CLI commands to activate the changes on the Clavister Security Gateway.

Chapter 9: VPN

This chapter describes the *Virtual Private Network* (VPN) functionality in CorePlus.

- Overview, page 451
- VPN Quick Start, page 455
- IPsec Components, page 465
- IPsec Tunnels, page 480
- PPTP/L2TP, page 500
- CA Server Access, page 510
- VPN Troubleshooting, page 513

9.1. Overview

9.1.1. VPN Usage

The Internet is increasingly used as a means to connect together computers since it offers efficient and inexpensive communication. The requirement therefore exists for data to traverse the Internet to its intended recipient without another party being able to read or alter it.

It is equally important that the recipient can verify that no one is falsifying data, in other words, pretending to be someone else. *Virtual Private Networks* (VPNs) meet this need, providing a highly cost effective means of establishing secure links between two co-operating computers so that data can be exchanged in a secure manner.


VPN allows the setting up of a *tunnel* between two devices known as *tunnel endpoints*. All data flowing through the tunnel is then secure. The mechanism that provides tunnel security is *encryption*.

There are two common scenarios where VPN is used:

1. **LAN to LAN connection** - Where two internal networks need to be connected together over the Internet. In this case, each network is protected by an individual Clavister Security Gateway and the VPN tunnel is set up between them.



2. **Client to LAN connection** - Where many remote clients need to connect to an internal network over the Internet. In this case, the internal network is protected by the Clavister Security Gateway to which the client connects and the VPN tunnel is set up between them.



9.1.2. VPN Encryption

Encryption of VPN traffic is done using the science of *cryptography*. Cryptography is an umbrella expression covering 3 techniques and benefits:

Confidentiality	No one but the intended recipients is able to receive and understand the communication. Confidentiality is accomplished by encryption.
Authentication and Integrity	Proof for the recipient that the communication was actually sent by the expected sender, and that the data has not been modified in transit. This is accomplished by authentication, and is often implemented through the use of cryptographic keyed hashing.
Non-repudiation	Proof that the sender actually sent the data; the sender cannot later deny having sent it. Non-repudiation is usually a side-effect of authentication.

VPNs are normally only concerned with confidentiality and authentication. Non-repudiation is normally not handled at the network level but rather is usually done at a higher, transaction

level.

9.1.3. VPN Planning

An attacker targeting a VPN connection will typically not attempt to crack the VPN encryption since this requires enormous effort. They will, instead, see VPN traffic as an indication that there is something worth targeting at the other end of the connection. Typically, mobile clients and branch offices are far more attractive targets than the main corporate network. Once inside those, getting to the corporate network then becomes easier.

In designing a VPN there are many issues that need to be addressed which aren't always obvious. These include:

- Protecting mobile and home computers.
- Restricting access through the VPN to needed services only, since mobile computers are vulnerable.
- Creating DMZs for services that need to be shared with other companies through VPNs.
- Adapting VPN access policies for different groups of users.
- Creating key distribution policies.

Endpoint Security

A common misconception is that VPN-connections are equivalents to the internal network from a security standpoint and that they can be connected directly to it with no further precautions. It is important to remember that although the VPN-connection itself may be secure, the total level of security is only as high as the security of the tunnel endpoints.

It is becoming increasingly common for users on the move to connect directly to their company's network via VPN from their laptops. However, the laptop itself is often not protected. In other words, an intruder can gain access to the protected network through an unprotected laptop and already-opened VPN connections.

Placement in a DMZ

A VPN connection should never be regarded as an integral part of a protected network. The VPN gateway should instead be located in a special DMZ or outside a gateway dedicated to this task. By doing this, the administrator can restrict which services can be accessed via the VPN and ensure that these services are well protected against intruders.

In instances where the gateway features an integrated VPN feature, it is usually possible to dictate the types of communication permitted and CorePlus VPN has this feature.

9.1.4. Key Distribution

Key distribution schemes are best planned in advance. Issues that need to be addressed include:

- How will keys be distributed? Email is not a good solution. Phone conversations might be secure enough.
- How many different keys should be used? One key per user? One per group of users? One per LAN-to-LAN connection? One key for all users and one key for all LAN-to-LAN connections? It is probably better using more keys than is necessary today since it will be easier to adjust access per user (group) in the future.

- Should the keys be changed? If they are changed, how often? In cases where keys are shared by multiple users, you may want to consider overlapping schemes, so that the old keys work for a short period of time when new keys have been issued.
- What happens when an employee in possession of a key leaves the company? If several users are using the same key, it should be changed.
- In cases where the key is not directly programmed into a network unit, such as a VPN gateway, how should the key be stored? On a floppy? As a pass phrase to memorize? On a smart card? If it is a physical token, how should it be handled?

9.1.5. The TLS Alternative for VPN

If secure access by clients to web servers using HTTP is the scenario under consideration, then using a Clavister Security Gateway for TLS termination can offer an alternative "lightweight" VPN approach that is quickly and easily implemented. This topic is described further in *Section 6.2.10, "The TLS ALG"*.

9.2. VPN Quick Start

Overview

Later sections in this chapter will explore VPN components in detail. To help put those later sections in context, this section is a quick start summary of the steps needed for VPN setup.

It outlines the individual steps in setting up VPNs for the most common scenarios. These are:

- IPsec LAN to LAN with Pre-shared Keys
- IPsec LAN to LAN with Certificates
- IPsec Roaming Clients with Pre-shared Keys
- IPsec Roaming Clients with Certificates
- L2TP Roaming Clients with Pre-Shared Keys
- L2TP Roaming Clients with Certificates
- PPTP Roaming Clients

Common Tunnel Setup Requirements

Before looking at each of these scenarios separately, it is useful to summarize the common CorePlus requirements when setting up any VPN tunnel, regardless of the type.

- **Define the Tunnel**

Firstly we must define the tunnel itself. CorePlus has various tunnel object types which are used to do this, such as an *IPsec Tunnel* object.

- **A Route Must Exist**

Before any traffic can flow into the tunnel, a *route* must be defined in a CorePlus *routing table*. This route tells CorePlus which network can be found at the other end of the tunnel so it knows which traffic to send into the tunnel.

In most cases, this route is created automatically when the tunnel is defined and this can be checked by examining the routing tables.

If a route is defined manually, the tunnel is treated exactly like a physical interface in the route properties, as it is in other aspects of CorePlus. In other words, the route is saying to CorePlus that a certain network is found at the other end of the tunnel.

- **Define an IP Rule to Allow VPN Traffic**


An IP rule must be defined that explicitly allows traffic to flow between a network and the tunnel. As with route definitions, the tunnel is treated exactly like a physical interface when defining the IP rule.

IP rules are not created automatically after defining the tunnel object and if they do not exist then no traffic can flow through the tunnel and will instead, be dropped.

The following sections will look at the detailed setup for each of the VPN scenarios listed earlier.

9.2.1. IPsec LAN to LAN with Pre-shared Keys

1. Create a **Pre-shared Key** object.
2. Optionally create a new **IKE Algorithms** object and/or an **IPsec Algorithms** object if the default algorithm proposal lists do not provide a set of algorithms that are acceptable to the tunnel remote end point. This will depend on the capabilities of the device at the other end of the VPN tunnel.
3. In the **Address Book** create IP objects for:
 - The remote VPN gateway which is the IP address of the network device at the other end of the tunnel (let's call this object *remote_gw*).
 - The remote network which lies behind the remote VPN gateway (let's call this object *remote_net*).
 - The local network behind the Clavister Security Gateway which will communicate across the tunnel. Here we will assume that this is the predefined address *lannet* and this network is attached to the CorePlus *lan* interface.



4. Create an **IPsec Tunnel** object (let's call this object *ipsec_tunnel*). Specify the following tunnel parameters:
 - Set **Local Network** to *lannet*.
 - Set **Remote Network** to *remote_net*.
 - Set **Remote Endpoint** to *remote_gw*.
 - Set **Encapsulation mode** to *Tunnel*.
 - Choose the IKE and IPsec algorithm proposal lists to be used.
 - For **Authentication** select the **Pre-shared Key** object defined in step (1) above.

The **IPsec Tunnel** object can be treated exactly like any CorePlus *Interface* object in later steps.
5. Set up two IP rules in the IP rule set for the tunnel:
 - An *Allow* rule for outbound traffic that has the previously defined *ipsec_tunnel* object as the **Destination Interface**. The rule's **Destination Network** is the remote network *remote_net*.
 - An *Allow* rule for inbound traffic that has the previously defined *ipsec_tunnel* object as the *Source Interface*. The **Source Network** is *remote_net*.

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
Allow	lan	lannet	ipsec_tunnel	remote_net	All
Allow	ipsec_tunnel	remote_net	lan	lannet	All

The Service used in these rules is *All* but it could be a predefined service.

- Define a new CorePlus **Route** which specifies that the VPN Tunnel *ipsec_tunnel* is the Interface to use for routing packets bound for the remote network at the other end of the tunnel.

Interface	Network	Gateway
ipsec_tunnel	remote_net	<empty>

9.2.2. IPsec LAN to LAN with Certificates

LAN to LAN security is usually provided with pre-shared keys but sometimes it may be desirable to use X.509 certificates instead. If this is the case, *Certificate Authority (CA)* signed certificates may be used and these come from an internal CA server or from a commercial supplier of certificates.

Creating a LAN to LAN tunnel with certificates follows exactly the same procedures as the previous section where a pre-shared key was used. The difference is that certificates now replace pre-shared keys for authentication.

Two unique sets of two CA signed certificates (two for either end, a root certificate and a gateway certificate) are required for a LAN to LAN tunnel authentication.

The setup steps are as follows:

- Open the WebUI management interface for the Clavister Security Gateway at one end of the tunnel.
- Under **Authentication Objects**, add the *Root Certificate* and *Host Certificate* into CorePlus. The root certificate needs to have 2 parts added: a certificate file and a private key file. The gateway certificate needs just the certificate file added.
- Set up the **IPsec Tunnel** object as for pre-shared keys, but specify the certificates to use under **Authentication**. Do this with the following steps:
 - Enable the **X.509 Certificate** option.
 - Add the **Root Certificate** to use.
 - Select the **Gateway Certificate**.
- Open the WebUI management interface for the Clavister Security Gateway at the other side of the tunnel and repeat the above steps with a different set of certificates.



Note: The system time and date should be correct

The CorePlus date and time should be set correctly since certificates have an expiry date and time.

Also review *Section 9.6, "CA Server Access"* below, which describes important considerations for


certificate validation.

Self-signed certificates instead of CA signed can be used for LAN to LAN tunnels but the Web Interface and other interfaces do not have a feature to generate them. Instead, they must be generated by another utility and imported into CorePlus. This means that they are not truly self-signed since they are generated outside of CorePlus control and it should be remembered that there is no guarantee that their private key is unique. However, the security provided can still be considered adequate.

Two self-signed certificates are required and the same two are used at either end of the tunnel but their usage is reversed. In other words: one certificate is used as the *root certificate* at one end, call it **Side A**, and as the *host certificate* at the other end, call it **Side B**. The second certificate is used in the opposite way: as the *host certificate* at **Side A** and the *root certificate* at **Side B**.

No CA server considerations are needed with self-signed certificates since CA server lookup does not take occur.

9.2.3. IPsec Roaming Clients with Pre-shared Keys



This section details the setup with roaming clients connecting through an IPsec tunnel with pre-shared keys. There are two types of roaming clients:

- A.** The IP addresses of the clients are already allocated.
- B.** The IP addresses of clients are not known beforehand and must be handed out by CorePlus as the clients connect.

A. IP addresses already allocated

The IP addresses may be known beforehand and have been pre-allocated to the roaming clients before they connect. The client's IP address will be manually input into the VPN client software.

1. Set up user authentication. *XAuth* user authentication is not required with IPsec roaming clients but is recommended (this step could initially be left out to simplify setup). The authentication source can be one of the following:
 - A **Local User DB** object which is internal to CorePlus.
 - An external authentication server.

An internal user database is easier to set up and is assumed here. Changing this to an external server is simple to do later.

To implement user authentication with an internal database:

- Define a **Local User DB** object (let's call this object *TrustedUsers*).
- Add individual users to *TrustedUsers*. This should consist of at least a username and password combination.

The **Group** string for a user can be specified if its group's access is to be restricted to certain source networks. **Group** can be specified (with the same text string) in the **Authentication** section of an IP object. If that IP object is then used as the **Source Network** of a rule in the IP rule set, that rule will only apply to a user if their **Group** string matches the **Group** string of the IP object.



Note

Group has no meaning in **Authentication Rules**.

- Create a new **User Authentication Rule** with the **Authentication Source** set to *TrustedUsers*. The other parameters for the rule are:

Agent	Auth Source	Src Network	Interface	Client Source IP
XAUTH	Local	all-nets	any	all-nets (0.0.0.0/0)

2. The **IPsec Tunnel** object *ipsec_tunnel* should have the following parameters:

- Set **Local Network** to *lannet*.
- Set **Remote Network** to *all-nets*
- Set **Remote Endpoint** to *all-nets*.
- Set **Encapsulation mode** to *Tunnel*.
- Set the IKE and IPsec algorithm proposal lists to match the capabilities of the clients.
- No routes can be predefined so the option **Dynamically add route to the remote network when tunnel established** should be enabled for the tunnel object. If *all-nets* is the destination network, the option *Add route for remote network* should be disabled.



Note

The option to dynamically add routes should not be enabled in LAN to LAN tunnel scenarios.

- Enable the option **Require IKE XAuth user authentication for inbound IPsec tunnels**. This will enable a search for the first matching XAUTH rule in the authentication rules.

3. The IP rule set should contain the single rule:

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
Allow	ipsec_tunnel	all-nets	lan	lannet	All

Once an *Allow* rule permits the connection to be set up, bidirectional traffic flow is allowed which is why only one rule is used here. Instead of *all-nets* being used in the above, a more secure defined IP object could be used which specifies the exact range of the pre-allocated IP addresses.

B. IP addresses handed out by CorePlus

If the client IP addresses are not known then they must be handed out by CorePlus. To do this the above must be modified with the following:

1. If a specific IP address range is to be used as a pool of available addresses then:
 - Create a **Config Mode Pool** object (there can only be one associated with a CorePlus installation) and in it specify the address range.
 - Enable the **IKE Config Mode** option in the **IPsec Tunnel** object *ipsec_tunnel*.
2. If client IP addresses are to be retrieved through DHCP:
 - Create an **IP Pool** object and in it specify the DHCP server to use. The DHCP server can be specified as a simple IP address or alternatively as being accessible on a specific interface. If an internal DHCP server is to be used then specify the loopback address *127.0.0.1* as the DHCP server IP address.
 - Create a **Config Mode Pool** object (there can only be one associated with a CorePlus installation) and associate with it the IP Pool object defined in the previous step.
 - Enable the **IKE Config Mode** option in the **IPsec Tunnel** object *ipsec_tunnel*.

Configuring IPsec Clients

In both cases **(A)** and **(B)** above, the IPsec client will need to be correctly configured. The client configuration will require the following: with as well as the pre-shared key.

- Define the URL or IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway. The client needs to locate the tunnel endpoint.
- Define the pre-shared key that is used for IPsec security.
- Define the IPsec algorithms that will be used and which are supported by CorePlus.
- Specify if the client will use config mode.

There are a variety of IPsec client software products available from a number of suppliers and this manual will not focus on any specific one. The network administrator should use the client that is best suited to their budget and needs.

9.2.4. IPsec Roaming Clients with Certificates

If certificates are used with IPsec roaming clients instead of pre-shared keys then no **Pre-shared Key** object is needed and the other differences in the setup described above are:

1. Load a *Root Certificate* and a *Gateway Certificate* into CorePlus. The root certificate needs to have 2 parts added: a certificate file and a private key file. The gateway certificate needs just the certificate file added.
2. When setting up the **IPsec Tunnel** object, specify the certificates to use under

Authentication. This is done by doing the following:

- a. Enable the **X.509 Certificate** option.
 - b. Select the **Gateway Certificate**.
 - c. Add the **Root Certificate** to use.
3. The IPsec client software will need to be appropriately configured with the certificates and remote IP addresses. As already mentioned above, many third party IPsec client products are available and this manual will not discuss any particular client.

The step to set up user authentication is optional since this is additional security to certificates.



Note: The system time and date should be correct

The CorePlus date and time should be set correctly since certificates have an expiry date and time.

Also review *Section 9.6, "CA Server Access"*, which describes important considerations for certificate validation.

9.2.5. L2TP Roaming Clients with Pre-Shared Keys

Due to the inbuilt L2TP client in Microsoft Windows, L2TP is a popular choice for roaming client VPN scenarios. L2TP is usually encapsulated in IPsec to provide encryption with IPsec running in *transport mode* instead of *tunnel mode*. The steps for L2TP over IPsec setup are:

1. Create an IP object (let's call it *l2tp_pool*) which defines the range of IP addresses which can be handed out to clients. The range chosen could be of two types:
 - A range taken from the internal network to which clients will connect. If the internal network is 192.168.0.0/24 then we might use the address range 192.168.0.10 to 192.168.0.20. The danger here is that an IP address might be accidentally used on the internal network and handed out to a client.
 - Use a new address range that is totally different to any internal network. This prevents any chance of an address in the range also being used on the internal network.
2. Define two other IP objects:
 - *ip_ext* which is the external public IP address through which clients connect (let's assume this is on the *ext* interface).
 - *ip_int* which is the internal IP address of the interface to which the internal network is connected (let's call this interface *int*).
3. Define a **Pre-shared Key** for the IPsec tunnel.
4. Define an *IPsec Tunnel* object (let's call this object *ipsec_tunnel*) with the following parameters:
 - Set **Local Network** to *ip_ext* (specify *all-nets* instead if CorePlus is behind a NATing device).
 - Set **Remote Network** to *all-nets*.

- Set **Remote Endpoint** to *none*.
 - For **Authentication** select the **Pre-shared Key** object defined in the first step.
 - Set **Encapsulation Mode** to *Transport*.
 - Select the IKE and IPsec algorithm proposal lists to be used.
 - Enable the IPsec tunnel routing option **Dynamically add route to the remote network when tunnel established**.
 - When *all-nets* is the destination network, as is the case here, the advanced setting option **Add route for remote network** must also be disabled. This setting is enabled by default.
5. Define an PPTP/L2TP Server object (let's call this object *l2tp_tunnel*) with the following parameters:
- Set **Inner IP Address** to *ip_int*.
 - Set **Tunnel Protocol** to *L2TP*.
 - Set **Outer Interface Filter** to *ipsec_tunnel*.
 - Set **Outer Server IP** to *ip_ext*.
 - Select the **Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption** allowed. Since IPsec encryption is used this can be set to be *None* only, otherwise double encryption will degrade throughput.
 - Set **IP Pool** to *l2tp_pool*.
 - Enable Proxy ARP on the *int* interface to which the internal network is connected.
 - Make the interface a member of a specific routing table so that routes are automatically added to that table. Normally the *main* table is selected.
6. For user authentication:
- Define a **Local User DB** object (let's call this object *TrustedUsers*).
 - Add individual users to *TrustedUsers*. This should consist of at least a username and password combination.
- The **Group** string for a user can also be specified. This is explained in the same step in the *IPsec Roaming Clients* section above.
- Define a User Authentication Rule:

Agent	Auth Source	Src Network	Interface	Client Source IP
PPP	Local	all-nets	l2tp_tunnel	all-nets (0.0.0.0/0)

7. To allow traffic through the L2TP tunnel the following rules should be defined in the IP rule set:

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
Allow	l2tp_tunnel	l2tp_pool	any	int_net	All
NAT	ipsec_tunnel	l2tp_pool	ext	all-nets	All

The second rule would be included to allow clients to surf the Internet via the *ext* interface on the Clavister Security Gateway. The client will be allocated a private internal IP address which must be NATed if connections are then made out to the public Internet via the Clavister Security Gateway.

8. Set up the client. Assuming Windows XP, the **Create new connection** option in **Network Connections** should be selected to start the *New Connection Wizard*. The key information to enter in this wizard is: the resolvable URL of the Clavister Security Gateway or alternatively its *ip_ext* IP address.

Then choose **Network > Properties**. In the dialog that opens choose the L2TP Tunnel and select **Properties**. In the new dialog that opens select the **Networking** tab and choose **Force to L2TP**. Now go back to the L2TP Tunnel properties, select the **Security** tab and click on the **IPsec Settings** button. Now enter the pre-shared key.

9.2.6. L2TP Roaming Clients with Certificates

If certificates are used with L2TP roaming clients instead of pre-shared keys then the differences in the setup described above are:

1. The CorePlus date and time must be set correctly since certificates can expire.
2. Load a *Gateway Certificate* and *Root Certificate* into CorePlus.
3. When setting up the **IPsec Tunnel** object, specify the certificates to use under **Authentication**. This is done by:
 - a. Enable the **X.509 Certificate** option.
 - b. Select the **Gateway Certificate**.
 - c. Add the **Root Certificate** to use.
4. If using the Windows XP L2TP client, the appropriate certificates need to be imported into Windows before setting up the connection with the **New Connection Wizard**.

The step to set up user authentication is optional since this is additional security to certificates.

Also review *Section 9.6, "CA Server Access"*, which describes important considerations for certificate validation.

9.2.7. PPTP Roaming Clients

PPTP is simpler to set up than L2TP since IPsec is not used and instead relies on its own, less strong, encryption.

A major secondary disadvantage is not being able to NAT PPTP connections through a tunnel so multiple clients can use a single connection to the Clavister Security Gateway. If NATing is tried then only the first client that tries to connect will succeed.

The steps for PPTP setup are as follows:

1. In the **Address Book** define the following IP objects:
 - A *pptp_pool* IP object which is the range of internal IP addresses that will be handed out from an internal network.

- An *int_net* object which is the internal network from which the addresses come.
 - An *ip_int* object which is the internal IP address of the interface connected to the internal network. Let us assume that this interface is *int*.
 - An *ip_ext* object which is the external public address which clients will connect to (let's assume this is on the *ext* interface).
2. Define a **PPTP/L2TP** object (let's call it *pptp_tunnel*) with the following parameters:
 - Set **Inner IP Address** to *ip_int*.
 - Set **Tunnel Protocol** to *PPTP*.
 - Set **Outer Interface Filter** to *ext*.
 - Set **Outer server IP** to *ip_ext*.
 - For **Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption** it is recommended to disable all options except *128 bit* encryption.
 - Set **IP Pool** to *pptp_pool*.
 - Enable Proxy ARP on the *int* interface.
 - As in L2TP, enable the insertion of new routes automatically into the *main* routing table.
 3. Define a User Authentication Rule, this is almost identical to L2TP:

Agent	Auth Source	Src Network	Interface	Client Source IP
PPP	Local	all-nets	pptp_tunnel	all-nets (0.0.0.0/0)

4. Now set up the IP rules in the IP rule set:

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
Allow	pptp_tunnel	pptp_pool	any	int_net	All
NAT	pptp_tunnel	pptp_pool	ext	all-nets	All

As described for L2TP, the *NAT* rule lets the clients access the public Internet via the Clavister Security Gateway.

5. Set up the client. For Windows XP, the procedure is exactly as described for L2TP above but without entering the pre-shared key.

9.3. IPsec Components

This section looks at the IPsec standards and describes in general terms the various components, techniques and algorithms that are used in IPsec based VPNs.

9.3.1. Overview

Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a set of protocols defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to provide IP security at the network layer. An IPsec based VPN is made up of two parts:

- Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE)
- IPsec protocols (AH/ESP/both)

The first part, IKE, is the initial negotiation phase, where the two VPN endpoints agree on which methods will be used to provide security for the underlying IP traffic. Furthermore, IKE is used to manage connections, by defining a set of Security Associations, SAs, for each connection. SAs are unidirectional, so there are usually at least two for each IPsec connection.

The second part is the actual IP data being transferred, using the encryption and authentication methods agreed upon in the IKE negotiation. This can be accomplished in a number of ways; by using IPsec protocols ESP, AH, or a combination of both.

The flow of events can be briefly described as follows:

- IKE negotiates how IKE should be protected
- IKE negotiates how IPsec should be protected
- IPsec moves data in the VPN

The following sections will describe each of these stages in detail.

9.3.2. Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

This section describes IKE, the Internet Key Exchange protocol, and the parameters that are used with it.

Encrypting and authenticating data is fairly straightforward, the only things needed are encryption and authentication algorithms, and the keys used with them. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol, IKE, is used as a method of distributing these "session keys", as well as providing a way for the VPN endpoints to agree on how the data should be protected.

IKE has three main tasks:

- Provide a means for the endpoints to authenticate each other
- Establish new IPsec connections (create SA pairs)
- Manage existing connections

Security Associations (SAs)

IKE keeps track of connections by assigning a set of Security Associations, SAs, to each connection. An SA describes all parameters associated with a particular connection, such as the

IPsec protocol used (ESP/AH/both) as well as the session keys used to encrypt/decrypt and/or authenticate/verify the transmitted data.

An SA is unidirectional and relates to traffic flow in one direction only. For the bidirectional traffic that is usually found in a VPN, there is therefore a need for more than one SA per connection. In most cases, where only one of ESP or AH is used, two SAs will be created for each connection, one describing the incoming traffic, and the other the outgoing. In cases where ESP and AH are used in conjunction, four SAs will be created.

IKE Negotiation

The process of negotiating session parameters consists of a number of phases and modes. These are described in detail in the below sections.

The flow of events can be summarized as follows:

IKE Phase-1

- Negotiate how IKE should be protected

IKE Phase-2

- Negotiate how IPsec should be protected
- Derive some fresh keying material from the key exchange in phase-1, to provide session keys to be used in the encryption and authentication of the VPN data flow

IKE and IPsec Lifetimes

Both the IKE and the IPsec connections have limited lifetimes, described both in terms of time (seconds), and data (kilobytes). These lifetimes prevent a connection from being used too long, which is desirable from a crypto-analysis perspective.

The IPsec lifetime must be shorter than the IKE lifetime. The difference between the two must be a minimum of 5 minutes. This allows for the IPsec connection to be re-keyed simply by performing another phase-2 negotiation. There is no need to do another phase-1 negotiation until the IKE lifetime has expired.

Lifetime Recommendations

It is recommended that the lifetime values are equal to or greater than the following values:

- IKE lifetime - 600 seconds (10 minutes)
- IPsec lifetime - 300 seconds (5 minutes)

If the administrator uses values which are less, CorePlus will accept them but a warning message will be presented during the reconfiguration.

IKE Algorithm Proposals

An IKE *algorithm proposal list* is a suggestion of how to protect IPsec data flows. The VPN device initiating an IPsec connection will send a list of the algorithms combinations it supports for protecting the connection and it is then up to the device at the other end of the connection to say which proposal is acceptable.

The responding VPN device, upon receiving the list of supported algorithms, will choose the algorithm combination that best matches its own security policies, and reply by specifying which member of the list it has chosen. If no mutually acceptable proposal can be found, the responder

will reply by saying that nothing on the list was acceptable, and possibly also provide a textual explanation for diagnostic purposes.

This negotiation to find a mutually acceptable algorithm combination is done not just to find the best way to protect the IPsec connection but also to find the best way to protect the IKE negotiation itself.

Algorithm proposal lists contain not just the acceptable algorithm combinations for encrypting and authenticating data but also other IKE related parameters. Further details of the IKE negotiation and the other IKE parameters are described next.

IKE Phase-1 - IKE Security Negotiation

An IKE negotiation is performed in two phases. The first phase, phase 1, is used to authenticate the two VPN gateways or VPN Clients to each other, by confirming that the remote device has a matching Pre-Shared Key.

However, since we do not want to publish too much of the negotiation in plaintext, we first agree upon a way of protecting the rest of the IKE negotiation. This is done, as described in the previous section, by the initiator sending a proposal-list to the responder. When this has been done, and the responder accepted one of the proposals, we try to authenticate the other end of the VPN to make sure it is who we think it is, as well as proving to the remote device that we are who we claim to be. A technique known as a *Diffie Hellman Key Exchange* is used to initially agree on a shared secret between the two parties in the negotiation and to derive keys for encryption.

Authentication can be accomplished through Pre-Shared Keys, certificates or public key encryption. Pre-Shared Keys is the most common authentication method today. PSK and certificates are supported by the CorePlus VPN module.

IKE Phase-2 - IPsec Security Negotiation

In phase 2, another negotiation is performed, detailing the parameters for the IPsec connection.

During phase 2 we will also extract new keying material from the Diffie-Hellman key exchange in phase 1 in order to provide session keys to use in protecting the VPN data flow.

If *Perfect Forwarding Secrecy* (PFS) is used, a new Diffie-Hellman exchange is performed for each phase 2 negotiation. While this is slower, it makes sure that no keys are dependent on any other previously used keys; no keys are extracted from the same initial keying material. This is to make sure that, in the unlikely event that some key was compromised, no subsequent keys can be derived.

Once the phase 2 negotiation is finished, the VPN connection is established and ready for traffic to pass through it.

IKE Parameters

There are a number of parameters used in the negotiation process.

Below is a summary of the configuration parameters needed to establish a VPN connection. Understanding what these parameters do before attempting to configure the VPN endpoints is strongly recommended, since it is of great importance that both endpoints are able to agree on all of these parameters.

With two Clavister Security Gateways as VPN endpoints, the matching process is greatly simplified since the default CorePlus configuration parameters will be the same at either end. However, it may not be as straightforward when equipment from different vendors is involved in establishing the VPN tunnel.

Endpoint Identification	<p>The <i>Local ID</i> is a piece of data representing the identity of the VPN tunnel endpoint. With Pre-Shared Keys this is a unique piece of data uniquely identifying the endpoint.</p> <p>Authentication using Pre-Shared Keys is based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.</p>
Local and Remote Networks/Hosts	<p>These are the subnets or hosts between which IP traffic will be protected by the VPN. In a LAN-to-LAN connection, these will be the network addresses of the respective LANs.</p> <p>If roaming clients are used, the remote network will most likely be set to <i>all-nets</i>, meaning that the roaming client may connect from anywhere.</p>
Tunnel / Transport Mode	<p>IPsec can be used in two modes, tunnel or transport.</p> <p>Tunnel mode indicates that the traffic will be tunneled to a remote device, which will decrypt/authenticate the data, extract it from its tunnel and pass it on to its final destination. This way, an eavesdropper will only see encrypted traffic going from one of VPN endpoint to another.</p> <p>In transport mode, the traffic will not be tunneled, and is hence not applicable to VPN tunnels. It can be used to secure a connection from a VPN client directly to the Clavister Security Gateway, for example for IPsec protected remote configuration.</p> <p>This setting will typically be set to "tunnel" in most configurations.</p>
Remote Endpoint	<p>The remote endpoint (sometimes also referred to as the <i>remote gateway</i>) is the device that does the VPN decryption/authentication and that passes the unencrypted data on to its final destination. This field can also be set to <i>None</i>, forcing the Clavister Security Gateway to treat the remote address as the remote endpoint. This is particularly useful in cases of roaming access, where the IP addresses of the remote VPN clients are not known beforehand. Setting this to "none" will allow anyone coming from an IP address conforming to the "remote network" address discussed above to open a VPN connection, provided they can authenticate properly.</p> <p>The remote endpoint can be specified as a URL string such as <i>vpn.company.com</i>. If this is done, the prefix <i>dns:</i> must be used. The string above should therefore be specified as <i>dns:vpn.company.com</i>.</p> <p>The remote endpoint is not used in transport mode.</p>
Main/Aggressive Mode	<p>The IKE negotiation has two modes of operation, main mode and aggressive mode.</p> <p>The difference between these two is that aggressive mode will pass more information in fewer packets, with the benefit of slightly faster connection establishment, at the cost of transmitting the identities of the security gateways in the clear.</p>

When using aggressive mode, some configuration parameters, such as Diffie-Hellman groups and PFS, cannot be negotiated and this means it is important to have "compatible" configurations at both ends.

IPsec Protocols

The IPsec protocols describe how the data will be processed. The two protocols to choose from are AH, Authentication Header, and ESP, Encapsulating Security Payload.

ESP provides encryption, authentication, or both. However, it is not recommended to use encryption only, since it will dramatically decrease security.

Note that AH only provides authentication. The difference from ESP with authentication only is that AH also authenticates parts of the outer IP header, for instance source and destination addresses, making certain that the packet really came from who the IP header claims it is from.



Note

CorePlus does not support AH.

IKE Encryption

This specifies the encryption algorithm used in the IKE negotiation, and depending on the algorithm, the size of the encryption key used.

The algorithms supported by CorePlus IPsec are:

- AES
- Blowfish
- Twofish
- Cast128
- 3DES
- DES

DES is only included to be interoperable with other older VPN implementations. The use of DES should be avoided whenever possible, since it is an older algorithm that is no longer considered to be sufficiently secure.

IKE Authentication

This specifies the authentication algorithms used in the IKE negotiation phase.

The algorithms supported by CorePlus IPsec are:

- SHA1
- MD5

IKE DH Group

This specifies the Diffie-Hellman group to use for the IKE exchange. The available DH groups are discussed below.

IKE Lifetime	<p>This is the lifetime of the IKE connection.</p> <p>It is specified in time (seconds) as well as data amount (kilobytes). Whenever one of these expires, a new phase-1 exchange will be performed. If no data was transmitted in the last "incarnation" of the IKE connection, no new connection will be made until someone wants to use the VPN connection again. This value must be set greater than the IPsec SA lifetime.</p>
PFS	<p>With <i>Perfect Forwarding Secrecy</i> (PFS) disabled, initial keying material is "created" during the key exchange in phase-1 of the IKE negotiation. In phase-2 of the IKE negotiation, encryption and authentication session keys will be extracted from this initial keying material. By using PFS, completely new keying material will always be created upon re-key. Should one key be compromised, no other key can be derived using that information.</p> <p>PFS can be used in two modes: the first is PFS on keys, where a new key exchange will be performed in every phase-2 negotiation. The other type is PFS on identities, where the identities are also protected, by deleting the phase-1 SA every time a phase-2 negotiation has been finished, making sure no more than one phase-2 negotiation is encrypted using the same key.</p> <p>PFS is generally not needed, since it is very unlikely that any encryption or authentication keys will be compromised.</p>
PFS DH Group	<p>This specifies the Diffie-Hellman group to use with PFS. The available DH groups are discussed below.</p>
IPsec DH Group	<p>This specifies the Diffie-Hellman group to use for IPsec communication. The available DH groups are discussed below in the section titled <i>Diffie-Hellman Groups</i>.</p>
IPsec Encryption	<p>The encryption algorithm that will be used on the protected IPsec traffic.</p> <p>This is not needed when AH is used, or when ESP is used without encryption.</p> <p>The algorithms supported by Clavister Security Gateway VPNs are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• AES• Blowfish• Twofish• Cast128• 3DES• DES
IPsec Authentication	<p>This specifies the authentication algorithm used on the protected traffic.</p> <p>This is not used when ESP is used without authentication,</p>

although it is not recommended to use ESP without authentication.

The algorithms supported by Clavister Security Gateway VPNs are:

- SHA1
- MD5

IPsec Lifetime

This is the lifetime of the VPN connection. It is specified in both time (seconds) and data amount (kilobytes). Whenever either of these values is exceeded, a re-key will be initiated, providing new IPsec encryption and authentication session keys. If the VPN connection has not been used during the last re-key period, the connection will be terminated, and re-opened from scratch when the connection is needed again.

This value must be set lower than the IKE lifetime.

Diffie-Hellman Groups

Diffie-Hellman (DH) is a cryptographic protocol that allows two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel through a series of plain text exchanges. Even though the exchanges between the parties might be monitored by a third party, Diffie-Hellman makes it extremely difficult for the third party to determine what the agreed shared secret key is and to decrypt data that is encrypted using the key.

Diffie-Hellman is used to establish the shared secret keys for IKE, IPsec and PFS.

The *Diffie-Hellman group* indicates the degree of security used for DH exchanges. The higher the group number, the greater the security but also the processing overhead. The DH groups supported by CorePlus are as follows:

- DH group 1 (768-bit)
- DH group 2 (1024-bit)
- DH group 5 (1536-bit)

All these HA groups are available for use with IKE, IPsec and PFS.

9.3.3. IKE Authentication

Manual Keying

The "simplest" way of configuring a VPN is by using a method called *manual keying*. This is a method where IKE is not used at all; the encryption and authentication keys as well as some other parameters are directly configured on both sides of the VPN tunnel.



Note

CorePlus does not support manual keying.

Manual Keying Advantages

Since it is very straightforward it will be quite interoperable. Most interoperability problems encountered today are in IKE. Manual keying completely bypasses IKE and sets up its own set of IPsec SAs.

Manual Keying Disadvantages

It is an old method, which was used before IKE came into use, and is thus lacking all the functionality of IKE. This method therefore has a number of limitations, such as having to use the same encryption/authentication key always, no anti-replay services, and it is not very flexible. There is also no way of assuring that the remote host/gateway really is the one it says it is.

This type of connection is also vulnerable for something called "replay attacks", meaning a malicious entity which has access to the encrypted traffic can record some packets, store them, and send them to its destination at a later time. The destination VPN endpoint will have no way of telling if this packet is a "replayed" packet or not. Using IKE eliminates this vulnerability.

PSK

Using a *Pre-shared Key* (PSK) is a method where the endpoints of the VPN "share" a secret key. This is a service provided by IKE, and thus has all the advantages that come with it, making it far more flexible than manual keying.

PSK Advantages

Pre-Shared Keying has a lot of advantages over manual keying. These include endpoint authentication, which is what the PSKs are really for. It also includes all the benefits of using IKE. Instead of using a fixed set of encryption keys, session keys will be used for a limited period of time, where after a new set of session keys are used.

PSK Disadvantages

One thing that has to be considered when using Pre-Shared Keys is key distribution. How are the Pre-Shared Keys distributed to remote VPN clients and gateways? This is a major issue, since the security of a PSK system is based on the PSKs being secret. Should one PSK be compromised, the configuration will need to be changed to use a new PSK.

Certificates

Each VPN gateway has its own certificate, and one or more trusted root certificates.

The authentication is based on several things:

- That each endpoint has the private key corresponding to the public key found in its certificate, and that nobody else has access to the private key.
- That the certificate has been signed by someone that the remote endpoint trusts.

Advantages of Certificates

A principal advantage of certificates is added flexibility. Many VPN clients, for instance, can be managed without having the same pre-shared key configured on all of them, which is often the

case when using pre-shared keys and roaming clients. Instead, should a client be compromised, the client's certificate can simply be revoked. No need to reconfigure every client.

Disadvantages of Certificates

The principal disadvantage of certificates is the added complexity. Certificate-based authentication may be used as part of a larger public key infrastructure, making all VPN clients and gateways dependent on third parties. In other words, there are more aspects that have to be configured, and there is more that can go wrong.

9.3.4. IPsec Protocols (ESP/AH)

The IPsec protocols are the protocols used to protect the actual traffic being passed through the VPN. The actual protocols used and the keys used with those protocols are negotiated by IKE.

There are two protocols associated with IPsec, AH and ESP. These are covered in the sections below.

AH (Authentication Header)

AH is a protocol used for authenticating a data stream.




Figure 9.1. The AH protocol

AH uses a cryptographic hash function to produce a MAC from the data in the IP packet. This MAC is then transmitted with the packet, allowing the remote endpoint to verify the integrity of the original IP packet, making sure the data has not been tampered with on its way through the Internet. Apart from the IP packet data, AH also authenticates parts of the IP header.

The AH protocol inserts an AH header after the original IP header. In tunnel mode, the AH header is inserted after the outer header, but before the original, inner IP header.

ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload)

The ESP protocol inserts an ESP header after the original IP header, in tunnel mode, the ESP header is inserted after the outer header, but before the original, inner IP header.

All data after the ESP header is encrypted and/or authenticated. The difference from AH is that ESP also provides encryption of the IP packet. The authentication phase also differs in that ESP only authenticates the data after the ESP header; thus the outer IP header is left unprotected.

The ESP protocol is used for both encryption and authentication of the IP packet. It can also be used to do either encryption only, or authentication only.




Figure 9.2. The ESP protocol

9.3.5. Algorithm Proposal Lists

To agree on the VPN connection parameters, a negotiation process is performed. As a result of the negotiations, the IKE and IPsec *security associations* (SAs) are established. A *proposal list* of supported algorithms is the starting point for the negotiation. Each entry in the list defines parameters for a supported algorithm that the VPN tunnel end point device is capable of supporting (the shorter term *tunnel endpoint* will also be used in this manual). The initial negotiation attempts to agree on a set of algorithms that the devices at either end of the tunnel can support.

There are two types of proposal lists, IKE proposal lists and IPsec proposal lists. IKE lists are used during IKE Phase-1 (IKE Security Negotiation), while IPsec lists are using during IKE Phase-2 (IPsec Security Negotiation).

Several algorithm proposal lists are already defined by default in CorePlus for different VPN scenarios and user defined lists can be added.

Two IKE algorithm lists and two IPsec lists are already defined by default:

- **High**

This consists of a more restricted set of algorithms to give higher security. The complete list is *3DES, AES, Blowfish, MD5, SHA1*.

- **Medium**

This consists of a longer set of algorithms. The complete list is *3DES, AES, Blowfish, Twofish, CAST128, MD5, SHA1*.

Example 9.1. Using an Algorithm Proposal List

This example shows how to create and use an IPsec Algorithm Proposal List for use in the VPN tunnel. It will propose 3DES and DES as encryption algorithms. The hash function SHA1 and MD5 will both be used in order to check if the data packet is altered while being transmitted. Note that this example does not illustrate how to add the specific IPsec tunnel object. It will also be used in a later example.

Command-Line Interface

First create a list of IPsec Algorithms:

```
Device:/> add IPsecAlgorithms esp-l2tptunnel
           DESEnabled=Yes DES3Enabled=Yes
           SHA1Enabled=Yes MD5Enabled=Yes
```

Then, apply the algorithm proposal list to the IPsec tunnel:

```
Device:/> set Interface IPsecTunnel MyIPsecTunnel
           IPsecAlgorithms=esp-l2tptunnel
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

First create a list of IPsec Algorithms:

1. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > IPsec Algorithms > Add > IPsec Algorithms**
2. Enter a name for the list, for example *esp-l2tptunnel*
3. Now check the following:
 - **DES**
 - **3DES**
 - **SHA1**
 - **MD5**
4. Click **OK**

Then, apply the algorithm proposal list to the IPsec tunnel:

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec**
2. Select the target IPsec tunnel
3. Select the recently created **esp-l2tptunnel** in the **IPsec Algorithms** control
4. Click **OK**

9.3.6. Pre-shared Keys

Pre-Shared Keys are used to authenticate VPN tunnels. The keys are secrets that are shared by the communicating parties before communication takes place. To communicate, both parties prove that they know the secret. The security of a shared secret depends on how "good" a passphrase is. Passphrases that are common words are extremely vulnerable to dictionary attacks.

Pre-shared Keys can be generated automatically through the WebUI but they can also be generated through the CLI using the command *pskgen* (this command is fully documented in the *CLI Reference Guide*).

Beware of Non-ASCII Characters in a PSK on Different Platforms!

If a PSK is specified as a passphrase and not a hexadecimal value, the different encodings on different platforms can cause a problem with non-ASCII characters. Windows, for example, encodes pre-shared keys containing non ASCII characters in UTF-16 while CorePlus uses UTF-8. Even though they can seem the same at either end of the tunnel there will be a mismatch and this can sometimes cause problems when setting up a Windows L2TP client that connects to CorePlus.

Example 9.2. Using a Pre-Shared key

This example shows how to create a Pre-shared Key and apply it to a VPN tunnel. Since regular words and phrases are vulnerable to dictionary attacks, they should not be used as secrets. Here the pre-shared key is a randomly generated hexadecimal key. Note that this example does not illustrate how to add the specific IPsec tunnel object.

Command-Line Interface

First create a Pre-shared Key. To generate the key automatically with a 64 bit (the default) key, use:

```
Device:/> pskgen MyPSK
```

To have a longer, more secure 512 bit key the command would be:

```
Device:/> pskgen MyPSK -size=512
```

Or alternatively, to add the Pre-shared Key manually, use:

```
Device:/> add PSK MyPSK Type=HEX PSKHex=<enter the key here>
```

Now apply the Pre-shared Key to the IPsec tunnel:

```
Device:/> set Interface IPsecTunnel MyIPsecTunnel PSK=MyPSK
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

First create a Pre-shared Key:

1. Go to **Objects > Authentication Objects > Add > Pre-shared key**
2. Enter a name for the pre-shared key, for example *MyPSK*
3. Choose **Hexadecimal Key** and click **Generate Random Key** to generate a key to the **Passphrase** textbox
4. Click **OK**

Then, apply the pre-shared key to the IPsec tunnel:

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec**
2. Select the target IPsec tunnel object

3. Under the **Authentication** tab, choose **Pre-shared Key** and select **MyPSK**
4. Click **OK**

9.3.7. Identification Lists

When certificates are used as authentication method for IPsec tunnels, the Clavister Security Gateway will accept all remote devices or VPN clients that are capable of presenting a certificate signed by any of the trusted Certificate Authorities. This can be a potential problem, especially when using roaming clients.

A Typical Scenario

Consider the scenario of travelling employees being given access to the internal corporate networks using VPN clients. The organization administers their own Certificate Authority, and certificates have been issued to the employees. Different groups of employees are likely to have access to different parts of the internal networks. For example, members of the sales force need access to servers running the order system, while technical engineers need access to technical databases.

The Problem

Since the IP addresses of the travelling employees VPN clients cannot be known beforehand, the incoming VPN connections from the clients cannot be differentiated. This means that the security gateway is unable to control the access to various parts of the internal networks.

The ID List Solution

The concept of Identification Lists presents a solution to this problem. An identification list contains one or more identities (IDs), where each identity corresponds to the subject field in a certificate. Identification lists can thus be used to regulate what certificates that are given access to what IPsec tunnels.

Example 9.3. Using an Identity List

This example shows how to create and use an Identification List for use in the VPN tunnel. This Identification List will contain one ID with the type DN, distinguished name, as the primary identifier. Note that this example does not illustrate how to add the specific IPsec tunnel object.

Command-Line Interface

First create an Identification List:

```
Device:/> add IDList MyIDList
```

Then, create an ID:

```
Device:/> cc IDList MyIDList
```

```
Device:/MyIDList> add ID JohnDoe Type=DistinguishedName
CommonName="John Doe"
```

```

OrganizationName=Clavister
OrganizationalUnit=Support
Country=Sweden
EmailAddress=john.doe@Clavister.com

```

```
Device:/MyIDList> cc
```

Finally, apply the Identification List to the IPsec tunnel:

```

Device:/> set Interface IPsecTunnel MyIPsecTunnel
AuthMethod=Certificate IDList=MyIDList
RootCertificates=AdminCert
GatewayCertificate=AdminCert

```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

First create an Identification List:

1. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > ID List > Add > ID List**
2. Enter a name for the list, for example *MyIDList*
3. Click **OK**

Then, create an ID:

1. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > IKE ID List > Add > ID List**
2. Select **MyIDList**
3. Enter a name for the ID, for example *JohnDoe*
4. Select **Distinguished name** in the **Type** control
5. Now enter:
 - **Common Name:** John Doe
 - **Organization Name:** Clavister
 - **Organizational Unit:** Support
 - **Country:** Sweden
 - **Email Address:** john.doe@Clavister.com
6. Click **OK**

Finally, apply the Identification List to the IPsec tunnel:

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec**
2. Select the IPsec tunnel object of interest
3. Under the **Authentication** tab, choose **X.509 Certificate**

4. Select the appropriate certificate in the **Root Certificate(s)** and **Gateway Certificate** controls
5. Select **MyIDList** in the **Identification List**
6. Click **OK**

9.4. IPsec Tunnels

This section looks more closely at IPsec tunnels in CorePlus, their definition, options and usage.

9.4.1. Overview

An IPsec Tunnel defines an endpoint of an encrypted tunnel. Each IPsec Tunnel is interpreted as a logical interface by CorePlus, with the same filtering, traffic shaping and configuration capabilities as regular interfaces.

Remote Initiation of Tunnel Establishment

When another Clavister Security Gateway or another IPsec compliant networking product (also known as the *remote endpoint*) tries to establish an IPsec VPN tunnel to a local Clavister Security Gateway, the list of currently defined IPsec tunnels in the CorePlus configuration is examined. If a matching tunnel definition is found, that tunnel is opened. The associated IKE and IPsec negotiations then take place, resulting in the tunnel becoming established to the remote endpoint.

Local Initiation of Tunnel Establishment

Alternatively, a user on a protected local network might try and access a resource which is located at the end of an IPsec tunnel. In this case, CorePlus sees that the route for the IP address of the resource is through a defined IPsec tunnel and establishment of the tunnel is then initiated from the local Clavister Security Gateway.

IP Rules Control Decrypted Traffic

Note that an established IPsec tunnel does **not** automatically mean that all the traffic flowing from the tunnel is trusted. On the contrary, network traffic that has been decrypted will be checked against the IP rule set. When doing this IP rule set check, the source interface of the traffic will be the associated IPsec tunnel since tunnels are treated like interfaces in CorePlus.

In addition, a Route or an Access rule may have to be defined for roaming clients in order for CorePlus to accept specific source IP addresses from the IPsec tunnel.

Returning Traffic

For network traffic going in the opposite direction, back into an IPsec tunnel, a reverse process takes place. First, the unencrypted traffic is evaluated by the rule set. If a rule and route matches, CorePlus tries to find an established IPsec tunnel that matches the criteria. If not found, CorePlus will try to establish a new tunnel to the remote endpoint specified by a matching IPsec tunnel definition.

No IP Rules Are Needed for the Enclosing IPsec Traffic

With IPsec tunnels the administrator usually sets up of IPsec rules that allow unencrypted traffic to flow into the tunnel (the tunnel being treated as an CorePlus interface). However, it is normally not necessary to set up IP rules that explicitly allow the packets that implement IPsec itself.

IKE and ESP packets are by default dealt with by the CorePlus's internal *IPsec engine* and the IP rule set is not consulted.

This behavior can be changed in the **IPsec advanced settings** section with the **IPsec Before**

Rules setting. An example of why this might be done is if there are a high number of IPsec tunnel connection attempts coming from a particular IP address or group of addresses. This can degrade the performance of the CorePlus IPsec engine and explicitly dropping such traffic with an IP rule is an efficient way of preventing it reaching the engine. In other words, IP rules can be used to have complete control over all traffic related to the tunnel.

Dead Peer Detection

Dead Peer Detection (DPD) can optionally be enabled for an IPsec tunnel. DPD monitors the aliveness of the tunnel by looking for traffic coming from the peer at the other end of the tunnel. If no message is seen within a length of time (specified by the the advanced setting **DPD Metric**) then CorePlus sends *DPD-R-U-THERE* messages to the peer to determine if it is still reachable and alive.

If the peer does not respond to these messages during a period of time (specified by the advanced setting **DPD Expire Time**) then the peer is considered dead and the tunnel is taken down. CorePlus will then automatically try to re-establish the tunnel after a period of time (specified by the advanced setting **DPD Keep Time**).

The advanced settings for DPD are described further in *Section 9.4.6, "IPsec Advanced Settings"*. DPD is enabled by default for CorePlus IPsec tunnels. Disabling does not disable to ability to respond to *DPD-R-U-THERE* from another peer.

Keep-alive

The IPsec *Keep-alive* option ensure that the tunnel is established at all times even if no traffic flows. It does this by continuously sending ICMP *Ping* messages through the tunnel. If replies to the ping messages are not received then the tunnel link is assumed to be broken and an attempt is automatically made to re-establish the tunnel. This option is only available for LAN to LAN tunnels.

Optionally, a specific source IP address and/or a destination IP address for the pings can be specified. It is recommended to specify a destination IP of a host which is known to being able to reliably respond to ICMP messages. If a destination IP is not specified, CorePlus will use the first IP address on the remote network.

An important usage of keep-alive is if a LAN to LAN tunnel with infrequent data traffic can only be established from one side but needs to be kept alive for hosts on the other peer. If the peer that establishes the tunnel uses keep-alive to keep the tunnel established, any hosts on the other side can use the tunnel even though the other peer cannot establish the tunnel when it is needed.

Comparing DPD and Keep-alive

DPD and Keep-alive can be considered to perform a similar function which is detecting if an IPsec tunnel is down and re-establishing it. However, there are differences:

- Keep-alive can only be used for LAN to LAN IPsec tunnels. It cannot be used with roaming clients.
- Keep-alive is much faster at detecting that a tunnel is down and re-establishing it. It is therefore a preferred solution for LAN to LAN tunnels.

Having keep-alive and DPD enabled simultaneously for a LAN to LAN tunnel is not needed since DPD will never trigger if keep-alive pings are being sent.

IPsec Tunnel Quick Start

This section covers IPsec tunnels in some detail. A quick start checklist of setup steps for these protocols in typical scenarios can be found in the following sections:

- *Section 9.2.1, "IPsec LAN to LAN with Pre-shared Keys".*
- *Section 9.2.2, "IPsec LAN to LAN with Certificates".*
- *Section 9.2.3, "IPsec Roaming Clients with Pre-shared Keys".*
- *Section 9.2.4, "IPsec Roaming Clients with Certificates".*

In addition to the quick start section, more explanation of tunnel setup is given below.

9.4.2. LAN to LAN Tunnels with Pre-shared Keys

A VPN can allow geographically distributed Local Area Networks (LANs) to communicate securely over the public Internet. In a corporate context this means LANs at geographically separate sites can communicate with a level of security comparable to that existing if they communicated through a dedicated, private link.

Secure communication is achieved through the use of IPsec tunneling, with the tunnel extending from the VPN gateway at one location to the VPN gateway at another location. The Clavister Security Gateway is therefore the implementer of the VPN, while at the same time applying normal security surveillance of traffic passing through the tunnel. This section deals specifically with setting up LAN to LAN tunnels created with a Pre-shared Key (PSK).

A number of steps are required to set up LAN to LAN tunnels with PSK:

- If both local and remote security gateways are Clavister Security Gateways, define the host and networks in the **Global Namespace**.
- Set up the **VPN tunnel properties** and include the Pre-Shared key.
- Set up the **VPN tunnel properties**.
- Set up the **Route** in the *main* routing table (or another table if an alternate is being used).
- Set up the **Rules** (a 2-way tunnel requires 2 rules).

9.4.3. Roaming Clients

An employee who is on the move who needs to access a central corporate server from a notebook computer from different locations is a typical example of a roaming client. Apart from the need for secure VPN access, the other major issue with roaming clients is that the mobile user's IP address is often not known beforehand. To handle the unknown IP address the CorePlus can dynamically add routes to the routing table as tunnels are established.

Dealing with Unknown IP addresses

If the IP address of the client is not known before hand then the Clavister Security Gateway needs to create a route in its routing table dynamically as each client connects. In the example below this is the case and the IPsec tunnel is configured to dynamically add routes.

If clients are to be allowed to roam in from everywhere, irrespective of their IP address, then the **Remote Network** needs to be set to **all-nets** (IP address: 0.0.0.0/0) which will allow all existing IPv4-addresses to connect through the tunnel.

When configuring VPN tunnels for roaming clients it is usually not necessary to add to or modify the algorithm proposal lists that are pre-configured in CorePlus.

PSK based client tunnels

The following example shows how a PSK based tunnel can be set up.

Example 9.4. Setting up a PSK based VPN tunnel for roaming clients

This example describes how to configure an IPsec tunnel at the head office Clavister Security Gateway for roaming clients that connect to the office to gain remote access. The head office network uses the 10.0.1.0/24 network span with external gateway IP ip_wan.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create a pre-shared key for IPsec authentication:

1. Go to **Objects > Authentication Objects > Add > Pre-Shared Key**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** Enter a name for the key, for example *SecretKey*
 - **Shared Secret:** Enter a secret passphrase
 - **Confirm Secret:** Enter the secret passphrase again
3. Click **OK**

B. Configure the IPsec tunnel:

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec > Add > IPsec Tunnel**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** RoamingIPsecTunnel
 - **Local Network:** 10.0.1.0/24 (This is the local network that the roaming users will connect to)
 - **Remote Network:** all-nets
 - **Remote Endpoint:** (None)
 - **Encapsulation Mode:** Tunnel
3. For Algorithms enter:
 - **IKE Algorithms:** Medium or High
 - **IPsec Algorithms:** Medium or High
4. For Authentication enter:

- **Pre-Shared Key:** Select the pre-shared key created earlier
5. Under the **Routing** tab:
 - Enable the option: **Dynamically add route to the remote network when a tunnel is established.**
 6. Click **OK**
- C. Finally configure the IP rule set to allow traffic inside the tunnel.

Self-signed Certificate based client tunnels

The following example shows how a certificate based tunnel can be set up.

Example 9.5. Setting up a Self-signed Certificate based VPN tunnel for roaming clients

This example describes how to configure an IPsec tunnel at the head office Clavister Security Gateway for roaming clients that connect to the office to gain remote access. The head office network uses the 10.0.1.0/24 network span with external gateway IP ip_wan.

InControl

With InControl, this is done in a different way to the Web Interface.

Web Interface

A. Create a Self-signed Certificate for IPsec authentication:

The step to actually create self-signed certificates is performed outside the WebUI using a suitable software product. The certificate should be in the PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail) file format.

B. Upload all the client self-signed certificates:

1. Go to **Objects > Authentication Objects > Add > Certificate**
2. Enter a suitable name for the Certificate object
3. Select the **X.509 Certificate** option
4. Click **OK**

C. Create Identification Lists:

1. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > ID List > Add > ID List**
2. Enter a suitable **name**, for example *sales*
3. Click **OK**
4. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > ID List > Sales > Add > ID**
5. Enter the **name** for the client

6. Select **Email** as **Type**
7. In the **Email address** field, enter the email address selected when you created the certificate on the client
8. Create a new ID for every client that you want to grant access rights according to the instructions above

D. Configure the IPsec tunnel:

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec > Add > IPsec Tunnel**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** RoamingIPsecTunnel
 - **Local Network:** 10.0.1.0/24 (This is the local network that the roaming users will connect to)
 - **Remote Network:** all-nets
 - **Remote Endpoint:** (None)
 - **Encapsulation Mode:** Tunnel
3. For Algorithms enter:
 - **IKE Algorithms:** Medium or High
 - **IPsec Algorithms:** Medium or High
4. For Authentication enter:
 - Choose **X.509 Certificate** as authentication method
 - **Root Certificate(s):** Select all your client certificates and add them to the **Selected** list
 - **Gateway Certificate:** Choose your newly created gateway certificate
 - **Identification List:** Select your ID List that you want to associate with your VPN Tunnel. In our case that will be **sales**
5. Under the **Routing** tab:
 - Enable the option: **Dynamically add route to the remote network when a tunnel is established.**
6. Click **OK**

E. Finally configure the IP rule set to allow traffic inside the tunnel.

Tunnels Based on CA Server Certificates

Setting up client tunnels using a CA issued certificate is largely the same as using Self-signed certificates with the exception of a couple of steps.

It is the responsibility of the administrator to acquire the appropriate certificate from an issuing authority for client tunnels. With some systems, such as Windows 2000 Server, there is built-in

access to a CA server (in Windows 2000 Server this is found in **Certificate Services**). For more information on CA server issued certificates see *Section 3.7, "Certificates"*.

Example 9.6. Setting up CA Server Certificate based VPN tunnels for roaming clients

This example describes how to configure an IPsec tunnel at the head office Clavister Security Gateway for roaming clients that connect to the office to gain remote access. The head office network uses the 10.0.1.0/24 network span with external gateway IP ip_wan.

InControl

With InControl, this is done in a different way to the Web Interface.

Web Interface

A. Upload all the client certificates:

1. Go to **Objects > Authentication Objects > Add > Certificate**
2. Enter a suitable name for the Certificate object
3. Select the **X.509 Certificate** option
4. Click **OK**

B. Create Identification Lists:

1. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > ID List > Add > ID List**
2. Enter a descriptive **name**, for example *sales*
3. Click **OK**
4. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > ID List > Sales > Add > ID**
5. Enter the **name** for the client
6. Select **Email** as **Type**
7. In the **Email address** field, enter the email address selected when you created the certificate on the client
8. Create a new ID for every client that you want to grant access rights according to the instructions above

C. Configure the IPsec tunnel:

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec > Add > IPsec Tunnel**
2. Now enter:
 - **Name:** RoamingIPsecTunnel
 - **Local Network:** 10.0.1.0/24 (This is the local network that the roaming users will connect to)
 - **Remote Network:** all-nets

- **Remote Endpoint:** (None)
 - **Encapsulation Mode:** Tunnel
3. For Algorithms enter:
 - **IKE Algorithms:** Medium or High
 - **IPsec Algorithms:** Medium or High
 4. For Authentication enter:
 - Choose **X.509 Certificates** as the authentication method
 - **Root Certificate(s):** Select your CA server root certificate imported earlier and add it to the **Selected** list
 - **Gateway Certificate:** Choose your newly created gateway certificate
 - **Identification List:** Select your ID List that you want to associate with your VPN Tunnel. In our case that will be **sales**
 5. Under the **Routing** tab:
 - Enable the option: **Dynamically add route to the remote network when a tunnel is established**
 6. Click **OK**
- D. Finally configure the IP rule set to allow traffic inside the tunnel.

Using Config Mode

IKE Configuration Mode (Config Mode) is an extension to IKE that allows CorePlus to provide LAN configuration information to remote VPN clients. It is used to dynamically configure IPsec clients with IP addresses and corresponding netmasks, and to exchange other types of information associated with DHCP. The IP address provided to a client can be either based on a range of predefined static IP addresses defined for Config Mode or it can come from DHCP servers associated with an *IP Pool* object.

An IP pool is a cache of IP addresses collected from DHCP servers and leases on these addresses are automatically renewed when the lease time is about to expire. IP Pools also manage additional information such as DNS and WINS/NBNS, just as an ordinary DHCP server would. (For detailed information on pools see *Section 5.4, "IP Pools"*.)

Defining the Config Mode Object

Currently only one Config Mode object can be defined in CorePlus and this is referred to as the *Config Mode Pool* object. The key parameters associated with it are as follows:

Use Predefined IP Pool Object	The IP Pool object that provides the IP addresses.
Use a Static Pool	As an alternative to using an IP Pool, a static set of IP addresses can be defined.
DNS	The IP address of the DNS used for URL resolution (already

	provided by an IP Pool).
NBNS/WINS	The IP address for NBNS/WINS resolution (already provided by an IP Pool).
DHCP	Instructs the host to send any internal DHCP requests to this address.
Subnets	A list of the subnets that the client can access.

Example 9.7. Setting Up Config Mode

In this example, the *Config Mode Pool* object is enabled by associating with it an already configured *IP Pool* object called *ip_pool1*.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > IKE Config Mode Pool**
2. The Config Mode Pool object properties web page now appears
3. Select **Use a predefined IPPool object**
4. Choose the *ip_pool1* object from the **IP Pool** drop-down list
5. Click **OK**

After defining the Config Mode object, the only remaining action is to enable Config Mode to be used with the IPsec Tunnel.

Example 9.8. Using Config Mode with IPsec Tunnels

Assuming a predefined tunnel called *vpn_tunnel1* this example shows how to enable Config Mode for that tunnel.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

- Go to **Interfaces > IPsec**
- Select the tunnel *vpn_tunnel1* for editing
- Select **IKE Config Mode** drop down list
- Click **OK**

IP Validation

CorePlus always checks if the source IP address of each packet inside an IPsec tunnel is the same as the IP address assigned to the IPsec client with IKE Config Mode. If a mismatch is detected the packet is always dropped and a log message generated with a severity level of **Warning**. This message includes the two IP addresses as well as the client identity.

Optionally, the affected SA can be automatically deleted if validation fails by enabling the advanced setting **IPsecDeleteSAOnIPValidationFailure**. The default value for this setting is *Disabled*.

9.4.4. Fetching CRLs from an alternate LDAP server

A Root Certificate usually includes the IP address or hostname of the Certificate Authority to contact when certificates or CRLs need to be downloaded to the Clavister Security Gateway. *Lightweight Directory Access Protocol* (LDAP) is used for these downloads.

However, in some scenarios, this information is missing, or the administrator wishes to use another LDAP server. The LDAP configuration section can then be used to manually specify alternate LDAP servers.

Example 9.9. Setting up an LDAP server

This example shows how to manually setup and specify an LDAP server.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add LDAPServer Host=192.168.101.146 Username=myusername
          Password=mypassword Port=389
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Objects > VPN Objects > LDAP > Add > LDAP Server**
2. Now enter:
 - **IP Address:** 192.168.101.146
 - **Username:** myusername
 - **Password:** mypassword
 - **Confirm Password:** mypassword
 - **Port:** 389
3. Click **OK**

9.4.5. Troubleshooting with *ikesnoop*

VPN Tunnel Negotiation

When setting up IPsec tunnels, problems can arise because the initial negotiation fails when the devices at either end of a VPN tunnel try but fail to agree on which protocols and encryption methods will be used. The *ikesnoop* console command with the *verbose* option is a tool that can be used to identify the source of such problems by showing the details of this negotiation.

Using *ikesnoop*

The *ikesnoop* command can be entered via a CLI console or directly via the RS232 Console.

To begin monitoring the full command is:

```
Device:/> ikesnoop -on -verbose
```

This means that *ikesnoop* output will be sent to the console for every VPN tunnel IKE negotiation. The output can be overwhelming so to limit the output to a single IP address, for example the IP address *10.1.1.10*, the command would be:

```
Device:/> ikesnoop -on 10.1.1.10 -verbose
```

The IP address used is the IP address of the VPN tunnel's remote endpoint (either the IP of the remote endpoint or the client IP). To turn off monitoring, the command is:

```
Device:/> ikesnoop -off
```

The output from *verbose* option can be troublesome to interpret by an administrator seeing it for the first time. Presented below is some typical *ikesnoop* output with annotations to explain it. The tunnel negotiation considered is based on Pre-shared Keys. A negotiation based on certificates is not discussed here but the principles are similar.

Complete *ikesnoop* command options can be found in the *CLI Reference Guide*.

The Client and the Server

The two parties involved in the tunnel negotiation are referred to in this section as the *client* and *server*. In this context, the word "*client*" is used to refer to the device which is the *initiator* of the negotiation and the *server* refers to the device which is the *responder*.

Step 1. Client Initiates Exchange by Sending a Supported Algorithm List

The *verbose* option output initially shows the proposed list of algorithms that the client first sends to the server. This list details the protocols and encryption methods it can support. The purpose of the algorithm list is that the client is trying to find a matching set of protocols/methods supported by the server. The server examines the list and attempts to find a combination of the protocols/methods sent by the client which it can support. This matching process is one of the key purposes of the IKE exchange.

```
IkeSnoop: Received IKE packet from 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
          Identity Protection (main mode) ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags           :
Cookies        : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x00000000
Message ID     : 0x00000000
Packet length  : 324 bytes
# payloads     : 8
```

```

Payloads:
SA (Security Association)
  Payload data length : 152 bytes
  DOI : 1 (IPsec DOI)
    Proposal 1/1
      Protocol 1/1
        Protocol ID           : ISAKMP
        SPI Size              : 0
        Transform 1/4
          Transform ID        : IKE
          Encryption algorithm : Rijndael-cbc (aes)
          Key length          : 128
          Hash algorithm      : MD5
          Authentication method : Pre-Shared Key
          Group description   : MODP 1024
          Life type           : Seconds
          Life duration       : 43200
          Life type           : Kilobytes
          Life duration       : 50000
        Transform 2/4
          Transform ID        : IKE
          Encryption algorithm : Rijndael-cbc (aes)
          Key length          : 128
          Hash algorithm      : SHA
          Authentication method : Pre-Shared Key
          Group description   : MODP 1024
          Life type           : Seconds
          Life duration       : 43200
          Life type           : Kilobytes
          Life duration       : 50000
        Transform 3/4
          Transform ID        : IKE
          Encryption algorithm : 3DES-cbc
          Hash algorithm      : MD5
          Authentication method : Pre-Shared Key
          Group description   : MODP 1024
          Life type           : Seconds
          Life duration       : 43200
          Life type           : Kilobytes
          Life duration       : 50000
        Transform 4/4
          Transform ID        : IKE
          Encryption algorithm : 3DES-cbc
          Hash algorithm      : SHA
          Authentication method : Pre-Shared Key
          Group description   : MODP 1024
          Life type           : Seconds
          Life duration       : 43200
          Life type           : Kilobytes
          Life duration       : 50000
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 8f 9c c9 4e 01 24 8e cd f1 47 59 4c 28 4b 21 3b
    Description : SSH Communications Security QuickSec 2.1.0
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 27 ba b5 dc 01 ea 07 60 ea 4e 31 90 ac 27 c0 d0
    Description : draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 61 05 c4 22 e7 68 47 e4 3f 96 84 80 12 92 ae cd
    Description : draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 44 85 15 2d 18 b6 bb cd 0b e8 a8 46 95 79 dd cc
    Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48
    Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f
    Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes

```

```
Vendor ID   : 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56
Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03
```

Explanation of Values

Exchange type: Main mode or aggressive mode

Cookies: A random number to identify the negotiation

Encryption algorithm: Cipher

Key length: Cipher key length

Hash algorithm: Hash

Authentication method: Pre-shared key or certificate

Group description: Diffie Hellman (DH) group

Life type: Seconds or kilobytes

Life duration: No of seconds or kilobytes

VID: The IPsec software vendor plus what standards are supported. For example, NAT-T

Step 2. Server Responds to Client

A typical response from the server is shown below. This must contain a proposal that is identical to one of the choices from the client list above. If no match was found by the server then a "No proposal chosen" message will be seen, tunnel setup will fail and the *ikesnoop* command output will stop at this point.

```
IkeSnoop: Sending IKE packet to 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
          Identity Protection (main mode) ISAKMP Version : 1.0

Flags      :
Cookies    : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID : 0x00000000
Packet length : 224 bytes
# payloads : 8
Payloads:
  SA (Security Association)
    Payload data length : 52 bytes
    DOI : 1 (IPsec DOI)
    Proposal 1/1
      Protocol 1/1
        Protocol ID      : ISAKMP
        SPI Size         : 0
        Transform 1/1
          Transform ID   : IKE
          Encryption algorithm : Rijndael-cbc (aes)
          Key length     : 128
          Hash algorithm  : MD5
          Authentication method : Pre-Shared Key
          Group description : MODP 1024
          Life type      : Seconds
          Life duration   : 43200
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 8f 9c c9 4e 01 24 8e cd f1 47 59 4c 28 4b 21 3b
    Description : SSH Communications Security QuickSec 2.1.0
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 27 ba b5 dc 01 ea 07 60 ea 4e 31 90 ac 27 c0 d0
    Description : draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 61 05 c4 22 e7 68 47 e4 3f 96 84 80 12 92 ae cd
    Description : draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02
  VID (Vendor ID)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
    Vendor ID   : 44 85 15 2d 18 b6 bb cd 0b e8 a8 46 95 79 dd cc
    Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00
  VID (Vendor ID)
```

```

Payload data length : 16 bytes
Vendor ID   : cd 60 46 43 35 df 21 f8 7c fd b2 fc 68 b6 a4 48
Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02
VID (Vendor ID)
Payload data length : 16 bytes
Vendor ID   : 90 cb 80 91 3e bb 69 6e 08 63 81 b5 ec 42 7b 1f
Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02
VID (Vendor ID)
Payload data length : 16 bytes
Vendor ID   : 7d 94 19 a6 53 10 ca 6f 2c 17 9d 92 15 52 9d 56
Description : draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03

```

Step 3. Clients Begins Key Exchange

The server has accepted a proposal at this point and the client now begins a key exchange. In addition, NAT detection payloads are sent to detect if NAT is being used.

```

IkeSnoop: Received IKE packet from 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
          Identity Protection (main mode) ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags      :
Cookies    : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID : 0x00000000
Packet length : 220 bytes
# payloads  : 4
Payloads:
  KE (Key Exchange)
    Payload data length : 128 bytes
  NONCE (Nonce)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  NAT-D (NAT Detection)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  NAT-D (NAT Detection)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes

```

Step 4. Server Sends Key Exchange Data

The Server now sends key exchange data back to the client.

```

IkeSnoop: Sending IKE packet to 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
          Identity Protection (main mode) ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags      :
Cookies    : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID : 0x00000000
Packet length : 220 bytes
# payloads  : 4
Payloads:
  KE (Key Exchange)
    Payload data length : 128 bytes
  NONCE (Nonce)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  NAT-D (NAT Detection)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  NAT-D (NAT Detection)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes

```

Step 5. Client Sends Identification

The initiator sends the identification which is normally an IP address or the *Subject Alternative Name* if certificates are used.

```
IkeSnoop: Received IKE packet from 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
      Identity Protection (main mode) ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags      : E (encryption)
Cookies    : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID : 0x00000000
Packet length : 72 bytes
# payloads : 3
Payloads:
  ID (Identification)
    Payload data length : 8 bytes
    ID : ipv4(any:0,[0..3]=192.168.0.10)
  HASH (Hash)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  N (Notification)
    Payload data length : 8 bytes
    Protocol ID : ISAKMP
    Notification : Initial contact
```

Explanation of Above Values

Flags: E means encryption (it is the only flag used).

ID: Identification of the client

The *Notification* field is given as *Initial Contact* to indicate this is not a re-key.

Step 6. Server ID Response

The server now responds with its own ID.

```
IkeSnoop: Sending IKE packet to 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
      Identity Protection (main mode) ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags      : E (encryption)
Cookies    : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID : 0x00000000
Packet length : 60 bytes
# payloads : 2
Payloads:
  ID (Identification)
    Payload data length : 8 bytes
    ID : ipv4(any:0,[0..3]=192.168.10.20)
  HASH (Hash)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
```

Step 7. Client Sends a List of Supported IPsec Algorithms

Now the client sends the list of supported IPsec algorithms to the server. It will also contain the proposed host/networks that are allowed in the tunnel.

```
IkeSnoop: Received IKE packet from 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
      Quick mode ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags      : E (encryption)
Cookies    : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID : 0xaa71428f
Packet length : 264 bytes
# payloads : 5
Payloads:
  HASH (Hash)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  SA (Security Association)
    Payload data length : 164 bytes
```

```

DOI : 1 (IPsec DOI)
  Proposal 1/1
    Protocol 1/1
      Protocol ID          : ESP
      SPI Size             : 4
      SPI Value            : 0x4c83cad2
    Transform 1/4
      Transform ID         : Rijndael (aes)
      Key length           : 128
      Authentication algorithm : HMAC-MD5
      SA life type         : Seconds
      SA life duration     : 21600
      SA life type         : Kilobytes
      SA life duration     : 50000
      Encapsulation mode   : Tunnel
    Transform 2/4
      Transform ID         : Rijndael (aes)
      Key length           : 128
      Authentication algorithm : HMAC-SHA-1
      SA life type         : Seconds
      SA life duration     : 21600
      SA life type         : Kilobytes
      SA life duration     : 50000
      Encapsulation mode   : Tunnel
    Transform 3/4
      Transform ID         : Blowfish
      Key length           : 128
      Authentication algorithm : HMAC-MD5
      SA life type         : Seconds
      SA life duration     : 21600
      SA life type         : Kilobytes
      SA life duration     : 50000
      Encapsulation mode   : Tunnel
    Transform 4/4
      Transform ID         : Blowfish
      Key length           : 128
      Authentication algorithm : HMAC-SHA-1
      SA life type         : Seconds
      SA life duration     : 21600
      SA life type         : Kilobytes
      SA life duration     : 50000
      Encapsulation mode   : Tunnel
  NONCE (Nonce)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  ID (Identification)
    Payload data length : 8 bytes
    ID : ipv4(any:0,[0..3]=10.4.2.6)
  ID (Identification)
    Payload data length : 12 bytes
    ID : ipv4_subnet(any:0,[0..7]=10.4.0.0/16)

```

Explanation of Above Values

Transform ID: Cipher

Key length: Cipher key length

Authentication algorithm: HMAC (Hash)

Group description: PFS and PFS group

SA life type: Seconds or Kilobytes

SA life duration: Number seconds or kilobytes

Encapsulation mode: Could be transport, tunnel or UDP tunnel (NAT-T)

ID: ipv4(any:0,[0..3]=10.4.2.6)

Here the first ID is the local network of the tunnel from the client's point of view and the second ID is the remote network. If it contains any netmask it is usually SA per net and otherwise it is SA per host.

Step 8. Client Sends a List of Supported Algorithms

The server now responds with a matching IPsec proposal from the list sent by the client. As in step 2 above, if no match can be found by the server then a "No proposal chosen" message will be seen, tunnel setup will fail and the *ikesnoop* command output will stop here.

```
IkeSnoop: Sending IKE packet to 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
    Quick mode ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags          : E (encryption)
Cookies       : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID    : 0xaa71428f
Packet length : 156 bytes
# payloads    : 5
Payloads:
  HASH (Hash)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  SA (Security Association)
    Payload data length : 56 bytes
    DOI : 1 (IPsec DOI)
      Proposal 1/1
        Protocol 1/1
          Protocol ID          : ESP
          SPI Size             : 4
          SPI Value            : 0xafba2d15
        Transform 1/1
          Transform ID         : Rijndael (aes)
          Key length           : 128
          Authentication algorithm : HMAC-MD5
          SA life type         : Seconds
          SA life duration     : 21600
          SA life type         : Kilobytes
          SA life duration     : 50000
          Encapsulation mode   : Tunnel
  NONCE (Nonce)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
  ID (Identification)
    Payload data length : 8 bytes
    ID : ipv4(any:0,[0..3]=10.4.2.6)
  ID (Identification)
    Payload data length : 12 bytes
    ID : ipv4_subnet(any:0,[0..7]=10.4.0.0/16)
```

Step 9. Client Confirms Tunnel Setup

This last message is a message from the client saying that the tunnel is up and running. All client/server exchanges have been successful.

```
IkeSnoop: Received IKE packet from 192.168.0.10:500 Exchange type :
    Quick mode ISAKMP Version : 1.0
Flags          : E (encryption)
Cookies       : 0x6098238b67d97ea6 -> 0x5e347cb76e95a
Message ID    : 0xaa71428f
Packet length : 48 bytes
# payloads    : 1
Payloads:
  HASH (Hash)
    Payload data length : 16 bytes
```

9.4.6. IPsec Advanced Settings

The following CorePlus advanced settings are available for configuring IPsec tunnels.

IPsec Max Rules

This specifies the total number of IP rules that can be connected to IPsec tunnels. By default this

is initially approximately 4 times the licensed **IPsecMaxTunnels** and system memory for this is allocated at startup. By reducing the number of rules, memory requirements can be reduced but making this change is not recommended.

IPsec Max Rules will always be reset automatically to be approximately 4 times **IPsec Max Tunnels** if the latter is changed. This linkage is broken once **IPsec Max Rules** is altered manually so that subsequent changes to **IPsec Max Tunnels** will not cause an automatic change in **IPsec Max Rules**.

Default: *4 times the license limit of IPsec Max Tunnels*

IPsec Max Tunnels

Specifies the total number of IPsec tunnels allowed. This value is initially taken from the maximum tunnels allowed by the license. The setting is used by CorePlus to allocate memory for IPsec. If it is desirable to have less memory allocated for IPsec then this setting can be reduced. Increasing the setting cannot override the license limit.

A warning log message is generated automatically when 90% of this setting's value is reached.

Default: *The limit specified by the license*

IKE Send Initial Contact

Determines whether or not IKE should send the "Initial Contact" notification message. This message is sent to each remote endpoint when a connection is opened to it and there are no previous IPsec SA using that gateway.

Default: *Enabled*

IKE Send CRLs

Dictates whether or not CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) should be sent as part of the IKE exchange. Should typically be set to ENABLE except where the remote peer does not understand CRL payloads.

Note that this setting requires a restart to take effect.

Default: *Enabled*

IPsec Before Rules

Pass IKE and IPsec (ESP/AH) traffic sent to CorePlus directly to the IPsec engine without consulting the rule set.

Default: *Enabled*

IKE CRL Validity Time

A CRL contains a "next update" field that dictates the time and date when a new CRL will be available for download from the CA. The time between CRL updates can be anything from a few hours and upwards, depending on how the CA is configured. Most CA software allow the CA administrator to issue new CRLs at any time, so even if the "next update" field says that a new CRL is available in 12 hours, there may already be a new CRL for download.

This setting limits the time a CRL is considered valid. A new CRL is downloaded when IKECRLVailityTime expires or when the "next update" time occurs. Whichever happens first.

Default: 86400 seconds

IKE Max CA Path

When the signature of a user certificate is verified, CorePlus looks at the *issuer name* field in the user certificate to find the CA certificate the certificate was signed by. The CA certificate may in turn be signed by another CA, which may be signed by another CA, and so on. Each certificate will be verified until one that has been marked as "trusted" is found, or until it is determined that none of the certificates are trusted.

If there are more certificates in this path than what this setting specifies, the user certificate will be considered invalid.

Default: 15

IPsec Cert Cache Max Certs

Maximum number of certificates/CRLs that can be held in the internal certificate cache. When the certificate cache is full, entries will be removed according to an LRU (Least Recently Used) algorithm.

Default: 1024

IPsec Gateway Name Cache Time

Maximum number of certificates/CRLs that can be held in the internal certificate cache. When the certificate cache is full, entries will be removed according to an LRU (Least Recently Used) algorithm.

Default: 1024

DPD Metric

The amount of time in tens of seconds that the peer is considered to be alive (reachable) since the last received IKE message. This means that no DPD messages for checking aliveness of the peer will be sent during this time even though no packets from the peer have been received during this time.

In other words, the amount of time in tens of seconds that a tunnel is without traffic or any other sign of life before the peer is considered dead. If DPD is due to be triggered but other evidence of life is seen (such as IKE packets from the other side of the tunnel) within the time frame, no *DPD-R-U-THERE* messages will be sent.

For example, if the other side of the tunnel has not sent any ESP packets for a long period but at least one IKE-packet has been seen within the last (*10 x the configured value*) seconds, then CorePlus will not send more *DPD-R-U-THERE* messages to the other side.

Default: 3 (in other words, 3 x 10 = 30 seconds)

DPD Keep Time

The amount of time in tens of seconds that a peer is assumed to be dead after CorePlus has detected it to be so. While the peer is considered dead, CorePlus will not try to re-negotiate the tunnel or send DPD messages to the peer. However, the peer will not be considered dead any more as soon as a packet from it is received.

A more detailed explanation for this setting is that it is the amount of time in tens of seconds that an SA will remain in the dead cache after a delete. An SA is put in the dead cache when the other side of the tunnel has not responded to *DPD-R-U-THERE* messages for *DPD Expire Time* x 10 seconds and there is no other evidence of life. When the SA is placed in the dead cache, CorePlus will not try to re-negotiate the tunnel. If traffic that is associated with the SA that is in the dead cache is received, the SA will be removed from the dead cache. DPD will not trigger if the SA is already cached as dead.

This setting is used with IKEv1 only.

Default: 2 (in other words, 2 x 10 = 20 seconds)

DPD Expire Time

The length of time in seconds for which DPD messages will be sent to the peer. If the peer has not responded to messages during this time it is considered to be dead.

In other words, this is the length of time in seconds for which *DPD-R-U-THERE* messages will be sent. If the other side of the tunnel has not sent a response to any messages then it is considered to be dead (not reachable). The SA will then be placed in the dead cache.

This setting is used with IKEv1 only.

Default: 15 seconds

9.5. PPTP/L2TP

The access by a client using a modem link over dial-up public switched networks, possibly with an unpredictable IP address, to protected networks via a VPN poses particular problems. Both the PPTP and L2TP protocols provide two different means of achieving VPN access from remote clients. The most commonly used feature that is relevant in this scenario is the ability of CorePlus to act as either a PPTP or L2TP server and the first two sections below deal with this. The third section deals with the further ability of CorePlus to act as a PPTP or L2TP client.

PPTP/L2TP Quick Start

This section covers L2TP and PPTP in some detail. A quick start checklist of setup steps for these protocols in typical scenarios can be found in the following sections:

- *Section 9.2.5, "L2TP Roaming Clients with Pre-Shared Keys".*
- *Section 9.2.6, "L2TP Roaming Clients with Certificates".*
- *Section 9.2.7, "PPTP Roaming Clients".*

9.5.1. PPTP Servers

Overview

Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) is designed by the PPTP Forum, a consortium of companies that includes Microsoft. It is an OSI layer 2 "data-link" protocol (see *Appendix D, The OSI Framework*) and is an extension of the older *Point to Point Protocol* (PPP), used for dial-up Internet access. It was one of the first protocols designed to offer VPN access to remote servers via dial-up networks and is still widely used.

Implementation

PPTP can be used in the VPN context to tunnel different protocols across the Internet. Tunneling is achieved by encapsulating PPP packets in IP datagrams using *Generic Routing Encapsulation* (GRE - IP protocol 47). The client first establishes a connection to an ISP in the normal way using the PPP protocol and then establishes a TCP/IP connection across the Internet to the Clavister Security Gateway, which acts as the PPTP server (TCP port 1723 is used). The ISP is not aware of the VPN since the tunnel extends from the PPTP server to the client. The PPTP standard does not define how data is encrypted. Encryption is usually achieved using the *Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption* (MPPE) standard.

Deployment

PPTP offers a convenient solution to client access that is simple to deploy. PPTP does not require the certificate infrastructure found in L2TP but instead relies on a username/password sequence to establish trust between client and server. The level of security offered by a non-certificate based solution is arguably one of PPTP's drawbacks. PPTP also presents some scalability issues with some PPTP servers restricting the number of simultaneous PPTP clients. Since PPTP does not use IPsec, PPTP connections can be NATed and NAT traversal is not required. PPTP has been bundled by Microsoft in its operating systems since Windows95 and therefore has a large number of clients with the software already installed.

Troubleshooting PPTP

A common problem with setting up PPTP is that a router and/or switch in a network is blocking TCP port 1723 and/or IP protocol 47 before the PPTP connection can be made to the Clavister Security Gateway. Examining the log can indicate if this problem occurred, with a log message of the following form appearing:

```
Error PPP lcp_negotiation_stalled ppp_terminated
```

Example 9.10. Setting up a PPTP server

This example shows how to setup a PPTP Network Server. The example assumes that you have already created certain address objects in the address book.

You will have to specify the IP address of the PPTP server interface, an outer IP address (that the PPTP server should listen to) and an IP pool that the PPTP server will use to give out IP addresses to the clients from.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Interface L2TPServer MyPPTPServer
ServerIP=ip_lan Interface=any
IP=ip_wan IPPool=pp2p_Pool
TunnelProtocol=PPTP
AllowedRoutes=all-nets
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > PPTP/L2TP Servers > Add > PPTP/L2TP Server**
2. Enter a name for the PPTP Server, for example *MyPPTPServer*
3. Now enter:
 - **Inner IP Address:** ip_lan
 - **Tunnel Protocol:** PPTP
 - **Outer Interface Filter:** any
 - **Outer Server IP:** ip_wan
4. Under the **PPP Parameters** tab, select **pp2p_Pool** in the **IP Pool** control
5. Under the **Add Route** tab, select **all_nets** from **Allowed Networks**
6. Click **OK**

Use User Authentication Rules is enabled as default. To be able to authenticate the users using the PPTP tunnel you also need to configure authentication rules, which will not be covered in this example.

9.5.2. L2TP Servers

Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is an IETF open standard that overcomes many of the problems

of PPTP. Its design is a combination of *Layer 2 Forwarding* (L2F) protocol and PPTP, making use of the best features of both. Since the L2TP standard does not implement encryption, it is usually implemented with an IETF standard known as L2TP/IPsec, in which L2TP packets are encapsulated by IPsec.

The client communicates with a *Local Access Concentrator* (LAC) and the LAC communicates across the Internet with a *L2TP Network Server* (LNS). The Clavister Security Gateway acts as the LNS. The LAC tunnels data, such as a PPP session, using IPsec to the LNS across the Internet. In most cases the client will itself act as the LAC.

L2TP is certificate based and therefore is simpler to administer with a large number of clients and arguably offers better security than PPTP. Unlike PPTP, it is possible to set up multiple virtual networks across a single tunnel. Because it is IPsec based, L2TP requires NAT traversal (NAT-T) to be implemented on the LNS side of the tunnel.

Example 9.11. Setting up an L2TP server

This example shows how to setup a L2TP Network Server. The example assumes that you have created some IP address objects. You will have to specify the IP address of the L2TP server interface, an outer IP address (that the L2TP server should listen to) and an IP pool that the L2TP server will use to give out IP addresses to the clients from.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Interface L2TPServer MyL2TPServer ServerIP=ip_l2tp
                Interface=any IP=ip_wan
                IPPool=L2TP_Pool TunnelProtocol=L2TP
                AllowedRoutes=all-nets
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > L2TP Servers > Add > L2TPServer**
2. Enter a suitable name for the L2TP Server, for example *MyL2TPServer*
3. Now enter:
 - **Inner IP Address:** ip_l2tp
 - **Tunnel Protocol:** L2TP
 - **Outer Interface Filter:** any
 - **Outer Server IP:** ip_wan
4. Under the **PPP Parameters** tab, select **L2TP_Pool** in the **IP Pool** control.
5. Under the **Add Route** tab, select **all_nets** in the **Allowed Networks** control.
6. Click **OK**

Use User Authentication Rules is enabled as default. To be able to authenticate the users using the PPTP tunnel you also need to configure authentication rules, which is not covered in this example.

Example 9.12. Setting up an L2TP Tunnel Over IPsec

This example shows how to setup a fully working L2TP Tunnel based on IPsec encryption and will cover many parts of basic VPN configuration. Before starting, you need to configure some address objects, for example the network that is going to be assigned to the L2TP clients. Proposal lists and PSK are needed as well. Here we will use the objects created in previous examples.

To be able to authenticate the users using the L2TP tunnel a local user database will be used.

A. Start by preparing a new Local User Database:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add LocalUserDatabase UserDB
```

```
Device:/> cc LocalUserDatabase UserDB
```

```
Device:/UserDB> add User testuser Password=mypassword
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **User Authentication > Local User Databases > Add > Local User Database**
2. Enter a suitable name for the user database, for example *UserDB*
3. Go to **User Authentication > Local User Databases > UserDB > Add > User**
4. Now enter:
 - **Username:** testuser
 - **Password:** mypassword
 - **Confirm Password:** mypassword
5. Click **OK**

Now we will setup the IPsec Tunnel, which will later be used in the L2TP section. As we are going to use L2TP, the Local Network is the same IP as the IP that the L2TP tunnel will connect to, ip_wan. Furthermore, the IPsec tunnel needs to be configured to dynamically add routes to the remote network when the tunnel is established.

B. Continue setting up the IPsec Tunnel:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Interface IPsecTunnel l2tp_ipsec LocalNetwork=ip_wan
RemoteNetwork=all-nets IKEAlgorithms=Medium
IPsecAlgorithms=esp-l2tptunnel
PSK=MyPSK EncapsulationMode=Transport
DHCPOverIPsec=Yes AddRouteToRemoteNet=Yes
```

```
IPsecLifeTimeKilobytes=250000
IPsecLifeTimeSeconds=3600
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > IPsec > Add > IPsec Tunnel**
2. Enter a name for the IPsec tunnel, for example *l2tp_ipsec*
3. Now enter:
 - a. **Local Network:** ip_wan
 - b. **Remote Network:** all-nets
 - c. **Remote Endpoint:** none
 - d. **Encapsulation Mode:** Transport
 - e. **IKE Algorithms:** High
 - f. **IPsec Algorithms:** esp-l2tpunnel
4. Enter *3600* in the **IPsec Life Time seconds** control
5. Enter *250000* in the **IPsec Life Time kilobytes** control
6. Under the **Authentication** tab, select **Pre-shared Key**
7. Select **MyPSK** in the **Pre-shared Key** control
8. Under the **Routing** tab, check the following controls:
 - **Allow DHCP over IPsec from single-host clients**
 - **Dynamically add route to the remote network when a tunnel is established**
9. Click **OK**

Now it is time to setup the L2TP Server. The inner IP address should be a part of the network which the clients are assigned IP addresses from, in this ip_lan. The outer interface filter is the interface that the L2TP server will accept connections on, this will be the earlier created l2tp_ipsec. ProxyARP also needs to be configured for the IPs used by the L2TP Clients.

C. Setup the L2TP Tunnel:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Interface L2TPServer l2tp_tunnel IP=ip_lan
Interface=l2tp_ipsec ServerIP=ip_wan
IPPool=l2tp_pool TunnelProtocol=L2TP
AllowedRoutes=all-nets
ProxyARPInterfaces=lan
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Interfaces > L2TP Servers > Add > L2TPServer**
2. Enter a name for the L2TP tunnel, for example *l2tp_tunnel*
3. Now enter:
 - **Inner IP Address:** ip_lan
 - **Tunnel Protocol:** L2TP
 - **Outer Interface Filter:** l2tp_ipsec
 - **Server IP:** ip_wan
4. Under the **PPP Parameters** tab, check the **Use User Authentication Rules** control
5. Select **l2tp_pool** in the **IP Pool** control
6. Under the **Add Route** tab, select **all-nets** in the **Allowed Networks** control
7. In the **ProxyARP** control, select the **lan** interface
8. Click **OK**

In order to authenticate the users using the L2TP tunnel, a user authentication rule needs to be configured.

D. Next will be setting up the authentication rules:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add UserAuthRule AuthSource=Local Interface=l2tp_tunnel
                OriginatorIP=all-nets LocalUserDB=UserDB
                agent=PPP TerminatorIP=ip_wan
                name=L2TP_Auth
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **User Authentication > User Authentication Rules > Add > UserAuthRule**
2. Enter a suitable name for the rule, for example *L2TP_Auth*
3. Now enter:
 - **Agent:** PPP
 - **Authentication Source:** Local
 - **Interface:** l2tp_tunnel
 - **Originator IP:** all-nets

- **Terminator IP:** ip_wan
4. Under the **Authentication Options** tab enter *UserDB* as the **Local User DB**
 5. Click **OK**

When the other parts are done, all that is left is the rules. To let traffic through from the tunnel, two IP rules should be added.

E. Finally, set up the rules:

Command-Line Interface

First, change the current category to be the *main* IP rule set:

```
Device: /> cc IPRuleSet main
```

Now, add the IP rules:

```
Device: /main> add IPRule action=Allow Service=all_services
                    SourceInterface=l2tp_tunnel
                    SourceNetwork=l2tp_pool
                    DestinationInterface=any
                    DestinationNetwork=all-nets
                    name=AllowL2TP
```

```
Device: /main> add IPRule action=NAT Service=all_services
                    SourceInterface=l2tp_tunnel
                    SourceNetwork=l2tp_pool
                    DestinationInterface=any
                    DestinationNetwork=all-nets
                    name=NATL2TP
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
2. Enter a name for the rule, for example *AllowL2TP*
3. Now enter:
 - **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** all_services
 - **Source Interface:** l2tp_tunnel
 - **Source Network:** l2tp_pool
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets
4. Click **OK**

5. Go to **Rules > IP Rules > Add > IPRule**
6. Enter a name for the rule, for example *NATL2TP*
7. Now enter:
 - **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** all_services
 - **Source Interface:** l2tp_tunnel
 - **Source Network:** l2tp_pool
 - **Destination Interface:** any
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets
8. Click **OK**

9.5.3. L2TP/PPTP Server advanced settings

The following L2TP/PPTP server advanced settings are available to the administrator:

L2TP Before Rules

Pass L2TP traffic sent to the Clavister Security Gateway directly to the L2TP Server without consulting the rule set.

Default: *Enabled*

PPTP Before Rules

Pass PPTP traffic sent to the Clavister Security Gateway directly to the PPTP Server without consulting the rule set.

Default: *Enabled*

Max PPP Resends

The maximum number of PPP layer resends.

Default: *10*

9.5.4. PPTP/L2TP Clients

The PPTP and L2TP protocols are described in the previous section. In addition to being able to act as a PPTP or L2TP server, CorePlus also offers the ability to act as a PPTP or L2TP clients. This can be useful if PPTP or L2TP is preferred as the VPN protocol instead of IPsec. One Clavister Security Gateway can act as a client and connect to another unit which acts as the server.

Client Setup

PPTP and L2TP shares a common approach to client setup which involves the following settings:

General Parameters

- **Name** - A symbolic name for the client.
- **Interface Type** - Specifies if it is a PPTP or L2TP client.
- **Remote Endpoint** - The IP address of the remote endpoint. Where this is specified as a URL, the prefix *dns:* must be precede it.

Names of Assigned Addresses

Both PPTP and L2TP utilizes dynamic IP configuration using the *PPP LCP* protocol. When CorePlus receives this information, it is stored in symbolic host/network names. The settings for this are:

- **Inner IP Address** - The host name that is used for storing the assigned IP address. If this network object exists and has a value which is not *0.0.0.0* then the PPTP/L2TP client will try to get that one from the PPTP/L2TP server as the preferred IP.
- **Automatically pick name** - If this option is enabled then CorePlus will create a host name based on the name of the PPTP/L2TP interface, for example *ip_PPTPTunnel1*.
- **Primary/Secondary DNS Name** - This defines the DNS servers from a list of predefined network objects.



Note: The default PPTP/L2TP route

A PPTP/L2TP server will not provide information such as gateway or broadcast addresses, as this is not used with PPTP/L2TP tunnels. When using PPTP/L2TP, the default route is normally routed directly across the PPTP/L2TP tunnel without a specified gateway.

Authentication

- **Username** - Specifies the username to use for this PPTP/L2TP interface.
- **Password** - Specifies the password for the interface.
- **Authentication** - Specifies which authentication protocol to use.
- **MPPE** - Specifies if *Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption* is used and which level to use.

If **Dial On Demand** is enabled then the PPTP/L2TP tunnel will not be set up until traffic is sent on the interface. The parameters for this option are:

- **Activity Sense** - Specifies if dial-on-demand should trigger on **Send** or **Recv** or both.
- **Idle Timeout** - The time of inactivity in seconds to wait before disconnection.

Using the PPTP Client Feature

One usage of the PPTP client feature is shown in the scenario depicted below.

Here a number of clients are being NATed through CorePlus before being connected to a PPTP server on the other side of the Clavister Security Gateway. If more that one of the clients is acting

as a PPTP client which is trying to connect to the PPTP server then this will not work because of the NATing.

The only way of achieving multiple PPTP clients being NATed like this, is for the Clavister Security Gateway to act as a PPTP client when it connects to the PPTP server. To summarize the setup:

- A PPTP tunnel is defined between CorePlus and the server.
- A route is added to the routing table in CorePlus which specifies that traffic for the server should be routed through the PPTP tunnel.




Figure 9.3. PPTP Client Usage

9.6. CA Server Access

Overview

Where certificates are used, the two sides of a VPN tunnel exchange their certificates during the tunnel setup negotiation and either may then try to validate the received certificate by accessing a *CA server*. A certificate contains a URL (the *CRL Distribution Point*) which specifies the validating CA server and server access is performed using an HTTP *GET* request with an HTTP reply. (This URL is more correctly called an FQDN - *Fully Qualified Domain Name*.)

CA Server Types

CA servers are of two types:

- A commercial CA server operated by one of the commercial certificate issuing companies. These are accessible over the public Internet and their FQDNs are resolvable through the public Internet DNS server system.
- A private CA server operated by the same organization setting up the VPN tunnels. The IP address of a private server will not be known to the public DNS system unless it is explicitly registered. It also will not be known to an internal network unless it is registered on an internal DNS server.

Access Considerations

The following considerations should be taken into account for CA server access to succeed:

- Either side of a VPN tunnel may issue a validation request to a CA server.
- For a certificate validation request to be issued, the FQDN of the certificate's CA server must first be resolved into an IP address. The following scenarios are possible:
 1. The CA server is a private server behind the Clavister Security Gateway and the tunnels are set up over the public Internet but to clients that will not try to validate the certificate sent by CorePlus.

In this case, the IP address of the private server needs only be registered on a private DNS server so the FQDN can be resolved. This private DNS server will also have to be configured in CorePlus so it can be found when CorePlus issues a validation request. This will also be the procedure if the tunnels are being set up entirely internally without using the public Internet.
 2. The CA server is a private server with tunnels set up over the public Internet and with clients that will try to validate the certificate received from CorePlus. In this case the following must be done:
 - a. A private DNS server must be configured so that CorePlus can locate the private CA server to validate the certificates coming from clients.
 - b. The external IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway needs to be registered in the public DNS system so that the FQDN reference to the private CA server in certificates sent to clients can be resolved. For example, CorePlus may send a certificate to a client with an FQDN which is *ca.company.com* and this will need to be resolvable by the client to a public external IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway through the public DNS system.

The same steps should be followed if the other side of the tunnel is another security gateway instead of being many clients.

3. The CA server is a commercial server on the public Internet. In this, the simplest case, public DNS servers will resolve the FQDN. The only requirement is that CorePlus will need to have at least one public DNS server address configured to resolve the FQDNs in the certificates it receives.
- It must be also possible for an HTTP *PUT* request to pass from the validation request source (either the Clavister Security Gateway or a client) to the CA server and an HTTP reply to be received. If the request is going to pass through the Clavister Security Gateway, the appropriate rules in the CorePlus IP rule set need to be defined to allow this traffic through.




Figure 9.4. Certificate Validation Components

CA Server Access by Clients

In a VPN tunnel with roaming clients connecting to the Clavister Security Gateway, the VPN client software may need to access the CA server. Not all VPN client software will need this access. In the Microsoft clients prior to Vista, CA server requests are not sent at all. With Microsoft Vista validation became the default with the option to disable it. Other non-Microsoft clients differ in the way they work but the majority will attempt to validate the certificate.

Placement of Private CA Servers

The easiest solution for placement of a private CA server is to have it on the unprotected side of

the Clavister Security Gateway. This however, is not recommended from a security viewpoint. It is better to place it on the inside (or preferably in the DMZ if available) and to have CorePlus control access to it.

As explained previously, the address of the private CA server must be resolvable through public DNS servers for certificate validation requests coming from the public Internet. If the certificate queries are coming only from the Clavister Security Gateway and the CA server is on the internal side of the security gateway then the IP address of the internal DNS server must be configured in CorePlus so that these requests can be resolved.

Turning Off FQDN Resolution

As explained in the troubleshooting section below, identifying problems with CA server access can be done by turning off the requirement to validate certificates. Attempts to access CA servers by CorePlus can be disabled with the **Disable CRLs** option for certificate objects. This means that checking against the CA server's revocation list will be turned off and access to the server will not be attempted.

9.7. VPN Troubleshooting

This section deals with how to troubleshoot the common problems that are found with VPN.

9.7.1. General Troubleshooting

In all types of VPNs some basic troubleshooting checks can be made:

- Check that all IP addresses have been specified correctly.
- Check that all pre-shared keys and usernames/passwords are correctly entered.
- Use ICMP *Ping* to confirm that the tunnel is working. With roaming clients this is best done by Pinging the internal IP address of the local network interface on the Clavister Security Gateway from a client (in LAN to LAN setups pinging could be done in any direction). If CorePlus is to respond to a Ping then the following rule must exist in the IP rule set:

Action	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Service
Allow	vpn_tunnel	all-nets	core	all-nets	ICMP

- Ensure that another **IPsec Tunnel** definition is not preventing the correct definition being reached. The tunnel list is scanned from top to bottom by CorePlus and a tunnel in a higher position with the **Remote Network** set to *all-nets* and the **Remote Endpoint** set to *none* could prevent the correct tunnel being reached. A symptom of this is often an *Incorrect Pre-shared Key* message.
- Try and avoid duplication of IP addresses between the remote network being accessed by a client and the internal network to which a roaming client belongs.

If a roaming client becomes temporarily part of a network such as a Wi-Fi network at an airport, the client will get an IP address from the Wi-Fi network's DHCP server. If that IP also belongs to the network behind the Clavister Security Gateway accessible through a tunnel, then Windows will still continue to assume that the IP address is to be found on the client's local network. Windows therefore will not correctly route packets bound for the remote network through the tunnel but instead route them to the local network.

The solution to this problem of local/remote IP address duplication is to create a new route in the client's Windows routing table that explicitly routes the IP address to the tunnel.

- If roaming client user authentication is not asking the users for their username/password then ensure that the following advanced settings are enabled:
 - *IPsec Before Rules* for pure IPsec roaming clients.
 - *L2TP Before Rules* for L2TP roaming clients.
 - *PPTP Before Rules* for PPTP roaming clients.

These settings should be enabled by default and they ensure that user authentication traffic between CorePlus and the client can bypass the IP rule set. If the appropriate setting is not enabled then an explicit rule needs to be added to the IP rule set to allow the authentication traffic to pass between roaming clients and CorePlus. This rule will have a destination interface of **core** (which means CorePlus itself).

- If the remote endpoint is specified as a URL, make sure that the URL string is preceded by the prefix *dns:*. If, for example, the tunnel remote endpoint is to be specified as *vpn.company.com*, this should be specified as *dns:vpn.company.com*.

9.7.2. Troubleshooting Certificates

If certificates have been used in a VPN solution then the following should be looked at as a source of potential problems:

- Check that the correct certificates have been used for the right purposes.
- Check that the certificate `.cer` and `.key` files have the same filename. For example, `my_cert.key` and `my_cert.cer`.
- Check that the certificates have not expired. Certificates have a specific lifetime and when this expires they cannot be used and new certificates must be issued.
- Check that the CorePlus date and time is set correctly. If the system time and date is wrong then certificates can appear as being expired when, in fact, they are not.
- Consider time-zone issues with newly generated certificates. The Clavister Security Gateway's time zone may not be the same as the CA server's time zone and the certificate may not yet be valid in the local zone.
- Disable CRL (revocation list) checking to see if CA server access could be the problem. CA Server issues are discussed further in *Section 9.6, "CA Server Access"*.

9.7.3. IPsec Troubleshooting Commands

A number of commands can be used to diagnose IPsec tunnels:

The `ipsecstat` console command

`ipsecstat` can be used to show that IPsec tunnels have correctly established. A representative example of output is:

```
Device:/> ipsecstat
--- IPsec SAs:
Displaying one line per SA-bundle
```

IPsec Tunnel	Local Net	Remote Net	Remote GW
L2TP_IPSec	214.237.225.43	84.13.193.179	84.13.193.179
IPsec_Tun1	192.168.0.0/24	172.16.1.0/24	82.242.91.203

To examine the first IKE negotiation phase of tunnel setup use:

```
Device:/> ipsecstat -ike
```

To get complete details of tunnel setup use:

```
Device:/> ipsecstat -u -v
```



Warning: Be careful using the `-num=all` option

When using any IPsec related commands, if there are large numbers of tunnels then avoid using the `-num=all` option since this will generate correspondingly large amounts of output.

For example, with a large number of tunnels avoid using:

```
Device:/> ipsecstat -num=all
```

Another example of what to avoid with many tunnels is:

```
Device:/> ipsectunnels -num=all
```

In these circumstances, using the option with a small number, for example **-num=10**, is recommended.

The *ikesnoop* console command

A common problem with setting up IPsec is a list of proposed algorithms that is unacceptable to the device at the other end of the tunnel. The *ikesnoop* command is a useful tool for diagnosing incompatible algorithm proposal lists by showing the details of negotiations during tunnel setup. The basic form of this command is:

```
Device:/> ikesnoop -on -verbose
```

Once issued, an ICMP *ping* can then be sent to the Clavister Security Gateway from the remote end of the tunnel. This will cause *ikesnoop* to output details of the tunnel setup negotiation to the console and any algorithm proposal list incompatibilities can be seen.

If there are multiple tunnels in a setup or multiple clients on a single tunnel then the output from *verbose* option can be overwhelming. It is therefore better to specify that the output comes from a single tunnel by specifying the IP address of the tunnel's endpoint (this is either the IP of the remote endpoint or a client's IP address). The command takes the form:

```
Device:/> ikesnoop -on <ip-address> -verbose
```

ikesnoop can be turned off with the command:

```
Device:/> ikesnoop -off
```

For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see *Section 9.4.5, "Troubleshooting with ikesnoop"*.

9.7.4. Management Interface Failure with VPN

If any VPN tunnel is set up and then the management interface no longer operates then it is likely to be a problem with the management traffic being routed back through the VPN tunnel instead of the correct interface.

This happens when a route is established in the main routing table which routes any traffic for **all-nets** through the VPN tunnel. If the management interface is not reached by the VPN tunnel then the administrator needs to create a specific route that routes management interface traffic leaving the Clavister Security Gateway back to the management sub-network.

9.7.5. Specific Error Messages

This section will deal with specific error messages that can appear with VPN and what they indicate. The messages discussed are:

1. **Could not find acceptable proposal / no proposal chosen.**
2. **Incorrect pre-shared key.**

- 3. *Ike_invalid_payload, Ike_invalid_cookie.*
- 4. *Payload_Malformed.*
- 5. *No public key found.*

1. **Could not find acceptable proposal / no proposal chosen**

This is the most common IPsec related error message. It means that depending on which side initiates tunnel setup, the negotiations in either the IKE or the IPsec phase of setup failed since they were unable to find a matching proposal that both sides could agree on.

Troubleshooting this error message can be involved since the reasons for this message can be multiple depending on where in the negotiation it occurred.

- **If the negotiation fails during phase-1 – IKE**

The IKE proposal list does not match. Double check that the IKE proposal list matches that of the remote side. A good idea is to use the *ikesnoop verbose* command in the console and get the tunnel to initiate the tunnel from the remote side. You will be able to then see what proposals the remote side is sending and then compare the results with your own IKE proposal list. At least ONE proposal has to match in order for it to pass phase-1. Don't forget that the lifetimes are also important as will be mentioned in Problem symptom-1. Note: In newer versions it is not possible to set the lifetime in KB for the IKE Phase, only seconds.

- **If the negotiation fails during phase-2 – IPsec**

The IPsec proposal list does not match. Double check that the IPsec proposal list matches that of the remote side. You can use the same method described above of using *ikesnoop* from when the remote side initiates the tunnel and compare it against your own proposal list. What is "extra" in the IPsec phase is that the networks are negotiated here, so even if the IPsec proposal list seem to match the problem may be with mismatching networks. The Local Network(s) on your side needs to be the Remote Network on the other side and vice versa. Remember that multiple networks will generate multiple IPsec SA's, one SA per network (or host if you use that option). The defined network size is also important in that it must have exactly the same size on both sides, as will be mentioned again later in the symptom section.

There are also some settings on the IPsec tunnel's IKE tab that can be involved in a no-proposal chosen issue. Such as Main or Aggressive mode, DH Group (for the IKE phase) and PFS (for IPsec phase).

2. **Incorrect pre-shared key**

A problem with the pre-shared key on either side has caused the tunnel negotiation to fail. This is perhaps the easiest of all the error messages to troubleshoot since it can be only one thing, and that is incorrect pre-shared key. Double-check that the pre-shared key is of the same type (Passphrase or Hex-key) and correctly added on both sides of the tunnel.

Another reason for why CorePlus detects that the pre-shared key is incorrect could be because the wrong tunnel is triggering during tunnel negotiations. IPsec tunnels are processed from the top to the bottom of the CorePlus tunnel list and are initially matched against the remote gateway. An example is if there is a roaming tunnel that uses *all-nets* as its remote gateway. This tunnel will trigger before your defined tunnel if it is above it in the tunnel list.

For example, consider the following IPsec tunnel definitions:

Name	Local Network	Remote Network	Remote Gateway
VPN-1	lannet	office1net	office1gw
VPN-2	lannet	office2net	office2gw
L2TP	ip_wan	all-nets	all-nets
VPN-3	lannet	office3net	office3gw

Since the tunnel *L2TP* in the above table is above the tunnel *VPN-3*, it will trigger a match before *VPN-3* because of the *all-nets* remote gateway (*all-nets* will match any network). Since these two tunnels use different pre-shared keys, you will receive an "*Incorrect pre-shared key*" error message.

The problem is solved if we reorder the list and move *VPN-3* above *L2TP*. The gateway *office3gw* will be then matched correctly and *VPN-3* will be the tunnel selected by CorePlus.

3. *Ike_invalid_payload, Ike_invalid_cookie*

In this case the IPsec engine in CorePlus receives an IPsec IKE packet but is unable to match it against an existing IKE.

If a VPN tunnel is only established on one side, this can be the resulting error message when traffic arrives from a tunnel that does not exist. An example would be if, for some reason, the tunnel has only gone down from the initiator side but the terminator still sees it as up. It then tries to send packets through the tunnel but when they arrive at the initiator it will drop them since no matching tunnel can be found.

Simply remove the tunnel from the side that believes it is still up to solve the immediate problem. An investigation as to why the tunnel only went down from one side is recommended. It could be that *DPD* and/or *Keep-Alive* is only used on one side. Another possible cause could be that even though it has received a *DELETE* packet, it has not deleted/removed the tunnel.

4. *Payload_Malformed*

This problem is very similar to the *Incorrect pre-shared key* problem described above. A possible reason is that the PSK is of the wrong TYPE on either side (Passphrase or Hex key).

Verify that you are using the same type on both sides of the IPsec tunnel. If one side is using Hex and the other Passphrase, this is most likely the error message that you will receive.

5. *No public key found*

This is a very common error message when dealing with tunnels that use certificates for authentication.

Troubleshooting this error message can be very difficult as the possible cause of the problem can be quite extensive. Also it is very important to keep in mind that when dealing with certificates you may need to combine the *ikesnoop* logs with normal logs as *ikesnoop* does not give that much information about certificates, while normal logs can provide important clues as to what the problem could be. A good suggestion before you start to troubleshoot certificate based tunnels is to first configure it as a PSK tunnel and then verify that it can successfully establish, then move on to using Certificates. (Unless the configuration type prohibits that).

The possible causes are as follows:

- The certificate on either side is not signed by the same CA server.
- The certificate's validity time has expired or it has not yet started to be valid. The latter can happen if the clock is set incorrectly on either the CA server or the Clavister Security Gateway or they are in different time zones.
- The Clavister Security Gateway is unable to reach the *Certificate Revocation List* (CRL) on the CA server in order to verify if the certificate is valid or not. Double-check that the CRL path is valid in the certificate's properties. (Using the CRL feature could be turned off.) Make sure also that there is a DNS client configured in CorePlus in order for it to be able to correctly resolve the path to the CRL.



Note: L2TP with Microsoft Vista

With L2TP, Microsoft Vista tries by default to contact and download the CRL list, while Microsoft XP does not. This option can be turned off in Vista.

- If multiple similar or roaming tunnels exist and you want to separate them using ID lists, a possible cause can be that none of the ID lists match the certificate properties of the connecting user. Either the user is non-authorized or the certificate properties are wrong on the client or the ID list needs to be updated with this user/information.
- With L2TP, the client certificate is imported into the wrong certificate store on the Windows client. When the client connects, it is using the wrong certificate.

9.7.6. Specific Symptoms

There are two specific symptoms that will be discussed in this section:

- 1. The tunnel can only be initiated from one side.**
- 2. The tunnel is unable to be set up and the ikesnoop command reports a config mode XAuth problem even though XAuth is not used.**

1. The tunnel can only be initiated from one side

This is a common problem and is due to a mismatch of the size in local or remote network and/or the lifetime settings on the proposal list(s).

To troubleshoot this you need to examine the settings for the local network, remote network, IKE proposal list and IPsec proposal list on both sides to try to identify a miss-match.

For example, suppose we have the following IPsec settings at either end of a tunnel:

- **Side A**

Local Network = 192.168.10.0/24
Remote Network = 10.10.10.0/24

- **Side B**

Local Network = 10.10.10.0/24
Remote Network = 192.168.10.0/16

In this scenario you will see that the defined remote network on **Side B** is larger than that defined for **Side A**'s local network. This means that **Side A** can only initiate the tunnel successfully towards **Side B** as its network is smaller. When **Side B** tries to initiate the tunnel, **Side A** will reject it because the network is bigger than what is defined. The reason it works the other way around is because a smaller network is considered more secure and will be accepted. This also applies to the lifetimes in the proposal lists.

2. Unable to set up with config mode and getting a spurious XAuth message

The reason for this message is basically "No proposal chosen". The case where this will appear is when there is something that fails in terms of network size on either local network or remote network. Since CorePlus has determined that it is a type of network size problem, it will try one last attempt to get the correct network by sending a config mode request.

By using *ikesnoop* when both sides initiate the tunnel, you should easily be able to compare the network that both sides are sending in phase-2. With that information you should be able to spot the network problem. It can be that it's a network size mismatch or that it doesn't match at all.

Chapter 10: Traffic Management

This chapter describes how CorePlus can manage network traffic.

- Traffic Shaping, page 521
- IDP Traffic Shaping, page 543
- Threshold Rules, page 548
- Server Load Balancing, page 550

10.1. Traffic Shaping

10.1.1. Overview

QoS with TCP/IP

A weakness of TCP/IP is the lack of true *Quality of Service* (QoS) functionality. QoS is the ability to guarantee and limit network bandwidth for certain services and users. Solutions such as the *Differentiated Services* (Diffserv) architecture have been designed to try and deal with the QoS issue in large networks by using information in packet headers to provide network devices with QoS information.

CorePlus Diffserv Support

CorePlus supports the Diffserv architecture the following ways:

- CorePlus forwards the 6 bits which make up the Diffserv *Differentiated Services Code Point* (DSCP) as well as copying these bits from the data traffic inside VPN tunnels to the encapsulating packets.
- CorePlus copies the 6 DSCP bits into the priority QoS bits of Ethernet VLAN frames on outgoing interfaces.
- As described later in this chapter, DSCP bits can be used by the CorePlus traffic shaping subsystem as a basis for prioritizing traffic passing through the Clavister Security Gateway.
- CorePlus automatically copies the entire *Differentiated Service Field* (DSField) of inner packets

to the outer IP header of ESP packets of IPsec tunnels. The field can alternatively be set to a fixed value in the outer tunnel packets as described in *Section 9.4.6, "IPsec Advanced Settings"*.

It is important to understand that CorePlus traffic shaping does not add new Diffserv information as packets traverse a Clavister Security Gateway. The CorePlus traffic shaping *priorities* described later in this chapter are for traffic shaping within CorePlus only and are not translated into Diffserv information that is then added to packets.

The Traffic Shaping Solution

Architectures like Diffserv however, fall short if applications themselves supply the network with QoS information. In most networks it is rarely appropriate to let the applications, the users of the network, decide the priority of their own traffic. If the users cannot be relied upon then the network equipment must make the decisions concerning priorities and bandwidth allocation.

CorePlus provides QoS control by allowing the administrator to apply limits and guarantees to the network traffic passing through the Clavister Security Gateway. This approach is often referred to as *traffic shaping* and is well suited to managing bandwidth for local area networks as well as to managing the bottlenecks that might be found in larger wide area networks. It can be applied to any traffic including that passing through VPN tunnels.

Traffic Shaping Objectives

Traffic shaping operates by measuring and queuing IP packets with respect to a number of configurable parameters. The objectives are:

- Applying bandwidth limits and queuing packets that exceed configured limits, then sending them later when bandwidth demands are lower.
- Dropping packets if packet buffers are full. The packets to be dropped should be chosen from those that are responsible for the congestion.
- Prioritizing traffic according to administrator decisions. If traffic with a high priority increases while a communication line is full, traffic with a low priority can be temporarily limited to make room for the higher priority traffic.
- Providing bandwidth guarantees. This is typically accomplished by treating a certain amount of traffic (the guaranteed amount) as high priority. The traffic that is in excess of the guarantee then has the same priority as other traffic, competing with all the other non-prioritized traffic.

Traffic shaping does not typically work by queuing up immense amounts of data and then sorting out the prioritized traffic to send before sending non-prioritized traffic. Instead, the amount of prioritized traffic is measured and the non-prioritized traffic is limited dynamically so that it will not interfere with the throughput of prioritized traffic.



Note: Traffic shaping will not work with the SIP ALG

Any traffic connections that trigger an IP rule with a service object that uses the SIP ALG cannot be also subject to traffic shaping.

10.1.2. Traffic Shaping in CorePlus

CorePlus offers extensive traffic shaping capabilities for the packets passing through the

Clavister Security Gateway. Different rate limits and traffic guarantees can be created as policies based on the traffic's source, destination and protocol, similar to the way in which security policies are created based on IP rules.

The two key components for traffic shaping in CorePlus are:

- **Pipes**
- **Pipe Rules**

Pipes

A *Pipe* is the fundamental object for traffic shaping and is a conceptual channel through which data traffic can flow. It has various characteristics that define how traffic passing through it is handled. As many pipes as are required can be defined by the administrator. None are defined by default.

Pipes are simplistic in that they do not care about the types of traffic that pass through them nor the direction of that traffic. They simply measure the aggregate data that passes through them and then apply the administrator configured limits for the pipe as a whole or for *Precedences* and/or *Groups* (these concepts are explained later in *Section 10.1.6, "Precedences"*).

CorePlus is capable of handling hundreds of pipes simultaneously, but in reality most scenarios require only a handful of pipes. It is possible that dozens of pipes might be needed in scenarios where individual pipes are used for individual protocols. Large numbers of pipes might also be needed in an ISP scenario where individual pipes are allocated to each client.

Pipe Rules

One or more *Pipe Rules* make up the CorePlus *Pipe Rule set* which determine what traffic will flow through which pipes.

Each pipe rule is defined like other CorePlus security policies: by specifying the source/destination interface/network as well as the service to which the rule is to apply. Once a new connection is permitted by the IP rule set, the pipe rule set is then checked for any matching pipe rules.

Pipe rules are checked in the same way as IP rules, by going from top to bottom (first to last) in the rule set. The first matching rule, if any, decides if the connection is subject to traffic shaping. Keep in mind that any connection that does not trigger a pipe rule will not be subject to traffic shaping and could potentially use as much bandwidth as it wants.



Note: No pipe rules are defined by default

The rule set for pipe rules is initially empty with no rules being defined by default. At least one rule must be created for traffic shaping to begin to function.

Pipe Rule Chains

When a pipe rule is defined, the pipes to be used with that rule are also specified and they are placed into one of two lists in the pipe rule. These lists are:

- **The Forward Chain**

These are the pipe or pipes that will be used for outgoing (leaving) traffic from the Clavister

Security Gateway. One, none or a series of pipes may be specified.

- **The Return Chain**

These are the pipe or pipes that will be used for incoming (arriving) traffic. One, none or a series of pipes may be specified.




Figure 10.1. Pipe Rules Determine Pipe Usage

The pipes that are to be used are specified in a *pipe list*. If only one pipe is specified then that is the pipe whose characteristics will be applied to the traffic. If a series of pipes are specified then these will form a *Chain* of pipes through which traffic will pass. A chain can be made up of a maximum of 8 pipes.

Explicitly Excluding Traffic from Shaping

If no pipe is specified in a pipe rule list then traffic that triggers the rule will not flow through any pipe. It also means that the triggering traffic will not be subject to any other matching pipe rules that might be found later in the rule set.

This provides a means to explicitly exclude particular traffic from traffic shaping. Such rules are not absolutely necessary but if placed at the beginning of the pipe rule set, they can guard against accidental traffic shaping by later rules.

Pipes Will Not Work With *FwdFast* IP Rules

It is important to understand that traffic shaping will not work with traffic that flows as a result of triggering a *FwdFast* IP rule in the CorePlus IP rule sets.

The reason for this is that traffic shaping is implemented by using the CorePlus *state engine* which is the subsystem that deals with the tracking of connections. *FwdFast* IP rules do not set up a connection in the state engine. Instead, packets are considered not to be part of a connection and are forwarded individually to their destination, bypassing the state engine.




Figure 10.2. FwdFast Rules Bypass Traffic Shaping

10.1.3. Simple Bandwidth Limiting

The simplest use of pipes is for bandwidth limiting. This is also a scenario that does not require much planning. The example that follows applies a bandwidth limit to inbound traffic only. This is the direction most likely to cause problems for Internet connections.

Example 10.1. Applying a Simple Bandwidth Limit

Begin with creating a simple pipe that limits all traffic that gets passed through it to 2 megabits per second, regardless of what traffic it is.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add Pipe std-in LimitKbpsTotal=2000
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Traffic Management > Traffic Shaping > Pipes > Add > Pipe**
2. Specify a suitable name for the pipe, for instance *std-in*
3. Enter *2000* in the **Total** textbox under **Pipe Limits**
4. Click **OK**

Traffic needs to be passed through the pipe and this is done by using the pipe in a Pipe Rule.

We will use the above pipe to limit inbound traffic. This limit will apply to the actual data packets, and not the connections. In traffic shaping we're interested in the direction that data is being shuffled, not which computer initiated the connection.

Create a simple rule that allows everything from the inside, going out. We add the pipe that we created to the *return chain*. This means that the packets travelling in the *return direction* of this connection (outside-in) should pass through the *std-in* pipe.

Command-Line Interface

```
Device: /> add PipeRule ReturnChain=std-in SourceInterface=lan
          SourceNetwork=lannet DestinationInterface=wan
          DestinationNetwork=all-nets Service=all_services name=Outbound
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Traffic Management > Traffic Shaping > Add > Pipe Rule**
2. Specify a suitable name for the pipe, for instance *outbound*
3. Now enter:
 - **Service:** all_services
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Interface:** wan
 - **Destination Network:** all-nets
4. Under the **Traffic Shaping** tab, make *std-in* selected in the **Return Chain** control
5. Click **OK**

This setup limits all traffic from the outside (the Internet) to 2 megabits per second. No priorities are applied, nor any dynamic balancing.

10.1.4. Limiting Bandwidth in Both Directions

Using a Single Pipe for Both Directions

A single pipe does not care in which direction the traffic through it is flowing when it calculates total throughput. Using the same pipe for both outbound and inbound traffic is allowed by CorePlus but this will not partition the pipe limit exactly in two between the two directions.

In the previous example only bandwidth in the inbound direction is limited. In most situations, this is the direction that becomes full first. But what if the outbound traffic must be limited in the same way?

Just inserting **std-in** in the forward chain will not work since we probably want the 2 Mbps limit for outbound traffic to be separate from the 2 Mbps limit for inbound traffic. If 2 Mbps of outbound traffic attempts to flow through the pipe in addition to 2 Mbps of inbound traffic, the total attempting to flow is 4 Mbps. Since the pipe limit is 2 Mbps, the actual flow will be close to 1 Mbps in each direction.

Raising the total pipe limit to 4 Mbps will not solve the problem since the single pipe will not know that 2 Mbps of inbound and 2 Mbps of outbound are the intended limits. The result might be 3 Mbps outbound and 1 Mbps inbound since this also adds up to 4 Mbps.

Using Two Separate Pipes Instead

The recommended way to control bandwidth in both directions is to use two separate pipes, one for inbound and one for outbound traffic. In the scenario under discussion each pipe would have a 2 Mbps limit to achieve the desired result. The following example goes through the setup for this.

Example 10.2. Limiting Bandwidth in Both Directions

Create a second pipe for outbound traffic:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> add Pipe std-out LimitKbpsTotal=2000
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Traffic Management > Traffic Shaping > Pipes > Add > Pipe**
2. Specify a name for the pipe, for example *std-out*
3. Enter *2000* in **Total** textbox
4. Click **OK**

After creating a pipe for outbound bandwidth control, add it to the forward pipe chain of the rule created in the previous example:

Command-Line Interface

```
Device:/> set PipeRule Outbound ForwardChain=std-out
```

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

1. Go to **Traffic Management > Traffic Shaping > Pipe Rules**
2. Right-click on the pipe rule you created in the previous example and choose **Edit**
3. Under the **Traffic Shaping** tab, select *std-out* in the **Forward Chain** list
4. Click **OK**

This results in all outbound connections being limited to 2 Mbps in each direction.

10.1.5. Creating Differentiated Limits Using Chains

In the previous examples a static traffic limit for all outbound connections was applied. What if the aim is to limit web surfing more than other traffic? Assume that the total bandwidth limit is 250 kbps and 125 kbps of that is to be allocated to web surfing inbound traffic.

The Incorrect Solution

Two "surfing" pipes for inbound and outbound traffic could be set up. However, it is not usually required to limit outbound traffic since most web surfing usually consists of short outbound server requests followed by long inbound responses.

A **surf-in** pipe is therefore first created for inbound traffic with a 125 kbps limit. Next, a new Pipe Rule is set up for surfing that uses the **surf-in** pipe and it is placed before the rule that directs everything else through the **std-in** pipe. That way web surfing traffic goes through the **surf-in** pipe and everything else is handled by the rule and pipe created earlier.

Unfortunately this will not achieve the desired effect, which is allocating a maximum of 125 kbps to inbound surfing traffic as part of the 250 kbps total. Inbound traffic will pass through one of two pipes: one that allows 250 kbps, and one that allows 125 kbps, giving a possible total of 375 kbps of inbound traffic but this exceeds the real limit of 250 kbps.

The Correct Solution

To provide the solution, create a *chain* of the **surf-in** pipe followed by the **std-in** pipe in the pipe rule for surfing traffic. Inbound surfing traffic will now first pass through **surf-in** and be limited to a maximum of 125 kbps. Then, it will pass through the **std-in** pipe along with other inbound traffic, which will apply the 250 kbps total limit.




Figure 10.3. Differentiated Limits Using Chains

If surfing uses the full limit of 125 kbps, those 125 kbps will occupy half of the **std-in** pipe leaving

125 kbps for the rest of the traffic. If no surfing is taking place then all of the 250 kbps allowed through **std-in** will be available for other traffic.

This does not provide a bandwidth guarantee for web browsing but instead limits it to 125 kbps and provides a 125 kbps guarantee for everything else. For web browsing the normal rules of first-come, first-forwarded will apply when competing for the 125 kbps bandwidth. This may mean 125 kbps, but it may also mean much slower speed if the connection is flooded.

Setting up pipes in this way only puts limits on the maximum values for certain traffic types. It does not give priorities to different types of competing traffic.

10.1.6. Precedences

The Default Precedence is Zero

All packets that pass through CorePlus traffic shaping pipes have a *Precedence*. In the examples so far, precedences have not been explicitly set and so all packets have had the same default precedence which is 0.

There are 8 Possible Precedence Levels

Eight precedences exist which are numbered from 0 to 7. Precedence 0 is the least important (lowest priority) precedence and 7 is the most important (highest priority) precedence. A precedence can be viewed as a separate traffic queue; traffic in precedence 2 will be forwarded before traffic in precedence 0, precedence 4 forwarded before 2.



Figure 10.4. The Eight Pipe Precedences

Precedence Priority is Relative

The priority of a precedence comes from the fact that it is either higher or lower than another precedence and not from the number itself. For example, if two precedences are used in a traffic shaping scenario, choosing precedences 4 and 6 instead of 0 and 3 will make no difference to the end result.

Allocating Precedence to Traffic

The way precedence is assigned to traffic is specified in the triggering pipe rule and can be done in one of three ways:

- **Use the precedence of the first pipe**

Each pipe has a *Default Precedence* and packets take the default precedence of the first pipe they pass through.

- **Use a fixed precedence**

The triggering pipe rule explicitly allocates a fixed precedence.

- **Use the DSCP bits**

Take the precedence from the DSCP bits in the packet. DSCP is a subset of the Diffserv architecture where the *Type of Service* (ToS) bits are included in the IP packet header.

Specifying Precedences Within Pipes

When a pipe is configured, a *Default Precedence*, a *Minimum Precedence* and a *Maximum Precedence* can be specified. The default precedences are:

- **Minimum Precedence: 0**
- **Default Precedence: 0**
- **Maximum Precedence: 7**

As described above, the *Default Precedence* is the precedence taken by a packet if it is not explicitly assigned by a pipe rule.

The minimum and maximum precedences define the precedence range that the pipe will handle. If a packet arrives with an already allocated precedence below the minimum then its precedence is changed to the minimum. Similarly, if a packet arrives with an already allocated precedence above the maximum, its precedence is changed to the maximum.

For each pipe, separate bandwidth limits may be optionally specified for each precedence level. These limits can be specified in kilobits per second and/or packets per second (if both are specified then the first limit reached will be the limit used).



Tip: Specifying bandwidth

Remember that when specifying network traffic bandwidths, the prefix **Kilo** means **1000** and NOT 1024. For example, **3 Kbps** means **3000** bits per second.

Similarly, the prefix **Mega** means one million in a traffic bandwidth context.

Precedence Limits are also Guarantees

A precedence limit is both a limit and a guarantee. The bandwidth specified for precedence also guarantees that the bandwidth will be available at the expense of lower precedences. If the specified bandwidth is exceeded, the excess traffic falls to the lowest precedence. The lowest precedence has a special meaning which is explained next.

The Lowest (*Best Effort*) Precedence

The precedence which is the minimum (lowest priority) pipe precedence has a special meaning: it acts as the *Best Effort Precedence*. All packets processed at this precedence will always be processed on a "first come, first forwarded" basis.

Packets with a higher precedence than best effort and that exceed the limit of their precedence will automatically be transferred down into the lowest (best effort) precedence and they are treated the same as other packets at the lowest precedence.

In the illustration below the minimum precedence is 2 and the maximum precedence is 6. Precedence 2 is taken as the best effort precedence.




Figure 10.5. Minimum and Maximum Pipe Precedence

Lowest Precedence Limits

It is usually is not needed to have a limit specified for the lowest (best effort) precedence since this precedence simply uses any spare bandwidth not used by higher precedences. However, a limit could be specified if there is a need to restrict the bandwidth used by the lowest precedence. This might be the case if a particular traffic type always gets the lowest precedence but needs to have restricted bandwidth usage.

Precedences Only Apply When a Pipe is Full

Precedences have no effect until the total limit specified for a pipe is reached. This is true because until the pipe limit is reached (it becomes "full") there is no competition between precedences.

When the pipe is full, traffic is prioritized by CorePlus according to precedence with higher precedence packets that don't exceed the precedence limit being sent before lower precedence packets. Lower precedence packets are buffered until they can be sent. If buffer space becomes exhausted then they are dropped.

If a total limit for a pipe is not specified, it is the same as saying that the pipe has unlimited bandwidth and consequently it can never become full so precedences have no meaning.

Applying Precedences

Continuing to use the previous traffic shaping example, let us add the requirement that SSH and Telnet traffic is to have a higher priority than all other traffic. To do this we add a Pipe Rule specifically for SSH and Telnet and set the priority in the rule to be a higher priority, say 2. We specify the same pipes in this new rule as are used for other traffic.

The effect of doing this is that the SSH and Telnet rule sets the higher priority on packets related to these services and these packets are sent through the same pipe as other traffic. The pipe then makes sure that these higher priority packets are sent first when the total bandwidth limit specified in the pipe's configuration is exceeded. Lower priority packets will be buffered and sent when higher priority traffic uses less than the maximum specified for the pipe. The buffering process is sometimes referred to as "throttling back" since it reduces the flow rate.

The Need for Guarantees

A problem can occur however if prioritized traffic is a continuous stream such as real-time audio, resulting in continuous use of all available bandwidth and resulting in unacceptably long queuing times for other services such as surfing, DNS or FTP. A means is required to ensure that lower priority traffic gets some portion of bandwidth and this is done with *Bandwidth Guarantees*.

Using Precedences as Guarantees

Specifying a limit for a precedence also guarantees that there is a minimum amount of bandwidth available for that precedence. Traffic flowing through a pipe will get the guarantee specified for the precedence it has, at the expense of traffic with lower precedences.

To change the prioritized SSH and Telnet traffic from the previous example to a 96 kbps guarantee, the precedence 2 limit for the *std-in* pipe is set to be 96 kbps.

This does not mean that inbound SSH and Telnet traffic is limited to 96 kbps. Limits in precedences above the best effort precedence will only limit how much of the traffic gets to pass in that specific precedence.

If more than 96 kbps of precedence 2 traffic arrives, any excess traffic will be moved down to the best effort precedence. All traffic at the best effort precedence is then forwarded on a first-come, first-forwarded basis.



Note: A limit on the lowest precedence has no meaning

Setting a maximum limit for the lowest (best effort) precedence or any lower precedences has no meaning and will be ignored by CorePlus.

Differentiated Guarantees

A problem arises if the aim is to give a specific 32 kbps guarantee to Telnet traffic, and a specific 64 kbps guarantee to SSH traffic. A 32 kbps limit could be set for precedence 2, a 64 kbps limit set for precedence 4 and then pass the different types of traffic through each precedence. However, there are two obvious problems with this approach:

- Which traffic is more important? This question does not pose much of a problem here, but it becomes more pronounced as the traffic shaping scenario becomes more complex.
- The number of precedences is limited. This may not be sufficient in all cases, even without the "which traffic is more important?" problem.

The solution is to create two new pipes: one for telnet traffic, and one for SSH traffic, much like the "surf" pipe that was created earlier.

First, remove the 96 kbps limit from the **std-in** pipe, then create two new pipes: **ssh-in** and **telnet-in**. Set the default precedence for both pipes to 2, and the precedence 2 limits to 32 and

64 kbps, respectively.

Then, split the previously defined rule covering ports 22 through 23 into two rules, covering 22 and 23, respectively:

Keep the forward chain of both rules as **std-out** only. Again, to simplify this example, we concentrate only on inbound traffic, which is the direction that is the most likely to be the first one to fill up in client-oriented setups.

Set the return chain of the port 22 rule to **ssh-in** followed by **std-in**.

Set the return chain of the port 23 rule to **telnet-in** followed by **std-in**.

Set the priority assignment for both rules to **Use defaults from first pipe**; the default precedence of both the **ssh-in** and **telnet-in** pipes is 2.

Using this approach rather than hard-coding precedence 2 in the rule set, you can easily change the precedence of all SSH and Telnet traffic by changing the default precedence of the **ssh-in** and **telnet-in** pipes.

Notice that we did not set a total limit for the **ssh-in** and **telnet-in** pipes. We do not need to since the total limit will be enforced by the **std-in** pipe at the end of the respective chains.

The **ssh-in** and **telnet-in** pipes act as a "priority filter": they make sure that no more than the reserved amount, 64 and 32 kbps, respectively, of precedence 2 traffic will reach **std-in**. SSH and Telnet traffic exceeding their guarantees will reach **std-in** as precedence 0, the best-effort precedence of the **std-in** and **ssh-in** pipes.



Note: The return chain ordering is important

*Here, the ordering of the pipes in the return chain is important. Should **std-in** appear before **ssh-in** and **telnet-in**, then traffic will reach **std-in** at the lowest precedence only and hence compete for the 250 kbps of available bandwidth with other traffic.*

10.1.7. Pipe Groups

CorePlus provides a further level of control within pipes through the ability to split pipe bandwidth into individual resource users within a *group* and to apply a limit and guarantee to each user.

Individual users can be distinguished according to one of the following:

- Source IP
- Destination IP
- Source Network
- Destination Network
- Source Port (includes the IP)
- Destination Port (includes the IP)
- Source Interface
- Destination Interface

This feature is enabled by enabling the *Grouping* option in a pipe. The individual users of a group can then have a limit and/or guarantee specified for them in the pipe. For example, if grouping is done by source IP then each *user* corresponds to each unique source IP address.

A Port Grouping Includes the IP Address

If a grouping by port is selected then this implicitly also includes the IP address. For example, port 1024 of host computer A is not the same as port 1024 of host computer B. It is the combination of port and IP address that identifies a unique user in a group.

Grouping by Networks Requires the Size

If the grouping is by source or destination network then the network size must also be specified. In other words the netmask for the network must be specified for CorePlus.

Specifying Group Limits

Once the way the method of grouping is selected, the next step is to specify the **Group Limits**. These limits can consist of one or both of the following:

- **Group Limit Total**

This value specifies a limit for each user within the grouping. For example, if the grouping is by source IP address and the total specified is 100 Kbps then this is saying that no one IP address can take more than 100 Kbps of bandwidth.

- **Group Precedence Guarantees**

In addition to, or as an alternative to the total group limit, individual precedences can have values specified. These values are, in fact, *guarantees* (not limits) for each user in a group. For example, precedence 3 might have the value 50 Kbps and this is saying that an individual user (in other words, each source IP if that is the selected grouping) with that precedence will be guaranteed 50 Kbps at the expense of lower precedences.

The precedences for each user must be allocated by different pipe rules that trigger on particular users. For example, if grouping is by source IP then different pipe rules will trigger on different IPs and send the traffic into the same pipe with the appropriate precedence.

The potential sum of the precedence values could clearly become greater than the capacity of the pipe in some circumstances so it is important to specify the total pipe limit when using these guarantees.

Combining the Group Total and Precedences

Use of group precedences and the group total can be combined. This means that:

- The users in a group are first separated by pipe rules into precedences.
- The users are then subject to the guarantees specified for their precedence.
- The combined traffic is subject to the total group limit.

The illustration below shows this flow where the grouping has been selected to be according to source IP.




Figure 10.6. Traffic Grouped By IP Address

Another Simple Groups Example

Consider another situation where the total bandwidth limit for a pipe is 400 bps. If the aim is to allocate this bandwidth amongst many destination IP addresses so that no single IP address can take more than 100 bps of bandwidth, the following steps are needed.

- Set the pipe limit, as usual, to be 400 bps.
- Set the **Grouping** option for the pipe to have the value *Destination IP*.
- Set the total for the pipe's **Group Limits** to be 100 bps.

Bandwidth is now allocated on a "first come, first forwarded" basis but no single destination IP address can ever take more than 100 bps. No matter how many connections are involved the combined total bandwidth can still not exceed the pipe limit of 400 bps.

Combining Pipe and Group Limit Precedence Values

Let us suppose that grouping is enabled by one of the options such as source IP and some values for precedences have been specified under **Group Limits**. How does these combine with values specified for the corresponding precedences in **Pipe Limits**?

In this case, the **Group Limits** precedence value is a guarantee and the **Pipe Limits** value for the same precedence is a limit. For example, if traffic is being grouped by source IP and the **Group Limits** precedence 5 value is 5 Kbps and the **Pipe Limits** precedence 5 value is 20 Kbps, then after the fourth unique source IP ($4 \times 5 = 20$ Kbps) the precedence limit is reached and the guarantees may no longer be met.

Dynamic Balancing

Instead of specifying a total for **Group Limits**, the alternative is to enable the *Dynamic Balancing* option. This ensures that the available bandwidth is divided equally between all addresses

regardless of how many there are. This is done up to the limit of the pipe.

If a total group limit of 100 bps is also specified with dynamic balancing, then this still means that no single user may take more than that amount of bandwidth.

Precedences and Dynamic Balancing

As discussed, in addition to specifying a total limit for a grouping, limits can be specified for each precedence within a grouping. If we specify a precedence 2 grouping limit of 30 bps then this means that users assigned a precedence of 2 by a pipe rule will be guaranteed 30 bps no matter how many users are using the pipe. Just as with normal pipe precedences, traffic in excess of 30 bps for users at precedence 2 is moved down to the best effort precedence.

Continuing with the previous example, we could limit how much guaranteed bandwidth each inside user gets for inbound SSH traffic. This prevents a single user from using up all available high-priority bandwidth.

First we group the users of the **ssh-in** pipe so limits will apply to each user on the internal network. Since the packets are inbound, we select the grouping for the **ssh-in** pipe to be *Destination IP*.

Now specify per-user limits by setting the precedence 2 limit to 16 kbps per user. This means that each user will get no more than a 16 kbps guarantee for their SSH traffic. If desired, we could also limit the group total bandwidth for each user to some value, such as 40 kbps.

There will be a problem if there are more than 5 users utilizing SSH simultaneously: 16 kbps times 5 is more than 64 kbps. The total limit for the pipe will still be in effect, and each user will have to compete for the available precedence 2 bandwidth the same way they have to compete for the lowest precedence bandwidth. Some users will still get their 16 kbps, some will not.

Dynamic balancing can be enabled to improve this situation by making sure all of the 5 users get the same amount of limited bandwidth. When the 5th user begins to generate SSH traffic, balancing lowers the limit per user to about 13 kbps (64 kbps divided by 5 users).

Dynamic Balancing takes place within each precedence of a pipe individually. This means that if users are allotted a certain small amount of high priority traffic, and a larger chunk of best-effort traffic, all users will get their share of the high-precedence traffic as well as their fair share of the best-effort traffic.

10.1.8. Traffic Shaping Recommendations

The Importance of a Pipe Limit

Traffic shaping only comes into effect when a CorePlus pipe is *full*. That is to say, it is passing as much traffic as the total limit allows. If a 500 kbps pipe is carrying 400 kbps of low priority traffic and 90 kbps of high priority traffic then there is 10 kbps of bandwidth left and there is no reason to throttle back anything. It is therefore important to specify a total limit for a pipe so that it knows what its capacity is and the precedence mechanism is totally dependent on this.

VPN Pipe Limits

Traffic shaping measures the traffic inside VPN tunnels. This is the raw unencrypted data without any protocol overhead so it will be less than the actual VPN traffic. VPN protocols such as IPsec can add significant overhead to the data and for this reason it is recommended that the limits specified in the traffic shaping pipes for VPN traffic are set at around 20% below the actual available bandwidth.

Relying on the Group Limit

A special case when a total pipe limit is not specified is when a group limit is used instead. The bandwidth limit is then placed on, for example, each user of a network where the users must share a fixed bandwidth resource. An ISP might use this approach to limit individual user bandwidth by specifying a "Per Destination IP" grouping. Knowing when the pipe is full is not important since the only constraint is on each user. If precedences were used the pipe maximum would have to be used.

Limits should not be more than the Available Bandwidth

If pipe limits are set higher than the available bandwidth, the pipe will not know when the physical connection has reached its capacity. If the connection is 500 kbps but the total pipe limit is set to 600 kbps, the pipe will believe that it is not full and it will not throttle lower precedences.

Limits should be less than Available Bandwidth

Pipe limits should be slightly below the network bandwidth. A recommended value is to make the pipe limit 95% of the physical limit. The need for this difference becomes less with increasing bandwidth since 5% represents an increasingly larger piece of the total.

The reason for the lower pipe limit is how CorePlus processes traffic. For outbound connections where packets leave the Clavister Security Gateway, there is always the possibility that CorePlus might slightly overload the connection because of the software delays involved in deciding to send packets and the packets actually being dispatched from buffers.

For inbound connections, there is less control over what is arriving and what has to be processed by the traffic shaping subsystem and it is therefore more important to set pipe limits slightly below the real connection limit to account for the time needed for CorePlus to adapt to changing conditions.

Attacks on Bandwidth

Traffic shaping cannot protect against incoming resource exhaustion attacks, such as DoS attacks or other flooding attacks. CorePlus will prevent these extraneous packets from reaching the hosts behind the Clavister Security Gateway, but cannot protect the connection becoming overloaded if an attack floods it.

Watching for Leaks

When setting out to protect and shape a network bottleneck, make sure that all traffic passing through that bottleneck passes through the defined CorePlus pipes.

If there is traffic going through your Internet connection that the pipes do not know about, they cannot know when the Internet connection is full.

The problems resulting from leaks are exactly the same as in the cases described above. Traffic "leaking" through without being measured by pipes will have the same effect as bandwidth consumed by parties outside of administrator control but sharing the same connection.

Troubleshooting

For a better understanding of what is happening in a live setup, the console command:

```
Device: /> pipe -u <pipename>
```

can be used to display a list of currently active users in each pipe.

10.1.9. A Summary of Traffic Shaping

CorePlus traffic shaping provides a sophisticated set of mechanisms for controlling and prioritising network packets. The following points summarize its use:

- Select the traffic to manage through *Pipe Rules*.
- Pipe Rules send traffic through *Pipes*.
- A pipe can have a limit which is the maximum amount of traffic allowed.
- A pipe can only know when it is *full* if a total limit for the pipe is specified.
- A single pipe should handle traffic in only one direction (although 2 way pipes are allowed).
- Pipes can be chained so that one pipe's traffic feeds into another pipe.
- Specific traffic types can be given a *priority* in a pipe.
- Priorities can be given a maximum limit which is also a guarantee. Traffic that exceeds this will be sent at the minimum precedence which is also called the *Best Effort* precedence.
- At the best effort precedence all packets are treated on a "first come, first forwarded" basis.
- Within a pipe, traffic can also be separated on a *Group* basis. For example, by source IP address. Each user in a group (for example, each source IP address) can be given a maximum limit and precedences within a group can be given a limit/guarantee.
- A pipe limit need not be specified if group members have a maximum limit.
- *Dynamic Balancing* can be used to specify that all users in a group get a fair and equal amount of bandwidth.

10.1.10. More Pipe Examples

This section looks at some more scenarios and how traffic shaping can be used to solve particular problems.

A Basic Scenario

The first scenario will examine the configuration shown in the image below, in which incoming and outgoing traffic is to be limited to 1 megabit per second.




Figure 10.7. A Basic Traffic Shaping Scenario

The reason for using 2 different pipes in this case, is that these are easier to match to the physical link capacity. This is especially true with asynchronous links such as ADSL.

First, two pipes called *in-pipe* and *out-pipe* need to be created with the following parameters:

Pipe Name	Min Prec	Def Prec	Max Prec	Grouping	Net size	Pipe limit
in-pipe	0	0	7	PerDestIP	24	1000kb
out-pipe	0	0	7	PerSrcIP	24	1000kb

Dynamic Balancing should be enabled for both pipes. Instead of *PerDestIP* and *PerSrcIP* we could have used *PerDestNet* and *PerSrcNet* if there were several networks on the inside.

The next step is to create the following Pipe Rule which will force traffic to flow through the pipes.

Rule Name	Forward Pipes	Return Pipes	Source Interface	Source Network	Destination Interface	Destination Network	Selected Service
all_1mbps	out-pipe	in-pipe	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	all

The rule will force all traffic to the default precedence level and the pipes will limit total traffic to their 1 Mbps limit. Having **Dynamic Balancing** enabled on the pipes means that all users will be allocated a fair share of this capacity.

Using Several Precedences

We now extend the above example by allocating priorities to different kinds of traffic accessing the Internet from a headquarters office.

Lets assume we have a symmetric 2/2 Mbps link to the Internet. We will allocate descending priorities and traffic requirements to the following users:

- **Priority 6** - VoIP (500 kpbs)
- **Priority 4** - Citrix (250 kpbs)
- **Priority 2** - Other traffic (1000 kpbs)
- **Priority 0** - Web plus remaining from other levels

To implement this scheme, we can use the *in-pipe* and *out-pipe*. We first enter the *Pipe Limits* for each pipe. These limits correspond to the list above and are:

- **Priority 6** - 500
- **Priority 4** - 250
- **Priority 2** - 1000

Now create the *Pipe Rules*:

Rule Name	Forward Pipes	Return Pipes	Source Interface	Source Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Selected Service	Precedence
web_surf	out-pipe	in-pipe	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	http_all	0
voip	out-pipe	in-pipe	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	H323	6
citrix	out-pipe	in-pipe	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	citrix	4
other	out-pipe	in-pipe	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	All	2

These rules are processed from top to bottom and force different kinds of traffic into precedences based on the *Service*. Customized service objects may need to be first created in order to identify particular types of traffic. The *all* service at the end, catches anything that falls through from earlier rules since it is important that no traffic bypasses the pipe rule set otherwise using pipes will not work.

Pipe Chaining

Suppose the requirement now is to limit the precedence 2 capacity (other traffic) to 1000 kbps so that it does not spill over into precedence 0. This is done with *pipe chaining* where we create new pipes called *in-other* and *out-other* both with a *Pipe Limit* of 1000. The *other* pipe rule is then modified to use these:

Rule Name	Forward Pipes	Return Pipes	Source Interface	Source Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Selected Service	Precedence
other	out-other out-pipe	in-other in-pipe	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	All	2

Note that *in-other* and *out-other* are first in the pipe chain in both directions. This is because we want to limit the traffic immediately, before it enters the *in-pipe* and *out-pipe* and competes with VoIP, Citrix and Web-surfing traffic.

A VPN Scenario

In the cases discussed so far, all traffic shaping is occurring inside a single Clavister Security Gateway. VPN is typically used for communication between a headquarters and branch offices in which case pipes can control traffic flow in both directions. With VPN it is the tunnel which is the source and destination interface for the pipe rules.

An important consideration which has been discussed previously, is allowance in the *Pipe Total* values for the overhead used by VPN protocols. As a rule of thumb, a pipe total of 1700 bps is reasonable for a VPN tunnel where the underlying physical connection capacity is 2 Mbps.

It is also important to remember to insert into the pipe all non-VPN traffic using the same physical link.

The *pipe chaining* can be used as a solution to the problem of VPN overhead. A limit which allows for this overhead is placed on the VPN tunnel traffic and non-VPN traffic is inserted into a pipe that matches the speed of the physical link.

To do this we first create separate pipes for the outgoing traffic and the incoming traffic. VoIP traffic will be sent over a VPN tunnel that will have a high priority. All other traffic will be sent at the *best effort* priority (see above for an explanation of this term). Again, we will assume a 2/2 Mbps symmetric link.

The pipes required will be:

- **vpn-in**
 - *Priority 6*: VoIP 500 kbps
 - *Priority 0*: Best effort

Total: 1700
- **vpn-out**
 - *Priority 6*: VoIP 500 kbps
 - *Priority 0*: Best effort

Total: 1700
- **in-pipe**
 - *Priority 6*: VoIP 500 kbps

Total: 2000
- **out-pipe**
 - *Priority 6*: VoIP 500 kbps

Total: 2000

The following pipe rules are then needed to force traffic into the correct pipes and precedence levels:

Rule Name	Forward Pipes	Return Pipes	Src Int	Source Network	Dest Int	Destination Network	Selected Service	Precedence
vpn_voip_out	vpn-out out-pipe	vpn-in in-pipe	lan	lannet	vpn	vpn_remote_net	H323	6
vpn_out	vpn-out out-pipe	vpn-in in-pipe	lan	lannet	vpn	vpn_remote_net	All	0
vpn_voip_in	vpn-in in-pipe	vpn-out out-pipe	vpn	vpn_remote_net	lan	lannet	H323	6
vpn_in	vpn-in in-pipe	vpn-out out-pipe	vpn	vpn_remote_net	lan	lannet	All	0
out	out-pipe	in-pipe	lan	lannet	wan	all-nets	All	0

Rule Name	Forward Pipes	Return Pipes	Src Int	Source Network	Dest Int	Destination Network	Selected Service	Precedence
in	in-pipe	out-pipe	wan	all-nets	lan	lannet	All	0

With this setup, all VPN traffic is limited to 1700 kbps, the total traffic is limited to 2000 kbps and VoIP to the remote site is guaranteed 500 kbps of capacity before it is forced to best effort.

SAT with Pipes

If SAT is being used, for example with a web server or ftp server, that traffic also needs to be forced into pipes or it will escape traffic shaping and ruin the planned quality of service. In addition, server traffic is initiated from the outside so the order of pipes needs to be reversed: the forward pipe is the *in-pipe* and the return pipe is the *out-pipe*.

A simple solution is to put a "catch-all-inbound" rule at the bottom of the pipe rule. However, the external interface (*wan*) should be the source interface to avoid putting into pipes traffic that is coming from the inside and going to the external IP address. This last rule will therefore be:

Rule Name	Forward Pipes	Return Pipes	Source Interface	Source Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network	Selected Service	Precedence
all-in	in-pipe	out-pipe	wan	all-nets	core	all-nets	All	0



Note: SAT and ARPed IP Addresses

*If the SAT is from an ARPed IP address, the **wan** interface needs to be the destination.*

10.2. IDP Traffic Shaping

10.2.1. Overview

The *IDP Traffic Shaping* feature is traffic shaping that is performed based on information coming from the CorePlus *Intrusion Detection and Prevention* (IDP) subsystem (for more information on IDP see Section 6.5, "Intrusion Detection and Prevention").

Application Related Bandwidth Usage

A typical problem that can be solved with IDP Traffic Shaping is dealing with the traffic management issues caused by bandwidth hungry applications. A typical example of this is traffic related to peer-to-peer (P2P) data transfer applications which include such things as *Bit Torrent* and *Direct Connect*.

The high traffic loads created by P2P transfers can often have a negative impact on the quality of service for other network users as bandwidth is quickly absorbed by such applications. An ISP or a corporate network administrator may therefore need to identify and control the bandwidth consumed by these applications and IDP Traffic Shaping can provide this ability.

Combining IDP and Traffic Shaping

One of the issues with controlling a traffic type such as P2P is to be able to distinguish it from other traffic. The signature database of CorePlus IDP already provides a highly effective means to perform this recognition and as an extension to this, CorePlus also provides the ability to apply throttling through the CorePlus traffic shaping subsystem when the targeted traffic is recognized.

IDP Traffic Shaping is a combination of these two features, where traffic flows identified by the IDP subsystem automatically trigger the setting up of traffic shaping pipes to control those flows.

10.2.2. Setting Up IDP Traffic Shaping

The steps for IDP Traffic Shaping setup are as follows:

1. **Define an IDP rule that triggers on targeted traffic.**

The IDP signature chosen determines which traffic is to be targeted and the signature usually has the word "*POLICY*" in its name which indicates it relates to specific applications types.

2. **Select the rule's action to be the *Pipe* option.**

This specifies that IDP Traffic Shaping is to be performed on the connection that triggers the rule and on subsequent, related connections.

3. **Select a *Bandwidth* value for the rule.**

This is the total bandwidth that will be allowed for the targeted traffic. The traffic measured is the combination of the flow over the triggering connection plus the flow from any associated connections, regardless of flow direction.

Connections opened before IDP triggered will not be subject to any restriction.

4. **Optionally enter a *Time Window* in seconds.**

This will be the period of time after rule triggering during which traffic shaping is applied to any associated connections that are opened.

Typically, a P2P transfer starts with an initial connection to allow transfer of control information followed by a number of data transfer connections to other hosts.

It is the initial connection that IDP detects and the *Time Window* specifies the expected period afterwards when other connections will be opened and subject to traffic shaping. Connections opened after the *Time Window* has expired will no longer be subject to traffic shaping.

A *Time Window* value of 0 means that only traffic flowing over the initial triggering connection will be subject to traffic shaping. Any associated connections that do not trigger an IDP rule will not be subject to traffic shaping.

5. **Optionally specify a Network**

If the *Time Window* value is greater than zero, a *Network* can be specified. This IP address range allows the administrator to further refine the subsequent connections associated with IDP rule triggering that will be subject to traffic shaping. At least one side of associated connection has to be in the IP range specified for it to be included in traffic shaping.

10.2.3. Processing Flow

To better understand how IDP Traffic Shaping is applied, the following are the processing steps that occur:

1. A new connection is opened by one host to another through the Clavister Security Gateway and traffic begins to flow. The source and destination IP address of the connection is noted by CorePlus.
2. The traffic flowing on the connection triggers an IDP rule. The IDP rule has *Pipe* as action so the traffic on the connection is now subject to the pipe traffic shaping bandwidth specified in the IDP rule.
3. A new connection is then established that does not trigger an IDP rule but has a source or destination IP that is the same as the connection that did trigger a rule. If the source or destination is also a member of the IP range specified as the *Network*, then the connection's traffic is included in the pipe performing traffic shaping for the original triggering connection.

If no *Network* is specified then this new connection is also included in the triggering connection's pipe traffic if source or destination match.

10.2.4. The Importance of Specifying a Network

Either Side Can Trigger IDP

After reading through the processing flow description above, it can be better understood why specifying a *Network* is important. The IDP subsystem cannot know which side of a connection is causing a rule to trigger. Sometimes it is the initiating client side and sometimes the responding server. If traffic flow on both sides becomes restricted, this may have the unintended consequence of traffic shaping connections that should not be traffic shaped.

Unintended Consequences

To explain this unintended traffic shaping, consider a client **A** that connects to host **X** with P2P traffic and triggers an IDP rule with the *Pipe* action so the connection becomes subject to traffic shaping. Now, if another client **B** also connects to host **X** but this time with web surfing traffic, an IDP rule is not triggered but the connection should not be traffic shaped along with client **A**'s connection just because host **X** is involved.

Excluding Hosts

To avoid these unintended consequences, we specify the IP addresses of client **A** and client **B** in the *Network* range but not host **X**. This tells CorePlus that host **X** is not relevant in making a decision about including new non-IDP-triggering connections in traffic shaping.

It may seem counter-intuitive that client **B** is also included in the *Network* range but this is done on the assumption that client **B** is a user whose traffic might also have to be traffic shaped if they become involved in a P2P transfer.

If *Network* is not specified then any connection involving either client **A** or host **X** will be subject to traffic shaping and this is probably not desirable.

10.2.5. A P2P Scenario

The schematic below illustrates a typical scenario involving P2P data transfer. The sequence of events is:

- The client with IP address *192.168.1.15* initiates a P2P file transfer through a connection (**1**) to the tracking server at *81.150.0.10*.
- This connection triggers an IDP rule in CorePlus which is set up with an IDP signature that targets the P2P application.
- The *Pipe* action in the rule sets up a traffic shaping pipe with a specified capacity and the connection is added to it.
- A subsequent connection (**2**) to the file host at *92.92.92.92* occurs within the IDP rule's *Time Window* and its traffic is therefore added to the pipe and is subject to shaping.
- The client network to which *192.168.1.15* belongs, should ideally be included in the *Network* address range for the IDP rule.




Figure 10.8. IDP Traffic Shaping P2P Scenario

10.2.6. Viewing Traffic Shaping Objects

Viewing Hosts

IDP traffic shaping has a special CLI command associated with it called *idppipes* and this can examine and manipulate the hosts which are currently subject to traffic shaping.

To display all hosts being traffic shaped by IDP Traffic Shaping, the command would be:

```
Device:/> idppipes -show
Host      kbps  Tmout
-----
192.168.1.1  100  58
```

A host, in this case with IP address *192.168.1.1*, can be removed from traffic shaping using the command:

```
Device:/> idppipes -unpipe -host=192.168.1.1
```

A full description of the *idppipes* command can be found in the separate *CLI Reference Guide*.

Viewing Pipes

IDP Traffic Shaping makes use of normal CorePlus pipe objects which are created automatically. These pipes are always allocated the highest priority and use the *Group* feature to throttle traffic.

The created pipes are, however, hidden from the administrator when examining the currently defined traffic shaping objects with the Web Interface, but they can be examined and manipulated using the normal CLI *pipes* command. For example, to show all currently defined pipes, the CLI command is:

```
Device: /> pipes -show
```

The IDP Traffic Shaping pipes can be recognized by their distinctive naming convention which is explained next.

Pipe Naming

CorePlus names the pipes it automatically creates in IDP Traffic Shaping using the pattern *IDPPipe_<bandwidth>* for pipes with upstream (forward) flowing traffic and *IDPPipe_<bandwidth>R* for pipes with downstream (return) flowing traffic. A number suffix is appended if name duplication occurs.

For example, the first pipes created with a limit of 1000 kbps will be called *IDPPipe_1000* for upstream traffic and *IDPPipe_1000R* for downstream traffic. Duplicates with the same limit would get the names *IDPPipe_1000_(2)* and *IDPPipe_1000R_(2)*. If another set of duplicates occur, the suffix (3) is used.

Pipes are Shared

There is not a 1 to 1 relationship between a configured IDP action and the pipes created. Two pipes are created per configured bandwidth value, one for upstream (forward) traffic and one for downstream (return) traffic. Multiple hosts use the same pipe for each direction with traffic in the upstream pipe grouped using the "Per Source IP" feature and traffic in the downstream pipe grouped using the "Per Destination IP" feature.

10.2.7. Guaranteeing Instead of Limiting Bandwidth

If desired, IDP Traffic Shaping can be used to do the opposite of limiting bandwidth for certain applications.

If the administrator wants to guarantee a bandwidth level, say 10 Megabits, for an application then an IDP rule can be set up to trigger for that application with the *Pipe* action specifying the bandwidth required. The traffic shaping pipes that are then automatically created get the highest priority by default and are therefore guaranteed that bandwidth.

10.2.8. Logging

IDP Traffic Shaping generates log messages on the following events:

- When an IDP rule with the *Pipe* option has triggered and either host or client is present in the *Network* range.
- When the subsystem adds a host that will have future connections blocked.
- When a timer for piping news connections expires, a log message is generated indicating that new connections to or from the host are no longer piped.

There are also some other log messages which indicate less common conditions. All log messages are documented in the *Log Reference Guide*.

10.3. Threshold Rules

10.3.1. Overview

The objective of a *Threshold Rule* is to have a means of detecting abnormal connection activity as well as reacting to it. An example of a cause for such abnormal activity might be an internal host becoming infected with a virus that is making repeated connections to external IP addresses. It might alternatively be some external source trying to open excessive numbers of connections. (A "connection" in this context refers to all types of connections, such as TCP, UDP or ICMP, tracked by the CorePlus state-engine).

Threshold Policies

A Threshold Rule is like other policy based rules found in CorePlus, a combination of source/destination network/interface can be specified for a rule and a type of service such as HTTP can be associated with it. Each rule can have associated with it one or more **Actions** which specify how to handle different threshold conditions.

A Threshold Rule has the following parameters associated with it:

- **Action**

This is the response of the rule when the limit is exceeded. Either the option **Audit** or **Protect** can be selected.

- **Group By**

The rule can be either **Host** or **Network** based.

- **Threshold**

This is the numerical limit which must be exceeded for the action to be triggered.

- **Threshold Type**

The rule can be specified to either limit the number of connections per second or limit the total number of concurrent connections.

These parameters are described below:

10.3.2. Limiting the Connection Rate/Total Connections

Limiting the Connection Rate

Connection Rate Limiting allows an administrator to put a limit on the number of new connections being opened to the Clavister Security Gateway per second.

Limiting the Total Connections

Total Connection Limiting allows the administrator to put a limit on the total number of connections opened to the Clavister Security Gateway.

This function is extremely useful when NAT pools are required due to the large number of connections generated by P2P users.

10.3.3. Grouping

The two groupings are as follows:

- **Host Based** - The threshold is applied separately to connections from different IP addresses.
- **Network Based** - The threshold is applied to all connections matching the rules as a group.

10.3.4. Rule Actions

When a Threshold Rule is triggered one of two responses are possible:

- **Audit** - Leave the connection intact but log the event.
- **Protect** - Drop the triggering connection.

Logging would be the preferred option if the appropriate triggering value cannot be determined beforehand. Multiple Actions for a given rule might consist of *Audit* for a given threshold while the action might become *Protect* for a higher threshold.

10.3.5. Multiple Triggered Actions

When a rule is triggered then CorePlus will perform the associated rule Actions that match the condition that has occurred. If more than one Action matches the condition then those matching Actions are applied in the order they appear in the user interface.

If several Actions that have the same combination of **Type** and **Grouping** (see above for the definition of these terms) are triggered at the same time, only the Action with the highest threshold value will be logged.

10.3.6. Exempted Connections

It should be noted that some advanced settings, known as *Before Rules* settings, can exempt certain types of connections for remote management from examination by the CorePlus IP rule set if they are enabled. These *Before Rules* settings will also exempt the connections from Threshold Rules if they are enabled.

10.3.7. Threshold Rule Blacklisting

If the *Protect* option is used, Threshold Rules can be configured so that the source that triggered the rule, is added automatically to a *Blacklist* of IP addresses or networks. If several *Protect* Actions with blacklisting enabled are triggered at the same time, only the first triggered blacklisting Action will be executed by CorePlus.

A host based Action with blacklisting enabled will blacklist a single host when triggered. A network based action with blacklisting enabled will blacklist the source network associated with the rule. If the Threshold Rule is linked to a service then it is possible to block only that service.

When Blacklisting is selected, the administrator can choose to leave pre-existing connections from the triggering source unaffected, or can alternatively choose to have the connections dropped by CorePlus.

The length of time, in seconds, for which the source is blacklisted can also be set.

This feature is discussed further in *Section 6.7, "Blacklisting Hosts and Networks"*.

10.4. Server Load Balancing

10.4.1. Overview

The *Server Load Balancing* (SLB) feature allows the administrator to spread client application requests over a number of servers through the use of IP rules with an *Action* of *SLB_SAT*.

SLB is a powerful tool that can improve the following aspects of network applications:

- Performance
- Scalability
- Reliability
- Ease of administration

The principle SLB benefit of sharing the load across multiple servers can improve not just the performance of applications but also scalability by facilitating the implementation of a cluster of servers (sometimes referred to as a *server farm*) that can handle many more requests than a single server.

The illustration below shows a typical SLB scenario, with Internet access to internal server applications by external clients being managed by a Clavister Security Gateway.




Figure 10.9. A Server Load Balancing Configuration

Additional Benefits of SLB

Besides improving performance and scalability, SLB provides other benefits:

- SLB increases the reliability of network applications by actively monitoring the servers sharing the load. CorePlus SLB can detect when a server fails or becomes congested and will not direct any further requests to that server until it recovers or has less load.

- SLB can allow network administrators to perform maintenance tasks on servers or applications without disrupting services. Individual servers can be restarted, upgraded, removed, or replaced, and new servers and applications can be added or moved without affecting the rest of a server farm, or taking down applications.
- The combination of network monitoring and distributed load sharing also provides an extra level of protection against *Denial Of Service* (DoS) attacks.

SLB Deployment Considerations

The following issues should be considered when deploying SLB:

- Across which servers is the load is to be balanced.
- Which SLB algorithm will be used.
- Will "stickiness" be used.
- Which monitoring method will be used.

Each of these topics is discussed further in the sections that follow.

Identifying the Servers

An important first step in SLB deployment is to identify the servers across which the load is to be balanced. This might be a *server farm* which is a cluster of servers set up to work as a single "virtual server". The servers that are to be treated as a single virtual server by SLB must be specified.

10.4.2. SLB Distribution Algorithms

There are several ways to determine how a load is shared across a set of servers. CorePlus SLB supports the following two algorithms for load distribution:

Round-robin The algorithm distributes new incoming connections to a list of servers on a rotating basis. For the first connection, the algorithm picks a server randomly, and assigns the connection to it. For subsequent connections, the algorithm cycles through the server list and redirects the load to servers in order. Regardless of each server's capability and other aspects, for instance, the number of existing connections on a server or its response time, all the available servers take turns in being assigned the next connection.

This algorithm ensures that all servers receive an equal number of requests, therefore it is most suited to server farms where all servers have an equal capacity and the processing loads of all requests are likely to be similar.

Connection-rate This algorithm considers the number of requests that each server has been receiving over a certain time period. This time period is known as the *Window Time*. SLB sends the next request to the server that has received the least number of connections during the last *Window Time* number of seconds.

The *Window Time* is a setting that the administrator can change. The default value is 10 seconds.

10.4.3. Selecting Stickiness

In some scenarios, such as with SSL connections, it is important that the same server is used for a series of connections from the same client. This is achieved by selecting the appropriate *stickiness* option and this can be used with either the round-robin or connection-rate algorithms. The stickiness options are as follows:

Per-state Distribution

This mode is the default and means that no stickiness is applied. Every new connection is considered to be independent from other connections even if they come from the same IP address or network. Consecutive connections from the same client may therefore be passed to different servers.

This may not be acceptable if the same server must be used for a series of connections coming from the same client. If this is the case then stickiness is required.

IP Address Stickiness

In this mode, a series of connections from a specific client will be handled by the same server. This is particularly important for TLS or SSL based services such as *HTTPS*, which require a repeated connection to the same host.

Network Stickiness

This mode is similar to IP stickiness except that the stickiness can be associated with a network instead of a single IP address. The network is specified by stating its size as a parameter.

For example, if the network size is specified as 24 (the default) then an IP address *10.01.01.02* will be assumed to belong to the network *10.01.01.00/24* and this will be the network for which stickiness is applied.

Stickiness Parameters

If either IP stickiness or network stickiness is enabled then the following stickiness parameters can be adjusted:

- **Idle Timeout**

When a connection is made, the source IP address for the connection is remembered in a table. Each table entry is referred to as a *slot*. After it is created, the entry is only considered valid for the number of seconds specified by the *Idle Timeout*. When new connection is made, the table is searched for the same source IP, providing that the table entry has not exceeded its timeout. When a match is found, then stickiness ensures that the new connection goes to the same server as previous connections from the same source IP.

The default value for this setting is 10 seconds.

- **Max Slots**

This parameter specifies how many slots exist in the stickiness table. When the table fills up then the oldest entry is discarded to make way for a new entry even though it may be still valid (the *Idle Timeout* has not been exceeded).

The consequence of a full table can be that stickiness will be lost for any discarded source IP addresses. The administrator should therefore try to ensure that the *Max Slots* parameter is set to a value that can accommodate the expected number of connections that require stickiness.

The default value for this setting is 2048 slots in the table.

- **Net Size**

The processing and memory resources required to match individual IP addresses when implementing stickiness can be significant. By selecting the *Network Stickiness* option these resource demands can be reduced.

When the *Network Stickiness* option is selected, the *Net Size* parameter specifies the size of the network which should be associated with the source IP of new connections. A stickiness table lookup does not then compare individual IP addresses but instead compares if the source IP address belongs to the same network as a previous connection already in the table. If they belong to the same network then stickiness to the same server will result.

The default value for this setting is a network size of 24.

10.4.4. SLB Algorithms and Stickiness

This section discusses further how stickiness functions with the different SLB algorithms.

An example scenario is illustrated in the figure below. In this example, the Clavister Security Gateway is responsible for balancing connections from 3 clients with different addresses to 2 servers. Stickiness is enabled.




Figure 10.10. Connections from Three Clients

When the round-robin algorithm is used, the first arriving requests *R1* and *R2* from *Client 1* are both assigned to one sever, say *Server 1*, according to stickiness. The next request *R3* from *Client 2* is then routed to *Server 2*. When *R4* from *Client 3* arrives, *Server 1* gets back its turn again and will be assigned with *R4*.




Figure 10.11. Stickiness and Round-Robin

If the connection-rate algorithm is applied instead, *R1* and *R2* will be sent to the same server because of stickiness, but the subsequent requests *R3* and *R4* will be routed to another server since the number of new connections on each server within the Window Time span is counted in for the distribution.




Figure 10.12. Stickiness and Connection-rate

Regardless which algorithm is chosen, if a server goes down, traffic will be sent to other servers. And when the server comes back online, it can automatically be placed back into the server farm and start getting requests again.

10.4.5. SLB Server Monitoring

SLB Server Monitoring can be used to continuously check the status of the servers in an SLB configuration. If monitoring is enabled and a server goes offline, CorePlus will not open any new connections to that server until monitoring indicates that the server is online again.

The SLB Monitoring feature is similar in concept to the *host monitoring* feature used for the CorePlus *Route Failover* feature and which is described in *Section 4.2.4, "Host Monitoring for Route Failover"*. However, there are important differences.

Enabling Server Monitoring

Server monitoring is enabled on a per SLB rule basis with the list of servers to be monitored and their IP addresses being already defined in each SLB rule.

Monitoring is turned on for an SLB rule by enabling polling through any one or any combination of the three methods described below. A routing table is also specified for monitoring, with *main* as the default, and this is the table used by polling to look up the server IP addresses. (This means

that the routing table chosen must necessarily contain routes for all the servers in the SLB rule.)

Monitoring Methods

The method by which hosts are polled can be any combination of:

- **ICMP**

An ICMP "Ping" message is sent to the server.

- **TCP**

A TCP connection is established to and then disconnected from the server.

- **HTTP**

An HTTP request is sent using a specified URL. Two extra pieces of data must be specified for HTTP polling:

1. **Request URL**

The URL which is to be requested from all servers.

This must be specified to be either a *FQDN* or a *Relative path*. An example FQDN is *http://www.mydomain.com/path/file.txt* and an example relative path is */path/file.txt*.

If a relative path is specified then the path is concatenated to the IP address of the server. For example, if the server IP is *10.12.14.01* then the relative path */path/file.txt* would become *http://10.12.14.01/path/file.txt* for the polling.

An FQDN must be used, however, when polling a server that is host to many virtual servers.

2. **Expected Response**

A text string which is the beginning (or complete) text of a valid response. If no text is specified, any response from the server will be considered valid.

Testing for a specific response text provides the possibility of testing if an application is offline. If, for a instance, a web page response from a server can indicate if a specific database is operational with text such as "*Database OK*", then the absence of that response can indicate that the server is operational but the application is offline.

Monitoring with HTTP assumes that the URL entered is valid for all the servers in the SLB rule so no DNS lookup needs to be done. An HTTP *GET* request is therefore sent straight to the IP address of the server. (This differs from route failover host monitoring, where HTTP URLs are resolved with a DNS lookup.)

All Server Polling Must Succeed

The polling methods configured for an SLB rule are all used on all the servers in the rule. If one configured polling method fails but another succeeds on the same server, that server is considered to be offline. In other words, all configured polling methods need to succeed on a server for that server to be considered operational.

Polling Options

For each polling method specified, there are a number of property parameters that should be set:

- **Ports**

The port number for polling when using the **TCP** or **HTTP** option.

More than one port number can be specified in which case all ports will be polled and all ports must respond for the server to be considered online. Up to 16 port numbers may be specified as a comma separated list for each polling method.

- **Interval**

The interval in milliseconds between polling attempts. The default setting is 10,000 and the minimum value allowed is 100 ms.

- **Samples**

The number of polling attempts used as a sample size for calculating the *Percentage Loss* and the *Average Latency*. The default setting is 10 and the minimum value allowed is 1.

- **Maximum Poll Failed**

The maximum permissible number of failed polling attempts. If this number is exceeded then the server is considered offline.

- **Max Average Latency**

The maximum number of milliseconds allowable between a poll request and the response. If this threshold is exceeded then the server is considered offline.

Average Latency is calculated by averaging the response times from the server for *Samples* number of polls. If a polling attempt receives no response then it is not included in the averaging calculation.

10.4.6. Setting Up *SLB_SAT* Rules

The key component in setting up SLB are IP rules that have *SLB_SAT* as the action. The steps that should be followed for setting up such rules are:

1. Define an IP address object for each server for which SLB is to be enabled.
2. Define an IP address group object which includes all these individual objects.
3. Define an *SLB_SAT* rule in the IP rule set which refers to this IP address group and where all other SLB parameters are defined.
4. Define a further rule that duplicates the source/destination interface/network of the *SLB_SAT* rule that permits the traffic through. This could be one rule or a combination of rules using the actions:
 - Allow
 - NAT



Note: FwdFast rules should not be used with SLB

In order to function, SLB requires that the CorePlus state engine keeps track of connections. FwdFast IP rules should not be used with SLB since packets that are forwarded by these rules are under state engine control.

The table below shows the rules that would be defined for a typical scenario of a set of web servers behind the Clavister Security Gateway for which the load is being balanced. The *Allow* rule allows external clients to access the web servers.

Rule Name	Rule Type	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
WEB_SLB	SLB_SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_ext
WEB_SLB_ALW	Allow	any	all-nets	core	ip_ext

If there are clients on the same network as the web servers that also need access to those web servers then a *NAT* rule would also be used:

Rule Name	Rule Type	Src Interface	Src Network	Dest Interface	Dest Network
WEB_SLB	SLB_SAT	any	all-nets	core	ip_ext
WEB_SLB_NAT	NAT	lan	lannet	core	ip_ext
WEB_SLB_ALW	Allow	any	all-nets	core	ip_ext

Note that the destination interface is specified as **core**, meaning CorePlus itself deals with this. The key advantage of having a separate *Allow* rule is that the web servers can log the exact IP address that is generating external requests. Using only a *NAT* rule, which is possible, means that web servers would see only the IP address of the Clavister Security Gateway.

Example 10.3. Setting up SLB

In this example server load balancing is to be done between 2 HTTP web servers which are situated behind the Clavister Security Gateway. The 2 web servers have the private IP addresses *192.168.1.10* and *192.168.1.11* respectively. The default SLB values for monitoring, distribution method and stickiness are used.

A *NAT* rule is used in conjunction with the *SLB_SAT* rule so that clients behind the gateway can access the web servers. An *Allow* rule is used to allow access by external clients.

InControl

Follow the same steps used for the Web Interface below.

Web Interface

A. Create an Object for each of the web servers:

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP Address**
2. Enter a suitable name, for example *server1*
3. Enter the **IP Address** as *192.168.1.10*
4. Click **OK**
5. Repeat the above to create an object called *server2* for the *192.168.1.11* IP address

B. Create a Group which contains the 2 web server objects:

1. Go to **Objects > Address Book > Add > IP4 Group**
2. Enter a suitable name, for example *server_group*

3. Add *server1* and *server2* to the group
 4. Click **OK**
- C. Specify the **SLB_SAT** IP rule:
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rule Sets > main > Add > IP Rule**
 2. Enter:
 - **Name:** Web_SLB
 - **Action:** SLB_SAT
 - **Service:** HTTP
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** ip_ext
 3. Select tab **SAT SLB**
 4. Under **Server Addresses** add *server_group* to **Selected**
 5. Click **OK**
- D. Specify a matching **NAT** IP rule for internal clients:
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rule Sets > main > Add > IP Rule**
 2. Enter:
 - **Name:** Web_SLB_NAT
 - **Action:** NAT
 - **Service:** HTTP
 - **Source Interface:** lan
 - **Source Network:** lannet
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** ip_ext
 3. Click **OK**
- E. Specify an *Allow* IP rule for the external clients:
1. Go to **Rules > IP Rule Sets > main > Add > IP Rule**
 2. Enter:
 - **Name:** Web_SLB_ALW

- **Action:** Allow
 - **Service:** HTTP
 - **Source Interface:** any
 - **Source Network:** all-nets
 - **Destination Interface:** core
 - **Destination Network:** ip_ext
3. Click **OK**

Chapter 11: High Availability

This chapter describes the high availability fault-tolerance feature in Clavister Security Gateways.

- Overview, page 561
- HA Mechanisms, page 564
- Setting Up HA, page 567
- HA Issues, page 573
- Upgrading an HA Cluster, page 575
- Link Monitoring and HA, page 577
- HA Advanced Settings, page 578

11.1. Overview

HA Clusters

CorePlus *High Availability* (HA) provides a fault tolerant capability to Clavister Security Gateway installations. HA works by adding a back-up *slave* Clavister Security Gateway to an existing *master* security gateway. The master and slave are connected together and make up a logical *HA Cluster*. One of the units in a cluster will be *active* when the other unit is *inactive* and on standby.

Initially, the cluster slave will be inactive and will only monitor the activity of the master. If the slave detects that the master has become inoperative, an *HA failover* takes place and the slave becomes active, assuming processing responsibility for all traffic. If the master later becomes operative again, the slave will continue to be active but the master will now monitor the slave with failover only taking place if the slave fails. This is sometimes known as an *active-passive* implementation of fault tolerance.

The *Master* and *Active* Units

When reading this section on HA, it should be kept in mind that the *master* unit in a cluster is not always the same as the *active* unit in a cluster.

The *active* unit is the Clavister Security Gateway that is actually processing all traffic at a given point in time. This could be the *slave* unit if a failover has occurred because the *master* is no

longer operational.

Interconnection of Cluster Units

In a cluster, the master and slave units must be directly connected to each other by a synchronization connection which is known to CorePlus as the *sync* interface. One of the normal interfaces on the master and the slave are dedicated for this purpose and are connected together with a crossover cable.

Special packets, known as *heartbeats*, are continually sent by CorePlus across the *sync* interface and all other interfaces from one unit to the other. These packets allow the health of both units to be monitored. Heartbeat packets are sent in both directions so that the passive unit knows about the health of the active unit and the active unit knows about the health of the passive.

The heartbeat mechanism is discussed below in more depth in *Section 11.2, "HA Mechanisms"*.

Cluster Management

An HA Cluster of two Clavister Security Gateways is managed as a single unit with a unique cluster name which appears in the management interface as a single logical Clavister Security Gateway. Administration operations such as changing rules in the IP rule set are carried out as normal with the changes automatically being made to the configurations of both the master and the slave.

Load-sharing

Clavister HA clusters do not provide load-sharing since only one unit will be active while the other is inactive and only two Clavister Security Gateways, the master and the slave, can exist in a single cluster. The only processing role that the inactive unit plays is to replicate the state of the active unit and to take over all traffic processing if it detects the active unit is not responding.

Hardware Duplication

Clavister HA will only operate between two Clavister Security Gateways. As the internal operation of different security gateway manufacturer's software is completely dissimilar, there is no common method available to communicating state information to a dissimilar device.

It is also strongly recommended that the Clavister Security Gateways used in cluster have identical configurations. They must also have identical licenses which allow identical capabilities including the ability to run in an HA cluster.

Extending Redundancy

Implementing an HA Cluster will eliminate one of the points of failure in a network. Routers, switches and Internet connections can remain as potential points of failure and redundancy for these should also be considered.

Protecting Against Network Failures Using HA and Link Monitor

The CorePlus *Link Monitor* feature can be used to check connection with a host so that when it is no longer reachable an HA failover is initiated to a peer which has a different connection to the host. This technique is a useful extension to normal HA usage which provides protection against network failures between a single Clavister Security Gateway and hosts. This technique is described further in *Section 2.4.2, "The Link Monitor"*.

Licensing

HA requires that the CorePlus licenses in both the master and slave units have their HA parameter set to enabled. HA will **not** function at all if either or both units in a cluster are operating in the 2 hour demonstration mode. CorePlus enters demonstration mode automatically if no valid license at all is present.

11.2. HA Mechanisms

This section discusses in more depth the mechanisms CorePlus uses to implement the high availability feature.

Basic Principles

Clavister HA provides a redundant, state-synchronized hardware configuration. The state of the active unit, such as the connection table and other vital information, is continuously copied to the inactive unit via the *sync* interface. When cluster failover occurs, the inactive unit knows which connections are active, and traffic can continue to flow after the failover with negligible disruption.

The inactive system detects that the active system is no longer operational when it no longer detects sufficient *Cluster Heartbeats*. Heartbeats are sent over the *sync* interface as well as all other interfaces.

Heartbeat Frequency

CorePlus sends 5 heartbeats per second from the active system and when three heartbeats are missed (that is to say, after 0.6 seconds) a failover will be initiated. By sending heartbeats over all interfaces, the inactive unit gets an overall view of the active unit's health. Even if *sync* is deliberately disconnected, failover may not result if the inactive unit receives enough heartbeats from other interfaces via a shared switch, however the *sync* interface sends twice as many heartbeats as any of the normal interfaces.

Heartbeats are not sent at smaller intervals because such delays may occur during normal operation. An operation, for example opening a file, could result in delays long enough to cause the inactive system to go active, even though the other is still active.

Disabling Heartbeat Sending on Interfaces

The administrator can manually disable heartbeat sending on any interface if that is desired. This is **not** recommended since the fewer interfaces that send heartbeats, the higher the risk that not enough heartbeats are received to correctly indicate system health.

The exception to this recommendation is if an interface is not used at all. In this case, it can be advantageous to disable heartbeat sending on that interface. The reason for this is that CorePlus would otherwise send heartbeats on the disabled interface and this can contribute to a false picture of system health since these heartbeats are always lost. A "false" failover could therefore be the result.

Heartbeat Characteristics

Cluster heartbeats have the following characteristics:

- The source IP is the interface address of the sending security gateway.
- The destination IP is the broadcast address on the sending interface.
- The IP TTL is always 255. If CorePlus receives a cluster heartbeat with any other TTL, it is assumed that the packet has traversed a router and therefore cannot be trusted.
- It is a UDP packet, sent from port 999, to port 999.
- The destination MAC address is the Ethernet multicast address corresponding to the shared

hardware address. In other words, *11-00-00-C1-4A-nn*. Link-level multicasts are used over normal unicast packets for security: using unicast packets would mean that a local attacker could fool switches to route heartbeats somewhere else so the inactive system never receives them.

Failover Time

The time for failover is typically about one second which means that clients may experience a failover as a slight burst of packet loss. In the case of TCP, the failover time is well within the range of normal retransmit timeouts so TCP will retransmit the lost packets within a very short space of time, and continue communication. UDP does not allow retransmission since it is inherently an unreliable protocol.

Shared IP Addresses and ARP

Both master and slave know about the shared IP address. ARP queries for the shared IP address, or any other IP address published via the ARP configuration section or through Proxy ARP, are answered by the active system.

The hardware address of the shared IP address and other published addresses are not related to the actual hardware addresses of the interfaces. Instead the MAC address is constructed by CorePlus from the Cluster ID in the form *10-00-00-C1-4A-nn* where *nn* is derived by combining the Cluster ID configured in the Advanced Settings section with the hardware bus/slot/port of the interface. The Cluster ID must be unique for each cluster in a network.

As the shared IP address always has the same hardware address, there will be no latency time in updating ARP caches of units attached to the same LAN as the cluster when failover occurs.

When a cluster member discovers that its peer is not operational, it broadcasts gratuitous ARP queries on all interfaces using the shared hardware address as the sender address. This allows switches to re-learn within milliseconds where to send packets destined for the shared address. The only delay in failover therefore, is detecting that the active unit is down.

ARP queries are also broadcast periodically to ensure that switches do not forget where to send packets destined for the shared hardware address.

HA with Anti-Virus and IDP

If a CorePlus cluster has the Anti-Virus or IDP subsystems enabled then updates to the Anti-Virus signature database or IDP pattern database will routinely occur. These updates involve downloads from the external Clavister databases and they require CorePlus reconfiguration to occur for the new database contents to become active.

A database update causes the following sequence of events to occur in an HA cluster:

1. The active (master) unit downloads the new database files from the Clavister servers. The download is done via the shared IP address of the cluster.
2. The active (master) node sends the new database files to the inactive peer.
3. The inactive (slave) unit reconfigures to activate the new database files.
4. The active (master) unit now reconfigures to activate the new database files causing a failover to the slave unit. The slave is now the active unit.
5. After reconfiguration of the master is complete, failover occurs again so that the master once again becomes the active unit.

Dealing with Sync Failure

An unusual situation that can occur in an HA cluster is if the *sync* connection between the master and slave experiences a failure with the result that heartbeats and state updates are no longer received by the inactive unit.

Should such a failure occur then the consequence is that both units will continue to function but they will lose their synchronization with each other. In other words, the inactive unit will no longer have a correct copy of the state of the active unit. A failover will not occur in this situation since the inactive unit will realize that synchronization has been lost.

Failure of the *sync* interface results in the generation of *hasync_connection_failed_timeout* log messages by the active unit. However, it should be noted that this log message is also generated whenever the inactive unit appears to be not working, such as during a software upgrade.

Failure of the *sync* interface can be confirmed by comparing the output from certain CLI commands for each unit. The number of connections could be compared with the *stats* command. If IPsec tunnels are heavily used, the *ipsecglobstat -verbose* command could be used instead and significant differences in the numbers of IPsec SAs, IKE SAs, active users and IP pool statistics would indicate a failure to synchronize. If the *sync* interface is functioning correctly, there may still be some small differences in the statistics from each cluster unit but these will be minor compared with the differences seen in the case of failure.

Once the broken *sync* interface is fixed, perhaps by replacing the connecting cable, synchronization between active and inactive units will **not** take place automatically. Instead, the unsynchronized inactive unit must be restarted after which the following takes place:

- During startup, the inactive unit sends a message to the active unit to flag that its state has been initialized and it requires the entire state of the active unit to be sent.
- The active unit then sends a copy of its entire state to the inactive unit.
- The inactive unit then becomes synchronized after which a failover can take place successfully if there is a system failure.



Note: An inactive unit restart is required for resynchronization

A restart of the inactive unit is the only time when the entire state of the active unit is sent to the inactive unit and this is the reason why a restart is required for resynchronization.

11.3. Setting Up HA

This section provides a step-by-step guide for setting up an HA Cluster. The setup process can be simplified using the *HA Setup Wizard* as described below.

11.3.1. HA Hardware Setup

The steps for the setup of hardware in an HA cluster are as follows:

1. Start with two physically similar Clavister Security Gateways. Both may be newly purchased or an existing unit may have a new unit added to it.

The master hardware does not need to exactly match the slave, however it is recommended that hardware with similar performance is used in order to avoid any performance changes after a failover.

2. Both master and slave units must have valid CorePlus cluster licenses that have identical capabilities and which have the HA cluster option enabled.
3. Make the physical connections:
 - Connect the matching interfaces of master and slave through separate switches or separate broadcast domains. It is important to keep the traffic on each interface pair separated from other pairs.
 - Select one unique interface on the master and slave which is to be used by the units for monitoring each other. This will be the *sync* interface. It is recommended that the same interface is used on both master and slave, assuming they are similar systems.



Caution: The sync interface must be unique

*With some hardware an interface may be part of a switch fabric which joins a set of interfaces together (for instance the **lan** interfaces on the Clavister SG10 and SG50 Series). If such an interface is used for **sync** then the other interfaces connected to the same switch block cannot be used for other purposes.*

Also keep in mind that there should be no CorePlus IP rules configured that include the *sync* interface.

- Connect together the *sync* interfaces. This can be done directly with a crossover cable or through a separate switch (or broadcast domain).
4. Decide on a shared IP address for each interface in the cluster. Some interfaces could have shared addresses only while others could also have unique, individual IP addresses for each interface specified in a *IP4 HA Address* object. The shared and individual addresses are used as follows:
 - The individual addresses specified for an interface in an *IP4 HA Address* object allow remote management through that interface. These addresses can also be "pinged" using ICMP provided that IP rules are defined to permit this (by default, ICMP queries are dropped by the rule set).

If either unit is inoperative, its individual IP addresses will also be unreachable. These IP addresses are usually private but must be public if management access across the public Internet is required.

If an interface is not assigned an individual address through an *IP4 HA Address* object then it must be assigned the default address *localhost* which is an IP address from the

sub-network 127.0.0.0/8.

ARP queries for the individual IP addresses specified in IP4 HA Address objects are answered by the security gateway that owns the address, using the normal hardware address, just as with normal IP units.

- One single shared IP address is used for routing and it is also the address used by dynamic address translation, unless the configuration explicitly specifies another address.




Note: Management cannot be done through the shared IP

The shared IP address cannot be used for remote management or monitoring purposes. When using, for example, SSH for remote management of the Clavister Security Gateways in an HA Cluster, the individual IP addresses of each security gateway's interfaces must be used and these are specified in IP4 HA Address objects as discussed above.

Typical HA Cluster Network Connections

The illustration below shows the arrangement of typical HA Cluster connections in a network. All interfaces on the master unit would normally also have corresponding interfaces on the slave unit and these would be connected to the same networks. This is achieved by connecting the same interfaces on both master and slave via a separate switch (or broadcast domain) to other network portions.



In the scenario shown above, the **lan** interface on the master and the **lan** interface on the slave would be connected to the same switch which then connects to an internal network. Similarly the **wan** interface on the master and the **wan** interface would connect to a switch which in turn connects to the external Internet.

If the **lan** interface is connected to a switch block in the security gateway hardware then the other interfaces connected to the block should not be used.



Note: The illustration shows a crossover cable sync connection

The illustration above shows a direct crossover cable connection between the sync interfaces of each unit. This connection could, instead, be via a switch or broadcast domain.

Wizard and Manual Software Setup

The software setup procedures are now divided into the two sections that follow:

- Section 11.3.2, “CorePlus Setup with the HA Wizard” for fast, simple setup.
- Section 11.3.3, “CorePlus Manual HA Setup” for step by step manual setup, without the wizard.

11.3.2. CorePlus Setup with the HA Wizard

CorePlus provides a wizard to automate the HA setup procedure. The wizard needs to be run twice: once when connected to the master unit in the HA cluster, and a second time when connected to the slave unit in the cluster. The procedure for doing this with each unit is as follows:

1. Connect to the Clavister Security Gateway through the WebUI.
2. Go to **Objects > Address Book** and create an **IP4 HA Address** object for each interface pair in the cluster. Each object will contain the master and slave IP addresses for the interface pair. Inclusion in an IP4 HA Address object is mandatory for any interface that will be used for remote management but optional for other interfaces.
3. **Save and activate** the new configuration before continuing to the next step.
4. Go to the **HA** section of the user interface and press the **Start Wizard** button. Running the wizard for the master and slave units is described in *A* and *B* below.
5. **Save and activate** the new configuration.

A. Running the Wizard for Master Setup

1. Specify the **NodeType**, **ClusterID** and **Interface** that will be used for synchronization.
2. If the two hardware models used in the cluster are different, this should also be indicated (see Section 11.3.5, “Unique Shared Mac Addresses” below for an explanation of this option).
3. Select the shared IP address and, if desired, the individual IP4 HA Address objects created earlier.
4. The wizard will confirm that master setup is complete.

B. Running the Wizard for Slave Setup

1. Specify the **NodeType**, **ClusterID** and **Interface** that will be used for synchronization.
2. If the two hardware models used in the cluster are different, this should also be indicated (see Section 11.3.5, "Unique Shared Mac Addresses" below for an explanation of this option).
3. The wizard will acknowledge that it will synchronize with the master unit.
4. Select the desired interface mapping.
5. The wizard will confirm that slave setup and synchronization is complete.

Installing a New Master Unit

It should be noted in the above process that the HA wizard synchronizes the slave from the master unit and not the other way around. This means that if the slave unit is swapped with a new unit, perhaps because of an equipment failure, the wizard can be used to perform the initial setup since it will copy over the configuration from the master.

But what if it is the slave unit that contains the configuration that is to be used and it is the master unit that is to be synchronized with it? This would be the case if the master unit suffered a fault and had to be swapped with a brand new unit.

There are two methods to resolve this:

Method A. Copying the slave configuration to the new master

The easiest and quickest way to configure a new master unit is as follows:

1. Use the normal configuration backup function to make a backup of the configuration that exists on the existing slave unit.
2. Restore the backup from the slave to the new master unit.
3. Through the management interface, change the new master unit's HA designation to be *Master*.

Method B. Turning the slave into the master

A second, slightly more involved approach, is to turn the slave unit into a master and then use the wizard as normal to copy the configuration across.

Changing the slave to the master is done through the management interface by changing the unit's HA designation to be *Master*. However, a remaining issue will be that the ARP caches of connected switches will not now be valid. To force an update of these caches either the switches should be restarted or the CLI command *arp -notify* could be issued from the new master (which was previously the slave).

This process of changing a slave to a master must be done quickly since there will be a reversion to the old configuration within the **Validation Timeout** period, which by default is 30 seconds. Within that time, the ARP cache problem must also be addressed. To solve this issue we can either commit the new configuration manually before dealing with the ARP issue, or lengthen the time available by increasing the advanced setting **Validation Timeout**.

11.3.3. CorePlus Manual HA Setup

To set up an HA cluster manually, without the wizard, the steps are as follows:

1. Connect to the master unit with the WebUI.
2. Go to **System > High Availability**.
3. Check the **Enable High Availability** checkbox.
4. Set the **Cluster ID**. This must be unique for each cluster.
5. Choose the **Sync Interface**.
6. Select the node type to be *Master*.
7. Go to **Objects > Address Book** and create an **IP4 HA Address** object for each interface pair. Each must contain the master and slave interface IP addresses for the pair.

Creating an object is mandatory for an interface pair used for remote management, but optional for other interfaces (in which case the default address *localhost* must be used which is an IP from the *127.0.0.0/8* sub-network).

8. Go to **Interfaces > Ethernet** and go through each interface in the list, entering the shared IP address for that interface in the **IP Address** field.

Also select the **Advanced** tab for each interface and set the **High Availability, Private IP Address** field to be the name of the IP4 HA Address object created previously for the interface (CorePlus will automatically select the appropriate address from the master and slave addresses defined in the object).



Note: IP addresses could be public addresses

The term "**private IP address**" is not strictly correct when used here. Either address used in an IP4 HA Address object may be public if management access across the public Internet is required.

9. **Save and activate** the new configuration.
10. Repeat the above steps for the other Clavister Security Gateway but this time select the node type to be *Slave*.

Making Cluster Configuration Changes

The configuration on both Clavister Security Gateways needs to be the same. The configurations of the two units will be automatically synchronized. To change something in a cluster configuration, log on to either the master or the slave, make the change, then save and activate. The change is automatically made to both units.

11.3.4. Verifying the Cluster Functions

To verify that the cluster is performing correctly, first use the *ha* command on each unit. The output will look similar to the following for the master:

```
Device: /> ha
This device is an HA MASTER
This device is currently ACTIVE (will forward traffic)
HA cluster peer is ALIVE
```

Then use the *stat* command to verify that both the master and slave have about the same number of connections. The output from the command should contain a line similar to the

following:

```
Connections 2726 out of 128000
```

The lower number on the left in this output is the current number of connections and the higher number on the right is the maximum number of connections allowed by the license.

The following points are also relevant to cluster setup:

- If this is not the first cluster in a network then the *Cluster ID* must be changed for the cluster so that it is unique (the default value is 0). The *Cluster ID* determines that the MAC address for the cluster is unique.
- Enabling the advanced setting *Use Unique Share MAC* is recommended so that each interface has its own MAC address. If this is not enabled, interfaces share a MAC address and this can confuse some third party switches.
- Make sure that the advanced setting *High Buffers* is set to be *automatic* for both units in the cluster. This setting determines how memory is allocated by CorePlus for handling increasing numbers of connections. A hardware restart is required for a change in this setting to take effect.

Where a cluster has a very high number (for example, tens of thousands) of simultaneous connections then it may be necessary to set a high value for this instead of using *automatic*. A very high value for *High Buffers* can suit situations with large numbers of connections but can have the disadvantage of increasing throughput latency.

11.3.5. Unique Shared Mac Addresses

For HA setup, CorePlus provides the advanced option *Use Unique Shared MAC Address*. By default, this is enabled and in most configurations it should not need to be disabled.

Enabling a Unique Shared MAC Address

The effect of enabling this setting is that a single, unique MAC address will be used for each pair of matching hardware interfaces so that, for example, the *lan1* interface on the master unit will appear to have the same MAC address as the *lan1* interface on the slave unit.

Problem Diagnosis

An HA cluster will function if this setting is disabled but can cause problems with a limited number of switch types where the switch uses a shared ARP table. Such problems can be hard to diagnose which is why it is best to always have the setting enabled.

With Dissimilar Hardware Units

In one situation, this setting should be disabled and that is when an HA cluster is set up using non-matching hardware. In order to function correctly, unique shared MAC addresses should not be used. For this reason, the setup wizard asks if non-matching hardware is being used and adjusts this setting appropriately.

11.4. HA Issues

The following points should be kept in mind when managing and configuring an HA Cluster.

Real-time Monitoring

The Real-time Monitor will not automatically track the active Clavister Security Gateway. If a Real-time Monitor graph shows nothing but the connection count moving, then the cluster has probably failed over to the other unit.

All Cluster Interfaces Need IP Addresses

All interfaces on both HA cluster units should have a valid private IP4 address object assigned to them. The predefined IP object *local host* could be assigned for this purpose. The need to assign an address is true even if an interface has been disabled.

SNMP

SNMP statistics are not shared between master and slave. SNMP managers have no failover capabilities. Therefore both security gateways in a cluster need to be polled separately.

Logging

Log data will be coming from both master and slave. This means that the log receiver will have to be configured to receive logs from both. It also means that all log queries will likely have to include both master and slave as sources which will give all the log data in one result view. Normally, the inactive unit will not be sending log entries about live traffic so the output should look similar to that from one Clavister Security Gateway.

Using Individual IP Addresses

The unique individual IP addresses of the master and slave cannot safely be used for anything but management. Using them for anything else, such as for source IPs in dynamically NATed connections or publishing services on them, will inevitably cause problems since unique IPs will disappear when the security gateway they belong to does.

The Shared IP Must Not Be 0.0.0.0

Assigning the IP address *0.0.0.0* as the shared IP address must be avoided. This is not valid for this purpose and will cause CorePlus to enter Lockdown Mode.

Failed Interfaces

Failed interfaces will not be detected unless they fail to the point where CorePlus cannot continue to function. This means that failover will not occur if the active unit can still send "I am alive" heartbeats to the inactive unit through any of its interfaces, even though one or more interfaces may be inoperative.

Changing the Cluster ID

Changing the cluster ID in a live environment is not recommended for two reasons. Firstly this will change the hardware address of the shared IPs and will cause problems for all units attached

to the local LAN, as they will keep the old hardware address in their ARP caches until it times out. Such units would have to have their ARP caches flushed.

Secondly this breaks the connection between the security gateways in the cluster for as long as they are using different configurations. This will cause both gateways to go active at the same time.

Invalid Checksums in Heartbeat Packets

Cluster Heartbeats packets are deliberately created with invalid checksums. This is done so that they will not be routed. Some routers may flag this invalid checksum in their log messages.

Making OSPF work

If OSPF is being used to determine routing metrics then a cluster **cannot** be used as the *designated router*.

If OSPF is to work then there must be another *designated router* available in the same *OSPF area* as the cluster. Ideally, there will also be a second, backup designated router to provide OSPF metrics if the main designated router should fail.

11.5. Upgrading an HA Cluster

The CorePlus software versions running on the master and slave in an HA cluster should be the same. When a new CorePlus version becomes available and is to be installed on both units, the upgrade is done one unit at a time.

The central principal in the upgrade process for a cluster is that upgrading the inactive unit will not effect the operation of the cluster and only momentarily make the inactive unit unavailable.

The overall sequence of steps to follow is:

- i. Identify which unit is inactive and upgrade that first.
- ii. When the inactive unit is once again synchronized with the active unit, cause a failover to occur so that the inactive becomes the active unit.
- iii. Now upgrade the inactive unit. Both units will then resynchronize and have the new CorePlus version.

These three steps will now be broken down into a more detailed description:

A. Establish which is the inactive unit in the cluster

The currently inactive unit will be upgraded first so it is necessary to identify this. To do this, connect with a CLI console to one of the cluster units and issue the `ha` command. The typical output if the unit is active is shown below.

```
Device:/> ha
This device is a HA SLAVE
This device is currently ACTIVE (will forward traffic)
This device has been active: 430697 sec
HA cluster peer is ALIVE
```

This unit (the slave) is the currently active unit, so the other one (the master) is the inactive unit.

B. Upgrade the inactive unit

Once the inactive unit is identified, upgrade this unit with the new CorePlus version. This is done exactly as though the unit were not in a cluster. For example, the Web Interface can be used to do the upgrade.



Important: Make sure the inactive unit is ALIVE

Before going to the next step make sure the inactive unit is fully operational and synchronized with the active unit after the software upgrade completes.

*To do this, issue the CLI `ha` command on the inactive unit. The output from the command should indicate that the status is **ALIVE**.*

```
Device:/> ha
This device is a HA SLAVE
This device is currently INACTIVE (won't forward traffic)
This device has been inactive: 2 sec
HA cluster peer is ALIVE
```

C. Cause a failover to occur

Now, connect to the active unit (which is still running the old CorePlus version) with a CLI console and issue the *ha -deactivate* command. This will cause the active unit to become inactive, and the inactive to become active.

```
Device:/> ha -deactivate
```

```
HA Was: ACTIVE  
HA going INACTIVE...
```

To check that the failover has completed successfully, an *ha* command can be issued again and the text "**INACTIVE**" and "**is ALIVE**" should appear in the output.

D. Upgrade the newly inactive unit

When the failover is complete, upgrade the newly inactive unit with the new CorePlus version. Just like step **B**, this is done in the normal way as though the unit were not part of a cluster.

E. Wait for resynchronization

Once the second software upgrade is complete, two units will automatically resynchronize and the cluster will continue operation. The roles of active and inactive unit will have been reversed.

If it is desirable to make the active unit inactive, and the inactive unit active, the CLI command *ha -active* can be used.

11.6. Link Monitoring and HA

Redundant Network Paths

When using an HA configuration, it can be important to use redundant paths to vital resources such as the Internet. The paths through the network from the master device in an HA configuration may fail in which case it may be desirable to have this failure trigger a failover to the slave unit which has a different path to the resource.

Monitoring Paths

Monitoring the availability of specific network paths can be done with the CorePlus *Link Monitor*. The Link Monitor allows the administrator to specify particular hosts whose reachability is monitored using ICMP "Ping" requests and therefore link status. If these hosts become unreachable then the link is considered failed and a failover to a slave can be initiated. Provided that the slave is using a different network link and also monitoring the reachability of different hosts, traffic can continue to flow.

Using the Shared IP Address

When using the Link Monitor in a High Availability cluster the option **Send from Shared IP Address** will be visible during Link Monitor setup. This option can be used if individual public IP addresses are not available for each unit in an HA cluster.

Further Link Monitor Reading

Link monitoring as a CorePlus feature separate from HA is described further in *Section 2.4.2, "The Link Monitor"*.

11.7. HA Advanced Settings

The following CorePlus advanced settings are available for High Availability:

Sync Buffer Size

How much sync data, in Kbytes, to buffer while waiting for acknowledgments from the cluster peer.

Default: *1024*

Sync Packet Max Burst

The maximum number of state sync packets to send in a burst.

Default: *20*

Initial Silence

The time in seconds to stay silent on startup or after reconfiguration. When the active unit in an HA cluster believes the inactive unit is no longer reachable, it continues to send synchronization traffic normally for a period of one minute in the expectation that the inactive unit will again become reachable. In order not to flood the network unnecessarily, after one minute has elapsed, the synchronization traffic is then only sent after repeated periods of silence. The length of this silence is this setting.

Default: *5*

Use Unique Shared Mac

Use a unique shared MAC address for each interface. For further explanation of this setting see [Section 11.3.5, "Unique Shared Mac Addresses"](#).

Default: *Enabled*

Deactivate Before Reconf

If enabled, this setting will make an active node failover to the inactive node before a reconfigure takes place instead of relying on the inactive node detecting that the active node is not operating normally and then taking over on its own initiative. Enabling this setting shortens the time where no node is active during configuration deployments.

Default: *Enabled*

Reconf Failover Time

Number of non-responsive seconds before failover at HA reconfiguration. The default value of zero means immediate reconfiguration.

Default: *0*

Chapter 12: Advanced Settings

This chapter describes the additional configurable advanced settings for CorePlus that are not already described in the manual. In the Web Interface or InControl these settings are found under **System > Advanced Settings**.

The settings are divided up into the following categories:



Note: Activating setting changes

After any advanced setting is changed, the new CorePlus configuration must be activated in order for the new value to take effect.

- IP Level Settings, page 580
- TCP Level Settings, page 584
- ICMP Level Settings, page 589
- State Settings, page 590
- Connection Timeout Settings, page 592
- Length Limit Settings, page 594
- Fragmentation Settings, page 597
- Local Fragment Reassembly Settings, page 601
- SSL Settings, page 602
- Miscellaneous Settings, page 604

12.1. IP Level Settings

Log Checksum Errors

Logs occurrences of IP packets containing erroneous checksums. Normally, this is the result of the packet being damaged during network transport. All network units, both routers and workstations, drop IP packets that contain checksum errors. However, it is highly unlikely for an

attack to be based on illegal checksums.

Default: *Enabled*

Log non IP4

Logs occurrences of IP packets that are not version 4. CorePlus only accepts version 4 IP packets; everything else is discarded.

Default: *Enabled*

Log Received TTL 0

Logs occurrences of IP packets received with the "Time To Live" (TTL) value set to zero. Under no circumstances should any network unit send packets with a TTL of 0.

Default: *Enabled*

Block 0000 Src

Block 0.0.0.0 as source address.

Default: *Drop*

Block 0 Net

Block 0.* as source addresses.

Default: *DropLog*

Block 127 Net

Block 127.* as source addresses.

Default: *DropLog*

Block Multicast Src

Block multicast both source addresses (224.0.0.0 - 255.255.255.255).

Default: *DropLog*

TTL Min

The minimum TTL value accepted on receipt.

Default: 3

TTL on Low

Determines the action taken on packets whose TTL falls below the stipulated TTLMin value.

Default: *DropLog*

Multicast TTL on Low

What action to take on too low multicast TTL values.

Default: *DropLog*

Default TTL

Indicates which TTL CorePlus is to use when originating a packet. These values are usually between 64 and 255.

Default: 255

Layer Size Consistency

Verifies that the size information contained in each "layer" (Ethernet, IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP) is consistent with that of other layers.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

SecuRemoteUDP Compatibility

Allow IP data to contain eight bytes more than the UDP total length field specifies. Checkpoint SecuRemote violates NAT-T drafts.

Default: *Disabled*

IP Option Sizes

Verifies the size of "IP options". These options are small blocks of information that may be added to the end of each IP header. This function checks the size of well known option types and ensures that no option exceeds the size limit stipulated by the IP header itself.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

IP Option Source/Return

Indicates whether source routing options are to be permitted. These options allow the sender of the packet to control how the packet is to be routed through each router and gateway. These constitute an enormous security risk. CorePlus never obeys the source routes specified by these options, regardless of this setting.

Default: *DropLog*

IP Options Timestamps

Time stamp options instruct each router and gateway on the packet's route to indicate at what time the packet was forwarded along the route. These options do not occur in normal traffic. Time stamps may also be used to "record" the route a packet has taken from sender to final destination. CorePlus never enters information into these options, regardless of this setting.

Default: *DropLog*

IP router alert option

How to handle IP packets with contained route alert.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

IP Options Other

All options other than those specified above.

Default: *DropLog*

Directed Broadcasts

Indicates whether CorePlus will forward packets which are directed to the broadcast address of its directly connected networks. It is possible to achieve this functionality by adding lines to the Rules section, but it is also included here for simplicity's sake. This form of validation is faster than entries in the Rules section since it is more specialized.

Default: *DropLog*

IP Reserved Flag

Indicates what CorePlus will do if there is data in the "reserved" fields of IP headers. In normal circumstances, these fields should read 0. Used by OS Fingerprinting.

Default: *DropLog*

Strip DontFragment

Strip the Don't Fragment flag for packets equal to or smaller than the size specified by this setting.

Default: *65535 bytes*

Multicast Mismatch option

What action to take when Ethernet and IP multicast addresses does not match.

Default: *DropLog*

Min Broadcast TTL option

The shortest IP broadcast Time-To-Live value accepted on receipt.

Default: *1*

Low Broadcast TTL Action option

What action to take on too low broadcast TTL values.

Default: *DropLog*

12.2. TCP Level Settings

TCP Option Sizes

Verifies the size of TCP options. This function acts in the same way as `IPOptionSizes` described above.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

TCP MSS Min

Determines the minimum permissible size of the TCP MSS. Packets containing maximum segment sizes below this limit are handled according to the next setting.

Default: *100 bytes*

TCP MSS on Low

Determines the action taken on packets whose TCP MSS option falls below the stipulated `TCPMSSMin` value. Values that are too low could cause problems in poorly written TCP stacks.

Default: *DropLog*

TCP MSS Max

Determines the maximum permissible TCP MSS size. Packets containing maximum segment sizes exceeding this limit are handled according to the next setting.

Default: *1460 bytes*

TCP MSS VPN Max

As is the case with `TCPMSSMax`, this is the highest Maximum Segment Size allowed. However, this setting only controls MSS in VPN connections. This way, CorePlus can reduce the effective segment size used by TCP in all VPN connections. This reduces TCP fragmentation in the VPN connection even if hosts do not know how to perform MTU discovery.

Default: *1400 bytes*

TCP MSS On High

Determines the action taken on packets whose TCP MSS option exceeds the stipulated `TCPMSSMax` value. Values that are too high could cause problems in poorly written TCP stacks or give rise to large quantities of fragmented packets, which will adversely affect performance.

Default: *Adjust*

TCP MSS Log Level

Determines when to log regarding too high TCP MSS, if not logged by `TCPMSSOnHigh`.

Default: *7000 bytes*

TCP Auto Clamping

Automatically clamp TCP MSS according to MTU of involved interfaces, in addition to TCPMSSMax.

Default: *Enabled*

TCP Zero Unused ACK

Determines whether CorePlus should set the ACK sequence number field in TCP packets to zero if it is not used. Some operating systems reveal sequence number information this way, which can make it easier for intruders wanting to hijack established connections.

Default: *Enabled*

TCP Zero Unused URG

Strips the URG pointers from all packets.

Default: *Enabled*

TCP Option WSOPT

Determines how CorePlus will handle window-scaling options. These are used to increase the size of the window used by TCP; that is to say, the amount of information that can be sent before the sender expects ACK. They are also used by OS Fingerprinting. WSOPT is a common occurrence in modern networks.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

TCP Option SACK

Determines how CorePlus will handle selective acknowledgement options. These options are used to ACK individual packets instead of entire series, which can increase the performance of connections experiencing extensive packet loss. They are also used by OS Fingerprinting. SACK is a common occurrence in modern networks.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

TCP Option TSOPT

Determines how CorePlus will handle time stamp options. As stipulated by the PAWS (Protect Against Wrapped Sequence numbers) method, TSOPT is used to prevent the sequence numbers (a 32-bit figure) from "exceeding" their upper limit without the recipient being aware of it.

This is not normally a problem. Using TSOPT, some TCP stacks optimize their connection by measuring the time it takes for a packet to travel to and from its destination. This information can then be used to generate resends faster than is usually the case. It is also used by OS Fingerprinting. TSOPT is a common occurrence in modern networks.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

TCP Option ALTCHKREQ

Determines how CorePlus will handle alternate checksum request options. These options were initially intended to be used in negotiating for the use of better checksums in TCP. However, these are not understood by any today's standard systems. As CorePlus cannot understand checksum algorithms other than the standard algorithm, these options can never be accepted. The ALTCHKREQ option is normally never seen on modern networks.

Default: *StripLog*

TCP Option ALTCHKDATA

Determines how CorePlus will handle alternate checksum data options. These options are used to transport alternate checksums where permitted by ALTCHKREQ above. Normally never seen on modern networks.

Default: *StripLog*

TCP Option Con Timeout

Determines how CorePlus will handle connection count options.

Default: *StripLogBad*

TCP Option Other

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with TCP options not covered by the above settings. These options usually never appear on modern networks.

Default: *StripLog*

TCP SYN/URG

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with TCP packets with SYN (synchronize) flags and URG (urgent data) flags both turned on. The presence of a SYN flag indicates that a new connection is in the process of being opened, and an URG flag means that the packet contains data requiring urgent attention. These two flags should not be turned on in a single packet as they are used exclusively to crash computers with poorly implemented TCP stacks.

Default: *DropLog*

TCP SYN/PSH

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with TCP packets with SYN and PSH (push) flags both turned on. The PSH flag means that the recipient stack should immediately send the information in the packet to the destination application in the computer.

These two flags should not be turned on at the same time as it could pose a crash risk for poorly implemented TCP stacks. However, some Apple MAC systems implement TCP in a non-standard way, meaning that they always send out SYN packets with the PSH flag turned on. This is why CorePlus normally removes the PSH flag and allows the packet through despite the fact that such packets would be dropped if standards were strictly followed.

Default: *StripSilent*

TCP SYN/RST

The TCP RST flag together with SYN; normally invalid (strip=strip RST).

Default: *DropLog*

TCP SYN/FIN

The TCP FIN flag together with SYN; normally invalid (strip=strip FIN).

Default: *DropLog*

TCP FIN/URG

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with TCP packets with both FIN (Finish, close connection) and URG flags turned on. This should normally never occur, as you do not usually attempt to close a connection at the same time as sending "important" data. This flag combination could be used to crash poorly implemented TCP stacks and is also used by OS Fingerprinting.

Default: *DropLog*

TCP URG

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with TCP packets with the URG flag turned on, regardless of any other flags. Many TCP stacks and applications deal with Urgent flags in the wrong way and can, in the worst case scenario, cease working. Note however that some programs, such as FTP and MS SQL Server, nearly always use the URG flag.

Default: *StripLog*

TCPE ECN

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with TCP packets with either the Xmas or Ymas flag turned on. These flags are currently mostly used by OS Fingerprinting.

It should be noted that a developing standard called *Explicit Congestion Notification* also makes use of these TCP flags, but as long as there are only a few operating systems supporting this standard, the flags should be stripped.

Default: *StripLog*

TCP Reserved Field

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with information present in the "reserved field" in the TCP header, which should normally be 0. This field is not the same as the *Xmas* and *Ymas* flags. Used by OS Fingerprinting.

Default: *DropLog*

TCP NULL

Specifies how CorePlus will deal with TCP packets that do not have any of the SYN, ACK, FIN or RST flags turned on. According to the TCP standard, such packets are illegal and are used by both OS Fingerprinting and stealth port scanners, as some gateways are unable to detect them.

Default: *DropLog*

TCP Sequence Numbers

Determines if the sequence number range occupied by a TCP segment will be compared to the receive window announced by the receiving peer before the segment is forwarded.

TCP sequence number validation is only possible on connections tracked by the state-engine (not on packets forwarded using a *FwdFast* rule).

Possible values are:

Ignore - Do not validate. Means that sequence number validation is completely turned off.

ValidateSilent - Validate and pass on.

ValidateLogBad - Validate and pass on, log if bad.

ValidateReopen - Validate reopen attempt like normal traffic; validate and pass on.

ValidateReopenLog - Validate reopen attempts like normal traffic; validate, log if bad.

ReopenValidate - Do not validate reopen attempts at all; validate and pass on.

ReopenValidLog - Do not validate reopen attempts at all; validate, log if bad.

Default: *ValidateLogBad*

Notes on the *TCPSequenceNumbers* setting

The default *ValidateLogBad* (or the alternative *ValidateSilent*) will allow the de-facto behavior of TCP re-open attempts, meaning that they will reject re-open attempts with a previously used sequence number.

ValidateReopen and *ValidReopenLog* are special settings giving the default behavior found in older CorePlus versions where only re-open attempts using a sequence number falling inside the current (or last used) TCP window will be allowed. This is more restrictive than *ValidateLogBad/ValidateSilent*, and will block some valid TCP re-open attempts. The most significant impact of this will be that common web-surfing traffic (short but complete transactions requested from a relatively small set of clients, randomly occurring with an interval of a few seconds) will slow down considerably, while most "normal" TCP traffic will continue to work as usual.

Using either *ValidateReopen* or *ValidateReopenLog* is, however, not recommended since the same effect can be achieved by disallowing TCP re-open attempts altogether. These settings exist mostly for backwards compatibility.

ReopenValidate and *ReopenValidLog* are less restrictive variants than *ValidateLogBad* or *ValidateSilent*. Certain clients and/or operating systems might attempt to use a randomized sequence number when re-opening an old TCP connection (usually out of a concern for security) and this may not work well with these settings. Again, web-surfing traffic is most likely to be affected, although the impact is likely to occur randomly. Using these values instead of the default setting will completely disable sequence number validation for TCP re-open attempts. Once the connection has been established, normal TCP sequence number validation will be resumed.

Allow TCP Reopen

Allow clients to re-open TCP connections that are in the closed state.

Default: *Disabled*

12.3. ICMP Level Settings

ICMP Sends Per Sec Limit

Specifies the maximum number of ICMP messages CorePlus may generate per second. This includes ping replies, destination unreachable messages and also TCP RST packets. In other words, this setting limits how many Rejects per second may be generated by the Reject rules in the Rules section.

Default: *500*

Silently Drop State ICMPErrors

Specifies if CorePlus should silently drop ICMP errors pertaining to statefully tracked open connections. If these errors are not dropped by this setting, they are passed to the rule set for evaluation just like any other packet.

Default: *Enabled*

12.4. State Settings

Connection Replace

Allows new additions to the CorePlus connection list to replace the oldest connections if there is no available space.

Default: *ReplaceLog*

Log Open Fails

In some instances where the Rules section determines that a packet should be allowed through, the stateful inspection mechanism may subsequently decide that the packet cannot open a new connection. One example of this is a TCP packet that, although allowed by the Rules section and not being part of an established connection, has its SYN flag off. Such packets can never open new connections. In addition, new connections can never be opened by ICMP messages other than ICMP ECHO (Ping). This setting determines if CorePlus is to log the occurrence of such packets.

Default: *Enabled*

Log Reverse Opens

Determines if CorePlus logs packets that attempt to open a new connection back through one that is already open. This only applies to TCP packets with the SYN flag turned on and to ICMP ECHO packets. In the case of other protocols such as UDP, there is no way of determining whether the remote peer is attempting to open a new connection.

Default: *Enabled*

Log State Violations

Determines if CorePlus logs packets that violate the expected state switching diagram of a connection, for example, getting TCP FIN packets in response to TCP SYN packets.

Default: *Enabled*

Log Connections

Specifies how CorePlus, will log connections:

- *NoLog* – Does not log any connections; consequently, it will not matter if logging is enabled for either *Allow* or *NAT* rules in the IP rule set; they will not be logged. However, *FwdFast*, *Drop* and *Reject* rules will be logged as stipulated by the settings in the Rules section.
- *Log* – Logs connections in short form; gives a short description of the connection, which rule allowed it to be made and any *SAT* rules that apply. Connections will also be logged when they are closed.
- *LogOC* – As for *Log*, but includes the two packets that cause the connection to be opened and closed. If a connection is closed as the result of a timeout, no ending packet will be logged
- *LogOCAll* – Logs all packets involved in opening and closing the connection. In the case of TCP, this covers all packets with SYN, FIN or RST flags turned on

- *LogAll* – Logs all packets in the connection.

Default: *Log*

Log Connection Usage

This generates a log message for every packet that passes through a connection that is set up in the CorePlus state-engine. Traffic whose destination is the Clavister Security Gateway itself, for example CorePlus management traffic, is not subject to this setting.

The log message includes port, service, source/destination IP address and interface. This setting should only be enabled for diagnostic and testing purposes since it generates unwieldy volumes of log messages and can also significantly impair throughput performance.

Default: *Disabled*

Dynamic Max Connections

Allocate the Max Connection value dynamically.

Default: *Enabled*

Max Connections

This setting applies if **Dynamic Max Connections** above is disabled. Specifies how many connections CorePlus may keep open at any one time. Each connection consumes approximately 150 bytes RAM. When this setting is dynamic, CorePlus will try to use as many connections as is allowed by product.

Default: *8192*

12.5. Connection Timeout Settings

The settings in this section specify how long a connection can remain idle, that is to say with no data being sent through it, before it is automatically closed. Please note that each connection has two timeout values: one for each direction. A connection is closed if either of the two values reaches 0.

TCP SYN Idle Lifetime

Specifies in seconds how long a TCP connection, that is not yet fully established, is allowed to idle before being closed.

Default: 60

TCP Idle Lifetime

Specifies in seconds how long a fully established TCP connection may idle before being closed. Connections become fully established once packets with their SYN flags off have travelled in both directions.

Default: 262144

TCP FIN Idle Lifetime

Specifies in seconds how long a TCP connection about to close may idle before finally being closed. Connections reach this state when a packet with its FIN flag on has passed in any direction.

Default: 80

UDP Idle Lifetime

Specifies in seconds how long UDP connections may idle before being closed. This timeout value is usually low, as UDP has no way of signalling when the connection is about to close.

Default: 130

UDP Bidirectional Keep-alive

This allows both sides to keep a UDP connection alive. The default is for CorePlus to mark a connection as alive (not idle) every time data is sent from the side that opened the connection. Connections that do not receive any data from the opening side within the UDP lifetime will therefore be closed even if the other side continues to transmit data.

Default: *Disabled*

Ping Idle Lifetime

Specifies in seconds how long a Ping (ICMP ECHO) connection can remain idle before it is closed.

Default: 8

IGMP Idle Lifetime

Connection lifetime for IGMP in seconds.

Default: 12

Other Idle Lifetime

Specifies in seconds how long connections using an unknown protocol can remain idle before it is closed.

Default: 130

12.6. Length Limit Settings

This section contains information about the size limits imposed on the protocols directly under IP level, such as TCP, UDP and ICMP.

The values specified here concern the IP data contained in packets. In the case of Ethernet, a single packet can contain up to 1480 bytes of IP data without fragmentation. In addition to that, there is a further 20 bytes of IP header and 14 bytes of Ethernet header, corresponding to the maximum media transmission unit on Ethernet networks of 1514 bytes.

Max TCP Length

Specifies the maximum size of a TCP packet including the header. This value usually correlates with the amount of IP data that can be accommodated in an unfragmented packet, since TCP usually adapts the segments it sends to fit the maximum packet size. However, this value may need to be increased by 20-50 bytes on some less common VPN systems.

Default: 1480

Max UDP Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of a UDP packet including the header. This value may well need to be quite high, since many real-time applications use large, fragmented UDP packets. If no such protocols are used, the size limit imposed on UDP packets can probably be lowered to 1480 bytes.

Default: 60000

Max ICMP Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of an ICMP packet. ICMP error messages should never exceed 600 bytes, although Ping packets can be larger if so requested. This value may be lowered to 1000 bytes if you do not wish to use large Ping packets.

Default: 10000

Max GRE Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of a GRE packet. GRE, Generic Routing Encapsulation, has various uses, including the transportation of PPTP, Point to Point Tunneling Protocol, data. This value should be set at the size of the largest packet allowed to pass through the VPN connections, regardless of its original protocol, plus approx. 50 bytes.

Default: 2000

Max ESP Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of an ESP packet. ESP, Encapsulation Security Payload, is used by IPsec where encryption is applied. This value should be set at the size of the largest packet allowed to pass through the VPN connections, regardless of its original protocol, plus approx. 50 bytes.

Default: 2000

Max AH Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of an AH packet. AH, Authentication Header, is used by IPsec where only authentication is applied. This value should be set at the size of the largest packet allowed to pass through the VPN connections, regardless of its original protocol, plus approx. 50 bytes.

Default: 2000

Max SKIP Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of a SKIP packet.

Default: 2000

Max OSPF Length

Specifies the maximum size of an OSPF packet. OSPF is a routing protocol mainly used in larger LANs.

Default: 1480

Max IPIP/FWZ Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of an IP-in-IP packet. IP-in-IP is used by Checkpoint Firewall-1 VPN connections when IPsec is not used. This value should be set at the size of the largest packet allowed to pass through the VPN connections, regardless of its original protocol, plus approx. 50 bytes.

Default: 2000

Max IPsec IPComp Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of an IPComp packet.

Default: 2000

Max L2TP Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of a Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol packet.

Default: 2000

Max Other Length

Specifies in bytes the maximum size of packets belonging to protocols that are not specified above.

Default: 1480

Log Oversized Packets

Specifies if CorePlus will log occurrences of oversized packets.

Default: *Enabled*

12.7. Fragmentation Settings

IP is able to transport up to 65536 bytes of data. However, most media, such as Ethernet, cannot carry such huge packets. To compensate, the IP stack fragments the data to be sent into separate packets, each one given their own IP header and information that will help the recipient reassemble the original packet correctly.

Many IP stacks, however, are unable to handle incorrectly fragmented packets, a fact that can be exploited by intruders to crash such systems. CorePlus provides protection against fragmentation attacks in a number of ways.

Pseudo Reass Max Concurrent

Maximum number of concurrent fragment reassemblies. To drop all fragmented packets, set `PseudoReass_MaxConcurrent` to 0.

Default: 1024

Illegal Fragments

Determines how CorePlus will handle incorrectly constructed fragments. The term "incorrectly constructed" refers to overlapping fragments, duplicate fragments with different data, incorrect fragment sizes, etc. Possible settings include:

- *Drop* – Discards the illegal fragment without logging it. Also remembers that the packet that is being reassembled is "suspect", which can be used for logging further down the track.
- *DropLog* – Discards and logs the illegal fragment. Also remembers that the packet that is being reassembled is "suspect", which can be used for logging further down the track.
- *DropPacket* – Discards the illegal fragment and all previously stored fragments. Will not allow further fragments of this packet to pass through during `ReassIllegalLinger` seconds.
- *DropLogPacket* – As *DropPacket*, but also logs the event.
- *DropLogAll* – As *DropLogPacket*, but also logs further fragments belonging to this packet that arrive during `ReassIllegalLinger` seconds.

The choice of whether to discard individual fragments or disallow the entire packet is governed by two factors:

- It is safer to discard the whole packet.
- If, as the result of receiving an illegal fragment, you choose to discard the whole packet, attackers will be able to disrupt communication by sending illegal fragments during a reassembly, and in this way block almost all communication.

Default: *DropLog* – discards individual fragments and remembers that the reassembly attempt is "suspect".

Duplicated Fragment Data

If the same fragment arrives more than once, this can mean either that it has been duplicated at some point on its journey to the recipient or that an attacker is trying to disrupt the reassembly of the packet. In order to determine which is more likely, CorePlus compares the data components of the fragment. The comparison can be made in 2 to 512 random locations in the fragment, four bytes of each location being sampled. If the comparison is made in a larger

number of samples, it is more likely to find mismatching duplicates. However, more comparisons result in higher CPU load.

Default: *Check8* – compare 8 random locations, a total of 32 bytes

Failed Fragment Reassembly

Reassemblies may fail due to one of the following causes:

- Some of the fragments did not arrive within the time stipulated by the *ReassTimeout* or *ReassTimeLimit* settings. This may mean that one or more fragments were lost on their way across the Internet, which is a quite common occurrence.
- *CorePlus* was forced to interrupt the reassembly procedure due to new fragmented packets arriving and the system temporarily running out of resources. In situations such as these, old reassembly attempts are either discarded or marked as "failed".
- An attacker has attempted to send an incorrectly fragmented packet.

Under normal circumstances, you would not want to log failures as they occur frequently. However, it may be useful to log failures involving "suspect" fragments. Such failures may arise if, for example, the *IllegalFragments* setting has been set to *Drop* rather than *DropPacket*.

The following settings are available for *FragReassemblyFail*:

- *NoLog* - No logging is done when a reassembly attempt fails.
- *LogSuspect* - Logs failed reassembly attempts only if "suspect" fragments have been involved.
- *LogSuspectSubseq* - As *LogSuspect*, but also logs subsequent fragments of the packet as and when they arrive
- *LogAll* - Logs all failed reassembly attempts.
- *LogAllSubseq* - As *LogAll*, but also logs subsequent fragments of the packet as and when they arrive.

Default: *LogSuspectSubseq*

Dropped Fragments

If a packet is denied entry to the system as the result of the settings in the *Rules* section, it may also be worth logging individual fragments of that packet. The *DroppedFragments* setting specifies how *CorePlus* will act. Possible settings for this rule are as follows:

- *NoLog* – No logging is carried out over and above that which is stipulated in the rule set.
- *LogSuspect* - Logs individual dropped fragments of reassembly attempts affected by "suspect" fragments.
- *LogAll* - Always logs individual dropped fragments.

Default: *LogSuspect*

Duplicate Fragments

If the same fragment arrives more than once, this can mean either that it has been duplicated at some point on its journey to the recipient or that an attacker is trying to disrupt the reassembly

of the packet. DuplicateFrag determines whether such a fragment should be logged. Note that DuplicateFragData can also cause such fragments to be logged if the data contained in them does not match up. Possible settings are as follows:

- *NoLog* - No logging is carried out under normal circumstances.
- *LogSuspect* - Logs duplicated fragments if the reassembly procedure has been affected by "suspect" fragments.
- *LogAll* - Always logs duplicated fragments.

Default: *LogSuspect*

Fragmented ICMP

Other than ICMP ECHO (Ping), ICMP messages should not normally be fragmented as they contain so little data that fragmentation should never be necessary. FragmentedICMP determines the action taken when CorePlus receives fragmented ICMP messages that are not either ICMP ECHO or ECHOREPLY.

Default: *DropLog*

Minimum Fragment Length

Minimum Fragment Length determines how small all fragments, with the exception of the final fragment, of a packet can be expressed in bytes.

Although the arrival of too many fragments that are too small may cause problems for IP stacks, it is usually not possible to set this limit too high. It is rarely the case that senders create very small fragments. However, a sender may send 1480 byte fragments and a router or VPN tunnel on the route to the recipient subsequently reduce the effective MTU to 1440 bytes. This would result in the creation of a number of 1440 byte fragments and an equal number of 40 byte fragments. Because of potential problems this can cause, the default settings in CorePlus has been designed to allow the smallest possible fragments, 8 bytes, to pass. For internal use, where all media sizes are known, this value can be raised to 200 bytes or more.

Default: 8

Reassembly Timeout

A reassembly attempt will be interrupted if no further fragments arrive within Reassembly Timeout seconds of receipt of the previous fragment.

Default: 65

Max Reassembly Time Limit

A reassembly attempt will always be interrupted Reassembly Time Limit seconds after the first received fragment arrived.

Default: 90

Reassembly Done Limit

Once a packet has been reassembled, CorePlus is able to remember reassembly for this number of seconds in order to prevent further fragments, for example old duplicate fragments, of that

packet from arriving.

Default: 20

Reassembly Illegal Limit

Once a whole packet has been marked as illegal, CorePlus is able to retain this in memory for this number of seconds in order to prevent further fragments of that packet from arriving.

Default: 60

12.8. Local Fragment Reassembly Settings

Max Concurrent

Maximum number of concurrent local reassemblies.

Default: 256

Max Size

Maximum size of a locally reassembled packet.

Default: 10000

Large Buffers

Number of large (over 2K) local reassembly buffers (of the above size).

Default: 32

12.9. SSL Settings

SSL Processing Priority

The amount of CPU time that SSL processing is allowed to use.

Default: *Normal*

TLS RSA 3DES 168 SHA1

Enable cipher RSA_WITH_3DES_168_SHA1.

Default: *Enabled*

TLS RSA RC4 128 SHA1

Enable cipher RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA1.

Default: *Enabled*

TLS RSA RC4 128 MD5

Enable cipher TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5.

Default: *Enabled*

TLS RSA EXPORT 1024 RC4 56 SHA1

Enable cipher TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA1.

Default: *Enabled*

TLS RSA EXPORT 1024 RC4 40 MD5

Enable cipher TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_40_MD5.

Default: *Disabled*

TLS RSA EXPORT 1024 RC2 40 MD5

Enable cipher TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_40_MD5.

Default: *Disabled*

TLS RSA EXPORT NULL SHA1

Enable cipher TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_NULL_SHA1 (no encryption, just message validation).

Default: *Disabled*

TLS RSA EXPORT NULL MD5

Enable cipher TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_NULL_MD5 (no encryption, just message validation).

Default: *Disabled*

12.10. Miscellaneous Settings

UDP Source Port 0

How to treat UDP packets with source port 0.

Default: *DropLog*

Port 0

How to treat TCP/UDP packets with destination port 0 and TCP packets with source port 0.

Default: *DropLog*

Watchdog Time

Number of non-responsive seconds before watchdog is triggered (0=disable).

Default: *180*

Flood Reboot Time

As a final way out, CorePlus automatically reboots if its buffers have been flooded for a long time. This setting specifies this amount of time.

Default: *3600*

Dynamic High Buffers

This setting decides if CorePlus will automatically specify the High Buffers value. The default value is *3% of total available memory, with a lower limit of 1024*

Note that in addition to this there is always an extra 512 Kbytes allocated for buffers.

This setting requires a hardware restart for a new value to take effect. A reconfiguration is not sufficient.

Default: *Enabled*

High Buffers

If **Dynamic High Buffers** is not enabled then this number of buffers will be allocated in RAM above the 1 MByte limit. When troubleshooting problems raising this value can sometimes provide a solution.

This setting requires a hardware restart for a new value to take effect. A reconfiguration is not sufficient.

Default: *1024*

Max Connections

Packet re-assembly collects IP fragments into complete IP datagrams and, for TCP, reorders segments so that they are processed in the correct order and also to keep track of potential

segment overlaps and to inform other subsystems of such overlaps. The associated settings limit memory used by the re-assembly subsystem.

This setting specifies how many connections can use the re-assembly system at the same time. It is expressed as a percentage of the total number of allowed connections. Minimum 1, Maximum 100.

Default: 80

Max Memory

This setting specifies how much memory that the re-assembly system can allocate to process packets. It is expressed as a percentage of the total memory available. Minimum 1, Maximum 100.

Default: 3

Timeout

The time in seconds before CorePlus automatically enables its screen saver for a CorePlus Software only installation. The screen saver will automatically adapt its activity to the current CPU load of the system. During high loads, it will update once per second, consuming a fraction of a percent of CPU load.

Default: 300 seconds (5 minutes)

Screen Saver Selection

The type of screen saver used.

Default: *Blank*

Status Bar Selection

The status bar control.

Default: *Auto*

Max Pipe Users

The maximum number of pipe users to allocate. As pipe users are only tracked for a 20th of a second, this number usually does not need to be anywhere near the number of actual users, or the number of statefully tracked connections. If there are no configured pipes, no pipe users will be allocated, regardless of this setting. For more information about pipes and pipe users, see *Section 10.1, "Traffic Shaping"*.

Default: 512

Appendix A: Update Subscriptions

Overview

The CorePlus Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) module, the Anti-Virus module, as well as the Web Content Filtering module, function by accessing the *Clavister Service Provisioning Network*. The following 3 CorePlus modules make use of this network:

- **Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP)**

A database of known threat signatures is stored locally in the Clavister Security Gateway. This local database needs to be updated regularly with the latest threat signatures by automatically downloading updates from the *Clavister Service Provisioning Network*.

- **Anti-Virus Scanning**

Like IDP, a database of known virus signatures is stored locally. This local database also needs to be updated regularly with the latest virus signatures by automatically downloading updates from the *Clavister Service Provisioning Network*.

- **Web Content Filtering**

Accesses the database available on the *Clavister Service Provisioning Network* for each website accessed in order to categorize them and implement the chosen filtering policy. CorePlus caches already looked-up websites locally to maximize look-up performance.

To make use of any of these CorePlus features, a subscription for that feature must be taken out. This is an addition to the standard CorePlus license. Subscribing is done by:

1. Purchasing the required subscription from your Clavister reseller. A subscription can be purchased with a lifetime of 1 year or 3 years. Each subscription is recorded in the central Clavister customer license database and becomes associated with your overall Clavister license.
2. Once your purchase is logged, use the Clavister Customer Web to update your Clavister Security Gateway license. This will cause the central Clavister database to be checked and your local Clavister Security Gateway license will be updated with the subscription information.



Important: DNS servers need to be configured

Make sure at least one external DNS server is correctly configured in CorePlus (see Section 3.9, "DNS") so that the Clavister network servers that provide updates can be located by CorePlus.

Subscription renewal

When any subscription is approaching its expiry date, you will receive notification in the following ways:

- A reminder email will be sent by Clavister to the email address associated with the license.
- Providing a log server has been configured, a log message will be sent which indicates that subscription renewal is required.



Important: Renew subscriptions in good time!

Make sure subscriptions are renewed well before the expiry date. This avoids the possibility of the system becoming unavailable due to license expiry.

IDP and Anti-Virus Database Updating

These services operate by downloading "signature" patterns which are used by CorePlus to search for the most recently recognized security threats in Internet traffic as well as viruses in downloads.

New threats are being identified every day and the signature databases in these modules need to be updated regularly. A subscription means that CorePlus will periodically access a central server and update the copy of the database on the local Clavister Security Gateway with the latest signatures. Database updates can involve as many as 20 signature changes or more in a single day.

By default CorePlus will check for updates every 12 hours. The frequency of checking for updates can be explicitly set. It can be set to zero if updates are not to be done automatically.

Updating with Transparent Mode

If transparent mode is being used then special considerations have to be made so that CorePlus has a way to access the public Internet. This involves setting up "normal" non-switch routes in the routing table to allow. This is described further in *Section 4.8.2, "Enabling Internet Access"*.

Database Console Commands

IDP and Anti-Virus (AV) databases can be controlled directly through a number of console commands.

Pre-empting Database Updates

An IDP database update can be forced at any time by using the command:

```
Device:/> updatecenter -update idp
```

An Anti-Virus update can similarly be initiated with the command:

```
Device:/> updatecenter -update av
```

Querying Update Status

To get the status of IDP updates use the command:

```
Device:/> updatecenter -status idp
```

To get the status of AV updates:

```
Device:/> updatecenter -status av
```

Querying Server Status

To get the status of the Clavister network servers use the command:

```
Device: /> updatecenter -servers
```

Deleting Local Databases

Some technical problem in the operation of either IDP or the Anti-Virus modules may be resolved by deleting the database and reloading. For IDP this is done with the command:

```
Device: /> removedb idp
```

To remove the Anti-Virus database, use the command:

```
Device: /> removedb av
```

Once removed, the entire system should be rebooted and a database update initiated. Removing the database is also recommended if either IDP or Anti-Virus is not used for longer periods of time.



Note: A pause can occur when updating

Anti-Virus database updates may require a couple of seconds to be optimized once an update is downloaded. This will cause the Clavister Security Gateway to sometimes momentarily pause in its operation. This behavior is normal. Deleting the databases can give rise to a similar pause.

Appendix B: IDP Signature Groups

For IDP scanning, the following signature groups are available for selection. There is a version of each group under the three *Types* of **IDS**, **IPS** and **Policy**. For further information see *Section 6.5, "Intrusion Detection and Prevention"*.

Group Name	Intrusion Type
APP_AMANDA	Amanda, a popular backup software
APP_ETHEREAL	Ethereal
APP_ITUNES	Apple iTunes player
APP_REALPLAYER	Media player from RealNetworks
APP_REALSERVER	RealNetworks RealServer player
APP_WINAMP	WinAMP
APP_WMP	MS Windows Media Player
AUTHENTICATION_GENERAL	Authenticantion
AUTHENTICATION_KERBEROS	Kerberos
AUTHENTICATION_XTACACS	XTACACS
BACKUP_ARKEIA	Network backup solution
BACKUP_BRIGHTSTOR	Backup solutions from CA
BACKUP_GENERAL	General backup solutions
BACKUP_NETVAULT	NetVault Backup solution
BACKUP_VERITAS	Backup solutions
BOT_GENERAL	Activities related to bots, including those controlled by IRC channels
BROWSER_FIREFOX	Mozilla Firefox
BROWSER_GENERAL	General attacks targeting web browsers/clients
BROWSER_IE	Microsoft IE
BROWSER_MOZILLA	Mozilla Browser
COMPONENT_ENCODER	Encoders, as part of an attack.
COMPONENT_INFECTION	Infection, as part of an attack
COMPONENT_SHELLCODE	Shell code, as part of the attacks
DB_GENERAL	Database systems
DB_MSSQL	MS SQL Server
DB_MYSQL	MySQL DBMS
DB_ORACLE	Oracle DBMS
DB_SYBASE	Sybase server
DCOM_GENERAL	MS DCOM
DHCP_CLIENT	DHCP Client related activities
DHCP_GENERAL	DHCP protocol
DHCP_SERVER	DHCP Server related activities
DNS_EXPLOIT	DNS attacks
DNS_GENERAL	Domain Name Systems
DNS_OVERFLOW	DNS overflow attack
DNS_QUERY	Query related attacks
ECHO_GENERAL	Echo protocol and implementations
ECHO_OVERFLOW	Echo buffer overflow
FINGER_BACKDOOR	Finger backdoor
FINGER_GENERAL	Finger protocol and implementation
FINGER_OVERFLOW	Overflow for Finger protocol/implementation
FS_AFS	Andrew File System

Group Name	Intrusion Type
FTP_DIRNAME	Directory name attack
FTP_FORMATSTRING	Format string attack
FTP_GENERAL	FTP protocol and implementation
FTP_LOGIN	Login attacks
FTP_OVERFLOW	FTP buffer overflow
GAME_BOMBERCLONE	Bomberclone game
GAME_GENERAL	Generic game servers/clients
GAME_UNREAL	UnReal Game server
HTTP_APACHE	Apache httpd
HTTP_BADBLUE	Badblue web server
HTTP_CGI	HTTP CGI
HTTP_CISCO	Cisco Embedded Web Server
HTTP_GENERAL	General HTTP activities
HTTP_MICROSOFTIIS	HTTP Attacks specific to MS IIS web server
HTTP_OVERFLOWS	Buffer overflow for HTTP servers
HTTP_TOMCAT	Tomcat JSP
ICMP_GENERAL	ICMP protocol and implementation
IGMP_GENERAL	IGMP
IMAP_GENERAL	IMAP protocol/implementation
IM_AOL	AOL IM
IM_GENERAL	Instant Messenger implementations
IM_MSN	MSN Messenger
IM_YAHOO	Yahoo Messenger
IP_GENERAL	IP protocol and implementation
IP_OVERFLOW	Overflow of IP protocol/implementation
IRC_GENERAL	Internet Relay Chat
LDAP_GENERAL	General LDAP clients/servers
LDAP_OPENLDAP	Open LDAP
LICENSE_CA-LICENSE	License management for CA software
LICENSE_GENERAL	General License Manager
MALWARE_GENERAL	Malware attack
METASPLOIT_FRAME	Metasploit frame attack
METASPLOIT_GENERAL	Metasploit general attack
MISC_GENERAL	General attack
MSDTC_GENERAL	MS DTC
MSHELP_GENERAL	Microsoft Windows Help
NETWARE_GENERAL	NetWare Core Protocol
NFS_FORMAT	Format
NFS_GENERAL	NFS protocol/implementation
NNTP_GENERAL	NNTP implementation/protocol
OS_SPECIFIC-AIX	AIX specific
OS_SPECIFIC-GENERAL	OS general
OS_SPECIFIC-HPUX	HP-UX related
OS_SPECIFIC-LINUX	Linux specific
OS_SPECIFIC-SCO	SCO specific
OS_SPECIFIC-SOLARIS	Solaris specific
OS_SPECIFIC-WINDOWS	Windows specific
P2P_EMULE	eMule P2P tool

Group Name	Intrusion Type
P2P_GENERAL	General P2P tools
P2P_GNUTELLA	Gnutella P2P tool
PACKINGTOOLS_GENERAL	General packing tools attack
PBX_GENERAL	PBX
POP3_DOS	Denial of Service for POP
POP3_GENERAL	Post Office Protocol v3
POP3_LOGIN-ATTACKS	Password guessing and related login attack
POP3_OVERFLOW	POP3 server overflow
POP3_REQUEST-ERRORS	Request Error
PORTMAPPER_GENERAL	PortMapper
PRINT_GENERAL	LP printing server: LPR LPD
PRINT_OVERFLOW	Overflow of LPR/LPD protocol/implementation
REMOTEACCESS_GOTOMYPC	Goto MY PC
REMOTEACCESS_PCANYWHERE	PcAnywhere
REMOTEACCESS_RADMIN	Remote Administrator (radmin)
REMOTEACCESS_VNC-CLIENT	Attacks targeting at VNC Clients
REMOTEACCESS_VNC-SERVER	Attack targeting at VNC servers
REMOTEACCESS_WIN-TERMINAL	Windows terminal/Remote Desktop
RLOGIN_GENERAL	RLogin protocol and implementation
RLOGIN_LOGIN-ATTACK	Login attacks
ROUTER_CISCO	Cisco router attack
ROUTER_GENERAL	General router attack
ROUTING_BGP	BGP router protocol
RPC_GENERAL	RPC protocol and implementation
RPC_JAVA-RMI	Java RMI
RSYNC_GENERAL	Rsync
SCANNER_GENERAL	Generic scanners
SCANNER_NESSUS	Nessus Scanner
SECURITY_GENERAL	Anti-virus solutions
SECURITY_ISS	Internet Security Systems software
SECURITY_MCAFFEE	McAfee
SECURITY_NAV	Symantec AV solution
SMB_ERROR	SMB Error
SMB_EXPLOIT	SMB Exploit
SMB_GENERAL	SMB attacks
SMB_NETBIOS	NetBIOS attacks
SMB_WORMS	SMB worms
SMTP_COMMAND-ATTACK	SMTP command attack
SMTP_DOS	Denial of Service for SMTP
SMTP_GENERAL	SMTP protocol and implementation
SMTP_OVERFLOW	SMTP Overflow
SMTP_SPAM	SPAM
SNMP_ENCODING	SNMP encoding
SNMP_GENERAL	SNMP protocol/implementation
SOCKS_GENERAL	SOCKS protocol and implementation
SSH_GENERAL	SSH protocol and implementation
SSH_LOGIN-ATTACK	Password guess and related login attacks
SSH_OPENSSH	OpenSSH Server

Group Name	Intrusion Type
SSL_GENERAL	SSL protocol and implementation
TCP_GENERAL	TCP protocol and implementation
TCP_PPTP	Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
TELNET_GENERAL	Telnet protocol and implementation
TELNET_OVERFLOW	Telnet buffer overflow attack
TFTP_DIR_NAME	Directory Name attack
TFTP_GENERAL	TFTP protocol and implementation
TFTP_OPERATION	Operation Attack
TFTP_OVERFLOW	TFTP buffer overflow attack
TFTP_REPLY	TFTP Reply attack
TFTP_REQUEST	TFTP request attack
TROJAN_GENERAL	Trojan
UDP_GENERAL	General UDP
UDP_POPUP	Pop-up window for MS Windows
UPNP_GENERAL	UPNP
VERSION_CVS	CVS
VERSION_SVN	Subversion
VIRUS_GENERAL	Virus
VOIP_GENERAL	VoIP protocol and implementation
VOIP_SIP	SIP protocol and implementation
WEB_CF-FILE-INCLUSION	Coldfusion file inclusion
WEB_FILE-INCLUSION	File inclusion
WEB_GENERAL	Web application attacks
WEB_JSP-FILE-INCLUSION	JSP file inclusion
WEB_PACKAGES	Popular web application packages
WEB_PHP-XML-RPC	PHP XML RPC
WEB_SQL-INJECTION	SQL Injection
WEB_XSS	Cross-Site-Scripting
WINS_GENERAL	MS WINS Service
WORM_GENERAL	Worms
X_GENERAL	Generic X applications

Appendix C: Verified MIME filetypes

Some CorePlus Application Layer Gateways (ALGs) have the optional ability to verify that the contents of a downloaded file matches the type that the filetype in the filename indicates. The filetypes for which MIME verification can be done are listed in this appendix and the ALGs to which this applies are:

- The HTTP ALG
- The FTP ALG
- The POP3 ALG
- The SMTP ALG

The ALGs listed above also offer the option to explicitly allow or block certain filetypes as downloads from a list of types. That list is the same one found in this appendix.

For a more detailed description of MIME verification and the filetype block/allow feature, see *Section 6.2.2, "The HTTP ALG"*.

Filetype extension	Application
3ds	3d Studio files
3gp	3GPP multimedia file
aac	MPEG-2 Advanced Audio Coding File
ab	Applix Builder
ace	ACE archive
ad3	Dec systems compressed Voice File
ag	Applix Graphic file
aiff, aif	Audio Interchange file
am	Applix SHELF Macro
arc	Archive file
alz	ALZip compressed file
avi	Audio Video Interleave file
arj	Compressed archive
ark	QuArk compressed file archive
arq	Compressed archive
as	Applix Spreadsheet file
asf	Advanced Streaming Format file
avr	Audio Visual Research Sound
aw	Applix Word file
bh	Blackhole archive format file
bmp	Windows Bitmap Graphics
box	VBOX voice message file
bsa	BSARC Compressed archive
bz, bz2	Bzip UNIX compressed file
cab	Microsoft Cabinet file
cdr	Corel Vector Graphic Drawing file
cgm	Computer Graphics Metafile
chz	ChArc compressed file archive
class	Java byte code

Filetype extension	Application
cmf	Creative Music file
core/coredump	Unix core dump
cpl	Windows Control Panel Extension file
dbm	Database file
dcx	Graphics Multipage PCX Bitmap file
deb	Debian Linux Package file
djvu	DjVu file
dll	Windows dynamic link library file
dpa	DPA archive data
dvi	TeX Device Independent Document
eet	EET archive
egg	Allegro datafile
elc	eMacs Lisp Byte-compiled Source Code
emd	ABT EMD Module/Song Format file
esp	ESP archive data
exe	Windows Executable
fgf	Free Graphics Format file
flac	Free Lossless Audio Codec file
flc	FLIC Animated Picture
fli	FLIC Animation
flv	Macromedia Flash Video
gdbm	Database file
gif	Graphic Interchange Format file
gzip, gz, tgz	Gzip compressed archive
hap	HAP archive data
hpk	HPack compressed file archive
hqx	Macintosh BinHex 4 compressed archive
icc	Kodak Color Management System, ICC Profile
icm	Microsoft ICM Color Profile file
ico	Windows Icon file
imf	Imago Orpheus module sound data
Inf	Sidplay info file
it	Impulse Tracker Music Module
java	Java source code
jar	Java JAR archive
jng	JNG Video Format
jpg, jpeg, jpe, jff, jfif, jif	JPEG file
jrc	Jrchive compressed archive
jsw	Just System Word Processor Ichitaro
kdelnk	KDE link file
lha	LHA compressed archive file
lim	Limit compressed archive
lisp	LIM archive data
lzh	LZH compressed archive file
md	MDCD compressed archive file
mdb	Microsoft Access Database
mid,midi	Musical Instrument Digital Interface MIDI-sequence Sound
mmf	Yamaha SMAF Synthetic Music Mobile Application Format

Filetype extension	Application
mng	Multi-image Network Graphic Animation
mod	Ultratracker module sound data
mp3	MPEG Audio Stream, Layer III
mp4	MPEG-4 Video file
mpg, mpeg	MPEG 1 System Stream , Video file
mpv	MPEG-1 Video file
Microsoft files	Microsoft office files, and other Microsoft files
msa	Atari MSA archive data
niff, nif	Navy Interchange file Format Bitmap
noa	Nancy Video CODEC
nsf	NES Sound file
obj, o	Windows object file, linux object file
ocx	Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) Control Extension
ogg	Ogg Vorbis Codec compressed WAV file
out	Linux executable
pac	CrossePAC archive data
pbf	Portable Bitmap Format Image
pbm	Portable Bitmap Graphic
pdf	Acrobat Portable Document Format
pe	Portable Executable file
pfb	PostScript Type 1 Font
pgm	Portable Graymap Graphic
pkg	SysV R4 PKG Datastreams
pll	PAKLeo archive data
pma	PMarc archive data
png	Portable (Public) Network Graphic
ppm	PBM Portable Pixelmap Graphic
ps	PostScript file
psa	PSA archive data
psd	Photoshop Format file
qt, mov, moov	QuickTime Movie file
qxd	QuarkXpress Document
ra, ram	RealMedia Streaming Media
rar	WinRAR compressed archive
rbs	ReBirth Song file
riff, rif	Microsoft Audio file
rm	RealMedia Streaming Media
rpm	RedHat Package Manager
rtf, wri	Rich Text Format file
sar	Streamline compressed archive
sbi	SoundBlaster instrument data
sc	SC spreadsheet
sgi	Silicon Graphics IRIS Graphic file
sid	Commodore64 (C64) Music file (SID file)
sit	Stuffit archives
sky	SKY compressed archive
snd, au	Sun/NeXT audio file
so	UNIX Shared Library file

Filetype extension	Application
sof	ReSOF archive
sqw	SQWEZ archive data
sqz	Squeeze It archive data
stm	Scream Tracker v2 Module
svg	Scalable Vector Graphics file
svr4	SysV R4 PKG Datastreams
swf	Macromedia Flash Format file
tar	Tape archive file
tfm	TeX font metric data
tiff, tif	Tagged Image Format file
tnef	Transport Neutral Encapsulation Format
torrent	BitTorrent Metainfo file
ttf	TrueType Font
txw	Yamaha TX Wave audio files
ufa	UFA archive data
vcf	Vcard file
viv	VivoActive Player Streaming Video file
wav	Waveform Audio
wk	Lotus 1-2-3 document
wmv	Windows Media file
wrl, vrmf	Plain Text VRML file
xcf	GIMP Image file
xm	Fast Tracker 2 Extended Module , audio file
xml	XML file
xmcd	xmcd database file for kscd
xpm	BMC Software Patrol UNIX Icon file
yc	YAC compressed archive
zif	ZIF image
zip	Zip compressed archive file
zoo	ZOO compressed archive file
zpk	ZPack archive data
z	Unix compressed file

Appendix D: The OSI Framework

Overview

The Open Systems Interconnection Model defines a framework for inter-computer communications. It categorizes different protocols for a great variety of network applications into seven smaller, more manageable layers. The model describes how data from an application in one computer can be transferred through a network medium to an application on another computer.

Control of data traffic is passed from one layer to the next, starting at the application layer in one computer, proceeding to the bottom layer, traversing over the medium to another computer and then delivering up to the top of the hierarchy. Each layer handles a certain set of protocols, so that the tasks for achieving an application can be distributed to different layers and be implemented independently. The model is relevant to understanding the operation of many CorePlus features such as ARP, Services and ALGs.

Layer number	Layer purpose
Layer 7	Application
Layer 6	Presentation
Layer 5	Session
Layer 4	Transport
Layer 3	Network
Layer 2	Data-Link
Layer 1	Physical

Figure D.1. The 7 Layers of the OSI Model

Layer Functions

The different layers perform the following functions:

- Layer 7 - Application Layer** Defines the user interface that supports applications directly. Protocols: HTTP, FTP, TFTP, DNS, SMTP, Telnet, SNMP and similar. The ALGs operate at this level.
- Layer 6 - Presentation Layer** Translates the various applications to uniform network formats that the rest of the layers can understand.
- Layer 5 - Session Layer** Establishes, maintains and terminates sessions across the network. Protocols: NetBIOS, RPC and similar.
- Layer 4 - Transport Layer** Controls data flow and provides error-handling. Protocols: TCP, UDP and similar.
- Layer 3 - Network Layer** Performs addressing and routing. Protocols: IP, OSPF, ICMP, IGMP and similar.
- Layer 2 - Data-Link Layer** Creates frames of data for transmission over the physical layer and includes error checking/correction. Protocols: Ethernet, PPP and similar. ARP operates at this level.
- Layer 1 - Physical Layer** Defines the physical hardware connection.

Alphabetical Index

A

- access rules, 298
- accounting, 70
 - interim messages, 72
 - limitations with NAT, 73
 - messages, 70
 - system shutdowns, 73
- address book, 101
 - ethernet addresses in, 104
 - folders, 106
 - IP addresses in, 102
- address groups, 105
 - excluding addresses, 105
- address translation, 403
- admin account, 31
 - changing password for, 42
 - multiple logins, 31
- advanced settings
 - ARP, 149
 - connection timeout, 592
 - DHCP relay, 292
 - DHCP server, 286
 - Ethernet, 124
 - fragmentation, 597
 - fragment reassembly, 601
 - general, 580
 - hardware monitoring, 82
 - high availability, 578
 - ICMP, 589
 - IP level, 580
 - IPsec, 496
 - L2TP/PPTP, 507
 - length limit, 594
 - logging, 68
 - memory monitoring, 84
 - RADIUS, 74
 - remote management, 53
 - routing, 202
 - SNMP, 81
 - SSL, 602
 - state, 590
 - TCP level, 584
 - transparent mode, 280
 - VLAN, 130
 - Alarm Repetition Interval setting, 68
 - Alert Level setting, 84
- ALG, 302
 - deploying, 302
 - FTP, 306
 - H.323, 340
 - HTTP, 303
 - POP3, 326
 - PPTP, 326
 - SIP, 328
 - SMTP, 317
 - spam filtering, 320
 - TFTP, 316
 - TLS, 356
- algorithm proposal list (see proposal lists)
- all-nets IP object, 106, 153
- Allow IP rule, 156
- Allow on error (RADIUS) setting, 74
- Allow TCP Reopen setting, 588
- amplification attacks, 397
- anonymizing internet traffic, 409
- anti-spam filtering (see spam filtering)
- anti-virus scanning, 379
 - activating, 380
 - database, 381
 - fail mode behaviour, 381
 - in the FTP ALG, 310
 - in the HTTP ALG, 304
 - in the POP3 ALG, 326
 - in the SMTP ALG, 317
 - memory requirements, 379
 - relationship with IDP, 380
 - simultaneous scans, 379
 - subscription, 607
- application layer gateway (see ALG)
- ARP, 143
 - advanced settings, 148, 149
 - cache, 143
 - gratuitous, 197
 - proxy, 203
 - publish, 146
 - static, 145
 - xpublish, 146
- ARP Broadcast setting, 150
- ARP Cache Size setting, 144, 150
- ARP Changes setting, 150
- ARP Expire setting, 144, 150
- ARP Expire Unknown setting, 144, 150
- ARP Hash Size setting, 145, 151
- ARP Hash Size VLAN setting, 145, 151
- ARP IP Collision setting, 151
- ARP Match Ethernet Sender setting, 149
- ARP Multicast setting, 150
- ARP poll interval setting, 202
- ARP Query No Sender setting, 149
- ARP Requests setting, 149
- ARP Sender IP setting, 149
- authentication, 429
 - administrators group, 432
 - auditors group, 432
 - databases, 431
 - HTTP, 443
 - local database, 431
 - rules, 440
 - setup summary, 431
 - source, 441
 - SSH client key usage, 433
 - using groups with IP rules, 431
 - using LDAP, 433
 - using RADIUS, 433
 - XAuth, 440
- Auto Add Multicast Route setting, 264
- autonomous system (see OSPF)
- Auto Save Interval (DHCP) setting, 293
- Auto Save Policy (DHCP) setting, 293
- auto-update, 91

B

- backing up configurations, 92
- bandwidth guarantees, 532
- banner files
 - in user authentication, 447
 - in web content filtering, 376
- blacklisting
 - hosts and networks, 400

- threshold rules, 549
- URLs, 361
- wildcarding, 361
- with IDP, 392
- Block 0000 Src setting, 581
- Block 0 Net setting, 581
- Block 127 Net setting, 581
- blocking applications with IDP, 385
- Block Multicast Src setting, 581
- boot menu (see console boot menu)
- BOOTP, 291
- BPDU relaying, 278
- Broadcast Enet Sender setting, 281
- broadcast IP address, 182

C

- CAM Size setting, 280
- CAM To L3 Cache Dest Learning setting, 280
- CA servers
 - access, 510
 - client access, 511
 - FQDN resolution, 512
- certificates, 167
 - CA authority, 167
 - certificate requests, 170
 - identification lists, 477
 - revocation list, 168
 - self-signed, 169, 457, 484
 - validity, 168
 - with IPsec, 460
 - VPN troubleshooting, 514
- certification exams, 19
- chains (in traffic shaping), 522
- Clavister logger, 65
- CLI, 29, 36
 - changing admin password, 42
 - command history, 38
 - command structure, 37
 - help command, 37
 - indexing, 39
 - multiple property values, 39
 - name references, 40
 - object category, 38
 - object context, 38
 - object type, 37
 - prompt change, 43
 - secure shell, 41
 - serial console access, 53
 - tab completion, 38
 - tab completion of data, 38
 - using hostnames, 40
- CLI scripts, 45
 - automatic creation, 47
 - command ordering, 46
 - error handling, 46
 - executing, 45
 - file naming, 45, 48
 - listing, 47
 - removing, 47
 - saving, 47
 - security gateway script (.sgs), 45
 - uploading with SCP, 50
 - validation, 46
 - variables, 46
 - verbose output, 46
- cluster (see high availability)
- cluster ID (see high availability)

- command line interface (see CLI)
- config mode, 487
- configuration object groups, 159
 - and folders, 163
 - and the CLI, 160
 - editing properties of, 161
- configurations, 55
 - checking integrity, 43
 - revision numbers, 61
- connection limiting (see threshold rules)
- connection number limit, 99
- connection rate limiting (see threshold rules)
- Connection Replace setting, 99, 590
- Consecutive fails setting, 203
- Consecutive success setting, 203
- console
 - boot menu, 51
 - changing password, 51
 - enabling password, 51
 - line speed, 41
 - password length, 51
- content filtering, 360
 - active content, 360
 - audit mode, 367
 - categories, 370
 - dynamic (WCF), 363
 - override, 368
 - phishing, 374
 - setting up, 365
 - site reclassification, 368
 - spam, 376
 - static, 361
- content filtering HTML
 - customizing, 376
- core interface, 117, 153
- core routes, 195
- crashdump CLI command, 86
- Critical Level setting, 84
- customer web, 97
 - transparent mode access, 272, 608

D

- date and time, 172
- dconsole CLI command, 85
- Deactivate Before Reconf (HA) setting, 578
- Decrement TTL setting, 280
- default access rule, 192, 298
- Default TTL setting, 582
- demilitarized zone (see DMZ)
- denial of service, 395
- destination RLB algorithm, 212
- DHCP, 284
 - leases, 284
 - multiple servers, 285
 - over ethernet, 120
 - relay advanced settings, 292
 - relaying, 291
 - server advanced settings, 286
 - server lease mappings, 287
 - servers, 285
 - static host assignment, 288
- DHCP_AllowGlobalBcast setting, 125
- DHCP_DisableArpOnOffer setting, 125
- DHCP_MinimumLeaseTime setting, 125
- DHCP_UseLinkLocalIP setting, 125
- DHCP_ValidateBcast setting, 125
- DH groups, 471

diagnostic tools, 85
 dconsole CLI command, 85
 diagnostic console, 85
 pcapdump CLI command, 86
 selftest CLI command, 88
 stat CLI command, 85
 diffie-hellman (see DH Groups)
 diffserv, 521
 VLAN DSCP forwarding, 130
 Directed Broadcasts setting, 583
 distance vector algorithms, 228
 DMZ, 415
 DNS, 179
 DHCP server assignment, 184
 dynamic lookup, 180
 manual configuration, 184
 DNS black lists for Spam filtering, 320
 documentation, 19
 DoS attack (see denial of service)
 downloading files with SCP, 49
 DPD Expire Time (IPsec) setting, 499
 DPD Keep Time (IPsec) setting, 498
 DPD Metric (IPsec) setting, 498
 drop all IP rule, 154
 Drop IP rule, 156
 Dropped Fragments setting, 598
 DSCP, 521
 forwarding to VLANs, 130
 in setting precedence, 529
 DST End Date setting, 177
 DST Offset setting, 177
 DST Start Date setting, 177
 Duplicated Fragment Data setting, 597
 Duplicate Fragments setting, 598
 dynamic balancing (in pipes), 535
 Dynamic CAM Size setting, 280
 dynamic DNS, 180
 Dynamic High Buffers setting, 604
 checking after upgrades, 91
 Dynamic L3C Size setting, 280
 Dynamic Max Connections setting, 591
 dynamic routing rules, 242, 244
 OSPF action, 245
 routing action, 245
 DynDNS service, 180

E

education, 19
 Enable Sensors setting, 82
 end of life procedures, 94
 ESMTMP extensions, 319
 ethernet interface, 118
 advanced settings, 124
 changing IP addresses, 122
 CLI command summary, 123
 default gateway, 120
 detecting new interfaces, 95
 IP address, 119
 with DHCP, 120
 VMware virtual interfaces, 122
 evaluation mode, 96
 evasion attack prevention, 388
 events, 62
 log message receivers, 63
 log messages, 62

F

Failed Fragment Reassembly setting, 598
 filetype download block/allow
 in FTP ALG, 309
 in HTTP ALG, 304
 Flood Reboot Time setting, 604
 folders
 with IP rules, 158
 with the address book, 106
 Fragmented ICMP setting, 599
 FTP ALG, 306
 command restrictions, 309
 connection restriction options, 308
 control channel restrictions, 309
 filetype checking, 309
 hybrid mode, 307
 server IP setup for passive, 316
 virus scanning, 310
 FwdFast IP rule, 156
 exclusion from traffic shaping, 524
 with multiplex rules, 255

G

Generic Router Encapsulation (see GRE)
 Grace time setting, 202
 gratuitous ARP generation, 200
 Gratuitous ARP on fail setting, 200, 203
 GRE, 134
 additional checksum, 134
 and IP rules, 135
 setting up, 134
 tunnel IP address advantages, 134
 Grouping interval setting, 178
 groups
 configuration objects, 159
 in authentication, 431
 in pipes, 533

H

H.323 ALG, 340
 HA (see high availability)
 hardware fault troubleshooting, 88
 hardware monitoring, 82
 availability, 82
 heartbeats (see high availability)
 high availability, 561
 advanced settings, 578
 cluster ID, 573
 disabling heartbeat sending, 564
 heartbeats, 564
 in demonstration mode, 562
 issues, 573
 licensing, 562
 link monitor usage, 577
 making OSPF work, 574
 mechanisms, 564
 physical interconnection, 562
 resynchronizing units, 566
 setting up, 567
 slave becomes master, 570
 swapping out the master, 570
 sync failure, 565
 unique shared MAC, 572
 upgrading CorePlus, 575

- with IDP and anti-virus, 565
 - with transparent mode, 271
 - wizard setup, 569
 - High Buffers setting, 604
 - host monitoring
 - for route failover, 200
 - for server load balancing, 554
 - HTML pages
 - content filtering customizing, 376
 - user auth customizing, 447
 - HTTP
 - ALG, 303
 - authentication, 443
 - whitelist precedence, 305
 - HTTP poster, 180
 - HTTPS Certificate setting, 55
 - HTTP URI normalization in IDP, 387
- I**
- ICMP Sends Per Sec Limit setting, 589
 - ICMP Unreachable message, 68, 156
 - IDENT and IP rules, 156
 - identification lists, 477
 - IDP, 385
 - HTTP URI normalization, 387
 - signature groups, 390
 - signatures, 389
 - signature wildcarding, 391
 - subscription, 607
 - subscriptions, 386
 - traffic shaping, 543
 - ifaceMon_BelowCPULoad setting, 126
 - ifaceMon_BelowfaceLoad setting, 127
 - ifaceMon_e1000 setting, 126
 - ifaceMon_ErrorTime setting, 127
 - ifaceMon_MinInterval setting, 127
 - ifaceMon_RxErrorPerc setting, 127
 - ifaceMon_TxErrorPerc setting, 127
 - iface poll interval setting, 202
 - IGMP, 253
 - advanced settings, 264
 - configuration, 259
 - rules configuration, 262
 - IGMP Before Rules setting, 264
 - IGMP Idle Lifetime setting, 592
 - IGMP Last Member Query Interval setting, 265
 - IGMP Lowest Compatible Version setting, 265
 - IGMP Max Interface Requests setting, 265
 - IGMP Max Total Requests setting, 265
 - IGMP Query Interval setting, 265
 - IGMP Query Response Interval setting, 266
 - IGMP React To Own Queries setting, 265
 - IGMP Robustness Variable setting, 266
 - IGMP Router Version setting, 265
 - IGMP Startup Query Count setting, 266
 - IGMP Startup Query Interval setting, 266
 - IGMP Unsolicited Report Interval setting, 266
 - IKE, 465
 - algorithm proposals, 466
 - lifetimes, 466
 - negotiation, 466
 - parameters, 467
 - IKE CRL Validity Time setting, 497
 - IKE Max CA Path setting, 498
 - IKE Send CRLs setting, 497
 - IKE Send Initial Contact setting, 497
 - ikesnoop VPN troubleshooting, 489, 515
 - Illegal Fragments setting, 597
 - InControl™, 29
 - Initial Silence (HA) setting, 578
 - insertion attack prevention, 388
 - Interface Alias (SNMP) setting, 81
 - Interface Description (SNMP) setting, 81
 - interfaces, 116
 - disabling, 118
 - groups, 141
 - loopback, 117, 117, 138
 - physical, 116
 - internet access setup, 181
 - internet key exchange (see IKE)
 - Interval between synchronization setting, 178
 - intrusion, detection and prevention (see IDP)
 - intrusion detection rule, 387
 - invalid checksum
 - in cluster heartbeats, 574
 - IP address objects, 106
 - broadcast IP, 182
 - IP Option Sizes setting, 582
 - IP Options Other setting, 583
 - IP Option Source/Return setting, 582
 - IP Options Timestamps setting, 582
 - IP pools, 294
 - with config mode, 487
 - IP Reserved Flag setting, 583
 - IP router alert option setting, 582
 - IP rules, 152
 - bi-directional connections, 156
 - IP rule set, 152
 - duplicate naming, 40
 - evaluation order, 155
 - folders, 158
 - loop avoidance, 157
 - multiple rule sets, 157
 - IPsec, 465
 - advanced settings, 496
 - algorithm proposal lists, 474
 - and IP rules, 480
 - clients, 460
 - dead peer detection, 481
 - keep-alive, 481
 - LAN to LAN setup, 456
 - overview, 465
 - quick start guide, 455
 - roaming clients setup, 458
 - troubleshooting, 513
 - tunnel establishment, 480
 - tunnels, 480
 - IPsec Before Rules setting, 497
 - usage, 480
 - IPsec Certificate Cache Max setting, 498
 - IPsec Gateway Name Cache Time setting, 498
 - IPsec Max Rules setting, 496
 - IPsec Max Tunnels setting, 497
 - ip validation
 - with config mode, 487
 - ISP connection setup, 181
- L**
- L2TP, 500
 - advanced settings, 507
 - client, 507
 - quick start guide, 461
 - server, 501
 - L2TP Before Rules setting, 507

- L3 Cache Size setting, 280
- LAN to LAN tunnels, 482
 - quick start guide, 456, 457
- Large Buffers (reassembly) setting, 601
- Layer Size Consistency setting, 582
- LDAP
 - authentication, 433
 - authentication with PPP, 438
 - MS Active Directory, 434
 - servers, 489
- licenses, 96
 - license files, 97
 - upload causing restart, 99
 - uploading license files, 98
 - VMware, 97
- link monitor, 76
 - initializing NICs, 77
 - Reconf Failover Time, 77
 - with high availability, 577
- link state algorithms, 228
- Local Console Timeout setting, 54
- local IP address in routes, 190
- lockdown mode, 98
- Log Checksum Errors setting, 580
- Log Connections setting, 590
- Log Connection Usage setting, 591
- logging, 62
 - advanced settings, 68
 - Clavister logger, 65
 - memlog, 63
 - SNMP traps, 66
 - syslog, 64
- login authentication, 440
- log messages, 62
 - changing severity, 67
 - customizing, 67
 - log message exceptions, 68
 - severity filter, 68
- Log non IP4 setting, 581
- Log Open Fails setting, 590
- Logout at shutdown (RADIUS) setting, 73, 74
- logout from CLI, 43
- Log Oversized Packets setting, 595
- Log Received TTL 0 setting, 581
- Log Reverse Opens setting, 590
- Log State Violations setting, 590
- loopback interfaces, 117, 117, 138
 - parameters, 138
 - setting up, 139
- Low Broadcast TTL Action setting, 583

M

- MAC addresses, 143
- management interfaces, 29
 - advanced settings, 53
 - configuring remote access, 44
- managing CorePlus, 29
- Max AH Length setting, 594
- Max Auto Routes (DHCP) setting, 293
- Max Concurrent (reassembly) setting, 601
- Max Connections (reassembly) setting, 604
- Max Connections setting, 591
- Max ESP Length setting, 594
- Max GRE Length setting, 594
- Max Hops (DHCP) setting, 293
- Max ICMP Length setting, 594
- Max IPIP/FWZ Length setting, 595

- Max IPsec IPComp Length setting, 595
- Max L2TP Length setting, 595
- Max lease Time (DHCP) setting, 293
- Max Memory (reassembly) setting, 605
- Max OSPF Length setting, 595
- Max Other Length setting, 595
- Max Pipe Users setting, 605
- Max PPM (DHCP) setting, 292
- Max PPP Resends setting, 507
- Max Radius Contexts setting, 74
- Max Reassembly Time Limit setting, 599
- max sessions
 - services parameter, 111
- Max Size (reassembly) setting, 601
- Max SKIP Length setting, 595
- Max TCP Length setting, 594
- Max time drift setting, 178
- Max Transactions (DHCP) setting, 292
- Max UDP Length setting, 594
- memlog, 63
- Memory Log Repetition setting, 84
- memory monitoring, 84
- Memory Poll Interval setting, 84
- Memory Use Percent setting, 84
- MIME filetype verification
 - in FTP ALG, 309
 - in HTTP ALG, 304
 - in POP3 ALG, 326
 - in SMTP ALG, 317
 - list of filetypes, 614
- Min Broadcast TTL setting, 583
- Minimum Fragment Length setting, 599
- MPLS, 279
 - pass through, 279
- multicast, 253
 - address translation, 257
 - forwarding, 254
 - IGMP, 259
 - reverse path forwarding, 253
- Multicast Enet Sender setting, 281
- Multicast Mismatch setting, 583
- multicast on ethernet, 120
- Multicast TTL on Low setting, 581
- multiple IP rule sets (see IP rule set)
- multiple login authentication, 440
- multiplex rules, 254
 - creating with CLI, 256
- multi-protocol label switching (see MPLS)

N

- NAT, 405
 - anonymizing with, 409
 - IP rules, 156
 - pools, 411
 - stateful pools, 411
- NetCon Before Rules setting, 54
- NetCon Idle Timeout setting, 54
- NetConMaxChannels setting, 54
- network address translation (see NAT)
- network interface card (see ethernet interface)
- new release notifications, 91
- NTP (see time synchronization)
- Null Enet Sender setting, 281

O

- open shortest path first (see OSPF)

OSPF, 228

- aggregates, 233, 241
- areas, 231, 238
- autonomous system, 231
- checking deployment, 248
- command, 248
- concepts, 231
- dynamic routing rules, 242
- interface, 239
- neighbors, 241
- router process, 236
- setting up, 245
- virtual links, 233, 242

Other Idle Lifetimes setting, 593

overriding content filtering, 368

P

packet flow

- full description, 24
- simplified, 154

password length, 42, 51

pcapdump CLI command, 86

- downloading output files, 87
- output file naming, 88

pcap file format (see pcapdump CLI command)

pciscan CLI command, 94

phishing (see content filtering)

Ping Idle Lifetime setting, 592

Ping poll interval setting, 202

pipe rules, 523

pipes, 522

policies, 152

policy based routing, 206

Poll Interval setting, 82

POP3 ALG, 326

Port 0 setting, 604

port address translation, 424

port forwarding (see SAT)

port mirroring (see pcapdump CLI command)

PPP authentication with LDAP, 438

PPPoE, 131

- client configuration, 132
- unnumbered support, 132

PPTP, 500

advanced settings, 507

ALG, 326

client, 507

problem with NAT, 508

quick start guide, 463

server, 500

PPTP Before Rules setting, 507

precedences

- in pipes, 529

pre-shared keys, 456, 475

- non-ascii character problem, 475

Primary Time Server setting, 177

product overview, 16

proposal lists, 474

proxy ARP, 203

- setting up, 203

Pseudo Reass Max Concurrent setting, 597

Q

QoS (see quality of service)

quality of service, 521

R

RADIUS

accounting, 70

advanced settings, 74

authentication, 433

real-time alerts, 76

real-time monitoring

- with Spam filtering, 324

Reassembly Done Limit setting, 599

Reassembly Illegal Limit setting, 600

Reassembly Timeout setting, 599

Reconf Failover Time (HA) setting, 77, 578

Reject IP rule, 156

Relay MPLS setting, 279, 282

Relay Spanning-tree BPDUs setting, 279, 282

restore to factory defaults, 93

restoring configuration backups, 92

reverse path forwarding (see multicast)

reverse route lookup, 154, 192, 298

Ringsize_e100_rx setting, 126

Ringsize_e100_tx setting, 126

Ringsize_e1000_rx setting, 125

Ringsize_e1000_tx setting, 125

Ringsize_yukon_rx setting, 126

Ringsize_yukon_tx setting, 126

Ringsize_yukonii_rx setting, 126

Ringsize_yukonii_tx setting, 126

roaming clients, 482

roundrobin RLB algorithm, 212

route failover, 197

- host monitoring, 200

route load balancing, 212

- algorithms, 212

- and VPN, 218

- between ISPs, 215

route notation, 193

routing, 187

- advanced settings, 202

- default gateway route, 120, 195

- dynamic, 228

- local IP address, 190

- metric for default routes, 195

- metrics, 188, 230

- monitoring, 197

- principles, 188

- routes added at startup, 195

- static, 188

- the all-nets route, 195

routing table membership, 207

S

SA (see security association)

SafeStream, 381

SAT, 415

- all-to-1 mapping, 424

- IP rules, 156

- multiple address translation, 421

- multiplex rule, 254

- port forwarding, 415

- second rule destination, 415

schedules, 164

SCP, 49

Screen Saver Selection setting, 605

scripting (see CLI scripts)

Secondary Time Server setting, 178

secure copy (see SCP)
 SecuRemoteUDP Compatibility setting, 582
 secure shell (see SSH)
 security/transport enabled option, 142
 security association, 465
 selftest CLI command, 88
 -burnin option, 89
 Send Limit setting, 68
 serial console (see console)
 serial console port, 40
 server load balancing, 550
 connection-rate algorithm, 551
 idle timeout setting, 552
 max slots setting, 552
 net size setting, 552
 round-robin algorithm, 551
 server monitoring, 554
 with FwdFast rules, 556
 service based routing, 206
 services, 107
 and ALGs, 110
 creating custom, 109
 custom IP protocol, 113
 custom timeouts, 114
 group, 114
 ICMP, 112
 max sessions, 111
 pass ICMP errors, 110
 specifying all services, 111
 specifying port number, 109
 SYN flood protection, 110
 sessionmanager CLI command, 44
 SG10 limitations, 149
 sgs file extension, 45
 Silently Drop State ICMPErrors setting, 589
 simple network management protocol (see SNMP)
 SIP
 ALG, 328
 and traffic shaping, 328
 and virtual routing, 331
 record-route, 330
 SLB (see server load balancing)
 SMTP
 ALG, 317
 ESMTP extensions, 319
 header verification, 323
 whitelist precedence, 318
 SNMP, 78
 advanced settings, 81
 community string, 79
 MIB, 79
 traps, 66
 with IP rules, 79
 SNMP Before Rules setting, 81
 SNMP Request Limit setting, 80, 81
 source based routing, 206
 spam filtering, 320
 caching, 324
 logging, 323
 tagging, 322
 spam WCF category, 376
 spanning tree relaying, 278
 spillover RLB algorithm, 212
 spoofing, 299
 SSH, 41
 SSH Before Rules setting, 53
 SSH client keys, 433
 SSL acceleration, 357

SSL Processing Priority setting, 602
 stat CLI command, 85
 state-engine, 20
 packet flow, 24
 stateful inspection (see state-engine)
 stateful NAT pools (see NAT)
 Static address translation (see SAT)
 Static ARP Changes setting, 150
 Status Bar setting, 605
 Strip DontFragment setting, 583
 subscriptions, 607
 switch routes (see transparent mode)
 Sync Buffer Size (HA) setting, 578
 Sync Pkt Max Burst (HA) setting, 578
 SYN flood protection, 110, 398
 syslog, 64
 System Contact (SNMP) setting, 81
 System Location (SNMP) setting, 81
 System Name (SNMP) setting, 81

T

tab completion (see CLI)
 TCP Auto Clamping setting, 584
 TCP ECN setting, 587
 TCP FIN/URG setting, 587
 TCP FIN Idle Lifetime setting, 592
 TCP Idle Lifetime setting, 592
 TCP MSS Log Level setting, 584
 TCP MSS Max setting, 584
 TCP MSS Min setting, 584
 TCP MSS On High setting, 584
 TCP MSS on Low setting, 584
 TCP MSS VPN Max setting, 584
 TCP NULL setting, 587
 TCP Option ALTCHKDATA setting, 586
 TCP Option ALTCHKREQ setting, 585
 TCP Option Con Timeout setting, 586
 TCP Option Other setting, 586
 TCP Option SACK setting, 585
 TCP Option Sizes setting, 584
 TCP Option TSOPT setting, 585
 TCP Option WSOPT setting, 585
 TCP Reserved Field setting, 587
 TCP Sequence Numbers setting, 587
 TCP SYN/FIN setting, 587
 TCP SYN/PSH setting, 586
 TCP SYN/RST setting, 586
 TCP SYN/URG setting, 586
 TCP SYN Idle Lifetime setting, 592
 TCP URG setting, 587
 TCP Zero Unused ACK setting, 585
 TCP Zero Unused URG setting, 585
 Teriary Time Server setting, 178
 TFTP ALG, 316
 threshold rules, 548
 Timeout setting, 605
 time synchronization, 174
 Time Sync Server Type setting, 177
 Time Zone setting, 177
 TLS ALG, 356
 TLS RSA 3DES 168 SHA1 setting, 602
 TLS RSA EXPORT 1024 RC2 40 MD5 setting, 602
 TLS RSA EXPORT 1024 RC4 40 MD5 setting, 602
 TLS RSA EXPORT 1024 RC4 56 SHA1 setting, 602
 TLS RSA EXPORT NULL MD5 setting, 602
 TLS RSA EXPORT NULL SHA1 setting, 602
 TLS RSA RC4 128 MD5 setting, 602

TLS RSA RC4 128 SHA1 setting, 602
 traffic shaping, 521

- bandwidth guarantees, 532
- bandwidth limiting, 525
- for VPNs, 536
- FwdFast IP rule exclusion, 524
- objectives, 522
- pipe groups, 533
- precedences, 529
- recommendations, 536
- summary, 538
- with IDP, 543

Transaction Timeout (DHCP) setting, 292

Transparency ATS Expire setting, 280

Transparency ATS Size setting, 280

transparent mode, 267

- advanced settings, 280
- and internet access, 271
- and NAT, 273
- grouping IP addresses, 273
- implementation, 268
- single host routes, 269
- switch routes, 267, 269
- with high availability, 271
- with VLANs, 270
- vs routing mode, 267

TTL Min setting, 581

TTL on Low setting, 581

tunnels, 117

U

UDP Bidirectional Keep-alive setting, 592

UDP Idle Lifetime setting, 592

UDP Source Port 0 setting, 604

Unknown VLAN Tags setting, 130

unnumbered PPPoE, 132

Unsolicited ARP Replies setting, 149

upgrade revisions, 90

upgrading CorePlus, 90

- under VMware, 91

uploading files with SCP, 49

uploading licenses, 98

- (see also licenses)

user authentication (see authentication)

user auth HTML

- customizing, 447

user based routing, 206

Use Unique Shared Mac (HA) setting, 572, 578

W

Warning Level setting, 84

Watchdog Time setting, 604

WCF (see web content filtering)

webauth, 443

web content filtering, 363

- fail mode, 365
- subscription, 607
- whitelisting, 365

web interface, 29, 31

- default connection interface, 31
- setting workstation IP, 32
- setup wizard, 181

WebUI (see web interface)

WebUI Before Rules setting, 54

WebUI HTTP port setting, 55

WebUI HTTPS port setting, 55

whitelisting

- hosts and networks, 400

- URLs, 361

- wildcarding, 361

wildcarding

- in blacklists and whitelists, 319, 361

- in IDP rules, 391

- in static content filtering, 305

Windows CA certificate requests, 170

wireshark with pcapdump, 88

V

Validation Timeout setting, 54

virtualization, 16

virtual LAN (see VLAN)

virtual private networks (see VPN)

virtual routers (see virtual routing)

virtual routing, 220

- multiple IP rule sets, 226

- troubleshooting, 226

virtual systems, 225 (see virtual routing)

VLAN, 127

- advanced settings, 130

- DSCP forwarding, 130

- license limitations, 130

- port based, 128

- trunk, 128

VMware, 16

- licensing, 97

- virtual interfaces, 122

voice over IP

- with H.323, 340

- with SIP, 328

VoIP (see voice over IP)

VPN, 451

- planning, 453

- quick start guide, 455

- troubleshooting, 513

X

X.509 (see certificates)

XAuth (see authentication)

CLAVISTER®

Clavister AB
Sjögatan 6J
SE-89160 Örnsköldsvik
SWEDEN

Phone: +46-660-299200
Fax: +46-660-12250

www.clavister.com